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Writing of Death: Ethics and Politics of the Death Fast in Turkey 
Özge Nadide Serin 
This dissertation is an ethnographic study of the seven-year-long mass hunger 
strike undertaken by prisoners affiliated with outlawed Marxist-Leninist organizations in 
Turkey to protest their transfer from traditional ward-type facilities to new cellular 
institutions modeled after maximum security prisons, and it scrutinizes as well as 
radicalizes the ontological and political structure of hunger striking to construe otherwise 
the contestatory relationship between the individual right to death and political 
sovereignty by insisting on the irreducible excess of death over the totalizing closure of 
the performative acts of political foundation. 
Anchored in participant observation and in-depth interviews with surviving 
hunger strikers, ex-political prisoners, their families, medical and forensic doctors, and 
enriched by the textual and visual analysis of prison memoirs, diaries, correspondence, 
testaments, and last speeches, the dissertation focuses on the ambiguity of the very right 
to die—an ambiguity that has been ignored by performance theories of sovereignty—in 
order to figure death at one and the same time as both radical possibility and 
impossibility. 
Accounting for the extraordinarily long duration of the prison movement (7 years) 
and self-starvation period before death (up to 558 days) by examining its temporal and 
organizational logics, the dissertation argues that hunger striking draws an enormous 
political power from keeping the possibility of death in suspense unlike the power of 
negation which dissipates itself irreversibly in a paroxysmal moment of actual death. In 
distinguishing the anticipatory relation to death on the hunger strike from its counterparts 
in suicide attacks and self-immolations, the dissertation seeks to reveal an inescapable 
anachrony between two deaths—the passage of time that separates and draws together 
death as possibility from death as an anonymous event which comes either too early or 
late. It claims that it is precisely in this interim state between two deaths that death 
withdraws from the realm of possibility only to fold in on life, creating a reserve in both 
senses of the term, one where state power and political organizations vie with each other 
for hegemony over the ideological representations of life and death. The dissertation 
narrates how the hyper-rationalized political instrumentation of the suspended state 
between life and death produces its own everyday socialities by organizing the affective 
relations of hunger strikers to the futurity of death, to their individual bodies, and others 
on the hunger strike in a destructive rivalry with the contradictory discourses and 
practices of state officials, families, doctors and mass media. It argues that “death” 
thereby yields itself to a movement of self-differentiation and proliferation, oscillating 
uncontrollably between sacrificial sublation and waste. The result is a growing division 
within the prison movement which propels it towards its eventual dissolution, leaving in 
its ruins a crippled political subject without futurity. The dissertation figures the 
surviving fasters afflicted with the Wernicke-Korsakoff Syndrome, a severe type of 
amnesia characterized by the inability to retain memories after an indefinite lapse of time, 
as an allegory for the ruination of the power to die in the performance of death itself. As 
such, it seeks to bring about a transformation in the very language of sacrificial politics 
by interrupting the economy of appropriation which functions in view of a future 
community founded upon the continuity of deaths towards an ever-receding presence.  
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The question of this dissertation was born, it seems in retrospect, in my very first 
interlocutor’s sharing of a secret with me, a secret which could not be divulged to his 
death-bed attendants and companions.  
R. was a survivor of the 1996 Death Fast and he was introduced to me as one of 
the heroes of the prison resistance in spite of his ongoing, tumultuous separation from the 
organization at the time of our first encounter in the summer of 2003. The following 
conversation, however, occurred after my return in 2005 and I retained a clear memory of 
this meeting on a cold December morning at 7 o’clock before the arrival of others in his 
workplace, a legal bureau where he was answering phones by day and sleeping in a back 
room at nights.  
He had passed into a different “mode” after his thirty-seventh day on the hunger 
strike and he could tell that his comrades had not noticed this transformation in him. He 
admitted that he himself kept secret this transformation which could only be “named,” he 
said, as a “place of madness.”  
He was lying in bed with his arms and legs immobilized. His eyes were closed 
with pads because they were blinded by light; his ears were plugged with cotton pieces 
because every sound, though not loud, exploded in his ears. He was removing the pads 
only when his comrades came to visit him at his bedside.  
It was just at that time that he had a very peculiar experience. He was listening to 
Shostakovich’s Leningrad Symphony. As the symphony played inside his head, and he 
said he had some knowledge of Shostakovich’s life story, he had become a firefighter 
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brigade during the siege of Leningrad by Nazi Germany: “Bombs were exploding in my 
head, fire engines were going right and left. I began to think that I was going crazy.” 
This peculiar experience underwent a further inflection when he began to “live” 
everything that was recounted to him with extraordinary conscientiousness by his 
comrades though his comrades thought that he was only “hearing their words.”  
The textile workers in Ünaltı, Gaziantep were on strike during the course of the 
Death Fast in 1996, and his secret and yet sustained relation to the strike allowed him to 
survive the Death Fast: “I didn’t know Ünaltı, but I happened to have gone there (gitmis 
oluyordum) when they were telling me about it. Really, I was no longer lying in a bed in 
one of the cells of the Ward C-3 on the second floor of Bayrampaşa Prison. I was in 
Antep and there were factories and workshops around me. The workers were mostly 
young people and I was on the struggle with them. We were fighting against the 
gendarmes and it was as if the bludgeons were really landing on me.” 
R. rejoiced in his new resource, before which all difficulties and hindrances to 
movement had fallen away and, after picturing himself in different libraries, R.’s 
consciousness outside himself sought for itself the openness of squares which, in their 
very emptiness, called forth crowds of people, and somewhere in the thick of the crowd 
stood R. possessed by their event: “I saw myself at Plaza del Mayo, Concord, Trafalgar, 
Central Park, Tiananmen, and Taksim, Kızılay and Konak. At first, there was no one but 
me and I was walking around and then I was merging with thousands of people. I had the 
sensation that I was capable of doing anything.” 
On the verge of losing his sensibility, not in spite of, but because of the extreme 
receptivity of his senses, what R. “lived” was his opening—himself becoming no one or 
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anyone, in opening to his own “death,” an opening which allowed him to traverse across 
time and space despite his confinement to a bed within prison. In R.’s narrative, “death,” 
which can only be experienced as this exposure, is transformed into the experience of an 
anywhere else and anyone else. This death is not an individual death, therefore, nor does 
it concern itself with the fate of the individual. It opens onto a teeming array of events 
and people which overflow the life and the death of the proper name R., and to that 
extent, it may perhaps best be described as an impersonal event. But inasmuch as death in 
this narrative is impersonal, it is also irreducibly singular, and it is the very anonymity of 
R.’s death which is akin to a writer’s anonymity that endows it with a singular force. For 
R.’s refusal to cleave to his dying self—an ambiguous refusal to the extent that it is more 
an effraction than a deliberate and voluntary distraction—has the effect of doubling him 
both as the impersonal event and an integral part of it, as the writer of the event and a 
character in it.  
In this sense, R.’s narrative is an exemplary account of the necessity of distance, 
since it is the detour through writing that alone allows him to affirm the event, which puts 
itself at a distance not only from all immediacy but from all mediation too, in order to 
make of his own death an event.1 This law of double separation that requires R. to forget 
himself is inescapable; for it is the condition of the possibility of relation to death. In the 
secrecy of his madness, R. impersonates the very figure of the death faster for whom the 
art of survival lies in the realization that the impossibility of relation to death may be 
transmuted into a relation of possibility, and this dual relation depends on the 
                                                
1 I use writing here in its Derridian sense—a movement of effacement and re-inscription that embraces acts 
of all kinds. 
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prolongation of the interval that separates his own death from death as an anonymous 
event and challenges their contemporaneousness.  
For this reason, R.’s unmentionable secret repudiates silently but obstinately the 
ideological overcoding of the event which entombs the anonymity of the death faster in 
the shrine of the autonomous, self-identical, first-person singular/plural (“I” as a mirror 
image of the “We”) whereby the death faster figures as the transcendental agent of the 
event, the sovereign as the “cut of the sword”.2 For the dual relation of the death faster to 
death is obscured here by a self-relation and by that token the radical indeterminacy of 
the event is subordinated to the unity and totality of a single act, as though the death of 
the death faster gathered the entirety of the responses to the Death Fast into a relation to 
itself as inescapable, with the result that the openness of the event turns into something 
more resembling an impervious foundation with the value of transcendence. For the event 
is unknowable only because it is radically open, and the eventfulness of the event consists 
in the very multiplicity of the response to its event, but by a fetishistic reversal, the 
infinite reserve of the event (both its inexhaustible multiplicity and exteriority) shadows 
forth in the first-person singular corporealization of death, and the performative act of 
foundation is confounded here with the event which always comes (back) from 
somewhere else and someone else, like death. But if the dead body of the death faster 
                                                
2 The more one reads Michel Foucault’s (2003:240-241) eleventh lecture in Society Must be Defended, the 
more one notices how little, in fact remains, despite the appearances to the contrary, of the personal agency 
of sovereign power. At the outset, Foucault makes the claim that sovereign power is caught in a practical 
imbalance in which the sovereign right of life and death essentially veers into the right of death. In the end, 
however, Foucault, for his part, tacitly cautions against the danger of trivializing the right of death into the 
absolute power of a sovereign subject with his insistent use of the infinitive to the point of doing away with 
the agent and the patient in order to accentuate the verbal trait of the act itself—“the right of the sword”: “It 
is not the right to put people to death or to grant them life. Nor is the right to allow people to live or to 
leave them to die. It is the right to take life or let live. And this obviously introduces a startling 
dissymmetry.” The language of Foucault in this passage strains to refrain from ascribing a personal agent to 
the event of death by figuring the sovereign as death, or, even beyond figurality, by implying that sovereign 
is death, and yet death here, like the cut of the sword, is an event, “a startling dissymmetry,” which 
occasions a breach of difference in time, rending apart the present. 
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becomes, as it were, the event, it is not because it can more, but because it can less; not 
because it interrupts the juridical and political order and offer itself as the foundation and 
beginning of a new order, but because it contests the possibility of all such acts of 
political foundation as an ineludible question mark.  
Though death withdraws the death faster from the world with an imperceptible 
persistence and alters him or her into a mark of its anonymity, and though it severs the 
relationship of the death faster with the space of politics, the question of the death faster 
still remains, and it remains as an absolute question that can no longer be relegated as it 
were to subsidiary status by the question of sovereignty: Who is this “I” without “I” and 
without a name?  
Writing of Death accompanies the death faster through the various twists and 
turns of the space of dying in order then to pry apart the ideological forms of dying by 
confronting them with the limits of their own concept of sovereignty. For it is only when 
the question of the Death Fast is not reducible to the question of sovereignty, I maintain, 







On January 23, 2007, the Death Fast of prisoners affiliated with outlawed 
Marxist-Leninist organizations in Turkey came to an end after one hundred and twenty 
two deaths. This mass hunger strike—two thousand two hundred and eighty six 
consecutive days long, which its organizers had extended over seven years, by launching 
new teams ever more, almost endlessly—had begun as a prison resistance against the 
introduction of high security penal institutions known as the F-type prisons. 
Though the new prison project had found its legal basis in Article 16 of the Anti-
Terror Law (1991) and though the punitive rigor of the penalty had found itself mirrored 
in the juridical classification of the criminal act, the goal of the new prison project was 
not simply the application of a penitentiary technique, isolation, to a special category of 
“dangerous prisoners”, but the general implementation of a disciplinary apparatus. The 
“F-type” was both an architectural model for the entirety of carceral institutions in the 
country and a model of disciplinary apparatus.1 The construction of the new F-type 
prisons, along with the alteration of the remaining seventy-five prisons into a similar 
cellular plan, provided the state with the infrastructural and technological capacity to 
abolish any structure of relation which was not overseen by the prison administration and 
thus re-establish punitive sovereignty over the prisoners, in order to regulate, control, and 
govern prison life in the service of a coercive individualization. The felicitous takeover of 
the government of life in prison, however, required first the destruction of the prison 
commune of the political prisoners as an economic and political entity which had 
                                                




organized everyday life in prison since the early 1990s, and second the dissolution of the 
political subject who was brought into being by the corporeal disciplines at the very heart 
of the functioning of the prison commune.2 The new prison project, despite the 
statements of the authorities to the contrary, was precisely not a project of restoring rule 
and order in the over-crowded ward-system but of nullifying the counter-disciplinary 
regime of the political organizations already existent and intact in prisons, and this was in 
part what gave the new prison project its undoubted necessity and unprecedented 
impetus.  
In this regard, it was no accident that the authorities attempted something more 
than simply mobilizing yet another discourse of “state security” to criminalize the 
political organizations and justify the new carceral regime of isolation by recourse to the 
definition of terrorism in the Anti-Terror Law. In contrast with criminal law, the Anti-
Terror Law focused on aim in order to assign guilt, and it was markedly less concerned 
with the effect of the crime and the motive of the agent. As a result, the penology of the 
Anti-Terror law prescribed a sentence execution that did not seek to transform but to 
sequester the agent from the source of terrorism. For the threat came less from the violent 
character of the agent, and most of the detainees and convicts under this law had not 
committed a violent act, than his or her vulnerability to possession by external forces. 
Thus, the objective of isolation was directed towards the separation of the agent from the 
source of the act by interrupting the communication between them: “Terrorists should not 
communicate with each other because the terrorist becomes a fish out of water when he 
                                                
2 See Arda Ibikoğlu, “Disciplinary Evolution of Turkish Prisons, 1980s-1990s” in Studies in Law, Politics, 
and Society, 2010, vol. 51, pp. 67-94. These everyday disciplines consisted of five hours of collective 
education and training (reading of communist and socialist classics, party bulletins and other publications), 
two hours of personal education and training, and one hour of collective physical exercise which was 
tantamount to guerilla training in the communes of DHKP-C and PKK. 
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cannot communicate. In other words, when the mental and intellectual source which 
nourishes the terrorist is desiccated, his revolutionary, destructive character dies out.”3 
According to this penology, the terrorists were not masters of their thought and action 
and thus they were, as it were, machines operated by others. 
This misidentification of ideological interpellation with mere control acquired a 
new, more radical inflection in the discourse of the authorities whereby the charismatic 
figure of authority at the source of speech and actions of the militants was displaced by a 
mere despot who was apparently no different from a mafia leader. This despotic figure 
restricted the communication of his subjects with the prison administration, lawyers, 
doctors, and family to the point of severing all their ties with the outside world, and in a 
rhetorical reversal, the prison commune itself became synonymous with isolation under 
the personal command of the leader.  In identifying the mafia leader with the political 
leadership of the organizations, the authorities conflated the mafia with the party but also 
tyranny with discipline. Conflating them in this way, the authorities were then able to 
introduce a distinction between the members of the organizations and their military and 
political leaders. In the discourse of the authorities, the economic and political power of 
the prison commune gave way to the personal sovereignty of the leader who arrogated to 
himself the sovereign right of life and death, and the single most important political 
question for the authorities, as for the public, came to be the security of life in the prison 
and the threat posed to it by the arbitrary power of the leaders. Thus, the new prison 
project was not premised upon the necessity to preserve the indivisible sovereignty of the 
Turkish state against terrorism, but on a culpable admission of the state’s inability to 
                                                
3 Sulhi Dönmezer, “Teröristlerin Rehabilitasyonu” (Rehabilitation of Terrorists) in Hukuk Fakültesi 
Mecmuası, vol. 1-4, 1985, p. 10.  
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protect the lives of its prisoners, and it became incumbent upon the state to secure the 
survival of its own prison population by saving them from the violence of the 
organizational command. The main task of the prison project was, as it were, less the 
carceral transformation of the individual than the production of the individual as such.   
The political prisoners were unyielding in their total and unconditional refusal of 
the new prison project, and their refusal was based on a double contention. First, there 
seemed little chance the threat of violence and death from the prison administration could 
ever be contained or avoided in the new prisons, and isolation would not lift the threat of 
violence and death, therefore, but in fact make it more likely by exposing them to the 
arbitrary power of the administration for this total exposure to power could not be 
contained without the necessary protection of the commune. Second, beyond such 
considerations of personal safety and well-being, the destruction of the prison commune 
would act as the prior condition of a slow and yet definite dissolution that would undo not 
only the political subject but ruin the very possibility of subjectivity. In the view of the 
prisoners, the F-type prison entombed the prisoner in the cell and by naming the cell-type 
prison tabutluk (coffin), they insisted that isolation was no different than being buried 
alive. For isolation killed the subject without killing; it annihilated the subject but 
conserved life.  
Such life, they argued, was at best only a hollow parody of life, a brutal and 
oppressive attempt to extend the condition of alienation and abstraction under capitalism 
by destroying their communal life in prison. For if life was a right, as the state authorities 
maintained, it was in the first instance essentially always a right to refuse a certain kind 
of life, stripped of meaning and purpose, sliding ever towards its nothingness. The life in 
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the prison cell was a materialization of this absolute immanence where naked existence 
referred only to itself and took on the character of the absolute: the impossibility of not 
living. Instead of appealing to the fundamental and inalienable right to life, and thus 
necessarily to life as a (legal) value in and of itself that had disquieting similarities with 
the very discourse of the state authorities it sought to challenge, the Death Fast reaffirmed 
each participant’s right to death, a right that was absolute to the extent that each death 
faster took their own sovereign decision. Indeed, one could contend that the right to death 
remains perhaps the only right when life is formulated as an obligation, since right refers 
only to itself, to the exercise of that freedom of which it is the expression.  
A total of eight hundred sixteen political prisoners, affiliated with three outlawed 
organizations DHKP-C (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front), MKP (Maoist 
Communist Party), TKIP (Turkish Communist Workers Party), began the hunger strike 
on October 20, 2000, a hunger strike that was converted, after a precipitous month, into a 
death fast on November 19, 2000.  
The hunger strikers had nine demands, and their demands pertaining to the 
carceral, despite the government’s efforts to make it seem otherwise, outweighed those 
pertaining to the juridical and judiciary. The first and the only irrevocable demand of the 
hunger strike as such—precisely because it affirmed its own necessity as an always prior 
demand for the restoration of their communal life—was the immediate abolition of the F-
type prison project. The second set of demands made public the excesses of the arbitrary 
power of the prison administration and wanted legal and medical reparations for the 
injuries suffered in the past and guarantees for a constant and assiduous legal and civil 
control over the carceral regime in the future. The hunger strikers asked for the trial and 
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punishment of the perpetrators of torture and violence in the carceral regime; for medical 
treatment of prisoners who became seriously ill or disabled after prison operations; and 
for regular inspection of prisons by auxiliary committees. The third set of demands 
repudiated the juridical and judiciary ground of the carceral regime and insisted on the 
abolition of the whole apparatus. They called for the annulment of the protocol between 
the Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Health which denied their rights of access to 
lawyers, medical examinations and family visitations; for the abrogation of the Anti-
Terror Law; and for the dissolution of the State Security Courts.  
The legal and political authorities chose to focus their attention on the 
implications of the third set of demands and contended that the demands of the prisoners 
could not be confined to the amelioration of prison conditions. Had the hunger strike 
sought to rescind some intolerable measure pertaining to prison conditions, it was only 
proper that this or that demand found a sympathetic hearing in the prison administration 
and the upper echelons of the state and received, if necessary, juridical recognition, but 
the real aim of the hunger strike, despite appearances to the contrary, was to erode and 
paralyze the government of prisons, and by extension the politico-juridical sovereignty of 
the state. In the view of the legal and political authorities, the hunger strike was a form of 
expression of the “terrorism”, in the guise of the victim, of the Marxist-Leninist 
organizations which did not hesitate to use violence, force, and coercion to influence and 
change the political regime of the country. The presentation of the hunger strike as a form 
of terrorism was in fact the official recognition of the political violence of the hunger 
strike. For the hunger strike did not simply extort concessions from the prison 
administration, nor change this or that law a contrario by forcing the state to make new 
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laws, but challenged politico-juridical sovereignty as such. The hunger strikers did not 
see themselves in the defensive position of escaping from the violence of the state with 
the modest means at their disposal, but in the active position of repudiating the politico-
juridical order in order to perform and invent the future and thereby (re)constitute a new 
politics, one that, before being established, had to pass through the stage of being a 
violent refusal of politics, an anti-politics and a non-politics, since it summoned the 
future by invoking the very right to death.  
For this reason, the state authorities were clearly aware that it was not merely 
enough to impose life as an obligation, it was equally important, if not indeed more so, to 
refuse the hunger strikers the sovereign decision, which would always risk reinforcing 
their claims to repudiate the politico-juridical regime. This is why, in the arguments of 
the authorities, death also became a duty on the part of the hunger strikers who sacrificed 
themselves for the preservation of the political organization at the command of their 
leaders. The hunger strike came to be conflated with the execution of orders, or even 
more extremely with the execution of expendable members for the survival of the Leader.   
During the brief period between November 19 and December 19, 2000, some 
discussion had taken place between the Ministry of Justice and the Central Coordination 
of Prisons, through a group of intermediaries composed of prominent intellectuals, 
writers and human rights activists, concerning a plan for the remodeling of the F-type 
prisons under the supervision of professional associations. Had the Minister complied 
with the requirement of the Central Coordination of Prisons for a common living unit 
with a minimum number of eighteen inmates and set the final seal on the plan with a 
public avowal, the Death Fast would have come to an end. However, despite the support 
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of the democratic movement, the negotiations failed, and the armed forces, instead, 
forced their way into twenty prisons across the country in the early morning of December 
19, 2000 to end the hunger strike on its sixty-first day.   
There is some evidence that the Minister of Justice, while paying lip service to the 
group of intermediaries, seems to have attempted to gain enough time for the military to 
prepare for the operation. For a fortnight before the operation, the Minister who had 
formerly taken an uncompromising stance, had delivered the government’s considered 
verdict with some enthusiasm: in giving heed to the public discontent with the prison 
project, “the transition to the new prisons,” he pronounced before a group of journalists, 
“was suspended until further notice.”4 This shift was no doubt not a chance event but the 
result of much criticism and scrutiny on the part of the democratic movement which had 
contested, apart from their humanistic objection to the physical and psychic effects of 
isolation, the legality of the augmentation of the penalty of the political prisoners over 
and beyond the mere privation of their liberty. The prison operation which resulted with 
the immediate and brutal transfer of the prisoners to various F-type prisons, constituted 
an essential turning point in the Death Fast, a turning point that, as the hunger strikers 
were wont to remark, turned the hunger strike of the three organizations into a general 
hunger strike with the participation of the rest of the prison organizations.   
The prison operation “Return to Life” was staged as a veritable war to save the 
hunger strikers from the hands of the organizations that were consuming the lives of the 
hunger strikers for their own survival. Armed forces attacked with bulldozers, drills, and 
bombs as if their objective was the retaking of the prisons and the prisoners beyond the 
walls, lost since the hunger strike to the enemy. The videotapes of the invasion were 
                                                
4 Radikal, December 5, 2000 
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broadcast on television at the behest of the military, and cell phone conversations 
between commune principals and political leaders ordering the hunger strikers to set 
themselves on fire were voiced over the images of self-immolation. The destruction of 
the ward-type prisons was a spectacle bringing into being a new form of sovereignty that 
based its legitimacy on its capacity to guarantee the security and well-being of its 
population even if that meant the self-destruction of the state’s own ideological 
apparatuses. In this way, the prison emerged as a site of biopolitical struggle between 
rival ways of governing life, and it unavoidably became a theatrical stage upon which 
both the state authorities and outlawed Marxist-Leninist organizations performed their 
violent conflict over the politics and ethics of life for the Turkish national public.  
By the time I appeared to conduct my fieldwork (late 2005, early 2006), the 
ending of the Death Fast had in a sense already taken place. The prison movement had 
cast itself down into a state of suspension overwriting its demands with a stumbling 
rhythm of perseverance and paralysis. On May 28, 2002, two-and-a-half years later, all 
the participating prison organizations had withdrawn from the Death Fast with the 
exception of DHKP-C (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front) and TKEP/L 
(Communist Labor Party of Turkey/Leninist). Throughout this period, the state 
authorities had followed a dual strategy of amending Article 16 of the Anti-Terror Law to 
maintain some kind of image of legitimate power for themselves within the national and 
international public sphere by recognizing the right of the prisoners to have access to 
cultural, social, vocational, and educational programs and sports activities, on the one 
hand, while extinguishing the prison resistance, as much as possible, by employing 
forced feeding after the first death on March 21, 2001, on the other. 
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The leading organization of the Death Fast, DHKP-C, was still launching new 
teams though with fewer death fasters, and at greater intervals. The second organization, 
TKEP/L had run out of its entire reserve of prisoners because the state authorities had 
begun to discharge, starting in May 2001, a large number of hunger strikers on the 
grounds of their debilitating health conditions. The readiness of the authorities, 
temporarily, to postpone the execution of the sentences of the detainees and grant 
presidential pardon for the convicts in their maneuver to prevent the escalation of deaths 
inside prison since the series of deaths in April had, at the very least, the effect of 
destabilizing the prison resistance and hastening its demise. The Revolutionary People’s 
Liberation Party-Front and the Maoist Communist Party had tried to overcome the 
division of the prison resistance by continuing to fast, after their discharge, in “resistance 
houses” located in the shantytowns Küçükarmutlu and Alibeyköy. These resistance 
houses were also dismantled by a series of police raids in early September 2001. Six 
hundred and sixty prisoners were discharged by October 2004, and this counter-tactic of 
the state authorities had as its paradoxical outcome the expansion of the communication 
between prisoners and society at large. The more the prison resistance lost its public 
visibility, the more the hunger strikers became accessible outside carceral surveillance, 
giving rise to the possibility of my fieldwork but also overdetermining its central 
problematic.  
I was beginning, so to speak, with the end, and the state of my interlocutors made 
me inordinately sensitive to the inarticulate disjuncture between the sacredness of the 
dead and the accursedness of the living; the stability of the dead and the insecurities of 
the living; the decisiveness of the past and unavowed undecidability of the present. The 
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present was dividing the past from itself and dismantling its identity from within by an 
alterity that the prison movement could not quite internalize: the survivors. Each survivor 
was struggling with a greater or lesser degree of impairment due to the effects of the 
extended period of starvation on their nervous system and some of them were entirely 
invalid. These ones could not stand up or walk on their own and they had to carry 
crutches or canes to be able to continue their everyday life. A few among them were 
stuttering in their speech so notably that it was possible to separate words from 
unintelligible sounds only after a few rounds of repetition. As far as the survivors were 
concerned, however, their amnesic state, or as they preferred to call it “the problem of 
registration” was the one impairment that disturbed them the most. For at the very 
moment they appeared to be anchoring themselves in the present by projecting the future, 
the future, inevitably, was destined in its turn to be lost. The inability to register events in 
the present took away both the past and the future or more accurately futurity, the 
possibility of retrieving the past from the future to be able to fulfill one’s promise to the 
other. These survivors were thus stricken with a more troubling sense of social paralysis 
within their poor health. Most of them had abandoned their contact with their families 
and were completely dependent on the care of their comrades which increasingly strained 
those relationships and threatened the confidence they professed in their political 
organizations for not being treated as equals anymore. They had turned their caretaker-
comrades, as it were, into their prostheses and the patience of this over-proximity in a 
vicious circle of its own had given rise to a tacit awareness of the fundamental 
impossibility of relation. No one made any plans with them and they were barely 
included in the social activities of the organizations let alone given political tasks and 
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responsibilities. But the organizations relied for its social relations heavily on their 
visibility as witnesses who spoke not in the name of their particular everyday difficulties 
but on behalf of all those who had fallen subject to the violence of the state. They were, 
so to speak, like Freud’s mystic writing pads; for they connected the organization with 
the outside as permeable membranes, and one and at the same time bore the inscriptions 
that have been inflicted upon it. While being mediatized as the victims of the Wernicke-
Korsakoff Syndrome, they lived, worked, or helped in the cultural centers, family 
organizations, legal bureaus, and newspaper offices. These places were themselves 
porous spaces where the difference between the political and social dissolved in the 
shared intimacies of everyday life, from drinking tea and reading newspapers in a 
familiar place in a threatening city, to more organized cultural and pedagogical activities 
such as music, theater, and reading lessons.  
Holding my conversations with the survivors amidst young sympathizers and 
comrades in these public spaces, it occurred to me that the survivors had not really shared 
their private experiences and that between the public and private events there were more 
discrepancies than correlations. The death of their comrades had placed the survivors 
before an essential and solitary responsibility which was the responsibility for living at 
the expense of their dead comrades. In every conversation, they referred to comradeship 
as a bond beyond kinship because it was based on sharing the possibility of death at every 
instant. This intense bond sealed in the sharing of the possibility of death enabled me to 
imagine a different relation with death that did not end in the sovereign consummation of 
the act. I began to change my questions. Instead of asking, “Why were you on the Death 
Fast?” I inquired more about this interval of time. “How did you manage to remain alive 
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for 200 hundred days?” “How was it possible for you to survive for such a long time?” 
“What did you do to pass the time on the Death Fast?”  And by asking this type of 
question, not why but how, I became aware of a peculiar passage from a time in which 
death could occur to an endless interval of dying, which had effected a transformation in 
the Death Fast drawing it outside and beyond itself, and confounding the political act, but 








Temporalities of Dying 
       Nothing is more substitutable and yet nothing is less so than the syntagm “my death.”  
--Jacques Derrida, Aporias 
 
“Suicide is an absolute right, the only one which is not the corollary of a duty, and 
yet it is a right which no real power reinforces.” 
--Maurice Blanchot, Space of Literature 
 
“We’re neither dying nor living.” 
--Sevgi Erdoğan, Diary Entry on March 8, 2001 
 
There is a particular form of walking in Turkish prisons called volta, which 
involves cycles of pacing back and forth longitudinally between the walls of a ward’s 
yard or a cell’s ventilation space (havalandırma).5 It can last the entire day, and its 
practitioners may indeed be found forgetting the passing of hours, as they “make plans,” 
“fantasize,” “think about events,” “scrutinize themselves,” and “empty out their minds” 
(Kafadar 2008: 29). More or less of a secret vocabulary or of an idiolect peculiar to 
spaces of confinement, the term originates from the Italian word volta which denotes 
time. Deriving from the verbal root voltare meaning to turn, volta also refers to the 
number of times something happens to take place. It thus inscribes within itself an 
understanding of time as re-turn. I shall conceive this movement of return as a movement 
of constant deferral of mastery in which repetition functions as both power and 
powerlessness. 
If the relentlessly unchanging daily routine in prison can be described as a 
continuous present, an identity, an everlastingness in the course of which one begins to 
                                                
5 In the newly installed F-type prisons, each cell has a five-meter-square ventilation space enclosed by five-
meter high walls and covered over with barbed wire. 
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lose a sense of the demarcation of time, volta appears to be the mastery or the 
incorporation of penal time by its spatialization in the ventilation space which is made 
one’s own with the specific rhythm of the footsteps of the prisoners. But the true content 
of volta can not be fully grasped without considering at the same time the temporalization 
of space at work in it. This mechanical, almost trance-like walk gives a feeling of escape 
from prison by emptying time of all presence in the endless repetition of the footsteps. It 
is perhaps unsurprising, therefore, that prisoners use the term as a designator for both the 
space and time of walking. For instance, one could say, “I went out to volta, or so and so 
happened at volta.” Or one could use it as a temporal reference and say “during volta I 
forget about time” (Kafadar 2008: 30). 
Volta takes place as a constant repetition of itself, and its effect is to bring about a 
striking transformation in the relationship of the prisoners to the anonymity of the prison. 
As the prisoners retreat from the prison’s grasp and carve out a personal hole in its 
impersonal being with each recurring step, they come to feel they have full mastery over 
themselves. The first hint of this process is that volta is said by prisoners to be the most 
private space in prison after one’s bed and it is a recognized rule among prisoners that 
one does not interrupt an other’s volta. This self-affection acquires an even greater 
intensity as volta allows a fleeting access to the outside by allying itself to a temporal 
dimension that may only be described as a time outside of time which is the time of 
return. One of my interlocutors expressed the force of volta with a brief statement in the 
present perfect subjunctive form: “we feel as though we have gone out and come back 
(dışarı gitmiş gelmiş gibi oluyoruz).” The repetitive cycle of walking enables the 
prisoners to overlook, as it were, their real condition of confinement and spreads a feeling 
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of escape. It is only when this movement of return bounds itself to the future as a moment 
of deferred ending that it proves to be a mere illusion, and repetition then assumes the 
form of compulsion and failure. Another ex-prisoner admitted that he would have taken 
the same steps and turned around at the exact same spot with the same foot even if the 
walls had not been there. He added later that he had been waiting for the day when the 
sky would not have appeared as a blue rectangle. The crux of this image turns on the 
bounded character of boundlessness and attests that freedom can be maintained here only 
in and through the constancy of repetition despite an irreducible yearning for the end.  
I am impelled by this image which renders visible the peculiar logic of volta to 
pose these questions: How do those who are serving time, so to speak, give time to 
themselves? How do they discover time as what it is (not): as freedom, as power, as 
themselves? As I elaborate volta, which is a daily activity of the hunger strikers who walk 
to maintain their mastery over their bodies, as a metaphor for a very different 
understanding of the temporal relation to death on the hunger strike, this preliminary set 
of questions will lead to new ones: How is death made one’s own? How is death turned 
into a power of self-constitution?  
I.  
Hunger striking resembles this form of walking in the course of which, as we 
described it, one turns inward, and in turning inward achieves a fleeting sense of the 
outside by divesting the present of its presence in the endless repetition of the turn. In a 
similar manner, hunger striking withdraws the body from relations of power into a self-
relation. Or more accurately, the relation to self is in effect here a relation to death by the 
detour of the relation to the embodied self which, through hunger, opens itself to death, 
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the void, the ultimate outside duly recognized to be inaccessible by law. Article 26 of the 
new Penal Sentence Execution Code (2005) prohibits hunger striking on the grounds that 
the act disables the state from executing the sentence of the prisoners. Here, law registers 
and aims to forestall the evasion of its target into an impassable realm where it will not be 
able to take hold of it anymore. For the longer hunger strikers go on with their fasts, the 
more death intrudes itself upon their lives. They approach death, creep towards the abyss 
and once there, they cling to it, unable to move either forward or backward. Hunger, 
which opens the void, does not have the power to seal it up. To persist in it would mean 
death, and with death the fast would end. They must therefore stay alive, but only to the 
extent that it keeps them at the point of death. The idea of ending is resisted in the interest 
of maintaining the constant possibility of the end until the attainment of their ends.    
Hunger strikers are thus drawn (or draw themselves) toward death at the same time as 
they are constantly drawn back to life. The mastery of death is never accomplished; or if 
it is accomplished in some sense, that is, if they are able to hold themselves in this zone 
between life and death or rather life-death where life has become suffused with death to 
such a degree that the difference between life and death has almost disappeared, we must 
conceive this in terms of a temporal movement of constant deferral of the end until the 
advent of the other’s response. For hunger strikers do not simply give themselves, give 
their lives. They first and foremost give time; they give time to the other to allow a 
response. 
If this temporal structure of the suspension of the end is a sign of the Other’s 
transcendence which is fatefully fantasized as a totalized addressee whose response will 
bring their act to a closure in a unity or meaning fully revealed or discovered, it acquires 
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a new kind of monstrous logic—an ante-logic as well as an anti-logic which defies 
political calculus—within the Death Fast, one whose effects are signaled by its most 
peculiar feature—duration. The task of this chapter is, then, to account for the 
extraordinarily long duration of the movement (7 years) and self-starvation period before 
death (up to 558 days) by examining the temporal and organizational logics of the prison 
movement. It demonstrates how the simultaneous but non-contemporaneous logics of the 
prolongation of the moment before death and the serialization of bodies are imagined to 
conjure an indestructible sovereign collective body only to reveal that this double logic of 
temporal recurrence and deferral is the function of an extreme form of powerlessness.  
Retracing the event, the participating political organizations offer little in the way 
of critical interpretation; their concern is rather to dramatize the duration of the prison 
struggle in terms of a theological-political idea of the immortal body. The idea of that 
which does not die is indissociable, as Ernst Kantorowicz’s classic study The King’s Two 
Bodies (1997 [1957]) shows, from that of political sovereignty—an idea which makes 
belief in immortality a guarantee of the durability of a political regime or institution. This 
idea of an invulnerable body, which appears to literalize itself in the invocation of the 
number of days on the fast6, is bound up with a nihilist conception of political will.7 This 
                                                
6 I underline the fantastical literalization since it is the very doubling of the monarch’s body that historically 
serves to guarantee the continuity of the “body politic” in the succession of mortal, “natural” bodies on the 
throne. This necessary doubling of the king’s body strikingly comes into view in the practice of placing the 
king’s effigy in its pompous regalia over the coffin in burials of royalty. See Kantorowicz, The King’s Two 
Bodies, 420-421. See also Claude Lefort (1986) who emphasizes that it is the mortal, natural body of the 
king which allows for the incorporation of the body politic in a figurehead by compelling the people to 
recognize the king as one of them.  
7 I do not use nihilism in its colloquial sense here. Following Friedrich Nietzsche, I define nihilism as the 
devalorization of life in the name of higher values. Nietzsche sees the devalorization of the highest values 
themselves as the fundamental movement of Western history impelling it towards an essential ruin. Instead 
of replacing values which have been devalorized simply with new values that occupy the same place as the 
old ones, Nietzsche acknowledges this historical impasse and seeks to overcome it by a new kind of 
valorization. This new valorization will reverse the nature and manner of valuing by dispensing with the 
supersensible world altogether and affirming the will as that essence of life which creates and posits its own 
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conception of the will, which mistakes self-sovereignty for political sovereignty, is 
susceptible of two divergent readings, depending on whether it is seen as a force of 
negativity which restores the sanctity of political ideals and values or one which has the 
power to overcome every limit and even death. Thus, there is an oscillating tension 
between a sacrificial will which recognizes a limit—albeit an ultimate one—in the 
political ideals and values, and a superhuman will which knows no limits:  
“The Death Fast Resistance is an unequaled resistance in multiple respects. First 
and foremost, it is unequaled in its longevity and its massiveness. The world has 
not borne witness to such a political action in the course of which hundreds of 
death fasters took over the flag from one another overtaking not only months and 
seasons but years. It is also unequaled in the enormity of the prices paid. There is 
no other death fast resistance in which one hundred twenty two revolutionary 
warriors have been martyred and more than five hundred of them have been 
disabled in different degrees. The Death Fast Resistance is a political action that 
has shattered a number of limits. In the face of the invincibility and intransigence 
of the revolutionary will, even the medical sciences were dumbfounded. In a 
world where the human is debased in an awful manner and where honor, dignity, 
self-respect, and fidelity to social ideals are forgotten, the Death Fast Resistance 
created the human anew.” 8 
 
                                                                                                                                            
values. However, this subjective positing of values, despite Nietzsche’s acknowledgement of its illusive yet 
necessary nature for the continuation of life, easily lends itself into a valorization of the will for its own 
sake. Indeed, by equating will with life on the basis of a common drive to preserve and ever increase their 
forces without any particular intent or aim other than constant self-affirmation, Nietzsche himself 
dangerously comes close to espousing a deadly nihilism where one is only left to affirm a sovereign subject 
which knows no limits. In contrast with Heidegger’s controversial reading of will to power as an ultimate 
affirmation of absolute subjectivity, Deleuze offers a different interpretation in his Nietzsche and 
Philosophy (1983), where he argues that what is affirmed in Nietzsche is actually the excess or outside 
which makes and unmakes the subject who traverses its own limits by ever opening itself up to difference. I 
am arguing that the discourse of these organizations masks this void by neglecting the fact that such 
sovereignty is traversed by a radical passivity at the unmasterable limits of the human. In this regard, see 
also Michel Foucault’s “A Preface to Transgression” in Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, ed. Donald 
F. Bouchard (Cornell University Press, 1977, pp. 29-53). For a more Heideggerian reading of Nietzsche, 
see Theodor Adorno and Max Horkheimer’s “Juliette or Enlightenment and Morality” in the Dialectic of 
Enlightenment, which traces this transformation from the Kantian autonomous, self-legislative moral 
subject to the Nietzschean Übermensch by way of the Sadean libertine. 
8 There are multiple iterations of such hyperbolization of the revolutionary will. This one is an excerpt from 
the article “21. Yüzyılın Tarihsel Çıkışı,” (The Historical Ascent of 21st Century), Devrimci Demokrasi, 
January 16-31, 2002.  
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Interestingly, it is the latter conception of will, the one which knows no limits to 
its power that is recognized in its very negation by the state officials who reverse its 
absolute autonomy into absolute heteronomy. The official view explains away the 
remarkably long duration of the protest as a function of mere automatism dispensing with 
the will altogether—even that of a suicidal one since it still bears within it the 
consciousness of the power of destruction—and putting in its place a command structure. 
In fact, even the command structure is understood here to be nothing more than an 
absolute submission to the desire of the individual leaders of the outlawed Marxist-
Leninist organizations, an understanding which is brazenly divulged in the press 
statement of Sadettin Tantan, the Minister of Internal Affairs at the time of the operation: 
“It was discovered that the death fasters were comprised of militants who had been 
selected by the organizations for execution. The prisoners who claim that they have been 
severely burnt in the operation have actually set themselves on fire under the command of 
the leaders of the organizations.” 9 Both the hyperbolization of the revolutionary will in 
the eulogical discourses of the participating political organizations and its total 
cancellation in the official counter-discourse occlude the highly mediated nature of this 
hyper-rationalized political instrumentation of the suspended state between life and death.  
The Death Fast was a mass hunger strike orchestrated by outlawed Marxist-
Leninist organizations which had rationalized this means into a complex mechanism over 
two decades of prison struggle and manipulated it to a point of exhaustion. A detailed 
analysis of this mechanism is crucial in understanding the temporal duration of the strike. 
Here, though, some more complications enter in the story. For this mechanism was beset 
with a complex rivalry between DHKP-C (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-
                                                
9 Milliyet, December 20, 2000. 
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Front) and TIKB (Revolutionary Communist League of Turkey) which polarized the rest 
of the participating organizations into two distinct camps under their leadership. We 
single out the two organizations—distinct adversaries, at times even enemies—because 
DHKP-C and TIKB were the first two organizations to introduce the death fast into the 
Marxist forms of prison struggle in 1984. They were also the only two organizations to 
provide a discursive account of the mechanism whereby the death fast in its specificity 
was consistently described, produced and rendered operative. Furthermore, their 
sustained and systematic yet oppositional formulations of the death fast determined the 
relation of individual fasters to the future, to death, to their bodies, and to others on the 
death fast.  
In the form of a series of potentially endless repetitive enactments which implied 
both finality and incompletion, DHKP-C invested in a structure of temporal return not 
unlike the 1981 Irish Hunger Strike.10 In contradistinction to this structure of temporal 
return which recuperated the possible through the very actualization of death, which was 
itself rendered possible by the multiplication of hunger strikers, the TIKB advanced a 
temporal suspension in the form of a constant deferral between life and death. In this 
way, the two opposing political organizations came to represent for the public gaze a 
politics of life and death respectively through their different temporalizations of the 
relation to death on the fast. This differential of temporalization produced a differential of 
sacrifice which ended with the valorization of one form of sacrifice, sacrifice as self-
preservation, over the other, sacrifice as self-dissipation. The latter sacrifice which was 
                                                
10 In contradistinction with the 1981 Irish Hunger Strike, the unit of series in the Death Fast was the team 
which was composed of 3 to 15 people (depending on the size of the organization). These teams were 
accompanied by hundreds of people on relay hunger strikes. In other words, the individual death fasters 
never had to bear the burden all by themselves as in the 1981 Irish Hunger Strike. See Feldman, 
Formations of Violence, p. 258. 
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sacrificed for its very seriality helplessly tried to prove its authenticity in the repetitive 
enactments of itself. And this sacrifice of sacrifice brought about the capitulation of 
political judgment to ethical responsibility for the dying other and spurred on the death 
fast with its rancor.  
In articulating the long duration of the Death Fast, there seems little doubt that the 
analysis of this rationalized mechanism needs to be supplemented with an ethnographic 
description of the ethical and social worlds produced by this mechanism’s two opposing 
animations. For the management of this suspended state between life and death or life-
death, by necessity becomes inseparable from what might be described as the 
familiarization of the foreignness of death. The very deferral of death saturates everyday 
life with death to such an extent that death gradually turns into something invisible, more 
nearly resembling life, in much the same way that, as we shall see in the pages that 
follow, it produces its own socialities which buttress the political movement, and yet 
which at the same time divide it ever more from itself, propelling it towards its ultimate 
dissolution. In explicating the temporal structure of the Death Fast as a suspension of the 
end, this chapter does not simply seek to uncover the temporal modality operative in the 
Death Fast but reads temporality itself as a cipher for the social relations that come into 
being with it.  
Such a reading calls for the separation of the question of the ontological from that 
of the political. This is not to accord an explanatory priority to one over the other but to 
discern their entwinement in the difference which opens up between them. If the 
ontological discloses the limits and impasses of a politics of life and death which insists 
on not recognizing its essential finitude, the political supplements the ontological by 
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allowing us to think the novel ways of ethical and social being which are rendered 
possible by a politically organized collective assumption of death.11 This chapter argues 
that the question of temporality provides a privileged analytic entry into crossings 
between the ontological and political at that limit between life and death where decision 
turns to paralysis and freedom to constraint. 
In his influential ethnography of the 1981 Irish Hunger Strike, Allen Feldman also 
makes a case for analyzing the hunger strike in terms of its temporality. In this next 
section, I will describe in some detail his conceptualization of the temporality of the 
hunger strike to better mark our differences, which revolve around our respective 
thinking of the “end.” This discussion will allow me to return to the hunger strike under 
analysis in due time by way of thinking death as possibility rather than as mere negation 
which will in turn bring into view a very different form of power.  
II. 
Allen Feldman locates the originary site of power in acts of violence. It is the 
performance of violence, he argues, that results in the positing—in positions—of power 
and not vice versa. Feldman’s point of departure for his “performance theory of power” is 
Friedrich Nietzsche’s On the Genealogy of Morals (1887): “For Nietzsche, power is not 
‘distributed’ from an archic center or a reserved site; rather it is fictionalized as a 
metonym of doing, the simultaneous site of origin and effect” (1991: 3). In other words, 
quasi-personified spheres of authority and totalities (paramilitary organizations or the 
state) arrive, after the fact, on this scene of violence, as the implicit or explicit “agents” 
who appear to possess, generate, direct and dispense such singular acts of violence at 
                                                
11 Being and Time stresses a similar point, arguing that the ontological plays the role of a necessary yet 
insufficient condition of possibility of what could be called (but Heidegger does not do so) the ethical and 
the political. For a critique of Heidegger’s erasure of the political and ethical, see Derrida, Aporias, p. 86.   
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will: “Legitimation resides in the construction of a fictive depth, a dimensionality of force 
which draws consciousness away from the concrete material investment in acts and 
effects that reproduce domination in time and space” (1991: ibid.). Power, he further 
asserts, is compelled to continue making a show of itself in such performances of 
violence, as if only through this repetition could it demonstrate its integrity and 
permanence. 
Feldman intends to put into question this fiction or myth of a violence, which is 
no longer scattered in discrete acts, but is collected together in a semblance of duration by 
an authorial and authorized power, by rearticulating the body as the specular(ized) site of 
violent transaction between antagonistic forces. The reciprocal acts and reenactments of 
violence between antagonistic forces trans-form the body into both a product-effect 
(“artifact”) and an instrument (“weapon”) of violence, and thus Feldman renames the 
body as “the weapon artifact” (1991: 176).  I must note here that his use of the verb “to 
form” and its related noun “formation” vacillates ambiguously between a productive or a 
causal transitive action (body as a product or an effect of violence), and a representational 
or an inscriptional act (body as an image of violent forces or a surface of violent 
inscription) culminating in the fetishization of the body.  In this account which 
hyperbolizes the formative power of violence, the very act of violence that produces the 
body as a surface of inscription at the same time invests it with (historical) agency: “The 
body made into a political artifact by an embodied act of violence is no less a political 
agent than the author(s) of violence” (1991: 7). Such a conflation of symbolic power with 
personal agency is enabled by grounding the agency of the body in a theory of 
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“subversive mimesis” which appears to be a critical reinscription of a Foucaultian 
account of productive power:  
“Foucault identifies the mimesis of empowered otherness as the principle of self-
subjugation, but mimesis not only repeats the model but counterfeits it. There is 
no power in the panopticon outside of its mimesis. There is no originary act of 
power, only interlocking circuits of mirrored replication. Subversive mimesis 
subjects the ‘model’ to the detours and diversions of simulation which can detach 
mimetic practice from any external or originary reference. This detachment, this 
transformation of power’s re-presentation into novel political presentation, 
becomes a project of self-emancipation” (1991: 178).   
 
It is well known that Foucault understands power as a differential of forces. 
Panopticism is both the ideal form (or “diagram”) of such force relations in disciplinary 
societies and the very materialization of this ideal form as a particular architectural and 
optical regime (1979: 205; see also Deleuze 1988: 34). As such, the panopticon is a 
political technology which molds a multiplicity by distributing bodies in space, ordering 
them in time and penetrating them by training. Even if we were to understand the 
panopticon simply as an architectural apparatus operating on the double principle of 
permanent visibility of the inmates and their uncertainty about the gaze of power, 
inscription in a differential of forces cannot be reduced to a process of mimetic 
identification with a position of power or its image and let alone with doubling its 
violence.12 Here, I want to suggest that Feldman’s reading reduces Foucault’s 
understanding of the panopticon to an internalization of a dyadic command structure that 
splits the subjugated self into a dominator who possesses and applies force and a 
                                                
12 In Foucault’s account, sovereign power leaves marks on the surface of the body as the manifestation of 
its surplus power whereas disciplinary power penetrates the body and leaves traces in the form of 
compliance. In this sense, Lorna Rhodes’s (2005) reading of the violent encounters in the maximum 
security prison as the necessary failure of disciplinary power is more accurate in that it shows how 
sovereign power and disciplinary power bleed into each other without collapsing the distinction between 
them. 
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dominated (body). This splitting allows the commanding part of the self to objectify and 
instrumentalize its own body as a weapon against the dominating force on the outside: 
“Foucault does not acknowledge that it is precisely the self-bifurcation of the prisoner, 
the mimesis of alterity, that is the basis of prison resistance and revolt. The body as the 
terminal locus of power also defines the place for the redirection and reversal of power. 
In revolt, the prisoner also bifurcates and objectifies the body as an instrument of 
violence” (1991: 179). Following Feldman’s logic, agency inheres in identification with 
the dominator and mimesis of its violence to the end of reversing the relations of 
domination. Yet, the reversal of these relations of domination partakes in the very same 
relations it denounces, perpetuating them indefinitely. Feldman’s ethnography finds itself 
dramatizing this circular logic by which, in the ethnography, all objects of violence end 
up becoming, by dialectical reversal, subjects of violence. 
This subject and object of violence is however betrayed by its very own body—
the means of its self-appropriation. The more it is objectified and instrumentalized, the 
more it becomes other to the self. As the site where self and the other come into contact 
and do battle, the body bears the traces of the other and can never be proper to the self. 
The paradoxicality of mimetic violence cannot be overcome but, on the contrary, is 
intensified to such an extent that it produces an uncontrollable contamination rendering 
self-identity impossible. Such an intimate intertwinement with the other in violence 
fatefully occasions the desire for death as the only possibility of purifying the self of the 
other and thereby recovering self-identity. Thus, Feldman introduces the 1981 Irish 
Hunger Strike which brings to an end the three-year-long Dirty Protest in the H-Blocks.  
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The Dirty Protest that becomes synonymous with the impasse of its own 
ineliminable excess, instead of giving access to self-identity, exceeds its own closure. As 
the protesting prisoners remain suspended in this endless state of abjection, the hunger 
strike enters in what is seemingly the moment of sublation in Feldman’s ethnography to 
resolve their predicament in death and thereby to complete a teleology of self-identity. 
Feldman tells us that the hunger strike to the death was expected to complete the 
interrupted biological decay that had been anticipated with the Dirty Protest. The 
endlessness of the Dirty Protest and the stalemate of the negotiations with the British 
government had convinced the prisoners that the only way they would ever leave the 
prison would be in their coffins. According to Feldman, the prisoners understood the 
hunger strike as a final act that would emancipate them not only from prison but also 
from their own captive bodies (1991: 249). The hunger strike, here, then, becomes simply 
an act of despair, and what Feldman does, in introducing Bobby Sands as the “architect 
of the cultural separatist ideology” in the H-Blocks, is in fact to show that death is 
endowed with a historical signification on the basis of a thinking of the time of the end—
eschatology.  
Now Feldman does so by thinking the messianic event on the basis of death rather 
than thinking death on the basis of the messianic event. He posits an analogical 
relationship between the event of individual death and the advent of redemption on 
account of a temporality of human finitude understood simply as a linear movement of 
time sealed by the oncoming event of death. In this way, Feldman reduces the temporality 
of the end to the end of biological life and, indeed identifies with a certain medical 
measuring and delimiting of life by the time on the clock. This analogy itself is belied by 
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Bobby Sand’s interpretation of eschatology as a movement of return in which a radically 
new future re-establishes a past ideal state. With these reservations in mind, I understand 
Feldman to be saying that death marks accordingly both the end of the prisoner’s being 
and the end of the historical epoch of colonization and oppression. In this sense, death is 
not only the end, but also the beginning of a new historical period, the basis of both 
political and cultural independence. Promising salvation, death opens to a future which 
returns from the past to bring back a lost Golden Age, a shattered Edenic harmony at the 
origin. The end meets the origin in a full circle, and return here becomes a function of 
permanence and identity. Thus, for instance, Feldman makes a point of stating that self-
immersion in Gaelic language and Irish cultural history in the H-Blocks was tied to 
hunger striking by a common utopian and eschatological impetus. Death, like the purity 
of the native language, was a denial of entwinement of the self with the other. What was 
true here of native language was also true for death; and the only antidote to the 
defilement of imprisonment proved to be the transcendence of the materiality that 
divulged the embarrassing secret: the impure body. To adopt the terms of Feldman’s 
analysis to the temporality of the hunger strike, if the hunger strike is about the beginning 
of the end, it is also about deathly purification of the other: “The penal imperative to 
incorporate the panoptic presence of the Other as a form of compliance and subjugation 
would itself be subjected to deflating mimesis and a final ironic reversal. In turn, the 
corpse of the hunger striker would be one more jettisoned sacrifecal fragment of state 
violence” (1991: 236; italics in the original).  The hunger strike, then, is a sacrificial 
expulsion of the other by means of eating the other, so to speak, or eating the very body 
which has become infested with the other, in other words, by consuming the other, all the 
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while consuming the self. Following René Girard who founds sacrifice upon an 
anthropology of mimetic violence and rivalry in his book Violence and the Sacred 
(1977), Feldman presents the hunger strike as a sacrificial rite that aspires to suspend and 
“purify” mimetic violence by a process of (re)presentation—or rather “incorporation”—
that will end in its displacement by founding violence. The body of the hunger striker 
here turns into a tragic theater where the latter plays the double role of the sacrificial 
victim and the executioner substituting for, doubling, and finally expelling the deathly 
force embodied by both the agents of the state and the paramilitary organizations.13  
Though the hunger strike may have pronounced the closure of political violence 
enshrined in the dead body of the hunger striker, the end of the hunger strike is itself not 
an end, and Feldman concludes that sacrificial expulsion never reaches completion. Apart 
from the highly significant serial organization of the hunger strike which he fails to 
recognize as an act that contests the possibility of ending with its strange logic of 
suspense and completion, the non-closure of political violence is reflected in the 
vulnerability of the corpse to antagonistic appropriations and, most clearly, in the very 
reproduction of sacrificial violence that was supposed to bring violence to an end by 
founding a new political order. After the Hunger Strike, the Republican prisoners were 
moved out of the H-Blocks and mixed in with the Loyalist ones. Both Republican and 
Loyalist prisoners wanted their own separate wings for military and political training. 
Together they took the decision to choose informers among their groups and to have them 
                                                
13 Even though the hunger strike is propelled by a no less violent logic of sacrifice, I do not think that the 
sacrificial violence of the state can be conflated with the self-sacrifice of the hunger striker. There is a 
difference between the two acts which cannot be simply effaced by equating both of them with the 
dialectical power of negation. This difference comes into view in the vacillating status of the corpse. The 
corpse appears here in two guises, as extreme negation and extreme affirmation, as the specular 
concentration of deathly force and the foundation of a new political order. I consider the question of 
sacrifice in Chapter V. 
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killed by the opposing group to secure residential segregation. In this way, reciprocal 
violence returns but it returns in an institutionalized and codified form giving the 
appearance of sectarian violence to a new form of sacrificial violence which repeats upon 
the political collective the very violence that was done to it. One murders more and more 
of those others that are inside or rather kills more and more of oneself since the others are 
inside one's self, to better demarcate one’s self from the external other.  Whether 
sectarian violence becomes a simulacrum of itself or not, the power of negation remains 
the absolute master of political culture in Northern Ireland: “In the end, the Hunger Strike 
returned Northern Ireland political culture to the customary insight that the manipulation 
of the human body as an erasable transparency is the utilitarian motor of historical 
alterity” (1991: 265). The Hunger Strike cannot eliminate the negativity that, having 
provoked it into existence at the outset, necessarily exceeds its closure at the end. In this 
way, what may appear at first sight to be an ethnographic instantiation of Hegel’s 
conceptualization of negativity as the essential driving force of history proves at a second 
look to more closely resemble a parody of Hegel, with the result that the Hegelian 
dialectic comes to be doubled in Feldman’s ethnography with a pseudo-dialectic that is 
more like a logic of paralysis than of progression. Negativity is here in fact irreducible to 
the dialectic of history it is meant to propel; instead it more closely resembles an 
inescapable violence. Feldman’s description of the hunger strike as an eschatology 
serves, then, only to dramatize more acutely still the question as to the relation between 
hunger striking and death.   
What if there is a relation to the end other than its actualization, albeit even in a 
nightmarish form of infinity where there is no actual getting to the end? Feldman does 
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not think death other than as the moment of death. He attributes an enormous political 
power to the event of death which, within history, interrupts history and opens up another 
possibility of history, or as he says “accelerates” history. From his perspective, the logic 
of the hunger strike is no different from the logics of the sectarian murders, 
indiscriminate civilian bombings, and assassinations of the individual members of the 
army or the police. According to Feldman, all these acts bespeak the need for sovereignty 
to disclose and affirm itself through negation, and the corpse becomes here the 
materialization of an alterity that is understood to irrupt in time or as time in and as the 
activity of negation. It must be shown that there is a different relation to death on the 
hunger strike that does not simply end in its realization in an instantaneous present, one in 
which hunger strikers misrecognize death as a subjective power.   
III.  
Hunger strikers in Turkey distinguish dying on the strike from dying in military 
operations by the difference in the origin of death. Death on the strike does not befall the 
self as an unforeseen event from the outside but is instead taken upon the self by a free 
and conscious decision. One does not suffer death, so to speak, at the hands of the enemy 
but one dies one’s own freely chosen death.  Political authority makes its omnipotence 
known through the menace of death. If one can die freely, then, if one can experience 
freedom of one’s death, one will have deflated its omnipotence to an empty form.  One 
will have attained freedom in death and, what is more, there will have been no absolute, 
not even death, left outside oneself.14 One will have absolved or loosened oneself from all 
bounds and become an absolute Subject.  
                                                
14 Indeed, the titles of the numerous collective memoirs of the Death Fast are made up of declarative 
sentences epitomizing this idea that one overcomes political power by overcoming death: Victory Lies on 
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C., who had been on the death fast for 229 days in Edirne F-type Prison and who 
since his release from prison on presidential pardon in February 2003 had sought the 
company of his comrades in prison with such dismal longing, expressed the promise of 
such an all-embracing moment of plenitude in charged words which carried a violence all 
their own in the constant repetition of the “I will”: “My life belongs to me. Were I to 
want to die, I will die in the way I want to. Were I to want to live, I will live in the way I 
want to live. They cannot decide how I will live my life. I will.” He followed up his 
remark almost immediately with this rhetorical question: “Didn’t we already win when 
we made the decision to go on the death fast?” The possibility of death becomes 
inseparable from life and absolute negation speaks here with the same authority as 
absolute affirmation. Accordingly, they are driven towards death neither by despair nor 
by anxiety. On the contrary, S., who often struck me as especially strong perhaps because 
she had desired to live and only to live and she had accomplished it after eight months on 
the death fast, spoke to me of pure joy:  
When you go on the hunger strike, you experience liberation from the confines of 
your everyday life existence in the prison. You experience the joy of defying the 
state. It is a way of exiting the prison. You are shouting, “I exist; I am (ben varım 
diyorsun)!” You live that joy to the fullest. It is a feeling of freedom and the 
inauguration of the hunger strike is euphoric. Tables are set and a lavish meal is 
prepared. The next day you go on the hunger strike as though you were going to a 
wedding. You select your glass with meticulous care, put on your best clothing, 
and eat your last meal. It is like a preparation for a wedding. 
 
The joy arises, S. puts it, when death appears to be one with freedom and self-
affirmation. It is with this feeling of freedom and power that almost all of the prisoners 
volunteered to go on the death fast, including those whose health conditions would not 
                                                                                                                                            
the Horizon of Death (Ölümün Ufkundaki Zafer), Those who are Condemned to Victory Overcome Death 
by Diminishing it (Zafere Mahkum Edilenler Ölümü Küçülterek Yenerler), No one can Defeat Those who 
have Defeated Death (Ölümü Yenenleri Kimse Yenemez). 
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allow for such long-term starvation. F. was one of them. She had been suffering from 
chronic anemia and she had still volunteered to be a death faster despite the central 
committee’s explicit injunction against the participation of prisoners with health 
problems.15 She had disregarded their disapproval and had started a hunger strike on her 
own initiative which she had to terminate after three days, corroborating the prudence of 
the committee’s decision. In the days that immediately followed, she was taken to 
Bayrampaşa Hospital, the only prison hospital in the country, where she found herself 
embracing the task of taking care of the death fasters who were taken there after the 
state’s operation in the prisons. Was it not ironic, she said, that it was the same state that 
justified its brutal operation as saving lives that had worn her out over the years by 
continuously shuttling her back and forth between the prison and the hospital without 
giving her amnesty for her health condition? Though she felt relieved that she could be of 
some service to the death fasters in the hospital, an overwhelming sense of self-
inadequacy permeates her plaintive remarks in a letter to her superior Kenan in the Edirne 
F-type Prison, reproduced in a collection of letters entitled Damlada Okyanus, 
Okyanusda Damla, (Ocean in a drop, A Drop in the Ocean).16  F. on one level accepts 
the selection committee’s reasons for declining her; but, as befits her own account of her 
defiance which she described in our conversation as having been elicited by “the personal 
nature of the state’s attack”, she dramatizes the implications of rejection in a very 
emphatic manner: 
                                                
15 As I will elaborate shortly, the organizational command did not allow for members with poor health to 
participate in the Death Fast. This biological calculus functioned to protect both the members and the Death 
Fast itself insofar as it was a precautionary measure against the falsifications of the authorities who were 
ready to exploit these instances as evidence for the executionary power of the organizations over their 
members. 
16 Tuncay Günel, Damlada Okyanus, Okyanusta Damla (Ocean in a Drop, A Drop in the Ocean). Istanbul: 
Şubat Basım Yayın, 2001, p. 90. 
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Hello Dear Comrade (Can Yoldaş) 17, 
…. 
These past few days have been very intense can yoldaş and every single heart has 
been rushing forth to declare “Me too, me too, I want to be among the ones who 
are running.” Days possess a certain density, days are difficult…And for those of 
us whose volunteering had not been accepted, everything we do feels inadequate 
for the times, writing to those of us who are running, taking over their duties, 
struggling, struggling, struggling for them as well and living… Still it is 
inadequate, it is still inadequate. Does it help to repeat that I am still a volunteer, 
comrade? I am not hopeful, I know why, I understand why, but in these times, it is 
not enough to know and understand comrade, it is not enough. (p. 90) 
 
This inadequacy in the face of death implies an internal demand, a demand which 
is that of hunger striking, of merging with the general. If one was not on the hunger 
strike, one felt as though one were not quite inside the struggle, lacking in the capacity to 
respond to the attack of the state by one’s own personal means. In our conversation, F. 
rearticulated this exacting demand by recourse to the exigency of self-sacrifice to which 
she had already begun to give an economic inflection: “I think that there was hardly 
anyone who did not rush forward to protect those comrades whom they believed had to 
be kept alive for the future of the struggle. They were saying, “I should be in the forefront 
to protect them; I should sacrifice myself for them.” Having first posited the exigency of 
self-sacrifice, she was then compelled to cast it into question by intimating that the very 
possibility of sacrifice, of giving one’s life for another, presupposed the right to one’s 
own death. This right to death, Blanchot claims (1978: 105), “is an absolute right, the 
only one which is not the corollary of a duty.” In the context of the Death Fast where the 
preservation of the political collectives took precedence over the desire of the individuals, 
however, one had to fight even for one’s right to die. F. told of the fierce competition 
                                                
17 Can means life substance in Turkish and it is a popular proper name for males. Since Turkish is an 
agglutinating language, terms of endearment such as canım (my dear) are constructed out of this 
substantive by adding the suffix for the personal possessive pronoun (can+ım). The form of address here is 
a marker of intimacy to the point of sharing the same substance or even being of the same substance. 
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among the volunteers. The volunteers communicated their candidacy by personal letters, 
communiqués, and oral declarations. In these correspondences, they gave their reasons 
for volunteering, trying to convince the committee of their eagerness, preparedness, and 
determination. They also made strenuous representations to persuade their comrades to 
suspend their candidacy. They wrote to one another at least three times a day to dissuade 
each other from nominating themselves in order to increase their chances of being 
selected for the teams. They went through multiple interviews and wept over decisions 
which left them out for the time being. In a letter written on May 23, 2001, I.’s 
pronouncement of his candidacy turns into a veritable imploring:  
Comrade, I can imagine your busy schedule, but I still want to let you know about 
something. I was not able to secure a place on the second team. I was either too 
slow or could not express my decidedness well. Comrade, I want you to know that 
I want to be on the third team which I know is about to be formed. Comrade, I had 
told you about my difficulties in expressing my thoughts. I always leave out some 
things. Comrade, my dear comrade (can yoldaşım), don’t you forget that I am a 
candidate for the third team! You don’t have to ask me again, comrade. You don’t 
have to ask me to restate my candidacy. I am waiting for your decision. (p. 380) 
 
According to F., each one was relentlessly arguing that it was their right (hak in 
Turkish) to take part in this political action because they had put so much labor into the 
struggle over the years. The competition between those volunteers who were closest to 
each other was even more irresistible. One had come to ask oneself, as F. put it, “What 
does s/he possess that I do not?” Each volunteer believed that they were as capable as the 
others of taking up such an arduous task. There were also those volunteers who had failed 
to perform their duties in the past, one common failure being speaking under torture. 
These ones thought that they could assail this exacting task and by doing so prove 
themselves to their political organization. Şafak thanks his superior for fulfilling his long-
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hoped-for wish after a long period of waiting in a letter written from the Edirne F-type 
prison:  
Comrade, I am so happy to be joining the action because it will be the first time I 
will have done something properly for our organization and the revolution. You 
know that I made a lot of mistakes in my revolutionary life. In a way, 
volunteering for the Death Fast will be a form of self-critique. I believe and trust 
myself that I will be able to fulfill this duty adequately. I thank my organization 
and you my comrades for trusting me with this task. I will not let you down. (p. 
390).   
 
This irrefutable appeal of death did not simply bespeak a sacrificial will to die for 
the other but a claim to one’s right to die. It was a desire for a different kind of 
substitution which sought not replacement but equality in the very unsubstitutability of 
one’s death. If s/he can die or has the power to die, why cannot I? Or rather I can too. 
Theirs was a demand to be recognized as the subject of a political movement which was 
deemed to be very close to victory at least at the very beginning. One wanted to be close 
to the center of the struggle. The more one participated, the more one was inside. One 
wanted to partake of the victory in its very center by proving that one could die. This 
illusion of the subject in both senses of the genitive is an effect of the extreme ambiguity 
of death. It is because death “is” neither outside nor inside or “is” both inside and outside 
the self, or better yet, it “is” the event which (dis)articulates the outside with the inside in 
the embodied self that the radical alterity of death is misrecognized as a subjective power.  
IV. 
For all the emphasis on the instant of decision, death is not given by a single 
stroke on the death fast. Rather than being a determinable event in time and space, death 
manifests itself as a menacing yet elusive “presence.” For if the threat of its imminence 
cannot ever be expelled, then, conversely, death always comes too early or too late. 
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Accordingly, the feeling of freedom does not emanate from the power to realize the 
possibility of death but rather from the power to retain it as a possibility. In this sense, 
being-on-the-death-fast is not unlike being-towards-death in Heidegger’s famous analysis 
in Being and Time.  According to Heidegger, one does not die once, once and for all, at a 
single moment at the end of one’s life; rather one is close to the end at every moment of 
one’s being.  
Death, like one’s shadow, pursues one with a strange intimacy which at the same 
time holds one at an irreducible distance. One cannot ever escape this shadow of death 
for one has received the gift of death like the gift of birth as an imperious law: one is born 
to die.18 Death cannot be negated, to accept or deny it returns to the same. But even if 
death has in some sense already happened to one and no longer belongs to the realm of 
possibility, it is still to come from the future as an unknowable event. If one cannot ever 
be freed from death, one can nonetheless, Heidegger claims, become free for it by taking 
on—receiving and affirming—the possibility of one’s annihilation in anticipation. Unlike 
the irrevocability of one’s birth which reminds one of the impossibility of pure self-
constitution, the always future possibility of one’s death gives one the hope of mastering 
this irreducible passivity, which we might call time. One cannot undo one’s birth, what 
has already taken place, but one can anticipate one’s death, the future by a structure of 
repeatability which turns the future into a ghostly premonition of the past.  
 The OED defines anticipation (from ante-+-capere) as “the action of taking into 
possession, actually or virtually, beforehand.” Heidegger rejects the first understanding of 
anticipation as the actual possession of something in advance of its expected time. He 
                                                
18 As Derrida (1985: 167) reminds us in “Tours de Babel”, playing on English and German, the gift is 
always poisoned—thus, one cannot refuse it. 
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wants to conceive of anticipation almost exclusively as a virtual possession, vacillating 
between presentiment (a fleeting sense of nothingness as a possibility in and as angst) 
and preconception (consciousness of one’s finitude) which, despite his strenuous efforts 
to make it appear as self-witnessing of one’s own death, it is difficult to understand in 
any other way than as representation. In stark contrast with other modes of relating to a 
future possibility (such as expectation), the anticipation of death, Heidegger stresses 
again and again in Being and Time, strictly excludes any implementation or realization of 
death.19 One does not precipitate towards one’s actual death in anticipation, but to the 
contrary, one holds the possibility of death as a possibility without transforming it into 
reality. Indeed, Heidegger contends, it is the very anticipation of the possibility of death 
that first discloses and makes this possibility possible, therein freeing one for death by 
making death one’s own.20  
The splendor of the “I” overshadows the anonymous character of death—“one 
dies”—by affirming its singularity in death, alone.21 One can say “I,” so to speak, 
because no one can take away one’s death from oneself. We glimpse here one of the 
oldest and greatest ruses of philosophy—an appropriation of the very event of 
                                                
19 Being and Time, p. 262: “As one comes closer understandingly, the possibility of the possible just 
becomes “greater.” The closest closeness which one may have in Being towards death as a possibility, is as 
far as possible from anything actual. … Death, as possibility, gives Dasein nothing to be “actualized,” 
nothing which Dasein, as actual, could itself be. It is the possibility of the impossibility of every way of 
comporting toward anything, of every way of existing. In the anticipation of this possibility it becomes 
“greater and greater”; that is to say, the possibility reveals itself to be such that it knows no measure at all, 
no more or less, but signifies the possibility of the measureless possibility of existence. In accordance with 
it essence, this possibility offers no support for becoming intent on something, “picturing” to oneself the 
actuality which is possible, and so forgetting its possibility.”  
20 Being and Time, p. 309: “The certain possibility, however, discloses Dasein as a possibility, but does so 
only in such a way that, in anticipating this possibility, Dasein makes this possibility possible for itself as 
its ownmost potentiality-for-Being. The possibility is disclosed because it is made possible in anticipation.”  
 
21 “One dies” would be the grammatical form for “demising” as opposed to “I die” in Heidegger’s schema 




disappropriation, an overcoming of the most radical form of otherness and negativity by 
opening the event of death to a process of replication or duplication whereby death 
becomes oddly synonymous with the possibility of death. One can become capable of 
dying only in anticipation that is in and through a certain redoubling of death in a scene 
of representation where death as event metamorphoses into death as possibility.22 By 
inscribing death as other than itself within a scene of representation, Heidegger 
transforms a radical impotence regarding the conditions in which one finds oneself to be 
born to die, into a power—but power less in the sense of being able to give death to 
oneself than in the more primary sense of being able to be even before death, as if it 
were, against death. Heidegger is not averring that death should be taken up as a 
possibility, but he rather wants to conceive of “death” as the disclosure of possibility 
itself. In other words, the relation to death as a relation of possibility does not open the 
future as death, which would simply be awaiting death or committing suicide—the end of 
all possibilities of existence. On the contrary, it opens up new possibilities of existence in 
the present by producing the “I” as an origin for actions that have yet to be, that is to say, 
for the future. In a counter-intuitive turn, then, Heidegger figures the scene of death—the 
originary encounter with one’s mortality—as a scene of birth where a subject or an “I” 
comes into being by grasping the ever open possibility of death as pure possibility in 
anticipation.  
Now it is precisely this anticipatory relation to death that distinguishes death 
fasting from self-immolations and suicide attacks. Whereas the latter display a desire to 
actualize death within the immediacy of a supreme moment, what is essential in death 
                                                
22 For another “mise-en-scène,” see Georges Bataille, “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice,” trans. Jonathan Strauss, 
Yale French Studies 78: On Bataille (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1990). 
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fasting is that the relation to death as a possibility be itself maintained as a possibility. 
Insofar as this suspended event of dying holds death as a possibility, it necessarily also 
holds it back and hence holds within itself the possibility of life or better the possibility of 
return to life. As such, the anticipatory relation to death on the hunger strike draws an 
enormous power from keeping the possibility of death in suspense, that is to say, from 
keeping death intimately near but nonetheless indefinitely distant unlike the power of 
negation which dissipates itself irreversibly in a paroxysmal moment of actual death. As 
one of the iconic figures of the Death Fast, Sevgi Erdoğan, liked to finish off her letters, 
“Prepared to die today, full of hope to live tomorrow.”23 Everything, she insisted, 
depended on the power of the conditional: “On the death fast, you never say to yourself I 
am definitely going to die. You try to show that you are prepared to die if your demands 
are not met.” Accordingly, anxiety does not emanate from the threat of death’s 
imminence, but rather from the inescapable anachrony between the two deaths—the 
passage of time that separates “death” as possibility from death as event which comes 
either too early or too late.  
V. 
There already is, as hunger strikers discover, another, more threatening death 
which comes earlier and which has little in common with the finality of death, namely the 
loss of consciousness. Their dread of this condition turns crucially on an awareness of the 
oscillating tension between the two deaths: between death which comes in one’s own 
time and one’s own way and death which is never accessible as such for any subject, who 
is unable to address dying as a personal experience belonging to any self-present subject 
                                                
23 Yasemin Berrin, Büyük Direnişin Uşak Cephesi Başeğmeyen Kadınlar, p. 105.  It is this power of 
suspension which bears within itself the possibility of both death and life that the Turkish state takes away 
from them by submitting them to forced feeding. 
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at all. The hunger strikers want to die without ceasing to be an “I” with full mastery over 
their bodies and speech. They seek to be conscious of their dying so that they can 
safeguard their bodies against the prison officials who keep them under surveillance to 
intervene at the onset of unconsciousness. They also want to remain as speaking subjects 
who throughout can render an account of their act by continuing to speak back to prison 
guards, doctors, and kin who interrogate or question their intentions and motives. In order 
to postpone the inevitable loss of consciousness, hunger strikers have developed over the 
years various techniques such as daily calisthenics, diary-keeping and most importantly, 
the intake of a dietary supplement, vitamin B 1, which ensures a balanced intake of water, 
sugar and salt by keeping the nervous system intact.  
Yet struggle as they do to maintain a distance from this other death which has 
already come without coming, the hunger strikers gradually fall under its grip, and 
instead of remaining themselves even in death, they lose their relation to themselves. A 
gap slowly opens between the “I” and “me” and the “I” dissipates itself in this crevice 
where a radical otherness inhabits it to such an extreme point of intimacy that not only 
others but the “I” itself can no longer touch its very self. Hunger strikers who enter into 
this inaccessible space of death are constantly pulled back into the sociality of going-to-
death-together by a continuous speech with the dying individual until the moment when 
the individual suspends his or her relationships with everyone else and turns towards 
death, “latching onto death,” (ölüme kitlenmek) as its witnesses call this death, which is 
already there even before it is realized. The dangling head, rolling eyes, murmuring voice 
are not simply the signs of an approaching death but death itself which never takes place 
except as a ghostly occurrence of itself.  
 42 
If the individual remains lodged in this crevice until death completely seizes him 
or her, the prison movement continues to recuperate death as a possibility—inasmuch it 
can boast of an inexhaustible reserve of individuals who are ready to take upon 
themselves death. In the early stages of the prison movement, the political organizations 
had proceeded with the certainty that they could resolve the conflict by pursuing the 
hunger strike to its limit by giving up their first three teams to death, but they quickly saw 
that death as an event had as its paradoxical outcome the very withdrawal of death from 
the realm of possibility.  
The hunger strikers who were violently transferred to F-type prisons after the 
state’s operation on December 19, 2000 stopped the intake of vitamin B-1 on January 10, 
2001 thinking that the advent of death would stir the national public which had hardly 
expressed any outrage against the brutality of the operation. The months of January, 
February and March, however, came to pass awaiting death, baffling all who did not 
understand why death would not come in their time. Taking advantage of the interval of 
time, political authorities used the absence of death against the hunger strikers by 
spreading the false rumor that their survival was a sign of their secret eating. In an effort 
to expose the falsity of such rumors, some cut down water, sugar or salt. But each of 
these tactics was quickly found wanting, and none of them proved strong enough to make 
a death come which still escaped the intentionality of the hunger strikers. The first death 
occurred on March 21, only after five full months, with consecutive deaths following it in 
the month of April. In response, political authorities sought to preempt the occurrence of 
more deaths in prisons by closely monitoring the hunger strikers. They separated the 
hunger strikers from their comrades with the detection of unconsciousness and 
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immediately transferred them to hospitals where they were force-fed.24 But if the political 
authorities in this way reduced the number of deaths coming about within prisons, they 
also sparked off a new form of dying. Some hunger strikers affiliated with the outlawed 
organization DHKP-C began to set themselves on fire to outmaneuver the state’s new 
tactic of forced feeding which had only served to prolong the ordeal of dying by opening 
up a wholly new series of deaths and resurrections. For upon regaining consciousness, the 
hunger strikers would pull off their IV lines and resume hunger striking. But after a few 
rounds of these undesired resurrections separated by weeks from each other, hunger 
strikers had become exasperated with resuming an act interrupted by medical 
intervention, and had sought shelter in death, which appeared to them to be the only way 
out of this endless comings and goings of life (or death). They wanted to give themselves 
death before it was, so to speak, taken away from them. In the meantime, the national 
media was hardly covering the newly occurring deaths and the number of people 
attending the funerals was increasingly abating. Against these distressing circumstances, 
self-immolations had acquired the appearance of a new rigor marked by desperation 
masquerading as self-sovereignty. Most of these self-immolations in the later stages of 
the movement were unauthorized by the central committees of the political organizations 
and they almost always missed the chance of giving themselves death more quickly for 
they were put out by prison guards and died painful, slow deaths in hospitals.  
The anticipation of one’s own death then has itself to be thought together with the 
endlessness of waiting on the hunger strike. The “not yet” turns from the possibility of 
time into the impossibility of time passing, and the hunger strikers are faced with what 
                                                
24 In the later stages of the movement, even those death fasters who were still conscious were taken to 
hospitals against their comrades and their own will which renewed the crises in prisons. 
 44 
Blanchot (1978), referring to the withdrawal of the event of death and using the 
substantival infinitive calls the impossibility of dying: “le mourir.” The withdrawal of 
death has the oddly contrary effect of reinforcing the will to die. “The search for death’s 
possibility, as Blanchot (1978: 95) writes, “ceases to be a meaningless issue.” If the very 
impossibility of dying begets the desire to die, its further retreat serves only to intensify 
such desire. Exasperated with the political impasse, Sevgi Erdoğan wrote in her diary in 
early March before the first death: “When and how is death going to come? We’re 
waiting. Come death, come death!”25 
Such powerlessness in the face of death is redoubled with a powerlessness to 
control the effects of their own political action which can only end once that ending is 
witnessed, endorsed, and countersigned by the other(s). Though this undecidability is true 
of all political action which always originates in the unknown and receives its 
signification and value from the other, it is exacerbated in the act of hunger striking 
wherein the active assumption of death is traversed by an extreme passivity with no 
possibility of mediation between the two. There is not much to do on the strike but to 
wait for the advent of the other’s response. Awaiting death takes on a different turn then 
tipping the relation to death into a relation with the other who, to echo Lévinas (2000: 
115), discloses him or herself in and as the temporal duration of the very suffering of the 
hunger strikers. Instead of the coming of speech across the rift between strikers and their 
addressees—a rift that also interrupts speech—death arrives as though mortality were the 
mark of being always already exposed to the violence of the other who, in not 
responding, attests to its power of negation. The eventual death on the hunger strike is 
almost always read as a sign of murder.  
                                                
25 Yasemin Berrin, Büyük Direnişin Uşak Cephesi Başeğmeyen Kadınlar, p. 154.  
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Though the hunger strikers admitted that it was impossible to calculate in advance 
the duration of a particular hunger strike, none of them had anticipated that the prison 
struggle would last for such a long time, and what is more, would still not succeed in 
eliciting a response despite the death of one hundred and twenty two people. One 
hundred and twenty two deaths had failed to deliver them from this interim state between 
two deaths—death become possibility and death itself. Indeed, one might well argue that 
the prison movement had cast itself down into a similar state of suspension overwriting 
the conclusiveness of its demands with a weakness born of exhaustion and repetition. 
Unable to concede its own incompletion after seven years and one hundred twenty two 
deaths, the end of the Death Fast was declared a “victory” by DHKP-C, which had 
continued with the struggle for four more years after the decision of the rest of the 
organizations to call off the death fast on May 28, 2002.26 But it was a strange declaration 
of victory in that the end itself was announced as an indeterminate suspension of the 
protest, its terminal finality fully incumbent upon the Turkish government’s putting into 
effect the circular which promised ten hours of socialization among prisoners in the F-
type prisons. The rest of the organizations responded with disbelief, to the strange, 
belated pronouncement of victory which was only the mask of unmentionable defeat, a 
hidden despondency, and an embarrassing powerlessness. 
VI. 
This chiasmic temporal structure of the hunger strike, where deferral and 
recurrence combine to invert end into endlessness, implying both power and impotence, 
is complicated further by the political organization of the Death Fast. The duration of the 
                                                
26 Yürüyüş, “Kazanmanın Coşkusuyla Kuruldu Halaylar,” (Dancing with the Euphoria of Winning), 
January 28, 2007. 
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movement (7 years) cannot be thought separately from its mass character (1500-2000 
persons at its peak) for the prison movement was neither organized nor conducted as a 
solitary assumption of death by individual hunger strikers. In fact, the participating 
political organizations invested in the very substitutability of the unsubstitutable relation 
to death. If I cannot substitute for the other in his or her death, and nor can the other 
ultimately replace me in my death, this apparently absolute relation to my own death is 
nonetheless infinitely substitutable. Derrida raises this very same issue when he remarks 
in Aporias (1993: 49) that if death “names the very irreplaceability of absolute singularity 
(no one can die in my place or in the place of the other), then all the examples can 
precisely illustrate this singularity. Whence comes a first exemplary complication of 
exemplarity: nothing is more substitutable and yet nothing is less so than the syntagm 
“my death””.  Death is irreducibly singular, and yet it is always already part of a 
predetermined series. I die only once, in a manner which is mine alone; but death is the 
most general and impersonal of events, to which, sooner or later, each one of us 
succumbs. Death is neither exemplary nor typical only because it is exemplary and 
typical. This substitutability of the unsubstitutable relation to death constituted the 
enigma and drama of the temporal duration of the Death Fast.  
The substitutability was achieved not by effacing the singular relation to death but 
only by accentuating it, not by denying the differences between the volunteers but by 
recognizing their irreducibility. It was the deliberative abstraction of self-starvation that 
enabled the suspension of the end of political action for seven years. But if the reserve of 
volunteers made possible the temporal extension of the Death Fast, it was the internal 
economy of recognition which produced and reinforced the desire to participate in the 
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death fast itself.  The selection committees’ discretion both translated a desire for an 
ample reserve and implied a belief in exceptional integrity. Each organization was 
compelled to make a presence in the prison movement in direct proportion with the size 
of its prison constituency. The selection committees were also concerned to display, 
deliberately but allusively, an acceptable proportion between the leading cadres and rank 
and file. They wanted to mobilize all their resources without jeopardizing the future of 
the organization by risking the lives of their most valuable members. But equally, they 
did not want to allow for the opening of a controversy in which the state authorities 
would present the selected volunteers as sacrificial victims picked by the leadership who 
chose to spare themselves the agony. Indeed, it was clearly to reinforce this very point 
that, some weeks after the beginning of the Death Fast, the political organizations 
disclosed the ages of the death fasters on a list.27 They also had reservations with regard 
to the legal status of the volunteers. Were they convicts or detainees on trial? How much 
time did they have left to serve? For here, as in their caution about the political status of 
the volunteers, what was at stake was a requirement that one attended not to impose the 
burden of responsibility only on those convicts who faced a long time of imprisonment. 
In this regard, it is no accident that later in the prison movement, after the state’s decision 
to discharge death fasters from the prisons in late spring 2001, the central committees of 
the political organizations that considered continuing the death fast outside the prison 
used the occasion to select those who legally qualified for immediate discharge.  
While the selection committees spent considerable time balancing between these 
various calculations, they have consistently and single-mindedly discredited eagerness to 
die as a desirable quality, maintaining as a result the necessity of political consciousness 
                                                
27 Haklar ve Özgürlükler Platformu, “Yalanlar,” (Lies), December 24, 2000. 
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and motivation. In this regard, knowledge of the political itinerary of the volunteers has 
come to exert a decisive influence over the decisions. What were the positions of the 
volunteers in the prison organization and in the overall movement? Was there a 
discrepancy between their duties and performances in the years leading up the Death 
Fast? Were they fully committed to the cause and determined to take the struggle to its 
end? Or did they show a false enthusiasm spurred by the political effervescence of the 
moment? Were they prepared to sustain such a demanding, arduous task? Or did they just 
want to be held in higher esteem? Yet despite the insistence on the determining effects of 
the political commitment of the volunteers on the decisions, the central committees of the 
participating organizations have rarely departed from what might be called a biological 
calculus: a calculus that sought to shun the risk of early attrition, fatigue and untimely 
death in order to preserve their limited forces and by so doing affirm the value of physical 
strength and stamina. Did the volunteers have any medical problems? Were their bodies 
more susceptible to early debilitation because of their participation in the 1996 Death 
Fast?28 The central committees of the participating organizations established a hierarchy 
among the volunteers by making a distinction between those who were capable of 
persevering and those who were not. The attribution of value was however tied in with 
specified obligations to be fulfilled. As the select few appeared on the stage to enter into 
this extreme form of contract, they might have been recognized as political subjects, but 
their agency was henceforth displaced onto the organization. In a pirouette, the free 
consent of the death faster turned into a constricting bind in this contractual relationship 
which concealed its violence under the name of volunteerism. It was then no longer the 
                                                
28 This biological calculus is another sign that the purpose of the Death Fast was not to die pure and simply 
but rather to occupy a suspended state between life and death until the acceptance of their demands.    
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death faster himself or herself but the central committees of the organizations that made 
the decisions about the suspension or termination of the fast in accordance with the new 
developments in the conflict whilst absolving themselves of any responsibility for their 
decisions by claiming that death fasting cannot be undertaken other than as an unforced 
and willed act on the part of the individual death fasters. 
This displacement of individual agency onto the central committees produced 
many contingencies which internally divided the movement. For instance, the collective 
decision to cut the intake of vitamin B1 following the state’s operation in the prisons 
accelerated the event of death for the initial teams of militants. At the same time, the new 
teams of militants initiated into the death fast subsequent to this decision lost 
consciousness more rapidly and were hospitalized in great numbers. With a view to 
prevent the escalation of deaths inside the prison walls, the government discharged the 
death fasters from prisons en masse by the provisional suspension of their sentences or by 
presidential pardon on the grounds of their deteriorating health. The Forensics Council 
issued scientifically dubious medical reports for death fasters who were in the early 
stages of their fasting or in some cases even to those who were not on the fast. This 
counter-tactic of the government fragmented the movement around the means of struggle 
to be employed outside the prison. While DHKP-C and MKP denounced the discharges 
as “bribery” and expected their death fasters to continue fasting outside the prison, the 
remaining organizations took the decision to terminate the fast upon discharge from the 
prison intensifying the polarization between themselves and the former two 
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organizations.29 As this decision increased the possibility of survival for the latter’s teams 
of fasters, it compelled the families of the former to rescue their children on the fast from 
the clutch of former two organizations. Moreover, these organizations did not expect their 
death fasters who were discharged from the prison before the decision to continue fasting 
outside the prison which was in stark contradiction with their violent ostracization of 
others who made the decision to terminate their fast outside the prison. In other words, 
this structure of centralized control paradoxically created unintended inequalities between 
the practitioners within and among different organizations as well as conflicts with 
families resulting in further divisions.  
Instead of bringing the Death Fast to an end, these divisions, on the contrary, kept 
it going. If the substitutability of the relation to death appeared to be secured by 
centralized control, there was always the risk that the individual would refuse to 
substitute for the other in his or her death. The very prolongation of the struggle disclosed 
the gap between the personal agency of the individual hunger strikers and the agency of 
the political organizations themselves. Even though this gap was denied on the basis of a 
volunteerism, which was provided as the proof of a fully conscious and willed self-
identification with the political organization, the individuals ultimately had the liberty to 
break the contract and go off the fast at any time in spite of political and ethical pressures, 
even if such personal decisions might have meant violent banishment from the political 
organization and, in most cases, a certain finalization of political lives. In the face of such 
decisions which were taken right after the prison operation and which increased 
                                                
29 See “Devletten Rüşvet” (Bribery from the State), Vatan, no. 90, May 17, 2001; “Direniş Çizgisindeki 
Bütün Siyasi Yapılara Öneri” (A Proposal to All Political Structures on the Line of Resistance), Sosyalist 
Barikat, August 2001; “Zindan Çatışmasında Güncel Durum,” (The Current State of the Prison Struggle), 
Kızıl Bayrak, September 1, 2001. 
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exponentially with the receding wave of optimism, the central committees had no other 
option than to select new volunteers to compensate for the withdrawals. In turn, this drive 
to select new volunteers had the inverse effect of increasing the very same cases of 
individual withdrawal since the selection process had lost its earlier scrupulousness and 
inflexibility in the rush to replace the old teams with new ones, and in fact it was entirely 
abandoned in the last year of the struggle.30 The implications of this vicious cycle of new 
teams replacing individual withdrawals from earlier teams leading to ever new 
withdrawals were serious ones for those militants who were continuing with the fast, for 
they were compelled to persevere for a longer period of time and here derived one of the 
forces behind the superhumanly long self-starvation period.31 These initial remarks lead 
us to a more detailed consideration of the political mechanism of hunger striking which 
derives its force precisely from playing on the movement of deferral and difference 
between life and death. 
                                                
30 Far from interrupting the fast, this lack of rigor in the selection process turns out to have already been 
used as a tactic outside the prisons to draw ever more people to the movement especially after the joining of 
close kin and sympathizers in the death fast. This abandoning of the course of the movement to personal 
decisions is actually a singularly important sign of the centralized control of agency. This tactic, as I will 
show in Chapter V, was instrumental in the fated conflation of political commitment with ethical 
obligation. 
 
31 As I will demonstrate later, the other two reasons behind this incredibly long self-starvation period are 
the use of vitamin B1 and the state’s policy of forced feeding which was imposed only after the loss of 
consciousness. In terms of number of days, 200 days would be the average for most death fasters though 
there were fasters who died as early as on their 60ths as well as other ones who went on till their 558ths. 
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Chapter II 
               The Political Machinery of Death Fasting 
 
In the aftermath of the military coup on September 12, 1980, the military 
administered the prison as a territory in which it enclosed the Marxist militants in an 
absolute war, a war without limitations in the use of violence, but one that would not 
spread outside the prison. The body of the prisoner was the new battlefield in and on 
which the military and Marxist militants fought for the political ordering of life. 
The prisoners had a de jure military status in the junta prisons and they were 
therefore identified as privates of the Turkish army corps until the end of their trial after 
which they served their sentences in civilian prisons. Military power aimed at the 
correction of the militants by conditioning and shaping their life as if the military 
organization of life could make soldiers out of the Marxist militants. The military 
commanders instituted meticulously detailed daily programs from strict sleep schedules 
to roll call and marching, from mandatory education and training in Atatürkism and 
religion to memorization of marches and synchronous recitation (Ibikoğlu 2010). In this 
way, military power sought to establish a perfect military society in the prison that would 
function as a machine, not a mechanical machine but a machine that functioned as a 
natural body in the prison.  That it could only compel the prisoners to obey orders with 
arbitrary and excessive violence was a sign therefore of the failure of its disciplinary 
control of the prisoner’s body. 
Political prisoners affiliated with Dev-Sol (Revolutionary Left; predecessor of 
DHKP-C) and TIKB in the Metris Prison in Istanbul refused to wear prison uniforms, 
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which they deemed a capitulation to the military regime that treated them as privates of 
the army, and a new form of prison struggle was thus born with the advent of the 1984 
Death Fast (Laçiner 2003).  This seventy-five-days-long death fast ended in the death of 
four prisoners, with the government granting the political prisoners the right to wear 
civilian clothes of the same color as the prison uniforms. Notwithstanding this paltry 
gain, Dev-Sol and TIKB considered the 1984 Death Fast to be a politically symbolic 
victory of the revolutionary will against the brutal repression of the military junta 
opening a path to gain of new rights in the prisons in the future. For the first time, the 
1984 Death Fast put death on the fast on a par with death in armed struggle, turning it 
into a form of vanguard war waged in the prisons (Sarıoğlu 2007).  
In the early years of civilian rule, the prison system developed in tandem with a 
counterinsurgency strategy that increasingly combined extra-judicial executions in the 
streets with juridical attrition. At the same time, both the clandestine character of armed 
struggle in general and the repeated execution of political and military cadres in 
particular made ideological transmission outside the prison impracticable. Consequently, 
the rapid rise in the prison population coupled with the ward system of incarceration, 
residentially segregating the prisoners in terms of their political affiliations, facilitated the 
development of self-governing political organizations, which in turn removed the 
prisoners from the disciplinary regime of the prison administration. For the outlawed 
Marxist organizations, the prison gradually became the center of revolutionary pedagogy 
and thus of ideological reproduction, and prison struggle relegated the military and 
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political campaigns outside the prison to a supplementary position.32 The armed 
propaganda groups outside the prison began to act as agentic extensions of political 
prisoners instituting an economy of revenge across the prison walls. The members of 
martial law courts along with several military commanders, prison officers and doctors 
overseeing torture in the military prison regime were shot by members of the propaganda 
groups; and courthouses, governmental buildings and construction sites of new prisons 
were bombed throughout the late 1980s. 
The Turkish government recognized that the ward system had only served to 
radicalize prisoners further by allowing them political indoctrination and training and 
made the first attempts at changing its penal strategy with the passing of the Anti-Terror 
Law on April 12, 1991. The Anti-Terror Law stipulated that the sentences of those 
convicted and awaiting or standing trial on charges under the provisions of this law 
would be served in “special penal institutions” built on a system of cells holding from 
one to three inmates, explicitly foreclosing any open visitation as well as communication 
and interaction between the inmates.33 The new cellular system of incarceration, though it 
made a distinction between small group isolation and solitary confinement, refused to 
recognize any social structure larger than the individual inmate. The inmate’s social 
space was reduced to the prison cell and to his or her minimal interactions with the prison 
staff reserving no place for political organization and ideology. The prisoners’ 
consciousness of the radical restructuring of the penal regime is evidenced by the 
                                                
32 For a comparison with other examples in the world, see Aryeh Neier, “Confining Dissent: The Political 
Prison” in Oxford History of the Prison, ed. Norval Morris and David J. Rothman (Oxford: Oxford 
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centrality that hunger strikes (1991, 1993) and death fasts (1996, 2000) occupied in their 
struggles to forestall the forced transfers to special type prisons in Eskişehir and Kartal 
which were the forerunners of the F-type prisons in 2000. 
After the failed attempts in 1991 and 1993, the transformation of the penal regime 
in 1996 was precipitated by the riotous May Day demonstrations during which young 
militants burned cars, broke ATM machines, pulled down  bus stops and crashed shop 
windows in the demonstration area as a reaction to the killing of three young men by the 
police at the initial stages of the gathering.34 In the wake of the mass arrests, the Minister 
of Justice published a series of circulars announcing the overflow of central prisons and 
authorizing the incarceration of new convicts and detainees in the special type Eskişehir 
Prison. The potential class consciousness of these fiery young militants had arisen 
directly out of the practical experience of daily struggle against police brutality in 
shantytown neighborhoods, and it was to be transformed into political and revolutionary 
consciousness in the prison. However, the radical Marxist social organization in the 
prison—command hierarchies and ideological training programs—was tailored for the 
ward system with its collective living situation and “revolutionary captive” psychology. 
Thus, they were unprepared both as individuals and as organizations for the radical 
transformation of the prison situation and its new psychological, political impact on the 
inmates. The segregation of the young militants in the new cellular prison meant the 
refusal on the part of the prison administration to recognize their organizational 
affiliations and therefore produced their extreme individualization. In an important 
                                                
34 The tension between the police and the radical Marxist groups resulted in the killing of three young men 
affiliated with DHKP-C before the beginning of the demonstrations. After this incident, the young militants 
started stoning the state hospital, breaking ATM machines, and crashing the shop windows in the 
demonstration area. 
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respect, the government’s new penal strategy targeted the total destruction of the 
ideological transmission between the old political cadres and the new militants recruited 
from the disenfranchised youth in the cities. The organizations threatened dire 
consequences, including a death fast, if the circulars were not annulled and the earlier 
prison situation was not restored. The prison struggle commanded much popular support 
and ended with the closing down of the Eskişehir Prison at the cost of twelve militants 
who died on the fast.   
The Death Fast in 2000 acknowledged the legacy of the 1996 Death Fast and 
reaffirmed the hope for the future by invoking its victory. In retracing its history, my aim 
is not primarily to put into question its retrospective construction as an exemplary 
struggle conferring unity on the particularly sectarian Marxist culture of Turkey, with its 
multiple fractions and splintering organizations, but more importantly, to bring into view 
the major ideological and tactical divisions that continued to have determining effects on 
the Death Fast in 2000. The 1996 Death Fast was openly divided at its inception around 
its collective naming: an indefinite hunger strike or a death fast? The debates surrounding 
this division proved to be significant for the prison struggle in 2000 too. 
The radical Marxist movement in Turkey makes an ideological and tactical 
distinction between an indefinite hunger strike and a death fast in terms of their demands. 
In contradistinction to the hunger strike, which is employed against the abuses of rights in 
the prison, the death fast is a “higher form” of prison struggle of the highest stakes in 
which the defense of rights in the prison is extended towards and linked with “greater 
political ends.”35 From this perspective, the 1981 Irish Hunger Strike and the 1984 Death 
                                                
35 Ölümü Yenenleri Kimse Yenemez: Süresiz Açlık Grevi ve Ölüm Orucu Direniş Güncesi [No one can 
Defeat those who have Defeated Death: Journal of Hunger Strike of Indefinite Duration and Death Fast], 
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Fast are seen as conceiving a proper relation between means and ends. The prisoners 
affiliated with the PKK (Kurdish Workers’ Party), on the other hand, are criticized for 
repeatedly calling off their death fasts prematurely and thus consuming the political force 
of this means of struggle. For the most significant characteristic of the death fast lies in 
the declaration of determination to die for the purported demands. It is not death but life 
that is contingent on the death fast. The imperative nature of the demands rules out any 
flexibility in the negotiations; and it is not supposed to be terminated without the event of 
death. This is not to say, however, that the death fast must continue until the compliance 
of the state with their demands. Rather, it must not be concluded without first gauging the 
impact of deaths on the conflict. For this reason, the practitioners are usually selected out 
of the leading prison cadres who could be trusted to persist with the act through to the 
end.    
The discussions which preceded the decision for the death fast in 1996 are highly 
instructive about the ways in which the political organizations rationalized this means 
into a complex mechanism for combating the penal strategy employed by the state. After 
the forty-fifth day, the collective hunger strike of the ten participating organizations had 
split into two forms. Under the leadership of DHKP-C, the seven of these participating 
organizations decided to convert their collective hunger strike into a death fast to be 
performed by select teams. Represented by TIKB, the remaining three organizations 
objected to this alteration in the means of the prison struggle and carried on with their 
collective hunger strike. The latter argued that the DHKP-C along with the other 
organizations on the death fast had not introduced and propagated transitional demands 
                                                                                                                                            
ed. Ulaş Osman Yılmaz (Istanbul: Öz Basım-Yayım, 1997), p. 357. The name of the editor is a pseudonym 
made of the first and last names of the strikers who died during the 1996 hunger strike. In what follows, I 
summarize the debates in this book. 
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which corresponded to the newly chosen means. More importantly, a comprehensive 
analysis of the objective historical conditions undermined the rationale for a vanguard 
war in the prisons. Turkey was experiencing an outbreak of one of the broadest mass 
struggles since the military coup in 1980 when the families were the sole supporting force 
outside the prison, and they were moved to mass action only by their children on the 
death fast in the prisons. In return, DHKP-C and other organizations reproached TIKB 
for committing collective suicide by not calling off the hunger strike after the forty-fifth 
day. They had designated this number of days as a limit for their general population 
whom they assumed would not be able to continue the hunger strike beyond it. In reply, 
TIKB called attention to the fact that the hunger strike did not have a definite term and 
contended that such lower limits could not be put arbitrarily on the duration of the hunger 
strike prior to the actual action which had historically proved to be able to surmount these 
cutoff points again and again.  
Nonetheless, TIKB conceded that the quality of the forces in the prisons might 
have necessitated a tactical change. After the new wave of arrests, the prison population 
of each organization had increased massively though not proportionally, DHKP-C 
possessing the largest prison population. Yet its forces consisted of newly recruited 
militants who might have easily yielded under the straining conditions on the hunger 
strike in prison due to lack of political consciousness and necessary ideological 
preparations. Taking into consideration the size and quality of their forces in the prison, 
TIKB suggested to DHKP-C and other organizations that they manage a reduction in the 
number of their hunger striking inmates either by administering their time of withdrawal 
or, even better, by adding them to the collective hunger strike at assigned grades of 
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ascending time zones (such as 20 days, 30 days, 40 days). If the former tactic would put 
out of sight the weaker forces, the latter would culminate in a gradual expanding of the 
forces in prisons across the country in a protracted war against the state. TIKB 
maintained that the tactical change of DHKP-C and other organizations had fatefully 
caused a reduction in the number of hunger striking forces from 1500 to 270 and thereby 
facilitated the government’s counterpropaganda. Furthermore, the families of children 
who came off the hunger strike had begun to carry food to prisons during open 
visitations, alienating the rest of the families who were still struggling for the well-being 
of their children on the strike. In reply, DHKP-C contrasted the large size of its prison 
population (around six hundred) with that of TIKB’s (approximately one hundred) and 
stated explicitly the difficulties of selection among such a large prison population. 
Nevertheless, DHKP-C made a group of twenty persons continue their hunger strike until 
the fifty-fifth day and increased the number of its death fasters.  
In 1996, then, TIKB was severely taken to task by the other organizations for 
what they called its “suicidal” insistence on the indefinite hunger strike; and DHKP-C 
was on the other hand presented as safeguarding its forces in its very decision to 
transform the indefinite hunger strike into a death fast. In 2000, DHKP-C’s seven-year-
long death fast was condemned as a fetishization of death by other leftist groups, and this 
organization was depicted both in mainstream and leftist media as a religious order 
(tarikat) or a sect (mezhep) exalting mass suicide.36 Between 1996 and 2000, a radical 
                                                
36 For contentious examples of these views, see Ayhan Özgür, “Ölümün Kutsanması ve Bir Ideolojik Hattın 
Çöküşü” (Sacralization of Death and the Fall of an Ideological Front), Özgürlük Dünyası, February 20, 
2001, no: 108 and Aydın Çubukçu, “Açmazdan Çıkmak,” (Stepping out of the Impasse) Evrensel, May 30, 
2001. 
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reversal took place in the portrayals of the two opposing groups, bringing into view the 
difference in the logics of the death fast and the indefinite hunger strike. 
It could be argued that hunger striking as a modality of prison resistance functions 
on the basis of a radical reversal of the principles of modern punishment, which, in 
Foucault’s (1979) account in Discipline and Punish, is marked by a decisive 
disappearance of public spectacle and minimalization or elimination of pain. If a “non-
corporeal” form of punishment is exercised in the secrecy of the prison, hunger striking is 
the public disclosure of its invisible violence in the staging of a suffering body. If 
execution is reduced to an instantaneous event ending life rather than torturing the body, 
hunger striking is a prolongation of suffering. And if disciplinary power annexes the 
prisoner’s body to a machinery of production by fragmenting it into part-objects and 
speeding up its performance through repeated exercises, hunger striking is an extremely 
slow wasting away of the body.  All of these propositions are true in one way or another 
and both the hunger strike and the death fast invest in this inverse logic of 
spectacularization. In the difference between the hunger strike and the death fast however 
we discover the splitting of this inverse logic of spectacularization in two different forms. 
While the death fast capitalizes on the visibility of the corpse, the indefinite 
hunger strike exploits the visibility of number. Their distinct logics of visibility in turn 
disclose a respective valorization of life and death. The visibility of the corpse indeed 
relies on the value of the life of the inmate, and in this sense, it makes a legal claim to the 
right to live, a strategy which, conforming to Foucault’s argument in the second lecture of 
Society Must be Defended (1997: 37-40), seeks to partake in the democratization of 
sovereignty by putting to radical use the disjuncture between law and right to fight back 
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against disciplinary forms of coercion. According to DHKP-C, the emergence of the 
corpse from the secrecy of the prison is to set in train the events that are to culminate in 
the concession of the state to the demands of the death fasters. TIKB, on the other hand, 
finds fault with this logic’s basic assumptions about the value of the inmate’s life. Since 
the state would prefer to dispense with the inmates and especially with the select few on 
the fast at any rate, TIKB argues, DHKP-C is serving the state by dying on the death fast. 
By dying on the death fast, one is actually carrying out the designs of the state, and in this 
respect, the death fast is simply a sacrificial waste of the present and future cadres of the 
socialist movement. According to TIKB, the collective nature of the indefinite hunger 
strike on the other hand disables the state from presenting the prison struggle as the 
rebellion of an unruly few. And at the same time it preserves the lives of the inmates in 
view of the fact that individuals who are dying can be pulled off the strike as long as a 
certain number of inmates are maintained on it. In opposition, DHKP-C makes a point of 
the impossibility of turning hunger into a spectacle. As the state very well knows and puts 
to propagandistic use, nothing can be seen in the performance of hunger striking.37 But 
the more nothing is seen, the greater the suspicion that some eating must be going on. In 
fact, no one could possibly watch the hunger strikers constantly, day and night, and so no 
one could produce firsthand evidence that their fast had really been rigorous and 
continuous. In this sense, the corpse could produce the only “proof” for the performance 
of hunger and thus DHKP-C insists that there can be no results to one’s wasting away in 
the secrecy of the prison without the emergence of the corpse behind the bars.   
                                                
37 Franz Kafka’s short story “Hunger Artist” asks precisely this question. Can hunger become a 
performance? Can it be watched as a spectacle? 
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In spite of these contentious debates, strangely enough, the distinction between 
the two forms was completely suspended in the course of the action in 1996. Unlike the 
death fasters, the hunger strikers were clearly not obliged to carry on with their act to 
death. Yet, most of them ended up doing so out of commitment to their cause and ethical 
responsibility for their dying comrades, a decision also impelled by the ward system 
wherein the collective living conditions ensured perpetual and meticulous care by one’s 
comrades but also inescapable moral encounters with them. Furthermore, the central 
committee of TIKB which had the full authority to pull dying hunger strikers off the 
strike let die four of its hunger strikers who had attained a certain visibility in national 
media. One may begin to see here that the prison struggle derives its political force 
neither from life nor from death but from the difference between them as it became more 
evident with the Death Fast in 2000. 
Whereas the difference between indefinite hunger strike and death fast had 
divided the prison struggle in 1996, and in dividing had effaced the distinction between 
them, the prison movement in 2000 combined both forms to make better use of them in 
what it projected a long-drawn-out war. It played off the visibility of the corpse against 
that of number and it did so precisely by maintaining the distinction between the 
indefinite hunger strike and the death fast. It also introduced a further division of labor by 
internally differentiating the form of the hunger strike based on two criteria: time and 
level of commitment. To protect or rather to employ their limited number of “forces” 
sparingly and to sustain a “reserve army” at all times, the organizations initiated rotating 
hunger strikes and hunger strikes with definite terms in addition to the indefinite hunger 
strike. While they staged their power through its show of force in both quantity and 
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quality, in this way, they were also able to include everyone and secure their complete 
identification with the movement.  
The participating organizations also turned the intake of vitamin B1 into a tactical 
instrument to capitalize on the deferral between life and death. The decision to use 
vitamin B1 was taken after consultations with a group of neurologists from Istanbul 
University who had conducted research with the prisoners on the effects of long term 
hunger on the nervous system in the wake of the 1996 Death Fast. Since vitamin B1, 
which is not a nutrient but helps maintain the nervous system, was not used in the 1996 
Death Fast, these neurologists argued, the cause of death was the terminal collapse of the 
nervous system in almost all cases.38 Given the publicization of this information by the 
Association of Turkish Physicians, the intake of vitamin B1 functioned as a political sign 
sending the message to the government and the national public that the death fast was not 
a suicide but a deferred death that could be preempted in due time. Accordingly, the 
cutting of the intake of vitamin B1 after the state’s operation for six months (from 
January 10 till June 12), was to assure the government of their determination to die for 
their unaccepted demands by accelerating its eventuality. In other words, political 
maneuvers were almost always made in the space of a difference between life and death.  
The anticipation of the prolongation of the struggle had compelled the 
organizations to maintain the distinction between the hunger strike and the death fast. 
Ironically, it was the unforeseeably long duration of the struggle itself which resulted in 
                                                
38 They also discovered that there was a direct correlation between the deficiency of vitamin B1 and the 
Wernicke-Korsakoff Syndrome the contraction of which resulted in eye movement disorders, ataxia, and 
most importantly in a severe form of amnesia. The amnesic state is characterized by both anterograde and 
retrograde amnesia.  For a complete description of the disorder, see Gokmen, Emel. Wernicke-Korsakoff 
Hastalığı ve Açlığın Diğer Nörolojik, Sistemik Komplikasyonları (Wernicke-Korsakoff Disease and Other 
Neurological and Systemic Complications of Hunger). Unpublished Medical Dissertation. Istanbul 
University, School of Medicine, Department of Neurology. Istanbul, 1999, esp. pp. 27-60. I explore this 
issue in Chapter 6.  
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the effacement of the very same distinction. After the first year of the struggle, there was 
no longer any difference between the regimens of the various forms of hunger strike and 
the death fast. The official regimen had included twenty cubes of sugar, one and a half 
teaspoons of salt and at least four liters of water a day which could be increased to up to 
nine liters a day. In a protracted war under the dreary conditions of isolation, the 
practitioners were gradually allowed to drink black and herbal tea, coffee and lemonade, 
and sugar cubes could be replaced with a special type of candy (konya şekeri).39 Neither 
was it possible to differentiate the death fast from a rotating hunger strike after the state’s 
decision to use medical intervention to break down the resistance in the prisons. The 
death fasters who were subjected to medical interventions had to suspend their fast and 
recommence after a week or two.  
The Death Fast came henceforth to be practiced as a purely abstracted form of 
self-starvation where the only distinction between a hunger strike and a death fast could 
be made by a performative act of naming. It was the central committees of the 
participating organizations who had the power to call into being a difference between a 
hunger strike and a death fast by positing a value for the practitioners themselves. In 
some cases, this task devolved to the rank and file who visited the prisons to tell upon the 
status of the individual death fasters. Whether this act of naming could cover up the utter 
debasement of the individuals or not, it was clear that they were no longer subjects but 
mediums animating a political action which was affirmed in the very abstraction of their 
deaths. As the slogan went—Long Live the Death Fast Resistance! It was for this reason 
that the seven-year struggle had to end with the self-sacrifice of an exemplary individual 
                                                
39 The decision to include these new additions and substitutions in their diets were left to the individual 
death fasters since the state did not procure the necessary goods in the commissary stores in every single 
prison.   
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whose freedom and social status as a lawyer and human rights advocate differentiated 
him from the rest of the death fasters who had lost their particular qualities and had come 
to possess a generic body. The death fast of Behiç Aşçı, in a remarkable shift, sought to 
transform their negative abstraction into positive equality under the encompassing 
category of the human by claiming to sacrifice his life in the name of the humanity of the 
political prisoners.  
 Let us now turn to the very beginning of the Death Fast to focus our attention on 
the debates over its timing and conduct, which will prove to be determining for the later 
splitting of the movement into two forms of dying with their different temporalities, 
corporealities and social relationships. 
As early as June 12, 2000, a meeting was held in the Bayrampaşa (Sağmalcılar) 
Prison to decide on the means of resistance against the impending assault of the state.40 It 
was during this meeting that four organizations—DHKP-C (Revolutionary People’s 
Liberation Party-Front), MKP (Maoist Communist Party), TKP/ML (Turkish Communist 
Party/Marxist-Leninist), and TIKB (Revolutionary Communist League of Turkey)—
agreed that it was imperative to begin a death fast. In the wake of the meeting, the 
representatives of the four organizations continued to meet among themselves to reach an 
agreement about the timing, conduct and regimen of the fast including the intake of 
vitamin B-1. In their last meeting on August 20, they concluded that all their forces 
would initiate a collective death fast in the case of a state operation in the central prisons 
such as Bayrampaşa and Ümraniye. Nonetheless, the representative for DHKP-C 
announced that his organization wanted to discuss among themselves certain issues like 
the public declaration about the intake of vitamin B-1. A week later, TIKB received an 
                                                
40 Ufuk Çizgisi, July 1, 2005, no. 17 
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invitation for a private meeting from the representative for DHKP-C. In this meeting, the 
latter expressed his organization’s concern about the possible consequences of a delay in 
starting the death fast which they proposed to initiate on the anniversary of the Ulucanlar 
Operation on September 26.41 With the opening of the Parliament in early September, 
they predicted, the state would make slight amendments to Article 16 of the Anti-Terror 
Law and thus give the appearance of a less severe isolationist regime in the prisons 
weakening the humanitarian support for the prison movement. They also expected a 
declaration of amnesty around October 29 which would mean the fragmentation of the 
resistance inside the prisons as well as the withdrawal of the support of the families. The 
representative of DHKP-C announced their decision to start the death fast immediately 
and added that they would do so even if the rest of the organizations left them on their 
own. TIKB was critical of this decision on several grounds.42 To the contrary, its 
representatives argued, the self-determining action of DHKP-C would divide up not only 
the prison movement but also the families which constituted the backbone of the public 
support outside the prison. The representatives of TIKB claimed that starting the death 
fast as a single organization without waiting for the participation of the rest would 
relegate the entire prison resistance into a simple duel between DHKP-C and the state and 
justify the latter’s falsifications of the prison movement as a mere opposition on the part 
of an unruly marginalized group to the new prison project. More importantly, TIKB 
identified the leading cadres as the main target of the state’s new penological strategy to 
                                                
41 This operation in Ulucanlar Prison in Ankara on September 26, 1999 resulted in the death of 10 inmates 
and created much public denouncement. While the state justified its violence with the claim that the 
political prisoners had taken over an empty ward, the political prisoners insisted that the violence of the 
security forces was unwarranted and deemed the operation as a precursor for the total transformation of the 
penal regime.   
 
42 Ufuk Çizgisi, July 15, 2005, no. 18 
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liquidate militant socialism. Insofar as they were the bearers of collective memory, the 
physical or ideological destruction of the cadres in prisons would have constituted a new 
rupture in the transmission of revolutionary theory and practice after the notorious 1980 
coup d’état. For this reason, TIKB criticized DHKP-C for dispatching its forces to the 
battlefront prematurely and thus facilitating the state in achieving its aim of denying a 
legacy to those who practiced Marxist politics. In turn, DHKP-C deridingly claimed that 
TIKB was absolving itself of the burdens of the struggle and relegating them to the 
“streets” while it pretended to protect the cadres.43 TIKB rejected these charges by 
maintaining that it recognized the necessity and inevitability of resistance with full force. 
Yet it also drew attention to the fact that this war was going to be a protracted one unlike 
the other prison struggles in the past. It reckoned that the state would not attack 
constantly but would interrupt its assaults to make concessions to the mediating groups to 
draw them towards its position, and thus the war would be spread across time flaring up 
and calming down periodically necessitating carefully planned tactical attacks in a war of 
strategic defense. DHKP-C, on the other hand, anticipated that the war between the 
organizations and the state would be decided in a single violent clash like in the death 
fasts in 1984 and 1996. Accordingly, it calculated that the increasing number of deaths 
would determine the outcome of the war. From this perspective, the struggle would have 
lasted for three or four months at the most, but it would have definitely ended in victory 
with the loss of perhaps 20-25 persons. In keeping with this calculative logic, DHKP-C 
deliberated that it would reap the fruits of acting as the first organization to initiate the 
death fast. In opposition, TIKB argued that DHKP-C was seeking to take advantage of 
                                                
43 Aydın  Hanbayat, “Direniş Simsarlığı mı, Devrimci Sağduyu mu?” (Brokerage of Resistance or 
Revolutionary Good Sense?) Devrimci Demokrasi, July 16-30, 2001. 
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the lacuna opened by the disbanding of the Kurdish separatist movement with the capture 
of their leader Abdullah Öcalan in February 1999 and thus to come forward as the only 
competent revolutionary vanguard in the country. By claiming leadership with the sheer 
force of its numbers, DHKP-C was striving to make use of the prison movement as a sign 
of its sovereignty. 44 TIKB warned that DHKP-C’s will to sovereignty would create 
doubts and uncertainties about the political ends of the prison struggle and delegitimize it 
in the eyes of the larger democratic movement against the new prison project. TIKB 
underscored the importance of building a strong democratic movement outside the 
prisons before initiating a death fast inside the prisons. In allying with a broader 
democratic movement, the prisoners would be saved from carrying the whole burden and 
paying the heaviest prices. DHKP-C, on the other hand, disparaged TIKB for adopting 
the campaigns of human rights organizations and argued that only the initiation of a death 
fast inside the prisons could detonate a mass movement outside. It invested in the 
political efficacy of dead bodies emerging from behind prison walls and fully expected 
the state to concede to their demands under the moral and political burden of these 
deaths.45      
Winning over MKP (Maoist Communist Party) and TKIP (Turkish Communist 
Workers Party), DHKP-C initiated an indefinite hunger strike on October 20, 2000.  
                                                
44 According to the statistics available on the official website of the General Directorate of Prisons and 
Detention Houses, there were 49, 512 people in prison at the time of the major transformation in the penal 
regime. The official number for the political prisoners convicted and detained under the Anti-Terror Law 
(Law # 3713) was 8, 657.  Unofficial sources of information report that the prisoners affiliated with the 
PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) constituted the three quarters of this population while the remaining 
quarter belonged to the outlawed radical left organizations. In other words, there were a little over 2,000 
prisoners affiliated with the various fractions of the radical left in 2000. Inmates affiliated with DHKP-C 
were estimated to be 640. For official figures, see http://www.cte.adalet.gov.tr. For unofficial estimates, see 
Ufuk Çizgisi, July 15, 2005, no. 18, p. 10. 
 
45 Devrimci Halk Kurtuluş Cephesi, “Neden Direniyoruz?” (Why are we Struggling?) August 26, 2002. 
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These three groups ended their collective hunger strike after a month while their first 
teams of death fasters that emerged from this collectivity continued on. The second teams 
of death fasters began their fast after a ten day interval accompanied with the rest of their 
prison constituencies, who restarted collective hunger strike that was to last for yet 
another month. These pre-selected teams composed of 3 to 15 militants were serially 
launched, initially with ten days between each team, and later with greater intervals.46 
Along with TIKB, the rest of the organizations, TKP/ML (Turkish Communist 
Party/Marxist-Leninist), MLKP (Marxist Leninist Communist Party), MLSPB (League of 
Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda), Direniş Hareketi (Resistance Movement), TKP (K) 
(Communist Party of Turkey (Spark)), TKEP/L (Communist Labor Party of 
Turkey/Leninist) waited until December 10 to begin a collective indefinite hunger strike 
which was turned into a death fast after hundred days, otherwise following the same 
alternating rhythm. Besides giving affective support to the individual death fasters on the 
teams, this alternating rhythm of expansion and contraction not only maintained the mass 
character of the resistance, but also gave the message that each and every prisoner could 
become a death faster. 
This ideological and tactical difference between DHKP-C and TIKB reflected a 
more essential difference in the revolutionary strategies of the two organizations which 
came to overdetermine the relation of the individual strikers to death, their bodies, and 
others on the fast.  
                                                
46 DHKP-C launched thirteen teams over six years. The dates for the launchings are as follows: November 
19, 2000; November 29, 2000; December 14, 2000; May 11, 2001; June 3, 2001; July 28, 2001; July 28, 
2001; September 26, 2001; May 1, 2002; November 30, 2002; October 20, 2003; July 25, 2004; May 9, 
2005; May 1, 2006. 
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In line with its Politicized Military War Strategy (Politikleşmiş Askeri Savaş 
Stratejisi), DHKP-C viewed the death fast as a military campaign against the state and 
intended to organize it as such by naming and ordering its death fasters into sacrifice 
units (feda birlikleri). For DHKP-C, the ideological and tactical equivalence between 
death fasting and military violence was based on the unmasking force of death. From this 
perspective, the force of death acted fundamentally by itself to shake the legitimacy of 
the state and to make transparent its violence. DHKP-C thought that it could ride on the 
waves of the force of death and secure the support of the national public. Oblivious of the 
fact that the signification and effects of death could never be self-present insofar as they 
always remain open to what befalls them in different contexts and scenes; it assumed that 
the reception and the effect of deaths would be under its control. DHKP-C’s investment 
in the force of death called for both its immediate actualization and its suspension by 
means of serialization, yielding itself to a fantasy of the infinitude of the political 
community: “No political movement on the entire face of the earth has come to an end by 
“dying”; yet there are hundreds of political movements which died out because they 
consumed themselves away politically.”47  
In opposition, TIKB declared the bankruptcy of this “archaic” form of vanguardist 
politics which espoused sacrificial death.48 There was no self-proclaimed vanguard 
whose sacrificial death would produce the very spark that would ignite the fire of 
revolution. Rather, the vanguard had to win recognition as a vanguard—the historical 
right to act as a vanguard—through its attempts to establish revolutionary ties with the 
                                                
47 See “Ölüm Orucuna Dair,” (Concerning the Death Fast), Ekmek ve Adalet, July 15, 2002. 
 
48 See “Ölüm Orucu Direnişinin Değerlendirilmesine Giriş” (Introduction to the Evaluation of the Death 
Fast Resistance) Alınteri, June 15, 2002. 
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advanced part of the proletarian class and its actual struggle. Without the systematic 
organizational work of such a revolutionary vanguard outside the prison, it would be 
absolutely illusory to assume that suddenly, overnight so to speak, with the mere impact 
of the deaths of militants, a consciousness equal to the demands of the present situation 
could be created among the broad masses. TIKB’s investment in the labor of 
revolutionary pedagogy transformed the death fast into a labor of dying. Driven by a 
fantasy of the immortality of the body, a sovereign self was summoned to master all the 
forces of life against death to defer it endlessly into the future.  
We now turn to the narrativizations of these two different ways of being in the 





Labor of Living, Invisibility of Dying 
“For, nearing death, one doesn’t see death; but stares beyond, perhaps  
with an animal’s vast gaze” 
--Rainer Maria Rilke, Duino Elegies, Eighth Elegy 
 
 “On the Death Fast, you rediscover life and everything.” 
--C., Revolutionary Communist League of Turkey’s Death Faster 
 
“In the world he is mortal, but in death—in this finish without definition—does he not 
risk becoming infinitely mortal?” 
--Maurice Blanchot, The Space of Literature 
 
“I wanted to die standing upright like a tree.” 
--O., Revolutionary Communist League of Turkey’s Death Faster  
 
From programmatic articles, communiqués and collective memoirs to letters, 
diaries and shared testimonies, the Revolutionary Communist League of Turkey’s 
(TIKB) narrativization of the Death Fast leads narrators and readers into an experience 
where each step forward towards death is necessarily a step back towards life; where the 
endlessness of dying gives way to the plenitude of an industrious life; where inadequacy 
in the face of death is omnipotence, passivity activity, and remembering forgetting death. 
In this narrativization, death is, strangely, an absent figure and if it figures at all, it figures 
in such a way that the whole abyss, that separates the present and death, “the margin”, in 
Emmanuel Lévinas’s (1987: 79) words, “at once both insignificant and infinite”, by 
remaining invisible, effaces the difference between life and death all the more. Dying, 
living becomes so close to one another that they die living and the incommensurability 
that exists between death and life is consequently transmuted into a relationship that 
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admits of mediation, a mediation whose inconspicuousness is vouchsafed by the labor of 
death fasters and the intensity of their desire. Dying becomes (already) a manner of 
living, (already) a way of enveloping the limitlessness of the outside in the limitlessness 
of desire, the excess of death in the surplus of desiring labor. Such an effacement of the 
alterity of death is bound to its imaginary transcendence in the workaday continuity of the 
struggle towards a future perfect as if the future did not always come as other, like death. 
I. Surviving as a Ghostly Future Perfect 
The whole thrust of the TIKB’s argument is that the Death Fast should not be 
conducted as if it were a life and death struggle between two warring political wills. If it 
were indeed such a definitive war between revolutionary vanguards and political 
authority, it could have come to a conclusion much more quickly. One could have simply 
given up one’s body to political authority in the name of one’s ideals and values, 
sidestepping the excruciating labor of hunger striking. But, as K. contended in one of our 
conversations at Yapı Sanatevi, it was imperative to address the masses caught between 
the two political wills and the TIKB sought to remind them of their inalienable right of 
refusal by fasting unto death: “You’re locked up between four walls and you have a fully 
armed state apparatus against you. Even under such impossible conditions, you have the 
freedom not to surrender, not to accept. The decision to prefer not, to say no belongs to 
you and only you.”  
Located on the third floor of the Rumeli Han in Beyoğlu, Yapı Sanatevi was a 
gathering place for a host of people associated with the organization to varying degrees, 
from young sympathizers to one-time comrades who still preserved social contact despite 
their withdrawal from political service, from members newly released from prison to 
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those in charge of the social activities who behaved with more solemnity. Though it was 
known as the cultural center of the organization, the place had the appearance of a coffee-
shop with a library and music-room in the back. The regulars stood around the tea stove 
exchanging the latest news or they sat in small groups, drinking tea, smoking and chatting 
leisurely. That the place was often raided by the police gave the convivial scene some 
shadowy hint of danger for me; yet it still retained its welcoming and tranquil character 
owing to the comfort of my company. K. frequently visited the familiar place for a 
change of atmosphere and to adjust himself to the life outside the prison. He had fallen a 
temporary victim to the Korsakoff’s amnesia after his one-hundred-twenty-days death 
fast and he had made a speedy if not full recovery.  
Our conversation proceeded with K. adducing an example from the Spanish Civil 
War to explain the logic of this absolute, categorical refusal. He readily conceded that 
there was indeed a danger in singing the Internationale in mass demonstrations under 
fascist rule, for the militants thereby exposed themselves to a violent death in a manner 
which might be defined as “suicidal or even foolish” by acting with the full knowledge 
that they were going to be killed for their rebellious act. What the Death Fast had in 
common with this historical example in K.’s mind was that the militants in both contexts 
knew that the odds of winning in the historical present were nearly impossible, and yet 
they lacked any doubts about the future efficacy of their acts. Their dominant concern 
was not then present victory, but preparing the future as the condition of the past and 
thus, success was not measured only by the extent to which they achieved their ends 
immediately in the present, but by setting into motion a ghostly future perfect. In his 
appeal to the Spanish Civil War, K. was evoking the futurity implicit within the past by 
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reminding me not only that the past was a condition of the future, but that the future was 
conditioned by the past. As mortal beings, they faced the risk of dying, but their actions, 
so to speak, did not truly pass; they were not something past for they would continue to 
act on the future from the past. The imperishability of their actions made them 
invulnerable to losses in the present which were, conversely, seen as infinitesimal gains 
on the way to ultimate victory.49  
S. was on the first team of death fasters and she admitted that she had not 
expected to survive in view of the historical lesson that the Turkish political authorities 
did not concede demands without the exigency of death. But she had harbored no doubts 
that their struggle would result in the improvement of the conditions in F-type prisons. 
She knew this for a fact because she had been in the movement long enough to witness 
the aftereffects of the 1984 Death Fast in prisons. This seventy-five-days-long death fast 
had ended in the death of four prisoners with the government finally granting the political 
prisoners the seemingly minor right to wear civilian clothes the same color as prison 
uniforms. But this paltry gain, S. insisted, had ameliorated the prison conditions greatly 
and indeed had paved the way for the elimination of the prison uniform in 1986. 
According to her, the 1984 Death Fast had such an abiding effect that it had even helped 
them repeal the new legislation reintroducing the prison uniform in 2000. She ascribed 
the staunch opposition of the liberal left to the prison uniform to this past struggle since 
they had not shown similar reservations regarding prison work which had also gone into 
effect with the new Penal Sentence Execution Code. The past would always be a 
                                                
49 Such certainty ignores the unmasterable nature of futurity—the chance but also the risk—contained in 
the historical past, announced by Walter Benjamin (1969: 255) in the fifth thesis of his famous Theses on 
the Philosophy of History: “The past can only be seized as an image which flashes up at the instant when it 
can be recognized and is never seen again…. For every image that is not recognized by the present as one 
of its own concerns threatens to disappear irretrievably.” 
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presence, ineffaceable, and on that account S. contended that the Death Fast could never 
be a zero-sum war in which they either gained or lost everything. The end result of the 
war was rather a “synthesis” between their demands and the government’s written laws, 
to be realized over time and in time. 
“Laws are made in the streets,” she said derisively, letting me know that she was 
repeating the very words of Mehmet Ağar, the Chief of Police who had been overseeing 
the multiple prison operations since the early 1990s. As S. quoted the Chief of Police’s 
words to describe the war between the Turkish state and Marxist-Leninist organizations 
in this way, she attested to what Walter Benjamin (1986) had critically formulated in his 
famous essay “Critique of Violence” as the founding violence at the origin of law, that 
violence which functioned in S.’s argument as the mark of the very vulnerability of 
power. Violence which preceded the law was thus not identified with the manifestation of 
a self-identical power; instead as an instantiation of political division, it always already 
bore the mark or re-mark of an encounter with a counter-force that could only be 
apparently assimilated to law by a seeming victory, one which was premised upon hidden 
concessions as much as spectacular displays of force. According to S., the prison struggle 
might not have attained its purported ends, but it had aborted the proper functioning of 
the new prison regime and had announced the promise, the coming of new laws in the 
future.  
If the past was there to remain, the future of the past depended upon its utopian 
completion and inevitably, raised the participating individual to the level of a historical 
subject. “At such historic moments”, K. professed, “every single action of individuals, 
political groups and even masses, determines the future”: “It is a responsibility not only 
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for the past, that is to say, our legacy and values which we have created with our own 
labor over the years, but also for the future. Once you come forward with the claim to a 
different future, it is no longer a past or a future outside of you.” The Death Fast was 
ostensibly such an historic moment and the TIKB urged its members to comprehend 
themselves as active participants in the drama of history which meant that they would 
adopt a vision which was perpetually turned towards the future, that future which took 
longer than tomorrow to come but was already visible in the present.  
Whence, perhaps, the brazen disclosure of the economic logic underlying their 
modality of sacrifice: were they permitted to die any of their members, they would do so 
by sacrificing the few for the preservation of the many and they would make a selection 
among the volunteers in consideration of the future of the struggle. While this calculus 
was the main target of derisive remarks by the members of the DHKP-C (Revolutionary 
People’s Liberation Party-Front) who saw it as an embarrassing sign of the reigning 
inequality between the leading cadres and the rank and file, the members of the TIKB 
criticized the latter for the high number of withdrawals among its death fasters. For 
TIKB, such a high number of withdrawals in the aftermath of the operation were due to 
the fact that the death fasters of DHKP-C lacked a vision of the future, which, they 
insisted, extended beyond the next day. C., who shared a cell with two fasting members 
of the DHKP-C in Edirne F-type prison, told me of their certainty that a mass movement 
had overtaken the streets in the wake of the prison operation. C. was putting precisely this 
certainty into question, including their other certainty that the prison authorities would be 
closing down the F-type prisons, transferring them back to their old facilities in a matter 
of a week or ten days. C. acknowledged the complete interruption of communications 
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with the outside world in the aftermath of the operation during which the prison 
authorities had put an interdiction on any correspondence and visitation with others, 
including families. Yet, he still refused to justify their living in a world of chimeras. Such 
chimeras, he contended, had led these two slowly into an empty space, a space whose 
emptiness had convinced them of the futility of death fasting. If only they had had a more 
expansive vision of the future, he argued, they would have able to overcome the twists 
and turns of their lengthy and wearing itinerary.50 Similarly, the TIKB imputed the self-
immolations of the members of DHKP-C to an impatience ensuing from an inability to 
conceive of a distant future. According to the TIKB, the death fasters of DHKP-C desired 
to die too much and they should not have equated the Death Fast with death by casting 
the shadow of an anxious desire to die upon it. Instead of taking up the arduous task of 
staying alive, the members of the DHKP-C had preferred to turn away from such a long 
term struggle in order to quickly arrive at death that lay beyond it. While the self-
immolations during the prison operation had allowed the political authorities to impart 
their responsibility for the death and injury of other prisoners onto the entire prison 
population by reporting all of them to have burned themselves to death, self-immolations 
in the F-type prisons convinced the authorities of increasing demoralization and 
resignation among the prisoners and emboldened them to aggravate the hopelessness. 
Perhaps the TIKB’s virulent critique of such an impulse to die comes into view most 
poignantly in their chastising of one of their own, a man who set himself on fire on his 
own initiative. He had done so in the atmosphere of ambiguity and desperation regnant in 
                                                
50 F., caretaker of death fasters at Bayrampaşa Prison Hospital, also claimed that the majority of DHKP-C’s 
female members had initially withdrawn from the fast in the hospital upon finding out that they were 
already transferred to the new prisons after the operation. According to F., many of those death fasters 
recommenced their fast after a short period of time from an encumbering sense of guilt.  
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the F-type prisons after the state’s transfer of the TIKB’s commune principals (sorumlu) 
which had had the effect of isolating the rank and file even more. In a prison note which 
was circulated among all the members of the TIKB in Edirne F-type prison, his superior 
writes: 
Yesterday friends first told me that you had passed out. It was only later that they 
informed me that you had attempted to set yourself on fire. When I heard this, I 
was surprised, saddened, and enraged! I must tell you that our organization does 
not espouse such a mode of action and you would not be able to find a single 
comrade among us who would affirm and approve it. Perhaps there would be 
some among us who would regard it as emotional revolutionism, but even those 
of us would deem it not as emotional strength but rather as mere weakness. 
Today, what should stand out in our struggle should be patience, composure, 
fortitude and resiliency. These are the greatest heroisms. Heroism is to bleed to 
your death drop by drop. Even if they were undertaken with the highest 
revolutionary intentions, emotional reactions and hasty behaviors would harm the 
resistance. I had given you the example of a marathon runner not only to describe 
the long-running of the resistance but also to explain that physical attrition and 
mental stress reach their utmost level in the final rounds of this long run. We have 
entered the last round. The state is trying to suppress the struggle by means of 
censorship; it is trying to choke it with silence and ambiguity. Isn’t the purpose of 
the isolation to break our morale? Psychological war is of the greatest importance 
in the struggle today. If we win this psychological war, we will win the entire war. 
Under such conditions, some throw away their gun and flee; some attack the 
enemy individually and sacrifice themselves. This second act appears as 
individual heroism. It is actually a mere reaction. If we were to analyze it, we 
would see that one would have chosen that road because one could not have held 
one’s own against the war’s mental stress. We certainly do not deem such an 
action as communist and proletarian heroism. I have been through many military 
operations. I am speaking in the name of Comrades Osman, Fatih, Ismail, Sezai, 
we would judge these acts not as prowess but as panic and fear.51 We understand 
your emotions. But you are the one who needs to surpass yourself. You have to 
stay alive for one more day to prove to the enemy your strength. Bleeding to death 
drop by drop is the right thing to do even for our fasting comrades today. Think 
about these issues, we are waiting for a self-criticism from you.52   
 
Writing of the self-immolation in this way, the author of the note presents it as an 
act of despair and panic and asks the addressee to resist the temptation to flee the struggle 
                                                
51 These are the TIKB’s death fasters who died in the past death fasts in 1984 and 1996. 
 
52 Tuncay Günel, Damlada Okyanus, p. 352. 
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by dying once and for all. The author endorses neither the hastiness of the act nor the 
individualism of its heroism. The emphasis falls instead on a higher form of heroism 
marked by the duration of endurance and patience. Indeed, the investment in the force of 
death that necessarily entails seriality by virtue of its demand for immediacy is displaced 
here by an investment in the endless deferral between life and death that calls for 
perseverance.  The logic of ‘one by one’ gives way to the logic of “drop by drop,” “piece 
by piece”—the logic of endless approach to the goal. 
II. Drop by Drop, Piece by Piece 
F. had used her own illness—she was suffering from Mediterranean anemia—as 
an excuse to be admitted to the Bayrampaşa Prison Hospital after a serious infection. The 
military had isolated the death fasters in the hospital by prohibiting admission after 
discharging as quickly as possible the injured from the prison operation. F. had coaxed 
the doctor in the emergency room of Şişli Etfal Hospital into transferring her to 
Bayrampaşa Prison Hospital on the grounds of insufficient security measures at the state 
hospital, and the doctors at the prison hospital had felt forced to accept the fait accompli 
despite the strict orders from the military. They placed her in the living quarters of the 
hospital, taking care to separate her from the death fasters. The military had divided the 
death fasters into two groups, those who still continued to fast on the upper floor of the 
hospital from the ones who had drawn their death fast to a close on the lower floor—the 
former wished neither to see nor to hear anything of the latter who were rewarded with 
greater servings of food and extended privileges in the commissary. When some among 
the latter resumed fasting under the weight of an inexorable sense of guilt, the military 
decided to remove them from the rest who had abandoned fasting once and for all and 
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lodged them with F. in the living quarters for lack of any other available space in the 
hospital. Thus, F. became the self-appointed caretaker of the death fasters, and the 
Bayrampaşa medical staff silently acquiesced. Aside from cleaning their rooms and 
changing their bed sheets, she carried the parcels of bottled water which had to be 
ordered twice a week from the commissary. It was also F. who kept the records of their 
water consumption to make sure they drank at least 5 liters of water a day, filling up their 
empty bottles and preparing their hot water and sugary water drinks. Companion in 
suffering to the death fasters in her care, F. had soon become the eyes, arms, and legs of 
the death fasters, notwithstanding their refusal to be treated as invalid patients, taking 
them to the bathroom, giving them a bath, massaging their feet, and reading for them. 
In our conversation after her release from prison in the summer of 2006, F. 
described death fasting as a form of political action which extends itself in time. First, she 
made the point that the death fasters desired to win “piece by piece,” and then, in seeming 
contradiction with herself, she continued to say that they desired to win “every single 
moment.” This temporal dichotomy between the piecemeal accomplishment of the act 
and the momentous fulfillment of its ends did not engender a questioning of the distance 
that already separated the death fasters from their addressees; it served rather to repeat 
and enact it in what she advanced as the message of life in death fasting: “I am taking the 
risk of dying for my demands. I can die at any moment, but if you concede my demands, 
I can also return to life immediately.” In this sense, every single moment was a charged 
ellipsis in which one held the possibility of winning the word of the other against the 
possibility of death, demanding of one a perseverance equal to the promise of the future. 
Despite appearances to the contrary, then, death fasting gave prominence to life by 
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delaying the advent of death: “You undertake this form of struggle reckoning that the 
longer you stay alive, the greater your chances of winning.” Understood in this way, 
death fasting had in fact little to do with self-dissipation. On the contrary, it was a 
productive consumption of life forces which aimed to bring forth a different form of 
existence by refusing to live under the conditions in the F-type prisons. According to F., 
it was the F-type prisons which were the very site of consumption proper (or 
unproductive consumption) where they would waste away bit by bit and inconspicuously 
not unlike the cumulative consumption of lives of surplus value extraction outside the 
prison.53 The decay of the prisoner was the very same as the exhaustion of the laborer 
who had to work, more than his body could bear, only to survive the conditions of 
existence. There was a hidden link between political violence and economic exploitation, 
and F. compared the death fast to the proletarian strike by conflating the interruption of 
social production with that of individual reproduction on the basis of a common interest 
in the betterment of material conditions of reproduction. She contended that workers 
whose lives are consumed with new coercive measures everyday, begin to struggle for 
better life conditions when they turn off the power switches to finish with that kind of 
labor in which their lives are wasted and gesture towards other forms of existence which 
may be beginning at this very moment: “Their life changes its form. It becomes a form of 
life looking forward towards winning. In the end, you’re going on the strike to better your 
life conditions. The more you force them to concede your demands, the more you win 
your life.” The longer one lasted on the death fast, the higher was the possibility of 
returning to life under better conditions. She acknowledged the possibility of death, but 
                                                
53 Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari make a similar argument in Anti-Oedipus (1972) about the immanence 
of death to the capitalist system where each act of production is inextricably linked to the process of anti-
production as life is expended for the valorization of capital. 
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she added that she would still have won life for the survivors, just like the striking 
workers who might not have been allowed to return to the factory but who would have 
changed the working conditions for all future workers. It was neither a personal gain, nor 
an organizational one but rather a gain for the social.  
In identifying the physiological consumption of the body with its social 
consumption, both of which are measured by the general equivalent of abstract time, F. 
conflates the relations of domination with relations of exploitation in the interest of 
suspending the consumption of the body for the expansion of capital and consolidation of 
state power. In so doing, she re-determines its use in accordance with the ends of a 
renewed social. The interruption of individual reproduction interrupts the realization of 
the reproduction of social relations within the prison which is already transformed into a 
site of ideological struggle by the Marxist-Leninist organizations.54 An invitation to 
undertake a similar act in institutions outside the prison, the death fast is narrativized here 
as a spectacle in which an enduring body refuses to be used (up) by capital and state 
power alike and becomes an radical space of experimentation and imagination regarding 
the relation to social surplus.55 In this sense, perseverance is both the message and the 
necessary personal quality to give time to the exploited others outside the prison to read 
this very message.  
                                                
54 In his famous essay “Ideology and Ideological Status Apparatuses,” Louis Althusser (1994: 114) 
concedes that even the repressive state apparatuses like the prison cannot solely function by violence. 
 
55 In this narrative, the formation of a different social subject becomes possible by way of extorting 
advantages like new legislations and labor contracts which at first sight might appear to remain within the 
legal and political constraints of the capitalist state. Yet as her comrade S. averred workers did not become 
agents of transformation by virtue of poverty but rather by shortening the working day to have time apart 
from the usual round of work and rest to think and form a judgment about the conditions of their existence. 
In this sense, one might argue that they take to task Walter Benjamin’s (1986: 291-292) distinction between 
“political” and “proletarian general” strikes by claiming that any strike takes place in the border region 
between “political” and “proletarian general” strike, between negotiation or, rather extortion, and “a wholly 
transformed work”.  
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Crucially, however, this imperative of perseverance transformed living into a 
more difficult task than dying. In this narrative, life and death were not absolute opposites 
but rather they blended with each other to such a degree that the ability to die turned into 
a luxury. S. elaborated a very different understanding of the relationship between life and 
death which concealed a deeply rooted antagonism with regard to that enshrined in the 
narratives of DHKP-C’s members. She would not attempt in vain to expose the true face 
of the Turkish state by dying since dying in such a way, she would have entrenched, 
without willing it, the myth of the indefatigability of the Turkish state ever more deeply 
into a world which was already marked by the signs of its violence. It was far more 
threatening, as she put it, to keep the Turkish state beside itself by living on for one more 
day. They were struggling to stay alive and it was no exaggeration to say that, for them, 
the labor of living was more demanding than dying: “We had to drink six liters of water 
to remain alive. It was such a torture to drink six liters of water everyday. Compared with 
this, dying is very easy.” According to S., they attempted something more essential than 
simply the task of dying. Instead, they pushed themselves to the limit of their endurance 
by fighting with death with persistence. From this view, an easy death was not 
permissible. It was supposed to be an unrelenting battle in which one was not to surrender 
the struggle even if it were to end in death. In a prose poem arrayed from letters written 
by death fasters to each other, the model of this merciless fight was figured by a 
commanding anonymous voice as the battle of Stalingrad with its memorable floor-by-
floor, close-quarters combat in the city’s apartment blocks, factories, warehouses, and 
office buildings: “You will not surrender a single cell, a single muscle without fighting 
like in the battle of Stalingrad, street to street, house to house, room to room.”56 
                                                
56 See Tuncay Günel, Damlada Okyanus, p. 283. 
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Extending the battle lines into every point of contact, they were then able to bring death 
and life out of infinite distance and into infinite proximity. The consequences here were 
dramatic, for such an intimacy with death paradoxically vanished away death. The most 
commendable fight took the form of ignoring or forgetting about death to the point of 
living as if one were not bound by time. C. confessed that he had never thought of death 
but always of living and winning during his two hundred and twenty days on the death 
fast. Unlike the death fasters from other organizations who were waiting to die, they had 
not assigned themselves any number of days. For his comrades and him, to approach 
death, or better, to be approached by death, was to confront the limitless limit of the 
indeterminable: “Nobody could believe that we could go beyond our hundredths and two 
hundredths by only drinking liquids. We had presumed that deaths would begin to occur 
serially on the sixtieths and seventieths, but people did not die till much later. After the 
hundredths, we stopped keeping track of the days. If we had survived our hundredths, we 
could have survived even more. We stopped thinking that we would be bedridden after 
our two hundredths. We no longer had any day delimitations on our minds. We were still 
doing well on our two-hundred-twenty-ninth day.” Walking upon death and lying down 
to death were two different things and the secret of their enduring force lay in vigilant 
and lucid resistance to death. A long-time comrade of C. and a leading cadre, Y., who 
was on the death fast for two hundred and five days, began to address this unremitting 
attachment to life by telling of their refusal to recognize any limits restricting their 
relation to life on the death fast. She gave a moving account of their endeavors to turn the 
new prison cell into a habitable space by petitioning for kettles, writing equipment, 
games, radios and televisions. Commenting in detail on the acquisition of these objects, 
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she pointed at the radio on her writing desk: “Look, this radio is very valuable. I wrote 
hundreds of petitions to get this radio. And when it was finally allowed in the cell, 
together with this radio life entered in the prison where there was not a single breath or 
voice before. I sometimes tuned in to the Turkish classical music channel, and sometimes 
listened to the news from 95.1 Free Radio. The entire ward was able to hear the voices on 
the radio.” The sheer struggle for the possession of these objects riveted her to life, 
reinforcing her will to live. No sooner was she allowed to have a radio in the prison cell 
than her protracted struggle reasserted itself with greater intensity for another object. 
Next, she was petitioning for a television and asked her husband to deposit the money for 
it with the prison administration on her two hundredths. If she was still able to stand 
upright and hold onto life on her two hundredths, Y. said, it was because she had no 
limits in her mind as to what she was capable of realizing.  
Instead of desiring to die quickly, Y. and her comrades were driven to push 
themselves to their limits, and in the process, they had also exposed themselves to the 
limitlessness that lay within them by redirecting all their attention to life which they were 
resolved to continue in its former state. It was important for them to continue with their 
ordinary life because they sought to impose measures on this long-term struggle with 
death involving paths which repeatedly called into question their initial resolve by so 
many dilemmas, so many sideways turnings or failings. Their prison life was already 
organized by a self-imposed penitential discipline, one which had acquired a new vigor 
with the Death Fast as if they were frightened that dying would free them from all 
discipline and restraint, abandoning them to one of the most dissolute of powers. They 
did not need to wake up at six in the morning for exercise and breakfast as they were used 
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to doing in the past. They could have slept in, Y. granted, yet they still took the trouble of 
waking up at the same hour.57 Instead of breakfasting, they now drank their water mixed 
with sugar and salt which had become completely “natural” like eating three times a day. 
It was as though, C. said self-bewilderedly, they had been living this way since the day 
they were born. The only difference was that they were spending hardly any time on the 
reproduction of biological life itself which, according to Y., had stolen precious time 
away from them unawares within the endless circuit of daily preparation and 
consumption of food. Once eating was eliminated from their daily activities, they had 
accrued a surplus of time which had allowed them to freely develop their full potential 
and to experience, as C. put it, an unprecedented degree of “productivity and creativity”.  
Each in their own way, on multiple occasions, dramatized the progression of the 
Death Fast in terms of a limitless self-transcendence beyond the endless circular 
movement of simple self-reproduction. They had read profusely, studied subjects from 
quantum physics, geometry to philosophy and foreign languages, and written numerous 
articles, petitions, and letters in stark contrast with the listless resignation of the DHKP-
C’s death fasters, who had allegedly watched television in lassitude all day long. 
According to these accounts, the Death Fast had revealed such measureless possibilities 
that they felt as if they did not have enough time to realize all of them. In a letter written 
on her hundredth day from the Bayrampaşa Prison Hospital, where she was taken 
                                                
57 Most would wake up around six or seven to drink their liquid mixture. Then, they would go back to bed 
only to get up for the eight o’clock body count. After the body count, many would go back to bed to wake 
up at noon and spend the rest of the day watching television and conversing with each other. According to 
Erdinç, another of their comrades, most of the death fasters did not even have to get up in the later stages of 
their fasting. The prison administration had made sure that each death faster was sharing a cell with a 
comrade who was not on the death fast so that they would take care of the ones on the fast. These 
caretakers would bring the liquid mixture to their bedside and they would not have to go down to the lower 
floor for the body count either. True, the longer the death fasters were able to continue with their everyday 
activities, the longer they survived the death fast, but according to D.’s testimonial, most did not follow this 
rule. 
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together with Y., L. speaks of the swift flight of time: “Time is slipping away between 
my fingers and I feel distressed that I cannot catch up with it, make good use of it… Days 
are just not enough. And we have so many things to do, don’t we, comrade? We need to 
run faster and faster.” A surplus of time turns unaccountably into one of lack here 
precisely because time is no longer synonymous with a measurable sequence of present 
nows simultaneously coming along and passing away in an uninterrupted flow. Time 
feels to be both abundant and deficient because it marks the very opening of a finite being 
to itself. The Death Fast is figured as such a moment of originary quickening that ushers 
the subject into the limitlessness of its possibilities. With a slight inflection of 
Heidegger’s thinking of time on the basis of death, we could say that the TIKB’s 
members acted as if time to die were time to be.58 Transported by his memories, C. 
declared from a temporal distance, without heeding the contradiction in his words (which 
did not give way to a dialectical synthesis): “On the death fast, you rediscover life and 
everything.” 
This insistence on the essential irrelevance of the difference between life and 
death that allows them to test to the extreme the possibilities embodied within the space 
between the possibility of living and possibility of dying is a seemingly odd citation of a 
certain fantasy of communism as an ideal social order in which social forces of 
productivity would finally thrive purged of capital’s constitutive antagonism.59 In the 
                                                
58 Here, I reverse Emmanuel Lévinas’s aphoristic translation of Heidegger’s thinking of time on the basis of 
death. As he writes in God, Death and Time (2000: 42): “Having to be is having to die. Death is not 
something in time; rather time is originarily zu sein, that is zu sterben.” 
 
59 In fact, Slavoj Žižek (1989) justly calls this “capitalist fantasy” insofar as it can only think communism 
in the figure of an idealization of capitalism as the order of limitless productivity and technological 
progress without the ruinous social consequences. For a phantasmatic notion of productivity in 
neoliberalism, see Michel Foucault, “The Birth of Biopolitics,” in Essential Works of Foucault, 1954-1984, 
vol. 1 (New York: New Press, 1997). pp. 73-80. 
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communist imaginary in Turkey, prison is the quintessential site for the cultivation of this 
fantasy and the Death Fast is narrativized here as an exceptional movement of its 
intensification. The perseverance of this fantasy of communism is, however, rendered 
possible by a conflation of private production with social production which finds its 
support in a radical forgetting of the social history of prison labor in Turkey.  
III. Deathly Repetition of the Past 
In the period leading up to the joint promulgation of the Labor Code and Penal 
Code in 1936, early republican industry had been characterized by a high level of labor 
turnover and absenteeism in consequence of the fact that the labor force in the country 
was comprised of peasant-workers who worked in the factories for short periods of time 
only to earn the necessary amount of money to pay for their taxes and debts and to return 
to their land. To accommodate the need for a steady, cheap labor force in the newly 
developing productive and extractive state industries, the early republican state turned 
towards captive labor power in prisons. According to Ali Sipahi (2006), the early 
republican state was not interested in inculcating in prisoners the discipline required of 
factory laborers so that they would join their ranks upon release. It was much more 
interested in consuming the use-value of this captive labor power, and consequently, 
prison labor took the form of wage-labor rather than unproductive, punitive, forced labor. 
In the language of early republican penology, prisoners were regarded as a mass of 
consumers living idly in prisons, wasting away the limited resources of the state and their 
families under the dire economic conditions during and after the Great Depression.60 It 
                                                                                                                                            
 
60 In 1929, the Ministry of Justice decided that no bread was to be given to prisoners who could afford one 
okka (1283 gr.) of bread a day because of the insufficiency of the provisions. By 1936, the Ministry of 
Justice was trying to collect money for the provision of stale bread from prisoners who refused to give any 
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was argued that prison labor would lessen the heavy burden of prisoners on the state’s 
shoulders by automatically cutting the food expenditures from their wages. In the labor-
based prisons (iş esasına dayalı hapishaneler), prisoners would earn their keep and even 
save extra-money which would be deposited in a bank account in their name while 
realizing the surplus-value necessary for national capital accumulation.  
In actuality, prison work was an essential aspect of prison life even before the 
establishment of labor-based prisons. Prisoners who did not have a family sending them 
money or provisions had to earn their bread. Some earned their bread by manufacturing 
handicrafts and selling them for profit both inside and outside the prison through the 
intermediary of prison guards who claimed a certain amount of the earnings for their 
services while others worked as personal servants for more opulent prisoners.61 Indeed, 
Sipahi argues that the new labor-based prisons were welcomed by prisoners in the old 
prisons who preferred to work for the republican state with circulating capital rather than 
serving as slaves of individual capital in their constant search for food and services in the 
prison.  
The new penal regime was structured as a “stage system” (devre sistemi) which 
consisted of four stages.62 The first stage would be spent in the cell day and night in 
isolation known as the Pennsylvanian system. Following this stage, the prisoners would 
pass to the second stage after a period of one to six months during which they would 
                                                                                                                                            
money to the revenue officers at the risk of serving thirty days more sentence time. See Ali Sipahi, “The 
Labor-Based Prisons in Turkey 1933-1953”. Unpublished Master’s Thesis, Boğaziçi University, Atatürk 
Institute for Modern Turkish Studies, 2006, p. 37. 
 
61 In the 1930s, there was a very high demand for the handicrafts of the famous Sinop Prison where most 
Turkish communists including the communist writer Sabahattin Ali and poet Nazım Hikmet were serving 
time.  
 
62 Ibid., p. 44. 
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spend only the nights in the cell at the end of collective, silent work during daytime 
known as the Auburn system in the criminological literature. In the third stage, there 
would be no cell confinement, and more importantly, three working days would be 
equivalent to four days of imprisonment. If the prisoner was employed in construction, 
roadwork, or mines, the ratio would be one to two, which was the case for all prisoners in 
the fourth stage. In this final stage, the prisoners could also petition for parole if they had 
completed 3/4 of their heavy sentence or 1/2 of all other kinds of sentence.  
Although these Western cellular penal regimes were much discussed among the 
republican penologists, the high costs of construction rendered the realization of the stage 
system highly unfeasible. In actual fact, the two early stages corresponded to the sentence 
time served in the old prisons, and the last two ones to the sentence time served in the 
new prisons, namely the labor-based prisons. Consequently, punishment increasingly 
became more labor-oriented and the stage-system was replaced by a new triad system 
functioning on the basis of a formal equality between work time and sentence time both 
of which were measured by the number of days. At the first stage, one day of work would 
compensate for one day of the sentence; at the second stage, this one-to-one ratio would 
increase to three-to-four; and in the third stage, to one-to-two.63 Moreover, the prisoners 
who worked overtime in these labor-based prisons were entitled to a bonus since the 
labor-based prisons were more than bureaucratic state apparatuses. They were rational-
capitalist corporations managed by a technocratic class which also occupied important 
positions in the executive, legislative and judicial branches of the state. It is Sipahi’s 
conclusion that the work in the labor-based prisons did not appear to be compulsory to 
the prisoners as the alternative was to serve sentences in the old prisons with no income, 
                                                
63 Ibid., p. 46. 
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and even worse with a redoubled sentence period. There was a chance to choose, so to 
speak, to work or to starve to death—like in a market economy. The disciplined factory 
laborer might have originated in these labor-based prisons, yet in contrast to other 
histories of prison labor (Foucault 1977; Ignatieff, 1978; Rothman 1971), prison labor 
here was not simply disciplinary and coercive but, to emphasize once again, it was first 
and foremost productive and exploitative, and thus one might argue that it put into crisis 
the distinction between free and unfree labor in the liberal understanding of capitalism, 
which sees the sole basis of accumulation on the individual wage-earner conceived as a 
free laborer.  
It is therefore of particular interest that there was a group of criminals who were 
deprived of the “right to work” in these labor-based prisons. These were the political 
prisoners who had committed “crimes against the personality of the state,” and they had 
to stay in the old prisons for the entire duration of their sentence because it was feared 
that political prisoners would disseminate “dangerous ideas” among common criminals 
and interrupt their insertion into the circuit of surplus value production for the capitalist 
state in labor-based prisons.64 If the fear of the technocratic-managerial class resulted in 
the exemption of political prisoners from prison work from the very inception of the 
penal regime in republican Turkey, it also, indirectly, produced the conditions of 
possibility for the imagination of a different kind of labor in prisons.65  
                                                
64 Ibid., pp. 178-181. Crimes against the personality of the state were punished with Articles 141 and 142 in 
the first section of the second part of the old Penal Code. Article 141 punished the formation of 
organizations with the goal of establishing communism, dictatorship, racism and destroying national 
sentiments. The latter article functioned in tandem with the former one, punishing propaganda activities 
toward these ends. 
 
65 In a letter from the Bursa Prison, the communist poet Nazim Hikmet describes his daily regimen in 
words which exalt his inexhaustible productivity bound only by the hours in a day: “In case it might 
interest you, I’m writing about my 24 hours: I wake up at 7 in the morning, listen to the radio at 7.45, 
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Crucially, the republican state turned its attention to political crime only when the 
labor-based prisons began to lose their importance due to the rapid rise in population, 
surplus labor force, and mechanization with the Marshall Plan’s subventions in the early 
1950s.66 The republican state was no longer interested in classifying prisons in terms of 
the economic value of inmates. In the new language of penology, the labor-based prisons 
were criticized for motivating the unemployed and penniless to commit crime owing to 
the shortening of sentence times, good health conditions and, most importantly, wage-
earning therein. A new and more punitive attitude toward the proper role of punishment 
emerged, and the post-1950 republican state re-structured its entire penal regime on the 
principle of dangerousness, seeking to separate the less from the more dangerous. The 
prisons were henceforth divided into “open”, “semi-open”, and “closed prisons”, a 
division largely by level of security. Concomitantly, the earlier investment in the 
productivity of the inmates was superseded by an investment in the punitiveness of 
imprisonment in direct proportion to the penal importance of the offense. As a result, 
cellular punishment in the first stage was annulled for inmates with light sentences, and 
they served their entire sentence time in labor-based prisons, skipping the stage system 
altogether. For inmates with heavy sentences, on the other hand, prison labor began to 
function distinctively as a reward. The latter were allowed to work in the labor-based 
prisons only at the third and fourth stages (the latter stage was completely dropped in 
1956), that is to say, after cellular punishment for a period of one to six months in the 
                                                                                                                                            
translate Tolstoy’s War and Peace from 8.30 until noon, work in the textile workshop from 2.30 to 4, work 
on my untitled and interminable book from 4 to 7, listen to the radio at 7 pm and write poems at various 
lengths from 7 to eleven and read a book from eleven until midnight. Under these conditions, I sometimes 
bemoan the fact that days are only twenty four hours.” The letter can be found in Bursa Cezaevinden Va-
Nulara Mektuplar [Letters to the Va-Nus from Bursa Prison] (Istanbul: Cem Yayınları, 1970), p. 26.  
  
66 Sipahi, “The Labor-Based Prisons in Turkey 1933-1953,” p. 175. In 1952, the entirety of prison-mines 
was closed as a result of the abundance of “free” labor. 
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first stage and compulsory work in the work-dorms within their penal institutions for the 
duration of the sixth of their remaining sentence time in the second stage.67 Yet it is clear 
from the regulations in the law of the specified exceptions to its own rule that the number 
of penal institutions lacking in work-dorms was not negligible at the time, resulting in the 
rapid construction of prisons extending from major cities to small districts .68 In such 
exceptional circumstances, inmates convicted with heavy sentences were given the right 
to transfer to labor-based prisons after spending a quarter of their sentence time in good 
conduct incarcerated in closed prisons.69 According to Article 20, inmates convicted of 
crimes against the state, drug trafficking, murder, theft and bribery were not eligible at 
any time to work in labor-based prisons. Hardly any different from its predecessor, then, 
the new law maintained the separate status of political prisoners from the rest of the 
prison population regarding prison labor. Indigent political prisoners continued to work in 
the work-dorms, if there were any in closed prisons, for their food and clothing. 70 
However, the work-dorms in the newly constructed prisons were nothing like the labor-
based prisons which functioned as quasi-capitalist corporations with the goal of 
increasing their profits, and hereafter it was interestingly the leftist prisoners who exalted 
                                                
67 If there were no cells in the penal institution, prisoners with heavy sentences would serve half of their 
sentence time in closed prisons at the end of which they could be transferred to labor-based prisons upon 
showing good conduct. 
 
68 For the complete text of the Law Number 6123 dated July 9, 1953, see 
http://www.hukuki.net/kanun/825.13.text.asp. The central prisons (merkez cezaevi) were located in the 
major cities and they were specifically designed for prisoners with heavy sentences as opposed to the 
district prisons (ilçe cezaevi). 
 
69 If the labor-based prisons exhausted their full capacity, then these inmates were enforced to work in 
agriculture, roadwork, construction, and mines as part of work-teams which were supposed to be comprised 
of no less than two inmates. 
 
70 According to Article 14, prison labor was voluntary for detainees who were allowed to work in the work-
dorms within the penal institutions for their food and clothing. Exceptional cases aside, political prisoners 
usually had better means than the other inmates. 
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voluntary work in prison, insisting that prisoners could find their full and complete 
essence only in productive work.  
It was under the new penal code that cellular punishment was annulled 
indiscriminately in 1965 and prison labor was rendered mandatory both for convicts and 
detainees.71 For all its centrality in the penal regime, however, the enforceability of prison 
labor remained incidental to the existence of work-dorms within the penal institutions.72 
There were inevitably many inmates who were not bound by this new rule due to the 
insufficiency of the work-dorms. Consequently, inmates with light sentences in open and 
semi-open prisons took the center of the labor regime and it was only those inmates in 
closed prisons who had served one quarter of their sentence time with good conduct that 
were allowed to work outside the prison in state enterprises ranging from agriculture, 
roadwork, construction, and mines to services in public institutions.73  
The continuity between the penal codes from 1965 to 2004 regarding prison labor 
was almost seamless and of the two, the latter restricted it to convicts without any 
profession unlike the former which had generalized prison labor. Though a law had 
already declared compulsory labor in prison to be an exception to the international ban on 
the use of forced labor in 1985, the legal definition of prison labor oscillated ambiguously 
between transformative and voluntary work in the new Penal Sentence Execution Code. 
According to Article 29, “physically and psychically healthy convicts lacking a 
                                                
71 Henceforth, cell imprisonment was used only as a disciplinary punishment which could not be more than 
fifteen days at a time. 
 
72 At the end of 1960s, there were 95 work-dorms in 613 closed prisons. See Ali Rıza Mengüç, Ceza İnfaz 
Hukuku ve Ceza Müesseseleri, (Ankara: Cezaevi Matbaası, 1968), p. 308. 
 
73 Sipahi, “Labor-Based Prisons in Turkey 1933-1953,” p. 176. In the early republican regime, petty 
criminals who did not meet the requirement of minimum one-year sentence were not able to serve their 
sentence time in labor-based prisons by reason of the necessary time to acquire a skill. 
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profession and those with professions who volunteer can be made to work 
(çalıştırılabilir) in the prison work-dorms and ateliers in exchange for wages within the 
means of the penal institution” (emphasis is mine). Despite the ambiguity of the 
definition of prison labor in this article, the Head of the Department of Work-Dorms in 
Prisons and Detention Houses, Kürşat Hamurcu, argues that the conditional in the letter 
of the law should be interpreted as a mark of the physical and technical constraints 
summoning the future construction of more prisons with work-dorms.74 In the same 
programmatic article, he makes the point that the term profession corresponds to an 
understanding of profession in its narrowest sense defined as “a lasting occupation by 
means of which one earns one’s livelihood,” leaving it to the discretion of the 
Administrative Board of Work-Dorm in each prison to decide whether an inmate has a 
profession or not. To justify the recourse to this narrow definition, he argues that prison 
labor is entrusted with the task of reforming individuals and, pursuing the same logic, he 
maintains that it constitutes the main component of the individualized treatment system, 
which tailors the punishment to the individual convict, to his or her personality, attitude, 
and willingness to change in the new penal regime. In the final analysis, he contends that 
the entirety of the prison population should be forced to work regardless of their 
professional status.75  
                                                
74 For the full text of his article on the website of the Department entitled “Türk Hukukunda Tutuklu ve 
Hükümlülerin Çalıştırılması” (Detainee and Convict Labor in Turkish Law), see 
http://www.iydb.adalet.gov.tr/makale1.asp. Indeed, the law which had founded this Department in 1997 
had also endorsed the construction of work dormitories and ateliers in every prison and detention house in 
the country. For the full stipulation of this law (number 4301) dated August 6, 1997, see 
http://www.hukuki.net/kanun/4301.15.text.asp. 
  
75 Despite the ambiguity of the legal definition of prison labor, the refusal to work is unequivocally 
considered a disciplinary infraction and punished accordingly, proving that prison labor aims first and 
foremost at establishing a power relation by subduing the individual. Article 42 stipulates that prisoners 
who refuse to work in occupations designated as appropriate for them by the Administrative Board of the 
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Inasmuch as prison labor functioned as a motive and measure of individual 
transformation in an individualized treatment system, however, the introduction of high 
security closed prisons known as F-type prisons in 2000 proved to be an anomalous 
exception to the new penal regime. Adding a new level of security to the carceral 
continuum, these prisons targeted a specific category of criminals, namely those who 
were convicted and awaiting or standing trial on charges under the Anti-Terror Law. The 
penal regime specific to these prisons can best be described as sorting individuals into 
groups according to the degree of control warranted by their risk to society and state.76 
Such a penal regime which shifts focus away from the individual convict and his or 
capacity for rehabilitation to the identificatory offense itself is markedly concerned with 
techniques for identifying, classifying and managing groupings sorted by dangerousness 
                                                                                                                                            
Work-Dorms in their institution will have the right of communication (letter, phone call, TV, and radio) 
restricted for a period of one to three months. This disciplinary punishment is followed by another in 
Article 43 where it is stated that prisoners who dissuade other prisoners from working in the work-dorms 
will be deprived of their right of visitation for a period of one to three months. In addition to this 
disciplinary punishment, the latter is also liable to incur extra sentence time for a period of one to three 
years in accordance with Article 298 of the new Penal Code. These two articles were clearly targeting the 
political prisoners who were protesting the implementation of the treatment system in cellular prisons by 
refusing to work in the new work-dorms as well as to participate in the cultural and sports activities after 
the amendment of Article 16 of the Anti-Terror Law.  
 
76 Article 220 of the new Penal Code stipulates the punishment of the formation of criminal organizations. 
Article 314 is a special article which regulates the punishment of armed criminal organizations and it 
constitutes one of the subcategories in the Anti-Terror Law which functions on the basis of a much wider 
definition of terrorism than the recourse to arms. The latter law describes terrorist organizations as criminal 
organizations comprised of at least two people that use force, violence and intimidation toward the ends of 
coercion and suppression. The Anti-Terror Law singularly punishes the aim of the crime, taking into 
consideration neither the (realized) effects of the crime nor the motives of the individuals who are punished 
one and at the same time both for their acts and their membership in the organization. The terrorist 
organizations are divided into two groups based on their aim: “absolute terrorist organizations” and 
“relative terrorist organizations.” The former organizations which are referred to as terrorist organizations 
proper are political organizations that threaten to destroy the security of the nation and the state (namely the 
Kurdish separatist movement) and the constitutional order (namely the Marxist-Leninist organizations) 
whereas the latter are comprised of interest-based criminal organizations such as the mafia. For an 
interpretation of the Anti-Terror Law, see Mustafa Avcı, “Yeni Yasal Düzenlemelere Göre Türk Hukunda 
Örgütlü Suç Kavramı” (Organized Crime in Turkish Law According to the New Regulations), Hukuk ve 
Adalet, 5 April 2005, pp. 248-273. 
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rather than the social and personal transformation of individuals.77 Accordingly, the 
entire penal regime in these prisons is based on isolation which arguably leaves the 
inmates immune to the lure of the totalizing immanence embodied in their criminal 
organizations by separating them from each other and, most importantly, from their 
leader.  
Though an exception at the initial stages of the penal transformation, the General 
Directorate of Prisons and Detention Houses anticipated extending this cellular regime by 
building new prisons based on the cell system and remodeling the large wards of existing 
seventy-five prisons into cell units in the following years for the effective administration 
and management of prisons. This imminent transformation of the penal regime was 
adjudged by political prisoners to implicate Turkish society in its entirety. Despite the 
government’s clothing of the penal transformation in a fog of “reform,” their argument 
ran, the new penal regime aimed not to promote greater security and order within prisons 
but merely to consolidate the new, neoliberal order by incarcerating the growing, 
menacing urban poor who were being precipitated headlong into crime by their 
conditions of existence.78 In programmatic articles which presaged the future and 
                                                
77 Under the pressure of delegations from the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture, the 
government amended the Article 16 of the Anti-Terror Law on May 1, 2001 recognizing the right to have 
access to programmes of cultural, social, educational, vocational and sport activities which would enable 
the prisoners to spend five hours outside their cells.  CPT does not disapprove of high security measures 
such as solitary confinement on principle, but tries to regulate its conditions. Recommendation No R (82) 
17 of the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe (1982) urges member states such as Turkey to 
“apply ordinary prison regulations as far as possible to dangerous prisoners, to apply security measures in a 
way respectful of human dignity, to counteract the possible adverse effects of reinforced security conditions 
and to provide education, vocational training, work and leisure-time occupations and other activities to the 
extent that security permits.” The prisoners affiliated with outlawed Marxist-Leninist organizations did not 
exercise this right reasoning that it would mean the acceptance of the new prison project.  
 
78 Prison struggle was not exterior to other social struggles and they expressed this argument in their 
slogans “F-Tipi IMF Tipi Yaşama Hayır” (No to F-type and IMF-type Life) and “İçeride Dışarıda Hücreleri 
Parçala” (Destroy the Cells Inside and Outside). 
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prefaced their struggle, they denounced the new penal regime for its reliance on a 
repressive apparatus that combined coercive individualization with compulsory labor by 
re-organizing the prison as a factory without any acquired social rights and securities.79  
Besides the general maintenance and development of the state prison system, the 
primary function of prison labor had been the disciplinary preparation of inmates as 
future workers with meager yet consistent payments from the late fifties until the 
construction of the F-type prisons in the late 1990s. 80 For prison labor was heavily 
subsidized by the state and it was in no condition to compete with the private sector since 
its inferior quality products took a long time to procure at higher costs.81 Indeed, it was 
only on March 27, 1998 that a new regulation had authorized the exploitation of prison 
labor by private firms by allowing prisoners to work for private capital inside and outside 
the prison. As such this legal transformation was a sign foretelling the incipient 
articulation of relations of domination with relations of exploitation by making available 
a cheap labor reserve in prison. The F-type prisons were an architectural harbinger of this 
                                                
79 For some examples, see “F-tipi Hücre Hapishaneleri Yıkacağız” (We’re Going to Destroy the F-type Cell 
Prisons), Kurtuluş, August-September-October 2000; DHKP-C, TKP(ML), TKIP Joint Statement, 
November 2000; “Şehitlerimizle Zafere Yürüyoruz,” (We’re Walking to Victory with Our Martyrs) Kızıl 
Bayrak, 28 July 2001; “F Tipi Tabutluk Gerçeği,” (The Reality of F-type Coffin) Ekmek ve Adalet, 5 June 
2002. 
 
80 According to available statistics, the number of prison workers increased from 3,214 in 1997 to 59,187 in 
2002 and there were 68 types of occupation ranging from carpentry to shoemaking, carpet weaving to 
furniture making, from ironworking to needlework and from construction work to printing. According to 
Article 7 of the Law 4301, ninety percent of the gross income is reserved for the maintenance and 
development of prisons and detention houses. The construction of eleven F-type prisons was funded by 
income from prison labor which was compensated at a rate one third of the minimum wage in 2001. See 
Yasemin Özdek’s articles, “Küreselleşme Sürecinde Ceza Politikalarında Dönüşümler,” (Transformations 
in Penal Regimes in the Age of Globalization) Amme Idaresi Dergisi, vol. 33, no. 4, December 2000, pp. 
21-48 and “Ceza Reformunun Görünmeyen Yüzü: Hapishanelerde Zorla Çalıştırma” (The Invisible Face of 
Penal Reform: Compulsory Labor in Prisons) Günışığı, February-March 2005, pp. 18-21.   
81 According to a sociological study of open prisons, there were carpets waiting to be finished for the past 
ten years in work ateliers in open prisons. See Ilkay Savcı, Adını Kader Koyduk [We Named It Fate] 
(Ankara: Phoenix, 2004), pp. 120-157.   
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new penal regime with their spacious work ateliers built above the prison cells.82 Political 
prisoners insisted that the goal of the new prison regime was the subsumption of the 
prison to the capitalist system where—to anticipate my argument below— “desiring 
production” had managed to survive within this exceptional enclave—or shall we say 
enclave in an enclave?—which had hitherto been kept separate by the Turkish state from 
the circuit of surplus value production.  
IV. A Different Kind of Labor 
I borrow the term “desiring production” from Gilles Deleuze and Felix Guattari’s 
Anti-Oedipus ([1972] 1994) to supplement Marx’s category of “use-value” in the interest 
of elucidating the counter-intuitive representation of the prison as the quintessential site 
of social surplus. As they state unequivocally: “The unconscious poses no problem of 
meaning, solely problems of use. The question posed by desire is not ‘What does it 
mean?’ but rather ‘How does it work?’” (108; emphasis in the original). Deleuze and 
Guattari argue for an “identity of nature” between desiring production and social 
production on the basis of the common essence of libido and labor as “the activity of 
production in general” (302-3). An essence which “is” itself neither fixed nor 
determinate, production-in-general (or abstract human labor in Marx’s terms), becomes 
visible under capitalism only to be subject to a radical privatization within the ostensibly 
segregated domains of commodity-production and reproduction.  
Deleuze and Guattari endeavor to undo the capitalist segregation of desire from 
labor and posit a link between them by means of the concept-metaphor of “desiring 
                                                
82 Despite the lingering language of rehabilitation, General Directorate of Prisons and Detention Houses 
had a gross income of 150 billion YTL with a profit of 24 billion YTL by 2004 and was planning to 
continue its business under a holding company called CE (the first two letters of prison in Turkish). See 
“Cezaevi Özel Sektörü Geçti” in Zaman, December 12, 2005 and “Cezaevi Holding Kuruluyor ‘Sayılı 
Gün’ Marka Oluyor” in Hürriyet, March 20, 2005.  
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machines.” As a concept, “desiring machines” replace the theatrical model of the psyche 
with a factory model of productive desire. Desire, they insist, does not lack anything, 
does not aim at what it does not have or what is “missing”; on the contrary, desire is first 
and foremost a productive force which exceeds the subject, and what it produces is the 
real world: “If desire produces, its product is real. If desire is productive, it can only be 
productive in the real world and can only produce reality…. The objective being of desire 
is the Real in and of itself” (26-7). Only secondarily, as a result of the organization of 
social production, does productive desire become reactive and construct a parallel world 
of gratification as imaginary compensation for what has been taken from it by agents of 
“anti-production” that organize the expenditure of social surplus.  
Indeed, the concept of “anti-production”, like the term “desiring machines,” 
provides for Deleuze and Guattari’s analysis a crucial link between the realms of desiring 
production and social production. Following Freud and Lacan, Deleuze and Guattari 
describe anti-production in the realm of desiring production as “primal repression,” an 
originary libidinal decathexis which brings into being an affective medium (“body 
without organs”) as the condition for the formation of a surface of inscription 
(“miraculating machine”) signaling the advent of a process of recoding and a subject 
(“celibate machine”) as the residual product of this process. For Deleuze and Guattari, the 
recoding process in the realm of desiring production is equivocal. By interrupting the 
repeated cathexes of singular objects, anti-production frees libido from remaining closed 
in on itself in an autoerotic loop, but at the same time it exposes this newly available 
libidinal flux to the danger of subjection in generalized systems of representation.83 
                                                
83 The hegemonic form of social repression in capitalism—the oedipalization of desire—leans on and is 
built from this primary repression which makes subjectivity possible in the first place: “If the family is able 
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It is one of the distinctive traits of the capitalist mode of anti-production- social 
production that it raises the equivocality of the recoding process in the realm of desiring 
production to the utmost. It revolutionizes and socializes productive forces; but then it 
yokes them to the dead-weight of private appropriation of social surplus, preventing the 
expenditure of surplus for purposes other than reinvestment in surplus value production. 
It frees desire from fixed codes by destabilizing previously existing social bonds, 
breaking up traditional belief systems, and dissolving established identities; but then it 
mobilizes a stronger and more devious apparatus of repression by locking desire up in a 
familial drama playing the Oedipal dialectic of subject and Other (337). What interests 
Deleuze and Guattari is the possibility of radicalizing the positive moment of this 
contradictory process unleashed by capitalism and turning it against its own order by 
freeing labor and libido from any objective determinations and limits.  
In Deleuze and Guattari’s terms, what is singular about capitalism is the 
peculiarity of its relation to its own limits. Capitalism fails any attempt at its 
circumscription and containment and makes the limit itself a function of the limitlessness 
on which it is necessarily premised. And though its continuity is secured by its 
limitlessness, Deleuze and Guattari argue that capitalism’s endlessness rests on the 
impossibility of dying where nothing can die if only because everything is already dead 
like “images” (337). Incorporating Freud’s notion of the death drive into their own text to 
interrupt it, they show that death becomes an “instinct” proper only under capitalism. An 
internalized movement, death no longer comes from the outside but is immanent to the 
                                                                                                                                            
in this manner to slip into the recoding of desire, it is because the body without organs on which this 
recoding is accomplished already exercises on its own account, as we have seen, a primal repression of 
desiring-production. It falls to the family to profit from this, and to superimpose the repression that is 
properly termed secondary” (120-21; emphasis in the original). 
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very capitalist system. Besides the death enterprise which is one of the principal forms of 
the absorption of surplus value in capitalism, Deleuze and Guattari argue that each act of 
production is inextricably linked to anti-production where everything is expended for the 
valorization of capital.  
The limitlessness of desiring production, on the other hand, constitutes a 
limitlessness that is irreducible to any law of identity and infinitely asymmetrical with it. 
For this productive force takes pleasure in variation, ramification, proliferation, and 
improvisation rather than in the mechanical repetition of the same. This repetition of 
difference is founded on a syncopal movement that requires a counter-force to bring it to 
a halt, to suspend or freeze the past cathexes in order that new and different ones may 
become possible. Deleuze and Guattari tell us that these desiring machines work by 
breaking down, or break down because they work too well. Hence, the risk of collapse, 
exhaustion, and destruction are intrinsic to their driving force. Death and desiring 
production do not exist in isolation from each other since perpetual dying belongs to life 
as its very condition of possibility for becoming other, and it is here that can be found 
their equivalent of the death drive which, for them, designates the interminable exposure 
to otherness which brings into being new existences of difference: “The experience of 
death is the most common of occurrences in the unconscious, precisely because it occurs 
in life and for life, in every passage or becoming, in every intensity as passage or 
becoming” (330).84 
                                                
84 This particular reading of death drive resonates with Heidegger’s reading of death in Being and Time, 
where Dasein always finds itself cast back to the otherness of its world with the possibility of the 
impossible experience of death. Deleuze and Guattari, however, prefer to cite Maurice Blanchot, a discreet 
critic of Heidegger, who in fact emphasizes the impossibility of dying: “Maurice Blanchot distinguishes 
this twofold nature clearly, these two irreducible aspects of death; the one, according to which the apparent 
subject never ceases to live and travel as a One—“one never stops and never has done with dying”; and the 
other, according to which this same subject, fixed as I, actually dies—which is to say it finally ceases to die 
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One may well argue that their political ontology of desire restores the significance 
of the category of use-value by locating the source of change in the radical heterogeneity 
of use-values which disperse and coalesce without unity or totality like the subject who 
dies only to be born as (an) other in that untrammeled but unpredictable trajectory of 
desire. And it is to this end that Deleuze and Guattari affirm the radical primacy and 
irreducible alterity of desire which belongs to the outside by virtue of multiplicity and 
errancy--albeit in social totalities where it is always already entangled in processes by 
which the former use their power for the purpose of self-preservation: “There are no 
desiring machines that exist outside the social machines that they form on a large scale, 
and no social machine without the desiring machines that inhabit them on a small scale” 
(340).85  
 From Marx to Deleuze and Guattari, then, the pivot of analysis remains the same 
yet the use of the analytical category use-value as a political mover is displaced in the 
opposite direction in their respective critical lexicons. If Deleuze and Guattari reveal the 
opaque idiom of desire as a threat to the libidinal economy of capital, Marx introduces 
the language of reason into the commodity language (Warensprache) by conferring a 
privilege on the effacement of the difference of use-values in the name of a radical 
                                                                                                                                            
since it ends up dying, in the reality of a last instant that fixes it in this way as an I, all the while undoing 
the intensity, carrying it back to the zero that envelops it” (330-331; italics in the original). 
 
85  Compare their statement with Gayatri Spivak’s reading of use-value in “Scattered Speculations on 
Value”, Diacritics, vol. 15, no. 4, Winter 1985, p. 80: “In my reading, on the other hand, it is use-value that 
puts the entire textual chain of Value in question and thus allows us a glimpse of the possibility that even 
textualization (which is already an advance upon the control implicit in linguistic or semiotic reductionism) 
may be no more than a way of holding randomness at bay….For use-value, in the classic of deconstructive 
levers, is both outside and inside the system of value determination…. It is outside because it cannot be 
measured by the labor theory of value…” The following reading of Marx is informed by Spivak’s reading 
reiterated in different formulations in her “Limits and Openings of Marx in Derrida” in Outside in the 
Teaching Machine (New York and London: Routledge, 1993) pp. 97-121, “Ghostwriting” in Diacritics, 
vol. 25, no. 2 (Summer, 1995), pp. 64-84 and in A Critique of Postcolonial Reason (Cambridge, Mass.: 
Harvard University Press, 1999).  
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equality. For commodities harbor within themselves the trace of their possible deletion 
and substitution by another commodity; by that very token, they also display in the 
necessary possibility of their effacement, the risk and chance of their abstractability and 
subsequent comparability. By inscribing within use-value the possibility of exchange, 
capital turns any commodity—and especially labor-power since the entire system is 
founded upon its use as abstract labor—into a ghost (Marx calls it “ghostly objectivity” 
[gespenstige Gegenständlichkeit] in Capital I, 46) constantly divided from itself and 
dismantled from within by abstraction. For that reason, Marx subordinates the multiple 
exteriority and immeasurable alterity of use-value to the unity or totality of abstract 
average labor in order for his implied readers, workers, to recognize their individual, 
privatized work as (constituting a) part of abstract social labor and invest an anonymous 
social subject. 86  
This ultimately explains the counterintuitive identification of prison as the site of 
surplus labor in the discourses of the Marxist prisoners. Here surplus labor in prison, to 
the extent that it cannot be (historically) included in the abstract average labor, indeed 
serves to operate as a name for desire itself, necessarily invoking that which exceeds the 
capitalist organization of social surplus, and just as the uses of commodities are infinite, 
or infinitely open, so too are the ways of consuming labor power. If the immanence of 
desire and surplus labor, which Gayatri Spivak (1985: 80) calls “affective labor,” 
discloses that there is no pre-given logic for defining the excess of surplus labor over 
socially necessary labor and thus for organizing the social relations to such so-called 
                                                
86 In A Critique of Postcolonial Reason, Spivak writes that “Marx’s project is to dislocate a restricted 
definition of the subject (which would ignore “superadequation,” that it is worth more ([Mehrwert = 
surplus-value] than itself) from the intent of the agent, so that it can occupy (besetzen—“cathect?”) this 
subject-position for others, not just selves. (69).  
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“excess,” the accentuation of desiring production in prison brings into view a desire for a 
qualitatively different kind of labor which puts into question the capitalist way of 
dividing the total labor-time into its necessary and surplus components. For in this 
representation of prison labor, the toil and fatigue of the laborer gives way to the pleasure 
of working in prison as political prisoners devote their days to reading, writing, learning, 
debating, producing handcrafted gifts (such as miniature carpets, embroidered cloth, 
cigarette boxes, wood carving, collages from scrap cloths, and bead jewelry) and creating 
anti-commodities by using the “means at hand,” like Levi-Strauss’s (1966) bricoleur (a 
game of billiards from broomsticks and crumpled paper; making natural dyes from fruit 
and vegetables; turning the tips of pens into a rosary).87  
In identifying the consumption of one’s own labor power with the consumption of 
the fruits of one’s labor, this narrativization of prison labor dispenses with the social 
relations of production to bring into the limelight a self-driven communist subject who 
enjoys his surplus labor without any obstructions. Insofar as the homology between 
surplus production and labor in prison ends in the staging of the immediate appropriation 
of the fruits of one’s (surplus) labor, this narrative cannot offer any other fantasy than 
self-affection to reorient the affective relations to social surplus. As such, the communist 
subject here proves to be an impossible subject of imaginary identification for those 
outside the prison whose relation to their surplus labor is always already mediated by 
social relations of production. “With a single subject,” Marx writes in Grundrisse (1993 
                                                
87 In contrast with the proletarians in nineteenth century France who had to write in the space of time 
intervening between the constraint of work and the constraint of sleep preparing the body for the next day’s 
work, political prisoners here occupy the privileged position of having all the days and nights of their 
desires. See Jacques Rancière’s moving account in The Nights of Labor: The Workers’ Dream in 
Nineteenth-Century France, trans. John Drury (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1989). 
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[1857]), “production and consumption appear as moments of a single act”: “The 
individual produces an object and, by consuming it, returns to himself, but returns as a 
productive and self-reproducing individual.” He goes on to disclose such identification of 
production with consumption to be an illusion which covers up the social relations of 
production coming between the individual and the fruits of one’s labor: “In society, 
however, the producer’s relation to the product, once the latter is finished, is an external 
one, and its return to the subject depends on his relations to other individuals.” (94)88  
By conflating society with an individual subject, the communist fantasy here 
inflects the capitalist libidinal economy by overdramatizing the right to enjoy one’s 
surplus labor. It would not be inaccurate to argue that this communist fantasy is a mirror 
image of the economic determinist narratives which reduce the movement of capital into 
a self-regulating expanded self-reproduction.89 In the place of the constitutive 
contradiction of capitalism which turns the expansion of value into an end in itself in the 
former narratives, the insatiable drive originates here in a subject of production who 
cannot be interrupted in its illimitable self-reproduction.  
This uninterrupted circuit of production and consumption, which is thrown out of 
balance only by the ontological openness of the desiring subject of production, however, 
dissimulates the law of equal distribution among political prisoners which makes desiring 
                                                
88 In the Introduction to the Grundrisse (1993 [1857], 88-100), Marx identifies production with 
consumption only to reveal that social relations of production produce the very means, motives, manners 
and, most importantly, subjects of consumption.  
 
89 For a critique of this determinist narrative dominant among Marxist political economists, see Yahya 
Madra and Ceren Özselçuk’s thoughtful essay “Economy, Surplus, Politics: Some Questions on Slavoj 
Žižek’s Political Economy Critique of Capitalism” in Did Somebody Say Ideology? Slavoj Žižek in a Post-
Ideological Universe, eds. Heiko Feldner and Fabio Vighi, (Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholarly 
Publishing, 2007), pp. 95-97.  
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production possible in the first place.90 This desiring subject of production who owes his 
or her existence to the law of distribution, cannot appropriate the fruits of his or her own 
labor directly if only because his or her survival depends upon identification of his or her 
desire with the desire of the group, and it is in response to this purported qualitative 
alterity of labor in prison that I will later explore the status of desire at length, by 
revealing the closure of its trajectory in the identification of the subject’s desire with the 
desire of the political collective. This discursive construction of the prison as the site of 
desiring production has as its reverse side, as we will see, the organization and perhaps 
repression of desire. 
But one might still ask how the labor of death fasting is imagined to be productive 
of surplus labor over the necessary labor of staying alive that is, if we pursue S.’s distinct 
rendering of such labor to its letter, the amount of labor required by the death fasters to 
reproduce themselves in order to remain on the death fast. What kind of a homology do 
the members of TIKB posit between surplus labor and the labor of death fasting? And 
what does such a homology function to produce in their narrative?  
C. had avoided narrating explicitly the details of their productivity which he was 
nonetheless clearly concerned to distinguish from mere preservation and reproduction of 
life.  And in seeming contradiction with the unambiguity of his earlier remarks, he cast 
this productivity into question by drawing attention to their life of relative “ease and 
comfort” compared with that of their comrades and kin outside the prison. While the 
latter were running from a government office to a demonstration in great consternation 
                                                
90 In the old prison regime, the prison representatives of the organizations could collect the individual 
deposits in a pool and distribute it equally among the prisoners. The new prison regime has rendered this 
law of distribution obsolete by individualizing the deposits of money, clothing and food. See the regulation 
which went into effect on July 13, 2005, 
http://www.cte.adalet.gov.tr/mevzuat_/yonetmelik/emanet_para_kullanim.doc.   
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about the well-being of the death fasters, all the death fasters had to do was to experience 
the boundless pleasure in living. He characterized as “utterly crazy” the joy of life to 
which his comrades and him had been prey, and began, in sounding words, to exalt the 
time when they had gone out to the ventilation space to feel the rain on their skins on 
their hundred and fourth day. The two hundred and twenty nine days that he was on the 
death fast were the “happiest time of his life,” and he continued to depict everyday life on 
the death fast as a sequence of eventless days when they were left to amuse themselves at 
their leisure in art, play and camaraderie not unlike the French Hegelian Kojève’s 
figuration of the end of history when history would know no further significant events. 
They read books, recited poems, sang folk songs, played games, wrote letters, and made 
gifts. 91 But in such narratives C.’s concerns were not simply anecdotal ones; for it would 
not be entirely untrue to recognize in his enumeration of these gratifying and entertaining 
everyday activities, which were decidedly not necessary to reproduce the conditions and 
means of survival but which instead had their ends in themselves, an appeal to the 
relation between surplus labor and desire. He was saying that they were capable of 
reproducing themselves as subjects of desire who did not merely look to their own self-
preservation and reproduction but wanted to produce—and to consume—more than 
themselves even under these conditions in which their embodied selves were decaying. 
                                                
91 Dispersed in single or three-person cells in the new F-type prisons across the country after the prison 
operation, political prisoners initially re-established communication by means of their naked voices within 
their respective prisons. They were given paper and pen two weeks later and at that time they began writing 
notes to each other which reached the other cells in the form of paper balls thrown across the adjacent walls 
of the exercise areas of the individual cells. At the end of their first month in the F-type prisons, the prison 
administrations gave back their right to communication by letters, and consequently letter writing became 
radically uncontainable within the bounds of the prison. Written and read in the mode of a collective 
conversation, letters appeared to establish temporal and spatial proximities not unlike the medium of 
speech. They contracted into the present the past but also the future which was written as if it were already 
happening at the moment of writing and as such promised its final fulfillment. These letters were 
supplemented with photographs and material objects such as dead butterflies, bugs, feathers, dried flowers 
which were found in the exercise areas of the prison cells and thus they carried metonymically their place 
of origin into their destinations, reconstituting the social in and by letter writing.  
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No longer synonymous with the quantitative difference in abstract labor time, surplus 
here designated the surplus of desire over death. Whatever the anguish of survival 
expressed by S., death fasters, on C.’s submission, were nevertheless able to domesticate 
the force of death by their desire and transmute it into the constancy or permanence that 
characterized the everyday. The endless finitude of the everyday came to stand for the 
resilience of their desire which disclosed itself in the hunger for something extra beyond 
the appetite for survival: a poem, a song, a letter, a game shared with others as if 
perpetual recitation and play could vie with the interminability of dying. Recurrence, 
here, however, did not shatter apparent self-identity; instead it was thematized as the 
affirmation of a subject who still held onto his desire despite the desultory force of death 
and derived a strange enjoyment (haz) from such mastery: “There was a certain comfort 
and easiness deriving from the lack of dread of death. They took you and locked you up 
behind four walls. They have separated you from your friends, other prisoners and the life 
outside. There are only three of you in the same cell, but they still cannot touch the thing 
that makes you respect yourself. That is of course a great joy (haz). To feel it, not to be 
on the losing side.” 92  
One might say, without doing too much violence to their narrativization that this 
desiring subject of production is staged as a full subject who coincides entirely with her 
or himself.93 If division between desire and interest is constitutive of the ideological 
                                                
92 In strictly Lacanian terms, jouissance. See his “The Subversion of the Subject and the Dialectic of Desire 
in the Freudian Unconscious,” in Écrits: A Selection, trans. Alan Sheridan (New York: W.W. Norton & 
Company, 1977), pp. 292-326. 
 
93 Gayatri Spivak (1999: 261) takes Deleuze and Foucault to task for seeking an (impossible) continuity 
between desire and interest unlike Marx’s project of class consciousness: “Full class agency (if there were 
such a thing) is not an ideological transformation of consciousness on the ground level, a desiring identity 
of the agents and their interest—the identity whose absence troubles Foucault and Deleuze. It is a 
contestatory replacement as well as an appropriation (a supplementation) of something that is “artificial” 
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subject—the division expressed in “I know that it is not in my interest to desire this, but 
still, I desire it”—the communist subject which perseveres on the Death Fast is defined as 
one who precisely lacks such a split.94 Indeed, the communist subject here displays to 
excess the coincidence between its desire and interest by narrativizing the experience of 
dying as an occasion for joyful self-transcendence against political authorities who coerce 
the militants into seeing through their desire their “interest”, one which is necessarily 
described as an individual interest in survival, love of life and well-being and life of 
pleasure.95 According to C., the communist subject repudiated this familiar life of 
pleasure which was comprised of “meaningless activities, subordinated to ordinary and 
paltry needs,” for a “true passion”, to respond to the demand of another law, one that was 
intimate and seductive, whose persuasiveness rested, paradoxically, not on a set of 
legitimate interests, but was strangely coincident with the subject’s desire. “The uncanny 
excess that perturbs the simple opposition between external social law and unwritten 
inner law,” Žižek (1991: 239) writes, “is the short-circuit between desire and law,” and 
by reading Lacan against Kant, he continues to explicate this short-circuit as “[the] point 
                                                                                                                                            
to begin with—“economic conditions of existence that separate their mode of life”” (emphasis in the 
original). 
 
94 This identification of desire with interest replicates itself in the identification of communist desire with 
the common Good. But such identification can always be refused to the political prisoners whose sacrifice 
for the common Good is susceptible to being exposed as a mask either for individual interest or even worse 
of being the instrument of the Leader’s enjoyment. I will reconsider these questions when I examine the 
mass mediation of the event in the final chapter. It is important to remember here that Marx did not make a 
moral argument about the exceptional status of the proletariat as a social agent of transformation. In fact, 
the proletariat occupied an exceptional status insofar as it was a non-class deprived of all status, property 
and particular quality. The proletariat was a real abstraction which potentially included everyone collapsing 
the difference between individual interests and class interest, and it is for this reason that Marx preferred to 
use the term “mass” (Masse) to refer to the proletariat. For Marx, it was the very “deindividualization” of 
the proletariat that opened up the possibility of true individuality or better singularity. See German 
Ideology, ed. C.J. Arthur (New York, International Publishers, 1988), pp. 84-85. 
 
95 The state authorities presented the new penitentiary regime of isolation as the autonomization of 
individual prisoners under ideological constraints. In this discourse, coercive individualization became the 
condition of possibility for the exercise of “individual liberties.” 
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at which desire itself becomes Law, a point at which insistence upon one’s desire equates 
to fulfilling one’s duty, a point at which Duty itself is marked by a stain of (surplus-) 
enjoyment.” There is a fundamental nonequivalence between the two moments or 
instances of the short-circuit described in Žižek’s account and it is by respecting this 
dissymmetry between the transcendence, always singular, of desire and its domestication 
in an over-identification with law that we will demonstrate the necessity of testifying to 
the pains and pleasures of perseverance on the Death Fast.96 Such perseverance on the 
Death Fast can be explained neither by the transgressive singularity of desire nor its 
complete alienation but rather by its ideological capture.97  
V. Subjects of Desire 
Death fasting which was described in the first instance as a “natural” reaction to 
the Turkish state’s attack came to be expressed by Erdinç shortly after in grammatical 
terms, as something one “must” do, an imperative marking the lack of  the discretion and 
reserve of judgment. The decision of death fasting was then not bound to the question of 
judgment; instead, according to Erdinç, it now appeared that an imperative had already 
intervened to suspend the alternative between “right” and “wrong,” and that, by passing 
beyond that alternative, one had begun to respond to an urgency, a demand, that 
nonetheless could not be traced back to an injunction of the Other but figured only as a 
                                                
96 Insofar as we search for pathological (in its Kantian sense) motivations such as social prestige and glory 
lurking behind the act of the death fasters, we will not be able to imagine this subject. It is our argument 
that symbolic expenditure cannot be the sole measure of this extraordinary perseverance. 
 
97 To imagine the ideological subject, we need to steer between the Scylla of desire and Charybdis of law. 
In our description of the enjoyment here, we thus part company with Žižek’s depiction of the communist 
subject (or rather the Stalinist subject) as a mere object-instrument of the law which is hardly any different 
from the Turkish state’s propagandistic representation. For an extraordinary historical account which casts 
into doubt Žižek’s analysis, see Jochen Hellback, Revolution on my mind: Writing a diary under Stalin 
(Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2006). 
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imperious silence: “Nobody asks you to go on the death fast, and if you are not on the 
death fast, nobody asks you why you are not on the death fast.” Yet nobody could bear to 
be refused inclusion under the lure of this effusive and all-embracing totality. The 
absence of the call, as it were, exacerbated the demand and one felt obliged to offer one’s 
being to attract the attention of the Other.98 What did the Other promise to give that one 
could put oneself forward to die and in such great numbers? Was it the anticipation of 
social recognition achieved at the risk of death? Or was it the certainty of escaping death 
by the immortality of the proper name? Or was it still something beyond all these 
prospects? 
We have seen that the covert process of selection disclosed a mechanism of 
interpellation which can be described as a performative speech act that recognized the 
difference of the volunteer in the conferral of the title “death faster” by organizational 
agency.99 This performative speech act transformed a mere captive into an autonomous 
political subject as one and the same with the bearers of organizational authority who 
were invested with a narcissistic perfection within a prison scene where a differentiating 
                                                
98 I use the “Other” in its Lacanian sense here referring to the symbolic authority that regulates the social 
relations in prison. This symbolic authority can be embodied by various individuals from one’s superiors in 
prison, to the members of the Central Committee, and the leader of the organization who are more or less 
idealized as its representatives. Here, I want to emphasize that the appeal to the excess of death is itself 
organized by a symbolic code. Death is both beyond and within the symbolic, or better yet folds, as it were, 
into the symbolic. Understood in this way, my ethnographic observations concur with Judith Butler’s 
epistemological and political critique of the relation between the Symbolic and the Real in Lacan and 
Žižek. See her Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex (New York: Routledge, 1993), pp. 187-
223 and Antigone’s Claim: Kinship Between Life and Death (New York: Columbia University Press, 
2000), pp. 40-55.  
 
99 I am not citing Althusser here because his specular scene of interpellation confounds symbolic 
identification with imaginary identification insofar as the former is identification with an empty place in the 
symbolic network instead of with the image of an individual who might be occupying that place. Of course, 




grade of membership organized social relations hierarchically despite its apparent non-
acknowledgment by the Turkish judiciary and prison administration.100  
This symbolic investiture, then, did not only endow the death fasters with an 
imaginary mastery which they have mistaken for the reality of a sovereign subject but 
also rendered them enviable in the eyes of other volunteers reinforcing the desire of the 
latter to take part in this self-transformative event. The volunteers were enveloped in this 
imaginary rivalry to such an extent that there were some among them who were ready to 
disregard the rules of proper investiture to accede to this place of full(er) subjectivity on 
their own initiative by means of unauthorized initiations of fasting and, rarely, self-
immolations. Indeed, these (in some measure) illicit claimants exposed the gap between 
the title and the occupant of the title, and the closure of the gap depended on a felicitous 
performance on the part of the occupant. The title had covered the occupants like a 
tombstone offering to them an almost immortal representation, except that this 
representation was incapable of guaranteeing the value of the subject once and for all; it 
had to be substantiated in their failure or success to measure up to the continuous 
demands of authority.101 For, the title came with a demand for proper performance and 
                                                
100 The organizations make a differentiation between sympathizers (sempatizan), partisans (taraftar), and 
members (üye) proper whereas the Anti-Terror Law does not recognize such distinctions. One of the main 
complaints of the advocates of political prisoners is that young men and women, who are arrested 
participating in pirate demonstrations, carrying the organization’s newspaper and other print material or 
painting the street walls with the emblem or slogans of the organization are charged with membership 
albeit the non-recognition of membership status by the outlawed political organizations themselves. 
 
101 Neither was the title capable of representing the singularity of the subject. N. told me of his ambivalence 
towards the memorialization of death fasters who lacked the qualities of a communist subject in their 
personal and professional life. If the latter was unnecessarily aggrandized and secured an undeserved lofty 
place in the history of the movement by virtue of their ability to bring their act to a successful conclusion in 
death, the contrary was also true. Participants including leading cadres who had given their years to the 
struggle fell from favor and lost face as a result of their infelicitous performance even when it was admitted 
that they had pushed their bodily capacities to their limit. In this sense, performance has overridden both 
the symbolic value of the title and singularity of the occupant, and ultimately resulting in the vitiation of the 
dependability of organizational authority. For a reading of this demand for performance as a sign of crisis 
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the occupant of the title was faced with the task of aligning this highly individual 
experience with a prescribed manner of dying, which exploited to radical effect the many 
paradoxes governing the relationship between the general and singular that were in 
themselves an uncontrollable consequence of the collective structure of the Death Fast as 
such. What was distinctive, however, about this demand for congruous performance was 
that it pushed these paradoxes to the extreme by enjoining the occupants of the title to 
persevere and if need be to consummate the act in death and one and at the same time to 
desire the very act itself; and it is at this point that everything changed and one was no 
longer allowed to discriminate with finality between what was general and what was 
singular, what was an external command and what was an autonomous act, what was 
subject to the law and what was beyond it.  
There were many death fasters who proved to be incapable of assuming fully and 
without restraint such a task and their inconstancy had betrayed, according to their 
comrades, a blind yet calculative impetuosity that was produced by the irresistible 
auraticity of the title during the jubilant inauguration of the Death Fast.102 Though the 
withdrawals in the early months of the struggle were distinguished from those that 
occurred long after the political inefficacy of the act became evident, this interpretation 
may thus be read not only as a commentary on the impressionability of individuals which 
was itself inseparable from the consecration of the death fasters, but also as a radical 
questioning of the object status of their desire if by that what is implied is that their desire 
                                                                                                                                            
in symbolic authority in modernity, see Eric Santer’s My Own Private Germany: Daniel Paul Schreber’s 
Secret History of Modernity (Princeton, N.J: Princeton University Press, 1996). 
 
102 N. indeed ascribed the high number of withdrawals in 2000 to these rituals suffused with a masculine 
heroism which, in his observation, had attracted numerous volunteers who had not carefully judged the 
self-repercussions of their decision to partake in the death fast.  
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was entirely bound to the desire of the Other: they desired nothing else but to become the 
object of the Other’s desire.103 The consequence of this critical evaluation, in turn, has 
been to determine the difference of death fasters whose felicitous perseverance is deemed 
to take them on this account beyond such object status.104  
Their difference may be measured by the extent to which they identified with the 
Other (and, once again, not with the object of the Other’s desire) to be desired as a 
subject who would, in turn, fix the gaze of others on the unfigurability of their desire.105 
The Other standing in the shadow of death reflected back at them the non-being of their 
desire as a blinding excess.106 If they nonetheless confounded this non-self-identity with 
narcissistic omnipotence it was because it became visible in its very invisibility only with 
the uncontrollable retreat of death on the fast.107  
                                                
103 For this reading of Lacan which distinguishes between the object and subject of desire on the basis of an 
understanding of human desire as pure negativity, see Mikkel Borch-Jakobsen’s “The Alibis of the 
Subject” in The Emotional Tie: Psychoanalysis, Mimesis, and Affect, trans. Douglas Brick (Stanford: 
Stanford University Press, 1993), pp. 155-175. 
 
104 In Group Psychology, Freud indeed describes society as a unanimous “mass” whose members have all 
put the same “object” (the Leader) in the place of the ego ideal and who identify with each other as a result. 
It is interesting to note that what remains specific to the totalitarian subject in Žižek becomes a predicate of 
political subjectivity in general in Freud. 
 
105 Indeed, such unfigurability generates the possibility and even the obligation of figuring, and for this 
reason, it must be also responsible for all those cases where the figures in question turn out merely to be 
provisional, false, or assumed ones. The organizational authority has always tried to control the difference 
between proper and improper figurations until the moment when the whole stability of this dominant 
discourse became undone with the political failure of the prison struggle revealing a plethora of singular 
figurations underneath the general one. At the risk of repeating the violence of generalization, I must say 
that honor and fidelity were the most common figurations of this desire that individual death fasters found 
themselves compelled to profess as their own reasons for continuing with the fast in the later stages of the 
struggle. I return to this question in Chapter V. 
 
106 Following Borch-Jakobsen’s reading, I am reading the originary lack of desire as the lack of being of 
desire which can only be recognized in the unobjectifiable excess of the Other’s desire.  
 
107 In my reading, the closure of the transcendence in immanence of desire is secondary to its capture with 
the lure of a force enabling self-differentiation. Underlying Žižek’s (and the rest of his Slovenian Lacanian 
School) critique of Althusser’s theory of ideological interpellation is the issue that has to do with the degree 
to which the promise of autonomy and self-identity can account for the way subjects are gripped by 
ideological practices. However, even Žižek’s reading remains somewhat unsatisfactory for it too is 
 117 
For, on one level, the demand for performance left much of the distance between 
the title and its bearer in place, while wildly exacerbating its effects in order to turn the 
emptiness of the title into a full embodiment of desire by doubling the death faster’s 
body; thus, on another level, it served to expose the lack of desire by introducing a split 
between the mortal, suffering body and another one which was supposed to be equal to 
the limitlessness of desire in its phantasmatic invulnerability. N. had turned away from 
his own body to such a degree that he did not once doubt that the dandruff-like flakes 
falling off the cuffs of his pants on his hundredths were the dust on the dirty cell floor 
until the time when the doctors who visited their cell to check upon their health condition 
told him that he was shedding his own dead skin. If their act had brought death into 
proximity, they also wanted to keep death at a distance, to exclude it from the purview of 
life by a withdrawal of cathexis from their mortal bodies. This decathexis, however, was 
not simply a way of avoiding the encounter with death; it was at the same a way of 
bearing their title by displacing the narcissistic libido onto an ideal ego.108 They elevated 
themselves above their mortal bodies only by saving their narcissism, by blowing 
themselves up to the height of their ideal ego which was deemed invulnerable. The more 
they approached their end, their death in an endless movement, the more they 
                                                                                                                                            
ultimately dependent on the reduction of desire to a desire for an impossible full identity. If the subject does 
not inexorably find its own place in the symbolic network, does this failure of symbolic self-representation 
necessarily produce a desire for full identity which ideology exploits to radical effect by offering the 
subject the eluding object that provides enjoyment as opposed to mere pleasure? In the last analysis, is 
desire always a desire for an impossible full identity or rather does desire always desire its alteration 
because it is not fixed on any predetermined object? For, as Deleuze and Guattari claim in Anti-Oedipus, 
desire invests first of all and most fundamentally not in this or that object, nor in this or that objective, but 
in an increase of force, even though such force is usually and most easily and widely accessible through the 
very power structures that channelize and repress it.  
 
108 Freud calls this differentiation within narcissism “idealization”. In his paper “On Narcissism: An 
Introduction” (Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, vol. 14, p. 94), 
Freud writes: “This ideal ego is now the target of the self-love which was enjoyed in childhood by the 
actual ego. The subject’s narcissism makes its appearance displaced on to this new ideal ego, which, like 
the infantile ego, finds itself possessed of every perfection that is of value.” 
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apperceived themselves to be invulnerable, feeling a dominion over the world and others. 
C. spoke of his heightened power of cognition and clear-sightedness which came with 
such feeling of invulnerability: “I felt as if I had conquered the world. All the burdens 
and responsibilities of everyday life had disappeared or they had begun to appear as 
insignificant and trivial. I was able to provide everyone with solutions to their problems 
including families who were visiting us in the prison. I had an amazing lucidity. I don’t 
think I ever felt this lucid since I joined the movement. Life had become transparent.” 
Unlike the feeling of the sublime which is always a negative pleasure, a pleasure that 
takes the place of a discomfiting fascination with an overwhelming force by separating 
oneself from it and thus by vanquishing it with the power of one’s reason109, the feeling 
of elevation, here, is akin to a manic elation where symbolic identification with the ego 
ideal collapses into an imaginary doubling, propelling them toward death, toward the 
death they want to master with full consciousness, without being rent apart by it.  
Y. wanted to be conscious of dying and not consciousness dying, and identified 
her desire for impossible self-presence before death with a desire for uprightness which 
was, in her words, only the property of man: “You know trees die standing upright. I said 
I am going to die standing upright in the act. I imagined a fully conscious death coming at 
an unexpected time for them [the prison administration] in order that they would not be 
able to force feed me. I knew from witnessing the death of other comrades that it was 
biologically impossible to remain conscious. As the body gets weaker, you begin to lose 
consciousness, but still I wanted to die with full consciousness remembering all my 
comrades. In other words, I wanted die like a human being, like a man [sic].” She 
                                                
109 For the feeling of sublime [das Erhabene], see Immanuel Kant’s Critique of Judgment, trans. Werner S. 
Pluhar (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1987), Second Book, § 23-29. 
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referred to M.’s death as an exemplary one because she had hidden the signs of death 
until her very last moment. “The doctors saw into the weakness of her body and attrition, 
but they still could not tell that she was so close to her death which took her that 
weekend. We were discharged to the hospital on April 19 [2001] and she died on the 
twenty second. We had gathered around her on her last day. She was so weak that she 
was not able to join in the conversation much. During the night her pulse got slower and 
around 2 am, a comrade who was watching over her told us that she had given her last 
breath. She seemed as if she were sleeping calmly. She had frustrated their attempt at 
forced feeding by latching onto death in this way. She knew that she would have died not 
one, but a thousand deaths following the medical intervention.” To refuse her death 
would intensify her suffering so much that she would die not one, but a thousand deaths. 
One had to render death invisible, then, to evade greater suffering impending in the hands 
of the other; but the ability to conceal death was only another name for the ability to 
conceal the prevailing suffering. One had to struggle as if there was life and only life 
before the moment of death, as if life had not already passed overtly, and without 
mediation, into its opposite. The only death allowed them was an unforeseen and 
inconspicuous “drop down” in the course of an active and industrious struggle for there 
was supposed to be no dying but only life abounding in itself in the space where they 
found themselves suspended between life and death. This was the burden of the TIKB’s 
fasters. 
VI. Disciplining Dying 
To speak—and to be open—about one’s own pain was therefore to fall subject to 
the “weakness of the will” which produced a renewed and interior struggle, one through 
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which the death fasters who could not cope with the suffering would be compelled to 
transform themselves in the ideal image of the communist subject. The exemplary 
communist who was to be emulated was Nikolai Alexeevich Ostrovosky, a Red Army 
soldier and writer who had continued to struggle for the revolutionary cause in spite of 
his paralysis and blindness.110 In a letter from the Uşak Prison, M. described the death 
fasters in these words: “They had set their eyes upon becoming Ostrovsky. Beyond their 
readiness to welcome the possibility of severe impairments, they imagined to continue to 
live on in this condition. Rather than succumbing to the loss of their limbs, they were 
looking forward to recuperating their missing limbs with an unlimited drive for self-
transformation which would overcome all limits including the lack of limbs. They were 
always enraged with those who chose to consume themselves by fearing incapacitation. 
They had become limitless (sınırsızlaşmışlardı).”111 Becoming Ostrovsky is, then, to 
“overpower” or transcend one’s limits in going to the limit of what one can do. The 
TIKB’s death fasters were driven by this notion of the limit which always already 
becomes the passage yet to another limit until it touches on its own impossibility, the 
limit of suffering that a body can still endure.112  
                                                
110 His first novel, How the Steel was Tempered is translated into Turkish as Ve Çeliğe Su Verildi. The 
online reviewers of the Turkish translation speak of the powerful impact of the novel upon their decision to 
join the communist movement after reading it during their high school years. I also encountered 
paraphrases of his famous quote among the published letters: “Man’s dearest possession is life. It is given 
to him but once, and he must live it so as to feel no torturing regrets for wasted years, never know the 
burning shame of a mean and petty past; so live that, dying he might say: all my life, all my strength were 
given to the finest cause in all the world-the fight for the Liberation of Mankind.” 
 
111 See Damlada Okyanus, p. 174. 
 
112 With Blanchot, Deleuze, Foucault, and quite a number of others that they read Hölderlin, Sade, 
Nietzsche, Kafka and Bataille, one could only transgress internal limits, but then the limit borders upon the  
limitlessness of a space and time without bounds. Each transgression of the limit must engender yet another 
transgression. For this notion of spiral transgression, see Michel Foucault, “A Preface to Transgression”, in 
Language, Counter-Memory, Practice, ed. Donald F. Bouchard, trans. Donald F. Bouchard and Sherry 
Simon (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977), pp. 29-52.  
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Nuray suffered from severe headaches during her last few months.113 She felt 
nauseous with every sip of water. To preempt vomiting, she had developed a few 
methods. She was lying down in bed without a pillow, pulling one of her legs up to her 
abdomen, and swallowing her spittle ten or fifteen times. When her comrades wanted to 
give her a head massage, or massage her entire body suffering from rheumatism since the 
age of six, she would say, “Don’t worry about it, it does not help at all. You haven’t read 
the papers today, why don’t you read me some articles?” (253) They knew that her bones 
hurt as if they were going to be scattered into pieces. Yet she still did not talk of her pain 
though they were able to read it on her face momentarily or make her tell them with 
irritation. One day they had seen the pain on her face and she had seen that they had seen 
her pain, and trying to fend off their gaze, she said smiling, “These are natural symptoms 
of the death fast. Why are you looking at me with such grief? It is not so bad at all” (254). 
When her pain resurfaced in her facial expressions another day and they inquired, she 
reported nonchalantly, “Nothing, my entire body has become numb.” (254) Numbness 
was from anemia, a serious condition when it was aggravated by the heat. It sometimes 
spread to her head and they would lay her down on a cool place and massage her body to 
promote her blood circulation. She had been seeing ever more poorly over the previous 
four months, but she did not care much. They rested her eyes with cotton pads and gave 
her a massage, starting from her eyes and moving towards her hair tips. This massage 
would suddenly revive her and they would find her either writing a letter to a comrade or 
                                                                                                                                            
 
113 This following section on Nuray’s experience is an excerpt from a twenty-page letter or rather a report 
written by her superior in Uşak Prison which I have perhaps improperly rewritten in some measure in free 
indirect style. For the entire letter entitled Kolektif Özne [Collective Subject], see Damlada Okyanus, pp. 
250-68. I give the exact page numbers for the direct speech quotes in the body of the writing. 
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looking closely at the cards and stationary that they were preparing as gifts, or watching 
the news by pinching her eyes. 
The best way of living with pain was to act as if it was not there, as if it was 
“nothing,” and one had to fight a veritable war within oneself, complete with hesitations, 
lapses, failings, and renewed commitments to achieve this more or less apathetic state 
under the gaze of friends and enemies. One was challenged, then, to an internal war 
which was deemed to be far more important than the ideological war raging outside for 
self-conquest was believed to bring into being the “free communist subject”; and 
consequently, the lack of body was almost always registered as the lack of desire in the 
fasting subject whose every outward move and expression was observed and recorded 
minutely. Reporting on the worsening temper of Nuray, who had started to have 
difficulties in taking in liquids, Hüsne wrote with no less certainty: “We knew very well 
that the problem was neither in the stomach nor in the throat but in the head. Our whole 
endeavor was to impel her to strengthen her will against her weaknesses which had 
nothing to do with her bodily capacities.” (257) Perhaps, it had everything to do with the 
capacities of the body and the disavowal of bodily lack dissimulated the subjection of 
desire which found its ideological expression in the idiom of “will.”114 To the extent that 
                                                
114 In her critical genealogy of the faculty of will in Western theology and philosophy, Hannah Arendt 
makes the claim that will was discovered in its impotence—“I will but I cannot”—an impotence which 
originates from the division of the self between its opposing powers of affirmation and negation—“I will 
and I nill”. She goes on to argue, following in the tracks of Nietzsche, that it is actually the experience of 
self-conquest that gives the illusive feeling of power by means of which we become aware of a faculty 
called will. By identifying ourselves with the part of the self which commands, we experience a feeling of 
superiority which comes from wielding power. But as Arendt insists—and so does Nietzsche—power here 
is only a feeling of power and one which is born of self-subjugation though the acting subject, who is a 
force among other forces, experiences him or herself as a causative agent by mistaking the effects of these 
multiple forces as its own making. If will turns out to have any effect at all, then, it has the effect of 
producing an interiority which mistakes its self-subjugation for real freedom in the world. Arendt writes 
(1978: 138): “Harborer of freedom turns out to be the destroyer of all freedom.” One could argue, then, that 
this insistence on the will is a form of coercion whereby the subject is compelled to vanquish its suffering 
part to become “free.” 
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ideological captivity is sealed first and foremost in the misrecognition of oneself as an 
autonomous and self-identical subject, we can contend after Althusser that the idiom of 
will is the ideological effect par excellence and as such it covers up coercion—the 
disciplinary coercion which goes into the making of an ideological subject who is 
supposed to recognize the effect of such work as its own desire springing from his or 
herself, intrinsic and unforced. Accordingly, the voice of the suffering body marks the 
place of the disjuncture between desire and law, and attending to this voice which sounds 
so self-indulgent, so narcissistically closed upon itself in these narratives, we will see that 
it is actually muffled by the reverberations of a superegoic voice which raises narcissism 
to another level by which the subjects are asked to measure, value and align 
themselves.115 
The war inside Nuray, in Hüsne’s words, was continuing on with forward and 
backward moves: “When she made a leap forward, she was overjoyed, but when she 
could not cope with the pain, she would start attacking others around her.” (255) Nuray 
was shouting with untypical impatience and brusqueness when the salt or drops of lemon 
juice in her water were a little too much. One of their comrades who did not know Nuray 
well could not put up with her capricious demands anymore and exploded one day: “She 
thinks that ‘I am a death faster, so I deserve everything. I can shout at anyone, I can 
despise them’.” (255) Hüsne and others explained to this comrade that the ground of 
Nuray’s domineering behavior was not in arrogance. Nuray was acting in such an 
imperious manner because she was no longer able to handle the suffering and looked for 
                                                
115 In “On Narcissism: An Introduction” (SE, 14, 93-94), Freud writes that idealization “heightens the 
demands of the ego” raising the level of repression. By showing that idealization is one method of forming 
the superego, the narcissistic way, Freud makes the important point that narcissism is indeed a way of 
repressing and channeling desire.  
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others to blame. True, one could have continued to struggle in this way, Hüsne conceded 
with disdain, one could have overcome obstacles in this way, and one could have died in 
this way. They had always thought that confining the struggle to dying was a short-
sighted vision. “Why should we limp and demand of our comrades to carry us on their 
backs,” she asked, “when we have the chance to fly in the sky?”(256) It was not enough 
to be able to die. One had to be capable of dying upright without yielding to the sordid 
intimacy of death which could not have been shared with the others. They alluded to the 
death of Cengiz Soydaş, DHKP-C’s death faster who was the very first one to die on 
March 21, 2001. They had heard by word of mouth that he had vomited out parts of his 
internal organs, and neither the doctors who came to check upon him nor his comrades 
had realized how much pain he had been going through until his very last moment. He 
had spent all his energy reassuring everyone around him that he was doing well. They 
had become aware of his self-dissimulation by looking at what had come out of his bed 
after his dead body was taken away. 
Nuray’s condition was getting serious and her cantankerousness had gone out of 
control.  Her entire world had begun to be comprised solely of her pains which had begun 
to reach up at her reason. Every sip of water was sitting on her throat like a fist, and she 
was coughing for a very long period of time when she was not able to swallow the water. 
When Hüsne compelled her to drink water one day, she shouted back at her 
acrimoniously, “Come and drink it yourself if you can with this throat and stomach!” 
Hüsne reminded her that she had been doing much worse than Nuray on her fortieths 
during the Death Fast in 1996. For each teaspoon of water she had drunk, she had 
vomited for hours. Hüsne had not stopped trying and she had finally stopped the 
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vomiting. Hadn’t Nuray herself been a witness to her efforts at the time? They were 
aware that she was suffering from great pains, but Hüsne and her other comrades were 
determined to keep her from riveting herself to her pain. If she were to think about 
everything in the cosmos except her pain, her pain would have diminished considerably. 
For though theirs was a companionship in suffering, yet Nuray suffered, as it were, alone 
even to the point of finding satisfaction in the anticipation of their bodily deterioration: 
“I’ll see you all if you yourselves get worse tomorrow.” All of them had pains in different 
parts of their bodies and they knew that their pain was going to intensify over the coming 
days. They acquiesced that they might not have the power to say a single word the next 
day, but Nuray had the power to do so at the moment, and yet she still refused to take in 
any liquids with a perilous stubbornness. “Why do you have your eyes set upon pain?” 
they asked in a reproaching manner as if death and only death was her aim. “Why do you 
assume that you are feeling worse than everybody else?”(257) A feeling with which, by 
their verdict, she was fleeing from life whilst certainly deceiving herself about her 
weaknesses. It may have been this companionship, its example and the control it 
exercised, which held Nuray back from closing in upon her death. But it also made her 
flee its corrective and restricting influence upon her more extravagant manner of dying. 
Here, we see that the reduction of pain to weakness of the will clandestinely performs the 
reduction of the singularity of death. Death is no longer singular and irreducible, but 
comparable. The paradox of death—that death is irreducibly singular and general at the 
same time—is leapt over by imposing an impossible synchronicity—dying at the same 
time.116 This imperative of synchronicity (which substitutes for simultaneity) is 
                                                
116 In Aporias, Jacques Derrida figures this anachrony as originary mourning: “(death is ultimately the 
name of impossible simultaneity and of an impossibility that we know simultaneously, at which we await 
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transformed into a desire for going on (and thus dying) endlessly in R.’s narrative of his 
experience in the death fast in 1996 which was preserved and transmitted to the death 
fasters in 2000 as an ideal conduct to be emulated.  
VII. The Law of Perseverance  
While the rest of the hunger strikers, even those whose existent infirmities and 
ailments had prepared everyone for their early debilitation, were still on their feet, R. 
became bed-ridden on his thirtieth day. He had started feeling unwell towards his thirtieth 
day; and after a minor recovery which had proved to be temporary, he was completely 
unable to stand up and walk on his thirty-seventh. His spine and joints were aching 
terribly and, with each new day, he became incapable of doing the things he was doing 
the day before. He was looking for difficult tasks to assign himself in order not to become 
completely immobile. What could he have done in bed? For a while, putting on and 
taking off his sweat pants had become his major occupation. He was able to accomplish 
this task two or three times in more than an hour.  
After becoming bedridden, he had started to feel a strong sense of guilt. It was 
“too soon” for the onset of vomiting and immobilization: “It was not easy for me to 
overcome this feeling of guilt which had its grounds in these symptoms. I kept thinking 
that I was demoralizing everyone around me by becoming bedridden so early in the 
struggle. I suspected that I was weakening everyone else’s resolve to continue with the 
action” (116).117 He did not want to be seen by anyone as if the signs of his mortality 
                                                                                                                                            
each other, at the same time, ama as one says in Greek: at the same time, simultaneously, we are expecting 
this anachronism and this contretemps)”, p. 65. The ethical relation to the other’s death is here 
overshadowed by the violent generalization of dying.   
 
117 R. was one of my first informants and he was introduced to me as a heroic figure in spite of his ongoing, 
tumultuous separation from the organization at the time of our encounter in the summer of 2003. I quote 
here from his diary which is published as part of the collective memoir entitled Ölümü Yenenleri Kimse 
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would have the effect of rendering the rest of them vulnerable to death. He found the 
visitations of his comrades disquieting for he was reminded of his ailing state whenever 
he had to talk to them and he could not escape from the feeling of embarrassment. To 
save himself the trouble, he was trying hard not to demand anything of them. His “too 
soon” debilitation in relation to the imperative of synchronicity had instigated a 
pernicious self-questioning. He exhausted himself in questions: Why had he become like 
this at such an early period in a struggle which would go on for a long time? How had he 
prepared himself for it? Was he disheartening everyone around him because he had not 
prepared well?  It was clear to him that he had not prepared well for the struggle. If he 
had established a strong relationship with the struggle, he insisted, he would not have 
fallen into this condition at such an early stage. Brooding at length over the implications 
of his early debilitation, he concluded that it was not so much his will as his physical 
strength which had betrayed him in the struggle. Corporeality was the real medium of 
betrayal and he acknowledged readily that it went beyond his powers to surmount such 
bodily impasse. Yet this acceptance of his finitude, instead of disburdening him of his 
anger at stumbling so soon, served only to confirm his desire to die quickly. He was the 
only one, he wrote, who could have put an end to his troubles. To end the struggle would 
mean to accept self-defeat, so it was inadmissible to withdraw from the strike. If he did 
not have the physical strength to continue with the struggle, he should, then, be able to 
die. But would he able to achieve dying? On his fiftieths, he had his last conversation 
with comrade T. who had also become bedridden a few weeks after him. If the struggle 
were to stretch itself in time, the two ailing men conjectured, the condition of the rest of 
                                                                                                                                            
Yenemez [No one can Defeat Those who have Defeated Death] (Istanbul: Özbasım Yayın, 1997), pp. 115-
126. 
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the comrades would begin to deteriorate, escalating the risk of physical and mental 
impairment. The two came to the conclusion that they had to achieve their ends before 
the rest of the comrades became bedridden like themselves. They agreed upon the 
exigency of accelerating the process by dying. But if this decision to hasten his death is 
an important thematic turn in R.’s account, it is also one that announces its own necessary 
retraction. Later in his memoir, R. admits that it was difficult for him to search for 
sources of motivation other than death which made of his impotence an interim state.  
The signs for new sources of motivation were revealed to him in his deathbed 
conversations with others which opened a completely new phase of tenacious resistance 
to death. When he was unable to move even a finger from repeated vomiting on his 
fiftieths, one of the sympathizer comrades came to R.’s bedside and asked in a distressed 
tone, “Why aren’t you withdrawing? You would know better, but it seems to me that you 
cannot go on in this way. The best thing to do is to withdraw.” (118) It was a very 
disturbing encounter for R. and while he was trying to restrain the violence of his anger, 
his visitor went on to say, “I cannot come near you. When I pass by your bed, I close my 
eyes so as not to see you. I cannot stand to see you in this way, I am getting really sad.” 
Taking notice of his trembling voice, self-interruptive speech, and hesitant gestures, R. 
had already made up his mind that his response would have to be toconvince the young 
sympathizer of the necessity of continuing with the struggle without injuring him. R. 
explained to him that they had to continue with the struggle to preempt the other 
comrades from becoming bedridden like them. Withdrawing here and now, R. told him, 
would be to impel the other comrades to fall into the same condition. After a momentary 
silence, R. asked him when he was thinking of withdrawing. Upon this question, the 
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young sympathizer responded to R. in the most decisive tone, “If you’re not withdrawing 
in this condition, why should I?” This conversation reinforced R.’s will to live by making 
him realize that his very perseverance could be one of the ways of spurring his comrades 
to go on. If his continuing with the struggle was a source of motivation for his comrades, 
then his task was to go on as long as possible. He had been feeling useless since his early 
collapse, but now that his new task was revealed to him, he experienced a renewed 
determination to live. In the end, his becoming bedridden early in the struggle had driven 
him to fight against death even more strongly and redoubled his reasons for living. 
VIII. The Law of Invisibility 
R.’s position in the Death Fast in 1996 is singular and his perseverance is 
susceptible of two radically divergent readings, depending on whether death is seen as 
triumph or defeat. In 1996, the crucial role of vitamin B-1 in the postponement of death 
was not yet known and, as a result, the period of starvation was crucially shorter, 
rendering death an inescapable necessity for the majority of the death fasters. Moreover, 
the death fasters had a greater ability to exercise their right to death for, as was to be 
discovered in the ensuing years, the Turkish government proved to be incapable of taking 
control of the operation of the death fast because of the peculiar specificity of the ward 
system where the death fasters began and always ended their act under the perpetual 
protection and care of their comrades without the constant threat of seizure.118 R. was an 
exceptional figure in 1996 in that he sacrificed his right to death by dedicating himself to 
the collective as a model for uninterrupted performance. But if R. in this way became a 
model for the TIKB’s death fasters in 2000, the generalization of his performance was a 
                                                
118 In fact, death fasters were given medical care by their own comrades and the bodies of the dead ones 
were not delivered over to the prison officials before proper funeral ceremonies in the wards. 
 
 130 
paradoxical outcome of the withdrawal of death from the realm of possibility in the latter 
death fast. It may be remembered that the appeal to Blanchot was a key move in my 
argument for it allowed me to figure the relation to death on the fast one and at the same 
time as extreme possibility and impossibility. I now want to emphasize that the use of 
vitamin B-1 in 2000 exacerbated this radical ambiguity of death and, furthermore, the 
deployment of forced feeding on the part of the Turkish government had the effect of 
making death impossible, leaving in its place the alarming prospect of becoming an 
invalid in the hands of the enemy.119 The TIKB’s fasters in 2000 were keenly aware of 
the limits imposed upon them by the impossibility of dying; but they realized too that 
those limits were not only the end, but also the beginning of their very attachment to life, 
the basis of both their impotence and inexhaustibility, their vulnerability and forbearance. 
Consequently, indiscernibility became the only conceivable condition of (more) proper 
death for the death fasters who endeavored to disappear into the general company to 
avoid being seized by the government appointed group of physicians visiting the prison 
hospital every day.120 And this is why, as death receded from their grasp, these survivors 
                                                
119 Whether forced feeding results in permanent impairment of the nervous system or not is a contentious 
issue between the government and the political organizations. I will examine the respective arguments of 
these oppositional positions in Chapter VI. But suffice it here to say that it was the administration of 
intravenous saline without a dose of vitamin B-1 which was behind the various degrees of impairment 
besides the irreversible effects of long-term starvation. The Association of Turkish Physicians had already 
informed the physicians at the prison hospitals and elsewhere about this fundamental requirement and the 
former incidents were in fact an unintended consequence of the continuous deferral of ethical responsibility 
among the physicians that culminated in the delivery of unconscious death fasters into the hands of 
physicians who knew hardly anything about their condition. But what is crucial for our purposes is that 
death fasters tried to evade from forced feeding on the fearful assumption that they would be intentionally 
impaired by the government’s physicians which was not untrue in certain exceptional cases. 
 
120 As I have noted in the prior chapter, the Turkish government decided to collect the death fasters in 
hospitals without waiting for their conditions to worsen after the first death in March followed by 
consecutive ones in April. Some of these death fasters who refused to accept medical treatment were sent 
back to their prison cells. In a letter written in April 2001, an anonymous prisoner-doctor informs his 
comrades that these death fasters were adversely affected by the long and burdensome transfers which were 
wearing them away unnecessarily. See Damlada Okyanus, p. 316-317. 
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of an impossible death exhibited a veritable narcissistic vulnerability regarding the 
integrity of their physical image. But if this concern with their appearance arose in 
response to a sense of the threat of forced feeding hanging over them, it was also a direct 
consequence of the imaginary rivalry between the death fasters who had fallen subject to 
the necessity and the compulsion to compare themselves with each other. This destructive 
game of rivalry between equals or “competition” in their idiom was another name for the 
desire for synchronicity—the impossible desire to die at the same time—which was 
turned into an imperative, as we have seen, by the disciplinary gaze of organizational 
authority. From 1996 to 2000, however, the rivalry between the death fasters had changed 
its aim from death to life for the auraticity of proper death had given way to the abject 
impossibility of dying. In 1996, such imaginary identification had introduced an 
antagonistic tension between the individual death fasters who were competing with each 
other to reach death before the other precisely because the possibility of (a more) proper 
death promised to render one incommensurable with the rest of the fasters. Accordingly, 
each healthier case was thus driven to think slightingly of itself in front of the dying one 
and the event of death gave rise to an irremediable distance the only antidote to which 
proved to be death itself, again. In his diary published as part of a collective memoir on 
the 1996 Death Fast, an anonymous death faster expresses his inadequacy in the face of 
death with these words: “I was feeling equal to the comrades before they fell as martyrs 
in the course of the action. Our journey was still continuing and we had the same chance 
of meeting at the line of immortality. But it is very difficult for me now to accept the fact 
that this equality has been lost forever. For this reason, I cannot restrain myself from 
wanting to stop time in order that the feeling of equality will linger.”121 Not incidentally 
                                                
121 See Ölümü Yenenleri Kimse Yenemez [No one can Defeat Those who have Defeated Death] (Istanbul: 
 132 
then, the closeness to death forged an intimacy which apparently only served to aggravate 
the competition between the death fasters who found themselves in a dyadic relationship 
regarding death. In the same collective memoir, we find a transcription of the voice 
recording of Osman [Akgün]’s last conversation before his loss of consciousness on his 
sixty-fourth day. Two anonymous death fasters who profess to have already lost the 
competition (and thus perhaps their anonymity) address the vicious competition that still 
continues at the very heart of the relation between Seyit and Osman who had started 
fasting at the same time: “No doubt you [Osman] have warm feelings for us. We feel the 
same way towards you, but we also know that Seyit occupies a special place for you 
since you two have started at the same time and have been running together ever since. 
You have guaranteed to be ahead of us in this competition, but nothing is conclusive yet 
between Seyit and you.”122 And echoing back the spur of his two comrades, Osman 
swears to compete with Seyit to the very end testifying to their bondship in death. But 
this idiom of competition might best be seen, as F. related to me, as humorous 
playfulness on the part of the death fasters in better condition. When they prompted their 
counterparts in lesser health to compete in order to embrace death, they were instead 
prescribing life to their comrades and the competition was made to signify here in fact a 
competition to take death upon oneself, to die in the other’s place since they believed that 
they could preempt the other’s death by dying before the other. But humor, as Freud 
(1988: 428-429) observes, “has something of grandeur and elevation,” and this 
distinguishing feature, he continues, “clearly lies in the triumph of narcissism, the 
                                                                                                                                            
Özbasım Yayın, 1997), p. 18. 
 
122 Ibid., p. 67. According to the transcription, Osman’s words were recorded at 7.48 pm on July 22, 1996, 
five days before his death which took place on the last day of the death fast. 
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victorious assertion of the ego’s invulnerability.” It is such grandeur and elevation that 
the death fasters approaching death have lost in 2000 because the possibility of proper 
death was withdrawn from them with the result that the death fasters of this latter period 
endeavored instead to preserve their individual dignity by blending into the general 
population. During this latter period, both the possibility of life and death was largely 
reliant on the similarity and thus the paradoxical impersonality of appearance in order to 
escape from being delivered over to the government’s physicians with the loss of 
consciousness. For incommensurability had come to be seen as a sign of vulnerability to 
becoming a thing in the hands of the enemy, and thus death fasters sought to keep up an 
average look to ensure their anonymity among the larger group gathered by force in 
hospitals. Such being the attitude, it is easy to understand that each death faster was 
inclined to appear as healthy as possible, even struggling so as to belong to the circle of 
the able-bodied, or come as close to it as possible. And so they served as mirrors to each 
other reflecting back bodily differences that were disclosed in order to be immediately 
concealed from outside eyes which sought to detect every single change in their physical 
appearance and movement. Has she lost weight or not? How visible is it? Has her face 
sunken? What must she do to make it look more bright-eyed and ruby-cheeked? 
According to F., their caretaker at Bayrampaşa Prison Hospital, the death fasters made an 
effort to help each other to conform to the standard by sharing critical knowledge 
regarding their physical states. If one could drink three liters of water, she would propose 
ways of making it easier for the other to raise her level of intake. If one identified a type 
of herbal tea that quelled her stomach pain, she would offer it to the other.  
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The death fasters in lesser health became aware only belatedly of their differences 
and acted as if they could perpetuate their selves by way of mimesis of the others in 
better condition. However, the converse might also have been equally true in this stoic 
play, and it is arguable that the death fasters in better condition too were compelled to 
efface their difference to deflect the daily assaults of the committee of physicians, 
military officers and government officials. This society of death fasters in the prison 
hospital would attempt to deceive the latter’s gaze by gathering together and dispersing 
around the sicklier ones according to a random movement of similarity and difference, a 
reciprocal intensification of indistinguishability. At times, some lay in bed, others sat 
down and some others still stood up; at others, the same persons shifted their places 
haphazardly in order that the bedridden death fasters could hardly be noticed by the 
unwanted visitors who would be confused by such inconstancy. Despite the work of 
dissimulation, the law of imperceptibility would nonetheless encounter an inescapable 
limit when individual differences could no longer be concealed and a small number of 
them would stand against the rest in all their singular frailty.  
With time, L.’s hands and face were covered with bleeding sores and if she was 
able to secret her hands from the gaze of the inspecting committee, it was impossible to 
hide her face which she saw reflected in the concerned looks of her companions. Indeed, 
when, at one moment, she ran into Bahar, a death faster from an earlier team which had 
started fasting two months before hers, F. heard her exclaim while commenting on the 
awkwardness with which she endeavored to remain alive: “Have you seen Bahar?” Bahar 
had started a long time before L. and yet she looked healthy and firm. She did not have 
any sores and she was able to walk by herself. L. tormented herself for not taking full 
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control of her body as if her body would listen to her commands like an obedient soldier. 
She confronted her mortality with an overwhelming sense of guilt which only served to 
identify her with the very force of dissolution that undid her two hundred days of work 
and ruined the very possibility of victory. The death fasters, as we have brought to 
attention earlier, were divided up into teams that joined in the movement at different 
intervals in 2000 and the comparison and the competition associated with such 
comparisons were especially recurrent among those from different teams. That L. was 
unquestionably the worse case of the two F. could not deny in all sincerity. Yet, at the 
time of this strange and climactic encounter, she had reminded L. in a knowing way that 
two hundredths was an incredible number of days for her given that she was shot at the 
age of fourteen in a police operation and in the light of this private event she concluded 
that L. should not put too much pressure on her feeble body. But what was immediately 
clear was that L. did not compete with herself but with an other at the very moment when 
equality proved to be impossible. The constitutions of the two women were irreducible to 
each other and yet it was far from evident that L., to the extent that she measured her 
threshold of endurance by that of the latter, was convinced that it was a great 
achievement for her to bring her body through this number of days for there were others 
who had already reached their three hundredths in good health. Whatever her partial 
blindness to her bodily limits, the law of perseverance that required L. remain invisible 
was inescapable. R. did not have to hide the mortality of his body; this, exceptionally, he 
had converted into a pedagogical advantage for the ideological formation of the political 
collective if only because he could indeed die a more proper death among his long-time 
comrades. L., on the other hand, had to respond to two demands at the same time, the 
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demand for perseverance and the demand of invisibility for she was allowed to end her 
fast by her organization on the sole condition that she was released from prison, and she 
could only be released with a forensic report diagnosing her with Wernicke-Korsakoff 
Syndrome. Like the other TIKB fasters, L. had to hold herself indeterminately on that 
thin line between life and death which meant that she would be perpetually dying.  
L. died in Çapa University Hospital on January 8, 2002 ten days after her release 
after a brief recovery. Her family had put all their efforts toward having her forensic 
report faxed to the office of the Attorney General from the State’s Forensics where it had 
been waiting for weeks and according to her sister, who was L.’s official visitor at the 
prison hospital, their private ambulance arrived at the scene at the same time with the 
military ambulance which was leaving with L.. By then, she was unconscious and no 
longer able to intervene in the final fight over her body. In her unproduced screenplay 
Lemon Tree (2006)123, L.’s sister, D., gives an account of L.’s struggle before her loss of 
consciousness and I want to quote this scene at length in order to share this eerie incident 
in which, as L. lies moribund on her bed, having apparently already slipped away, she 
hears the metal door—at which point she revives and is brought back to life, not once but 
twice.124 
Scene VI A Block 
                                                
123 A copy of the screenplay was given to me by L.’s sister, D. herself. I translated the entire screenplay into 
English for her funding applications for film production.  
 
124 The title of the screenplay comes from a widely circulating story among the members of TIKB which 
recount the sprouting of a lemon seed from muddy soil fuming with deathly gas vapors. TIKB’s women 
prisoners (including L. and Y.) were all covered with mud from their hair tips down to the soles of their 
shoes, having been dragged along a muddy ground and beaten up with their face in it during the operation 
in Ümraniye Prison. Instead of washing off the mud in the bathroom, they collected it in a tub and aired out 
the soil which was suffused with the gas from the bombs used in the prison operation. They put a lemon 
seed inside this soil and took care of it every single day, changing its place constantly depending on the 
sunlight available, and in the first week of April, they finally saw the lemon seed giving a sprout. The 
screenplay opens with this story and continues to tell of their unremitting attachment to life throughout L.’s 
final days on the death fast.  
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L. doesn’t hear F. at all. She wants to walk. She stands up with D. and puts her 
arm around her shoulder. They walk together a few meters in the room. L. is 
shaking as they walk. She gets tired quickly and throws herself on the bed. D. puts 
her in bed and covers her. F. is waiting with a glass of water in her hand. L. 
extends her hand to take the glass with great difficulty, her hand is covered with 
open sores. She takes the glass, but doesn’t drink the water. She holds the glass 
right over her chest and closes her eyes. D. and F. look at each other in distress.  
F.: She shouldn’t sleep. L., comrade, come on open your eyes! 
D.: Everyone sent you their greetings, they love you so much! 
F.: Comrade, drink your glass of water first and then you can sleep… 
D.: If you don’t wake up, I’ll start singing a song! 
 
Right at that moment they hear the metal door opening and someone coming in. L. 
suddenly opens her eyes and sits up. F. and D. are looking at her in astonishment. 
L. is sitting up in bed and is looking at the doctor who has just come in the room. 
She turns her head towards him. 
Doctor: Good morning, L.! 
L.: Good morning. 
The doctor is looking at her with attentive eyes 
L.: As you see, I’m doing fine. How are you? 
Doctor: I’m fine, but it seems like your sores have increased 
L.: Yes, this is also a part of the struggle 
The doctor doesn’t say anything and looks at D.. 
 
Doctor: I will stop by later. Take care of yourself. 
L.: You, too. 
The doctor leaves the room. One hears the metal door opening and closing behind 
him again. L. collapses and closes her eyes. 
 
F.: Comrade, not again! Please don’t sleep anymore. 
L. doesn’t respond back and doesn’t open her eyes. D. and F. try to wake her up 
and make her talk, but L. doesn’t talk back and open her eyes. It seems like she is 
not hearing them at all. Then, the same scene repeats itself. The metal door opens 
noisily and L. opens her eyes and sits up in bed. The same doctor enters in the 
room and she smiles at him. 
 
L.: Hi 
Doctor: I wondered how you were doing 
L.: As you see, I’m doing fine, but it seems like you’re not 
Doctor: Why is that? 
L.: You look at me so worriedly 
The doctor smiles and caresses her hair. 
 





L.: I don’t have the intention to die yet. There’s still so much to do. 
 
The doctor leaves the room and L. lies down in bed again closing her eyes. F. and 
D. try to wake her up again, but they don’t succeed. 
 
The violence of her anger at having to live on as an invalid, instead of being 
allowed to die in the arms of her sister and comrade, serves only to stimulate her into a 
more violent refusal of death. No sooner does L. hear the metal door announcing the 
arrival of the other, the semblance of death gives way to the semblance of life until some 
hours later, when she loses consciousness, so to speak, for good.  
L. was an uncanny embodiment of the law of perseverance like the rest of the 
TIKB’s death fasters who were dead at one moment and alive the next or, better, alive 
and dead at the same time. But though this perseverance in being had turned into a 
perpetual recapitulation of death, it proved culpably to be a selfish appetite for living 
from the point of view of the DHKP-C’s fasters who were chasing after a death which 
would come at a single blow. In the next chapter, we will see that the mode and tense of 
being on the fast changes completely, displacing this law of perseverance with a law of 
sacrifice which purports to dispense altogether with an interest in self-preservation, 




Burning: The Temptation of Death 
 
She had a cigarette lighter in her hands. She must have stashed it away for the 
foreseen occasion since it was not lost in all the upheaval. She ran the lighter along her 
hair as if wanting to set all of her self alight at the same time. The flame laboriously 
licked her hair, but suddenly the alighted parts burned out, proving her efforts to be in 
vain. She caught the smell of her own singed hair, and in desperation called out to her 
comrade at the window looking on to the exercise yard. Her body was not feeding the 
fire. The piece of nylon they found for a fuse did not do the work either. On her far side, 
another comrade was trying to set herself on fire, and Yasemin asked for her lighter. 
When she refrained from bringing it, she castigated the defiant comrade. Not everyone 
was authorized to set themselves on fire, she exclaimed immediately. With the 
indisputability of an order she declared that she would be the only one.125  
Yasemin, in the course of her conversations with the volunteers, had spoken of 
the Death Fast as if it were a temptation to all, suspending and reversing the literal 
meaning of confinement: “If I had been outside, I would have wanted to live such a time 
inside the prison.” The head of the DHKP-C ward in Uşak Prison, then, had appealed to 
the volunteers—it was such a “special feeling” to be a death faster—and everyone had a 
right to this feeling. Yasemin could not partake in the ongoing Death Fast solely and 
simply because she had already been a death faster in 1996. Though to be sure she 
                                                
125 This detailed account of the events in Uşak Prison during the prison operation is based on a collective 
memoir and my extended interviews with an eye-witness. The collective memoir is published under a 
pseudonym contrived from the proper names of the two militants who burned themselves, Yasemin Berrin, 
Büyük Direnişin Uşak Cephesi Başeğmeyen Kadınlar (Istanbul: Boran Yayınevi, 2004).  
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begrudged any falling off in the duty she owed to the struggle, she was disallowed to join 
in the Death Fast in compliance with the Party’s decision and she could only put up with 
her non-inclusion in the measure in which she could service the death fasters in every 
way. Though she was not there, she said, to watch her comrades dying in front of her 
eyes, she had had her turn and she did not want to be “selfish”—she wanted everyone to 
have the chance to experience this feeling. Having pursued a vigorous polemic against 
the total neglect of feelings in furtherance of the struggle under the direction of reason, 
she was now offering this special, extra feeling as a reward for entering into the struggle. 
What was the allure of this prized feeling that Yasemin reluctantly capitulated to the 
volunteers for the latest Death Fast? Already in Nazım Hikmet’s oft-recited line, “No tree 
will have [not] borne such a fabulous fruit,” (Hiçbir ağaç böyle bir yemiş vermemiştir) 
the nature of this reward seemed to have been fundamentally concealed with the double 
negative; and one could argue that it was thus marked in advance with the possibility of 
its qualification (or disqualification) as non-object or nothing or even death. That the 
promise of communism persisted and made its claims felt with a certain insistence from 
the outside had the effect of exacerbating rather than appeasing its lure. For this promised 
but necessarily unrevealed surplus feeling invoked a subject that occupied the place of an 
exception, a subject who never failed to enjoy an excess jouissance and who never failed 
to diminish still further the little jouissance the others were constrained to have.126 One 
could say that much the same structure of difference as purportedly obtained between 
DHKP-C and other leftist organizations also governed the relation between death fasters 
and the rest of the members. While the other leftist organizations had wholly succumbed 
                                                
126 For this phallic structure of jouissance, see Lacan (1998a: 64-89) and for discussions of his formulas of 
sexuation, see Copjec (2004: 201-236) and Žižek (1999: 273-306). 
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to castration because of their fear of the state—and what is castration but a limit or a 
limitation?—DHKP-C’s members knew no limits or limitation; and, indeed, Haydar 
dramatized their self-characterization as “demented” by the police officers in a manner 
that very closely echoed, in content if not necessarily in its vocabulary, Yasemin’s 
description of the death fasters as seductive figures who took exception to the law. As a 
result, the fantasy of a subject not subjected to law—the fantasy of no limit—determined 
DHKP-C’s organization of jouissance on the Death Fast as well. This phallic 
organization of jouissance was itself limited by a place of exception which indeed 
stimulated a response, a certain haste, a precipitation towards that absolute satisfaction 
only attainable by a chosen few. But more crucially each and every member’s equal right 
to this place of exception was prone to provoke a contagious, mimetic passion of 
identification with the narcissistic subject who, one might say, is the subject par 
excellence.127   
When the captivating conversation had led to the drawing up of the team lists, 
Yasemin had indeed spoken with a firm conviction in the equality of the volunteers, 
“Everyone can be a volunteer, the Party decides.” One of the volunteers had asked her, 
“What about those who had never been in any action, say someone who had not even 
posted up a placard?” “All you need is belief,” Yasemin had answered the volunteer, 
assigning to belief the predominant place over experience. This affirmation of belief was 
the measure of her abiding trust in the organizational command which, in her eyes, could 
never be proven wrong by experience, and it was by reinforcing the essential 
                                                
127 I refer the reader to Freud’s Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego ([1922] 1989) and especially 
to the two chapters entitled “Identification” and “Hypnosis and the State of Being in Love” for the 
following argument. For critical readings of Freud’s and Lacan’s understanding of identification, see 
Borch-Jakobsen (1993: 1-35); Žižek (1989: 94-145). 
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irrefutability and certitude of that authority that she had subordinated judgment to 
compliance. Yasemin had conducted a brief interview with Berrin when the latter had to 
produce herself after the morning exercise, up in the dormitory where she was secretly 
given the good tidings of her election away from the gaze of the others who had been 
waiting for the past two days for the decision: “From where are you going to secure your 
force on the Death Fast?” Berrin had begun to count the names of the martyrs, but the 
examples she had before her eyes were inadequate in the end for Yasemin. If Berrin was 
to respond to the exhortation, it would mean confronting, not simply the question of 
fidelity, a question that for her was embodied in the figures of martyrs who had invested 
a good deal of labor in her political formation, but more urgently, in Yasemin’s view, the 
question of belief. Though Yasemin had begun her discussion by suggesting how belief 
radically transcended experience, her speech ended not by testifying to belief’s 
indifference to experience and rational arguments but by demanding of the volunteers 
that they elevate their undertaking above and beyond fidelity to their dead comrades. As 
far as Yasemin was concerned, what was beyond the other, so to speak, was the Other, 
but the Other in the guise of a code that governed everyday practices and rites endowing 
them with sense if only by guaranteeing their pure and simple repetition, and this law of 
repetition could be defied by the ethical demand of fidelity to the otherness of the 
other.128 For to properly pay tribute to another means paying tribute to another’s 
                                                
128 Pascal’s scandalous advice to non-believers is well-known. The best way to become a believer, he 
suggests, is to simply follow religious rituals whereby belief will come by itself with an inescapable 
necessity. Though Žižek emphasizes the objectivity of belief following Althusser’s reading of Pascal, he 
nonetheless takes Althusser to task for ignoring the Other of the symbolic order with his insistence on 
nothing but the materiality of the rituals. For, Žižek (1989: 39) argues, there is an unconscious belief 
embodied in the ritual, a “belief before belief” which produces the Other by ascribing to the senseless ritual 
a supposition that it means something even if one does not know what—a belief that there is something to 
believe in and that there is a “subject supposed to know” who can make sense of the nonsensical ritual: 
“What distinguishes the Pascalian ‘custom’ from insipid behaviorist wisdom (‘the content of your belief is 
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difference; and this is achieved not by faithful repetition but by recognizing the necessity 
of infidelity. Forgetting for the instant that she was not unexempt from the Party’s rule 
that gave permission to those and only to those on the first team who had already pledged 
to die, Yasemin did not desist from setting herself on fire notwithstanding her last word 
on the inadequacy of fidelity. Before the prison operation, she repeated to the death 
fasters what she had said once already, “You never know who is going to die first.” She 
had already decided upon her death on her own, authorizing herself from herself. 
From the roof of the administration building, the hosemen had begun to spurt 
water into the blazing wards, and splashes of water passed through the people in the 
exercise yard as well. Confronted with the impenetrable smoke rising from the wards, 
Yasemin thought to herself what the assault troops were doing to her comrades left in the 
smoke-filled ward. They needed to bring the operation to a halt one way or another. 
Yasemin could not stand still. She regulated the lighter in order to produce a long flame, 
yet her body did not catch fire. She was soaking wet. The Kurdish inmates who had filed 
out into the exercise yard at the command of the troops without raising any barricades 
headed towards her to take away the lighter. She tried to flee, took a few steps, still firm, 
then advanced along the wall of the exercise yard towards the smoke-filled wards. 
Suddenly her legs gave away underneath the pressure of their restraining hands, and she 
fell to the ground cursing with frustration. 
The troops had already entered the corridor giving access to the wards when 
Yasemin and Ayşen on the lookout alerted the others in the wards before the two women 
                                                                                                                                            
conditioned by your factual behavior’) is the paradoxical status of a belief before belief: by following a 
custom, the subject believes without knowing it, so the final conversion is merely a formal act by means of 
which we recognize what we have already believed.” 
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were summarily hurled into the exercise yard by the overbearing troops. Groping their 
way in the darkness, all the DHKP-C’s inmates aggregated in the ward reserved for the 
death fasters to barricade the door by putting beds on top of beds. Some were shouting at 
the top of their voices, “Long live the Death Fast Resistance!” as they defended 
themselves against the bludgeons, others were hurling threats as they attacked the 
invading soldiers, “If you enter in the ward, we are going to set ourselves on fire, we are 
going to burn ourselves.” The soldiers were already opening up gaps in the barricade 
through which they jumped into the ward advancing with easy cruelty towards the 
inmates who had begun to retreat to the back of the ward in the direction of the death 
fasters. They knew that the protection afforded by the barricade was temporary. Their 
liberator was fire which could have served just as well as a bulwark or as a weapon. They 
thought they could take refuge in fire for it would maintain an impassible boundary 
between the troops and themselves, guarding their autonomy and self-identity. Though 
they refused to confront it, their position seemed to be a paradoxical one, particularly 
since fire threatened to devour all boundaries and limits beginning with its very own with 
a dizzying and outrageous indifference. Yet fire, for the sieged inmates, was a signifier of 
the other, inner fire, the fire that preceded the fire, the fire that was itself impervious to 
any smothering, but which was the necessary prior condition of their act of burning. This 
fire—fire “as such”—was their desire whose boundlessness could only be manifested by 
a rigorous insistence on separation and difference. But no sooner the limits of their act 
were marked than those very limits were overwhelmed by the boundlessness of 
affirmation that spilled beyond them, and such excess posed an ineliminable challenge to 
the totality and stability of domination. In this respect, fire proved also to be a weapon, 
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but a weapon which burned the other, one might say, without burning, even and 
especially when they did not run towards the troops as deadly torches.  
The death fasters were standing in a huddle. Berrin was anxiously searching for a 
light in the middle with the other three fasters peering at her from an outer circle. The 
retreating inmates arrived at the scene to form the final concentric ring in order to protect 
the death fasters from the troops. Berrin started with her hair and hastily spread the flame 
from her hair to neck, then from her neck to her entire body without letting it die out. 
“I’m going to leave the prison on shoulders,” she had declared to her comrades during her 
pledge of fealty, “I was not able to be Sibel, I am going to be Idil.”129  
Marked by prophetic certainty, Berrin’s pronouncements had remained suspended 
on a death scene that refused to develop beyond this heroic ending. And as she confirmed 
her pact with death, she addressed her friends with all the animation of an actress, 
alluding to her act as if she were acting out a role. That Berrin did not speak under the 
name of the other at the time is clear from her words; but if that was so, her pledge also 
gives an indication of the degree to which she thought she was that other in repeating her 
exemplary act in the present. Though the exemplary other still appeared as other, as the 
quotation of the two proper names suggests, and Berrin still recognized a distance 
between her role and self, she wanted to cross that divide and come into the place of the 
other who by the same token would no longer be an other but rather “herself” albeit with 
the risk that Berrin, for one, would have found herself deprived of the memory of the 
                                                
129 Sibel Yalçın (1973-1995) was a DHKP-C militant who died in a lethal attack against the center-right 
True Path Party’s (Doğru Yol Partisi, DYP) quarters in Şişli, Istanbul in 1995. Ayçe Idil Erkmen (1970-
1996) was the first woman death faster to die on a death fast. She lost her life the day before the end of the 




other. Indeed, in the discretionary suspension of the Party’s rule, the law of example was 
overridden by an uncontrollable contagion of burning, leaving behind nothing but 
replications of the self performing the same act at the same time like fire that did not take 
heed of any boundaries or limits between the self and other gathering everyone into its 
all-embracing totality.     
One after another, the other death fasters eventually took the flame from Berrin, 
enkindling their hair from hers. Then, the rest of their comrades received the fire as 
something which in a way protected them, just as the prison walls did before, and 
suddenly the flames multiplied, transforming themselves into one great ball of fire. The 
troops would have to pull off their arms before they would let go of each other for all 
together they would not disband even in this fire. 
Having bored a hole in the roof of the ward, the firemen sprayed the ward with 
heavy water, knocking down the inmates. Struggling to their feet, they managed to get 
out of the smoke-filled ward. Almost smothered, many of the inmates came staggering 
into the exercise yard, the death fasters, feebler still, could scarcely drag themselves 
along, swaying as if they were about to collapse into a heap. Yasemin approached the 
death fasters whose strength was giving out and beseeched them to hold out as best as 
they could, for their greater fear was that the troops would round up the death fasters to 
take them to the hospital. Before long Yasemin was proved to be right, the troops asked 
the death fasters to come forward, watching out with the guards who had already begun 
to identify the death fasters. Holding the death fasters firmly in their middle, they stayed 
together, pressed up against each other, shouting out their slogans, “Heroes don’t die. 
People cannot be defeated.”  
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Though the slogan endowed its speakers with a powerful invulnerability against 
death, it did not deny, as it did so, the threat of death hanging over them. For immortal 
though they were, they were immortal only to the extent that they were also able to die, 
and indeed, to die a death that left behind a void which could not be occupied by anyone 
else. This absence of both life and death was sheltered in the empty rigidity of the proper 
name; but as though, to refuse to allow even that much, the immortality of the hero was 
relegated to the immortality of the animal by the imperious dismissal of the singularity of 
their dying by the authorities. For on Bataille’s (1990: 8) submission, whose reading of 
Hegel is closely based on that of Kojève, the animal, so it is said, never dies because it is 
condemned to a life that is ever merged with the perennial life of the species if only 
because it is incapable of grasping itself as a separate entity among other entities. From 
the perspective of the authorities, the immortality of the hero behaved according to this 
blind principle of pure substitutionality, and their death occurred, to the extent that it 
maybe described as occurring in time at all, without occurring: one martyr replacing 
another until being displaced by yet another in an endless succession that changed, as it 
were, each member of the series to a replica of the transcendental subject who only in 
retrospect subsisted beyond them all. But it would be to trivialize matters unduly simply 
to identify, as authorities have done, the immortality at issue here with mere seriality for 
the essence of immortality lies not in a process of replication or duplication, but rather in 
a movement of return that turns each event or person into a ghostly occurrence or 
repetition of another. Despite the name, the immortal subject is thus not an entity, nor is 
it, properly speaking, a transcendental. It is rather another name for what Derrida (1988: 
127) has called a “quasi-transcendental”: it cannot be found to endure anywhere else than 
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in the singular persons and acts by which it is quoted and reenacted not unlike the 
anonymous voice in the slogan which spoke in the third person while speaking through 
the first person, withdrawing identity and dividing its enunciator from itself. So what 
spoke without speaking, once more, for the first time, repeatedly but always differently 
was a phantasmatic subject who declared its deathlessness in the interminable echoing of 
the slogans that passed from one mouth to another, exposing the troops and the guards to 
its lack of origin and, more disturbingly, to its irreducible multiplicity.  
Having fought off the soldiers for the time being, they began to dance the halay in 
the small but populous yard ululating under the gaze of the other inmates, prison guards, 
and soldiers who were perturbed by their joyful performance in the face of death more 
than their resistance.130 Holding each other hand to hand, they began to turn around in a 
circle, chorusing a Group Yorum march, “Bize Ölüm Yok,” “There is No Death for Us.” 
As they circled around the empty hole in their middle, the act of encircling itself, neither 
adding an object to the world nor removing one from it, installed within the real—which 
it thus suspended—a gap, a void that could not be filled by anything like the emptiness of 
their hunger.131 
Stretched along the wall of the exercise yard were the troops who were still 
awaiting the death fasters to drop down on the ground. Yeliz lasted no more than a few 
rounds in the halay. She found herself unable to keep in step with the rest of the inmates 
who had begun to tread on her heels. A death faster from the third team, she had shoved 
                                                
130 Halay is a folk dance mostly performed during weddings and other festive events. Typically, halay 
dancers form a circle or a line, holding each other with the little finger, or hand to hand, or shoulder to 
shoulder, with the first and last dancer waving a piece of cloth. 
 
131 As Lacan (1997: 121) writes, “the fashioning of a signifier and the introduction of a gap or a hole in the 
real is identical.” 
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newspapers underneath her pajamas, reclined on a bed in the very back corner of the 
ward, and set herself alight without wanting anyone to notice her. She had burned until 
the troops managed to see her and put out the flames. Yeliz had resisted all this while, but 
she could no longer maintain her pose neither before her comrades nor the soldiers, who 
took advantage of her fainting and attacked the group in order to snatch away the 
seventeen-year-old woman who had become all body.  
In less than ten minutes, all the able-bodied inmates had been divided between 
two ten-person cells on the disused left-wing of the prison after a rapid and summary 
body search. What happened to the death fasters, to the wounded, they could establish 
only later: the latter were collected together in a third separate cell after their short-lived 
stay at the hospital.  
The next day, they were provided with soap and blankets. “And what about our 
death fasters?” accosted Yasemin, taking advantage of this opportunity to ask the warden 
to distribute the death fasters and the wounded inmates between the two other cells. They 
could not be expected to take care of themselves, wounded and feeble, moreover their 
painful condition was being made even worse by the fact that they were all put in 
dilapidated, filthy cells. In keeping with the order of the troops, the warden refused to 
accept Yasemin’s solicitation for a new rearrangement. That was asking too much, 
Yasemin announced in a loud voice that they had begun a collective death fast without 
water, and he gradually allowed them to send a comrade to nurse the death fasters and the 
wounded inmates in the other cell.  
The following day, a tiny group was given permission to gather together 
belongings from the wrecked wards. The dispatch came back with a bundle of dry 
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clothing among which there was a red shirt. They tore the shirt into long, thin strips to 
make new headbands for the death fasters who were sleeping in the safest place of the 
cell to gain strength. That same day, in late afternoon, the guard delivered the papers. The 
succession of headlines began with the joyous announcement that the troops had taken 
over the prisons from the seditious organizations, and a description of the fanatical 
devotion of the death fasters to the organizational hierarchy. One after another, the 
subordinates had burned themselves on the order of their superiors who were dispensed 
from the same scandalous duty of putting their lives at stake. Yasemin protested with 
indignation at the lies of the papers, “They will see whether the Principals are dying or 
not.” Only they saw what the papers were hiding, and she thought her death would pierce 
through the deception that the papers had concocted overnight. There was little doubt that 
the papers were alluding to their fugitive leader in Belgium and the rest of the leading 
cadres who have been steering the negotiations with the state officials in Bayrampaşa 
Prison, and Yasemin did not discern that, by endeavoring to die, she was falling victim to 
the very same portrayal she sought to contest with her death. Berrin began to cry when 
she saw the photograph of Ahmet Ibili in the paper, the first death faster to set himself 
alight in the Ümraniye Prison. The soldiers had shot him to death when he came running 
towards them like a torch. “If only I could have gotten hold of a lighter faster or have 
found some cologne, I could have torched myself successfully,” Berrin spoke from 
remorse, “I wasn’t equal to the task.” 
Then, they heard the metallic noise of the outer gate. No sooner did the soldiers 
appear at the main entrance than their commander shouted, “Open the door! We’re going 
to move you to another place,” and as if afraid that his verbal command, however 
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vigorous, might not be heeded, he impatiently repeated his staccato summons, “Step 
outside right now. I am a soldier. I don’t bargain. I give the orders here.” When the voice 
stopped, an indignant chorus of protests broke out, “We’re not going to go in the cells.” If 
the soldiers were to carry out their threats, they would aggravate the situation with 
immediate dramatic consequences insofar as they were prepared to set themselves on fire. 
The threat of the commander had failed to intimidate them, it had only pushed Yasemin 
to complete her unfinished act with this awaited opportunity, “We’re burning ourselves.” 
Blocking the passage of troops with a cupboard, she proceeded with her plan. The 
soldiers retreated to the gate, covered by the rifles which they were pointing unsteadily 
between the railings as if the inmates were about to make a retaliatory attack. Encouraged 
by the retreat of the soldiers, the warden tried to forestall Yasemin’s initiative. In a 
nervous voice, he guaranteed that they would only be moved into better cells. Pointing to 
her hair in flames, Yasemin gave a preliminary warning, “Look, it has started up here and 
it can go until the feet.” If anyone were to get too close to the door, she would not 
hesitate to set her entire body alight. “We will come out only to return to our wards,” 
Yasemin rebuked the warden with a sharp declaration. Resigned, he turned back 
immediately and went in search of the prosecutor.  “I doubt whether they’re likely to 
keep their promise,” she said. All of them feared that this was a ploy. How did they know 
that the soldiers wouldn’t start firing? After what they had done already, they were 
capable of anything. They were not to be trusted. “I will set myself on fire,” Yasemin 
announced imperturbably. “I’m coming with you,” said Berrin. Already gathered around 
the two volunteers, the inmates came to an agreement that Yasemin should not be 
allowed to burn herself. According to the rule approved by all of them, a single death 
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faster was supposed to set herself on fire in the likely case of an assault. Once it had been 
decided that one and only one person was going to set herself on fire, Yasemin silenced 
the rest of the inmates with her determination, she was going to be the one, even if she 
was not a death faster. Yasemin accompanied by Berrin, put on the most inflammable 
clothing available and the two women padded themselves with newspapers. Then, they 
opened the doors of the cupboard to preempt the soldiers from putting out their fire. 
Some of the inmates gripped the two’s hands tightly and said they wanted to join them. 
“Only two,” Yasemin stated definitively. The two took off their shoes and walked in the 
direction of the cupboard without faltering for a moment as if, “they were two brides,” A. 
recounted, “hastening toward their wedding.”132  
Like the rest of the death fasters, the two were likened to brides because they had 
fulfilled their desire at the risk of approaching the limit between life and death, and A. 
went on to claim that they had done so by escaping if not death at least the anguish of 
death, as she put it, they had gone to their death as it were “a great celebration.” That the 
realization of their desire was fantasized as a fulfillment, and in particular as the 
fulfillment of love, was an indication that they had the same desire for death as for the 
desire of the Other. Death, as it were, communicated something like an appeal from the 
Other, something like an appeal of love and they were more than ready to offer 
themselves to the Other as the object of its desire if only because the Other they glimpsed 
lurking in the place of death gave access to a promised but necessarily undisclosed 
plenitude. This taming of desire into the desired also evaded the enigma of death, 
                                                
132 This figuration of death as wedding is common among the Palestinian guerrillas and other resistance 
movements across the Middle East. For a descriptive account of the transformation of martyrs’ funerals 
into weddings in the camps of Lebanon, see Laleh Khalili, Heroes and Martyrs of Palestine: The Politics of 
National Commemoration (Cambridge: University of Cambridge Press), 2007: pp. 124-127.  
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converting “nothing,” the question mark, into an illusory fullness—“deception of love” 
Lacan (1998b: 268) calls it—a joining of two complementary halves fulfilling each 
other’s desire. The price of full identity, one may say, was objectification for they saw 
themselves as the object that was capable of fulfilling the desire of the Other, as 
“loveable” (Lacan 1998b: 243) or as A. described with superlatives which attributed the 
distinguishing traits of the death fasters to the transforming effects of an outside gaze: 
“But of course,” the death fasters were called brides, although one didn’t have to 
preoccupy oneself with a such a self-transparent question, for having been chosen out of 
a mass of volunteers by the Central Committee, they were “the most beautiful, the most 
perfect, the most powerful.”133 The specular identification with the Other’s imaginary 
object of desire had endowed them with a surplus value, and it was this elevating 
transformation which death was to make permanent that had driven their fellow inmates 
to make a whole preparation that was almost ceremonial. They had taken meticulous care 
in cleaning and arranging the ward of the death fasters, adorning their beds with 
embroidered pillow cases and sheets as if they were conjugal beds. They had hand-picked 
their bottles, glasses, straws, and pens labeling each with the proper names of the death 
fasters. The death fasters knew that they had gained power over the other inmates, but as 
if their person alone or their person without signs, that is to say, their naked body without 
attributes was too bare to reflect the magical operation which had aggrandized them 
without altering anything in their nature, they wanted to mark their bodies ardently with 
the signs of the organization. They were wearing a red headband, the color of the Party 
                                                
133 For transference love, Lacan explains in the last lecture of his eleventh Seminar, consists of an 
identification “centered on the Ideal point, capital I, placed somewhere in the Other, where the Other sees 
me, in the form I like to be seen” (1998b: 268): the subject seems himself in that point as: “loveable” (ibid., 
243), as the object capable of fulfilling the desire of the Other. 
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flag, which was tied by the hands of a surviving death faster from the 1996 Death Fast at 
their pledge of fealty, intimating double fidelity to both their cause and the martyrs, and 
they took particular care to wear it at all times, tight around their forehead. They also 
wore a DHKP-C star pendant, Party insignia, and in anticipation of the confiscation of 
these symbols by the prison guards, they had hennaed their hands by placing a star-
shaped piece of paper in their palms.134 The red of the henna accentuated the skin-colored 
star making them appear as if they were carrying the red Party flag with the yellow star 
on their skin. The incorporation of the transcendental signifier of desire, and 
transcendental signifier it was to the extent that the Party had ushered in the void of 
desire only to occupy it with its name and insignia, had served ultimately to seal the 
breach between their bodies proper and the signifier, so much so that, in A.’s view, the 
signifier overtook the place of the body in its final form: “You are going to your death 
with your star in your hand, and you’re flaunting it to the State. Even when your body is 
dead, your belief is stamped in your hand.” That the brilliance of the signifier 
overshadowed the impersonal gravity of the corpse can be inferred from her words; but as 
the signifier diverted attention from the corpse of the death faster, it also captured some 
of the uncanny obduracy of the corpse which gleamed through it as a materiality that 
refused itself to full identification. Indeed, after the series of fumbling attempts at burning 
which failed to reach conclusion, at the tenuous peak of Yasemin and Berrin’s self-
immolation, a telling fissure cast into question A.’s account that made the body of the 
death faster appear to be nothing but a necessary support for the transcendental signifier 
                                                
134 During the final days of the Death Fast in 1996, DHKP-C’s female death fasters were searching for a 
particular sign to mark their soon-to-be dead bodies, and the result was the practice of hennaing the hands 
which, according to A.’s explication, mingled fealty with uncompromising defiance. This spontaneous act 
became a sanctioned practice in the succeeding Death Fast in 2000, and moreover, it proved to be an 
effective tactic against the confiscations of the headbands and pendants.  
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of desire. For the signifier of desire was no longer single, but singular and multiple, 
personified in the figures of the two women.  
Suddenly the voices had fallen silent. Standing in the tiny cell, they looked on 
intently, with increased acuity, at the distant sight of two burning bodies as if there were 
an uncrossable distance between these bodies and themselves, a distance which was 
brought into existence by the breach of time. It was by virtue of their act that Yasemin 
and Berrin had fissured time; yet the beginning of their act remained suspended on the 
threshold of its own violence. “Maybe,” wrote a witness, “time had stopped,” rendering 
the beginning and the ending of their act in fact remarkably indeterminate. The hesitation 
was itself the result of their exposure to the interval of time between the beginning and 
the ending or, one may say, between two deaths that separated them and challenged their 
self-identity, delaying the closure of their act. This interval of separation between two 
deaths became inseparable from what might be described as an experience of blindness. 
“Maybe,” the same witness wrote in the lines that followed, “everything had become 
invisible” for they could see nothing except “the two sparks that were struck.” They saw 
the burning bodies, then, as the object that had prevented them from seeing anything else, 
and it was neither fear nor pity but the extraordinary proportion of pain undergone by two 
impervious bodies that fascinated them. “Neither the ones who were going dragged their 
feet,” wrote the eye-witness, “nor the ones who were staying held onto their feet and told 
them not to do it. Both Yasemin and Berrin felt the pain in their skin, in their flesh.” The 
suffering body, Lacan (1997) tells, fixes the gaze of the other, and it does so by blinding 
it to the ultimate cause of its fascination insofar as it displays and hides in one and the 
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same movement the void that lies beyond this impassible limit between two deaths that 
he designates as the site of desire.135  
Berrin’s feet had begun to burn. She was barely able to keep upright, “Hold my 
hand Fidan, Murat… I’m coming to rejoin you,” Berrin was calling out on another scene. 
Further along, very slowly, she fell to her knees when her feet were completely burnt. 
Yasemin was still supporting herself with her arms in the air. “Stop crying, stop crying,” 
she ordered them, while the other inmates watched her complete an act which was thus 
far aborted by unwarranted interventions and miscalculations. She advanced in a straight 
line towards the door and shouted out, “Comrades, we love you, as much as our 
martyrs…” Death had taken on, in a certain sense, the traits of the dead martyrs and had 
thereby lost its threat and perhaps had become even seductive. Then, she paused, 
undecided, asked, “Am I burning,” as if her body were no longer hers, as if she were a 
voice separated from her body. She needed the other inmates to see herself, to regain her 
corporeal integrity momentarily. But Yasemin could no longer see herself, that is 
recognize herself—in the gaze of the others who were briefly blinded by the excessive 
exposure to the “more or less unbearable brilliance” emitted by the burning bodies of 
Yasemin and Berrin, that brilliance Lacan calls the “beautiful” (1997: 297). For the two 
figures hovering at the limit between death and death, between corporeal death and 
“nothing”, the question mark of desire, had burned through the impenetrable but 
indeterminate obscurity of desire, both reflecting and refracting it. They had themselves 
become the irreducibly opaque signifiers of desire.  
                                                
135 “The beauty effect is a blindness effect,” Lacan (1997: 281, 298) writes, because it “prevents that site 
[of desire] from being seen.” 
 157 
The fumes had brought tears to the inmates’ eyes and a stinging sensation to their 
throats and nostrils. They could no longer stay inside the cell and took refuge in the 
bathroom in the back. Far from being overwhelmed by the circumstances, Sevgi Erdoğan, 
the ward leader, refused to leave without saying a final good-bye to Yasemin and Berrin. 
It was Günay Öğrener who was to perform the same act three years later that warned her 
that she could not stay there anymore. Sevgi wrote in her diary on January 6, 2000:  
“Yasemin—the first female guerrilla of the Aegean Rural Units, the 1996 Death 
Faster—took Berrin with her. They began the fire dance and fell as martyrs. She 
really wanted to be a martyr, and she managed to trip me up in a rapturous 
manner. Their determination, their last words were beautiful inside the fire dance. 
Particularly, Yasemin was standing upright till the last moment and was calling 
out. Her determination was reflected in her speech. Before such a heart, I wanted 
to say good-bye even inside the fire dance. I took my leave with the victory sign 
when both were burning like torches.”  
 
Cries could be heard coming from the adjoining cell. The stench of burning flesh 
had also reached the inmates in the other cell. “What’s happening there?” they cried out. 
“It’s only Yasemin and Berrin,” the spectator-inmates replied. The latter were afraid that 
the others would think everyone was setting themselves on fire. Then, there would be no 
way of controlling them.  
Panic in Uşak Prison, one might conclude, had a seemingly peculiar manifestation 
for it was not in fact the anarchic dispersion of individuals and the narcissistic drive for 
self-protection that made such a movement of dispersal possible, but rather the 
sacrificiality of an unruly mimetism which had almost taken on an absolute dimension by 
rendering the self indistinct from the other.136 However, even this reading remains 
somewhat unsatisfactory, for it does not take into account what Borch-Jakobsen (1993: 9) 
has described as the “paradox” of panic, namely that panic is “a disbanding bond or an 
                                                
136 Mimesis as sacrifice becomes indistinguishable from mimesis of sacrifice on this exceptional scene. 
 158 
asocial sociality.” According to Borch-Jakobsen, panic leaves one with no reliable 
criteria to distinguish between that which is “narcissistic,” “asocial” and that which is 
“non-narcissistic,” “social,” even though the difference between the two is 
indispensable—as difference—to the very possibility of establishing the social bond. 137 
For underlying the very narcissism of the individuals is a certain weakness or 
vulnerability to others that threatens the integrity of their bodies and identities: “panic is 
precisely an uncontrollable breaching of the ego by (the affects of) others, or if you will, 
a mimetic, contagious, suggested narcissism.” The contagious act of burning in Uşak 
Prison can be characterized, then, as an inverted embodiment of the paradoxical truth of 
panic for strictly speaking there could be no act of contagion insofar as it is becoming 
other in opening to the other—something that can only be “experienced” as a kind of 
exposure. For the intentional act of burning was already divided from itself here by a 
primary exposure which veered towards incorporation with the total collapse of the 
separation between the self and the other inasmuch as each one let herself be acted by the 
other. As such, the exceptional turn of events in this provincial prison brings to light, like 
an unwieldy symptom, the fundamental ambiguity that traverses DHKP-C’s structuration 
of the Death Fast, splitting it apart between autonomy and heteronomy, freedom and 
obligation, desire and law, self-identity and anonymity.   
For the organizational command upheld that the only act that can be properly 
called a political act—as opposed to “activity” which merely acted within the limits of 
law—was one which took the risk of self-annihilation in negating the totality of the legal 
and political order as such. The main difference between the radical political act and its 
                                                
137 That Freud was at pains to reduce the implications of this paradox to a mere effect of the divisive 
rupture of the libidinal-political bond is already clear from his remarks in Group Psychology on the 
necessarily foundational character of the libidinal-political bond for every social bond. 
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impoverished version lay, then, in the immediate and absolute negativity of the former 
and, by that token, in its absolute self-affirmation in the face of the order of law. The 
limit of law in both senses of the genitive was identified here with the limit of existence 
insofar as the threat of death held the gap between the jouissance of absolute freedom and 
the order of law. As a result, the encounter with the agents of law was almost always 
narrativized as an encounter between two deaths, death against death, whereby the 
murderous power of negation recoiled back on itself only to fall short of negating itself. 
Though the negation of negation manifested the full subject, we might say, it manifested 
him or her as death, and this proved to be an absolute aporia for the full subject was no 
longer a subject to the extent that s/he ceased to be in the act—which is not an act—of 
dying.138 The negation of negation was a self-defeating double bind which, unchecked, 
was liable to produce an unavoidable political paralysis insofar as it led to nothing other 
than the dissipation of death in death. DHKP-C, by conceiving of political action as 
immediate and absolute negation, demonstrated, in spite of itself, the propensity of this 
fervently defended act to lapse into suicidal escapism, for absolute freedom, as DHKP-
C’s leftist critics had charged, was only achieved at the level of individuals who did not 
survive their act, leaving behind a political conflict which was not susceptible of 
resolution. By a fatal contradiction, then, DHKP-C was threatened with becoming the 
reverse image of its opponents, the liberal left and in particular the oppositional camp 
                                                
138 In seeking to illustrate the irreducibly imaginary character of absolute freedom, Blanchot (2004: 28) 
writes Sade into the Hegelian dialectic. By unleashing an uncontrollable excess in the negative moment at 
the center of the Hegelian dialectic, one that is accentuated by Bataille (1990) himself in “Hegel: Death and 
Sacrifice,” he demonstrates that absolute sovereignty, the Sadian temptation, is ultimately nothing other 
than the dissolution of the subject itself: “The complete subject, completely affirmed, is also completely 
destroyed.”    
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under the leadership of TIKB, whom it held in contempt for their escapist half-measures 
and lack of audacity.  
Yet the immediate and absolute negativity of the act, despite appearances to the 
contrary, was already subject to the limits of a sacrificial economy—and isn’t every 
economy of death (or life) indeed a sacrificial economy?—that curbed the drive of the 
individual members by organizing them into a hierarchical series wherein each member 
acceded to the right to act in the measure of its resemblance to the exemplary model. The 
name of this sacrificial economy was vanguardism, and it operationalized the internal 
difference between the exemplary original and the examples to impose an interval of time 
between acts which were themselves ranked according to their degree of proximity to the 
principle of immediate and unconditional form of dying, a principle which had turned the 
ambiguity of death on the death fast into an imperative. Instead of safeguarding the lives 
of the vanguards, this economy of vanguardism, which took on a very different, not to 
say diametrically opposed meaning to that of the organizations in the oppositional camp, 
functioned, as far as the vanguards were concerned, as an excessive possibility of 
substitution for it was by placing its political and military cadres at the deathly center of 
the struggle that DHKP-C had, by a seeming paradox, fomented their continuous 
elimination and replacement. The perpetual consumption of the vanguards was, thus, the 
complement rather than the opposite of their exemplary distinction, and DHKP-C’s 
vanguardism, despite its emphasis on sacrificial dissipation, already contained within 
itself the principle of its own restriction inasmuch as it conserved the exemplary model 
without conserving the examples. Which means, of course, that this economy of sacrifice 
was fundamentally supported by identification, and such identification was already, as we 
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have seen, divided from itself by a more primary, excessive form which had radically 
challenged—if it had not indeed undone—the sanctioned identification. The sanctioned 
form of identification abided by the law of (specular) mediation which required that it 
kept the necessary separation between the subject and the sacrificial example for without 
this exigent distance the subject would not be able to re-present him or herself and s/he 
would be seized by or, one might say, sacrificed to the other. By contrast, the prohibited 
form of identification which might be termed sacrifice proper, were it not that sacrifice is 
already a radical form of impropriety, suspended the very separation between the subject 
and other in consequence of an affection whereby the subject, no longer the same, no 
longer a subject, had become an opening by and of itself. An intractable contagion—
perhaps the very contagion that, according to Bataille, is indistinguishable from 
sacrifice—affected both these forms of identification, implicating the one in the other, 
constantly transforming the one into the other, and yet the possibility of appropriation 
which was always already implicit in the economy of sacrifice was effectuated in fact by 
restraining the latter form of identification. The unauthorized, simultaneous acts of 
burning in Uşak Prison appeared as an aberration from their authorized, serial 
counterparts in the prominent prisons, but an aberration that brought to surface the hidden 
truth that the absolute negativity of desire which had always already abandoned itself to 
the desire of the Other was taken under control by separating the acts of burning by 
means of pauses that indeed functioned in sync with the division of death fasters into 
teams succeeding each other on the battlefront.  
Bataille conceded as much when he laid bare the tragic-comic subterfuge at the 
center of the sacrificial act in his “Hegel, Death and Sacrifice,” as the subterfuge of 
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identification, namely identification with the sacrificial victim who alone allowed the 
subject to manifest himself to himself—and the subject must manifest him or herself 
before him or herself to become a self-consciousness—as the radical negativity of desire 
or, as Kojève puts it, “death which lives a human life” (quoted in Bataille 1989: 18). But 
if Bataille was ready, in “Hegel, Death, and Sacrifice”, to exploit Kojève’s 
anthropological reading of Hegelian desire, he was willing to accompany the Hegelian 
dialectic up to a certain point. Ultimately, Bataille turned Kojève’s Hegel against himself 
insofar as negativity, rather than marking a necessary moment within the teleological 
unfolding of the dialectic, came to figure instead a recalcitrant impasse testifying to the 
failure of the dialectic. At the outset, Bataille reiterates the claim, made by Kojève in his 
lectures on Hegel, that for the living being to become fully human, he must negate the 
natural, animal being in himself for the human way of Being—desire—is not satisfied by 
the merely immediate and unconscious way of Being of natural life. Yet to negate the 
natural, animal being—that is, his self-identical “given being”— necessarily means 
negating the human being himself, and thus the human being finds himself in a quandary 
of having to negate his natural, animal being to reveal himself to himself as perpetual 
self-transcendence, but by so doing, he has to face his own extinction. The human being 
is dispossessed of his own negativity in the encounter with death that is the non-
dialectical other of existence and as Bataille writes in his final comment on this scene of 
suspended self-reflection: “The privileged manifestation of Negativity is death, but death, 
in fact, reveals nothing.” (ibid., 19; emphasis added).  In the end, of course, in order to 
surmount this paralysis, the human being is forced to come up with a conjuring trick, and 
that trick is sacrifice: sham of a death that is not a death but only a simulation that is in 
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fact performed on the basis of having already predetermined the Being of beings as a 
common substance or ground subsuming the totality of beings within its undying unity. 
Yet what for Hegel is construed as a paradigmatic case of dialectical mediation and 
passage, remains for Bataille an encounter with the impossibility of sacrifice inasmuch as 
death itself is the impossible communion of finite beings. The singular event of dying, 
because it is singular, renders impossible the immanence of Being to itself by exposing 
the substantial ground to be nothing but a differential relation between Being and 
beings.139 There is no Subject or substance of common being, and the Hegelian 
Aufhebung turns here into an aporetic impasse, but one Bataille only exacerbates by 
emphasizing that the fraudulence of the dialectic is irreducible. Sacrifice is not a ploy for 
which there exists some more authentic alternative for death is an event without a 
present, an experience without a subject, a simulacrum without an original: “At least, it 
would be a comedy” he writes, “if some other method existed which could reveal to the 
living the invasion of death” (ibid., 19). To the extent that the scene of sacrifice is 
necessarily a representation, it is a representation of a scene that cannot take place except 
as a simulacrum of itself. As Blanchot ([1955] 1978) reiterates in a host of essays 
throughout the same period, death is only ever mine: but when it takes place, it takes 
place in my absence because in death “I” do not die; the one who dies is the impersonal, 
anonymous “one”. The identification with the scene of sacrifice cannot therefore be 
identification for not only does the “I” not recognize itself in the death of the other, but 
more disturbingly, there is no one recognizable. Instead of finding itself in the other, in 
another “I”, the “I” itself comes to be the site of its own excess, its own alterity, its own 
                                                
139 For this critique of immanentism, see Jean-Luc Nancy, Inoperative Community, trans. Peter Connor, 
Lisa Garbus, Michael Holland, and Simona Sawhney (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1991), 
pp. 1-43. 
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difference with itself by opening to the other “who” has lost its relation to itself as 
possibility or propriety and has dissipated itself to a point of extremity where it has 
become one with the impersonal anonymity of the event of death.  
Impersonal anonymity of death though it cannot be thought as a reserve gathering 
together its multiple and singular instantiations, it still draws them into relation but a 
relation without relation, relation without adequation, equality, symmetry or reciprocity. 
Separated and drawn together by the interval of difference, the simultaneity of the acts of 
burning may not be properly thinkable within chronological time for they evince a 
different kind of simultaneity, the simultaneity of the non-simultaneous insofar as death 
constantly differs from itself, and by that very token, occurs without occurring, once 
more, for the first time, repeatedly but always differently, in singular instantiations 
(single instants and singular bodies). In this regard, the simultaneity of the acts of burning 
in Uşak Prison may in fact contest the law of exemplification with their peculiar status as 
examples without example for the fatal and faithful exigency of return here reveals in the 
law of repetition the excess of difference; and one could argue that the difference 
between desire and law, act and conduct, event and ritual hinges ultimately on nothing 
other than the difference between the two forms of repetition. The reproduction of heroic 
death as an exemplary model, while it may seek to order the repeated return of death by 
way of seriality, is always already threatened with dissolution for death is by definition 
beyond all possible models and models of possibility. Lacking a self-present origin, death 
is repetition as such or repeated return of the different that suspends the distinctions 
between original and copy, act and citation, instant and instance. Which in turn explains 
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alternative but to affirm their insubordination, were construed as inordinately violent and 
illicit since they transgressed both the law, and in competition with the law, the law of 
their own organization. In this sense, law and transgression, as the organizational 
command was bound to acknowledge in its impotence, had themselves already been 
transgressed, so to speak, by the repeated return of death which was irreducible to any 
dialectic of limitation and transgression. The simultaneous acts of burning in Uşak Prison 
were other than the law and the transgression that already belonged to the law, not 
because of their superior power or legitimacy in the face of the law, but rather because of 
their ultimate refusal—on the grounds of a certain vulnerability to the Other—to be 
addressed by the language of law despite the continuous exchange of threats between the 
troops and the prisoners during the operation. Far from being beyond the law, the serial 
acts of burning in the principal prisons (Bayrampaşa, Ümraniye, Buca and Çanakkale), 
which in fact behaved as a prototype of the temporal succession of teams insofar as the 
precipitation of dying inhabited DHKP-C organization of the Death Fast as its abiding, 
innermost principle, on the contrary, recognized the law by entering into a reciprocal 
relation with it, albeit a reciprocity that indeed lied outside of the law of equivalence 
governing the negotiations between the political and administrative authorities and the 
organizations, and presented itself as a challenge of death.  
For the prison operation coming at the heels of the unilateral ending of the 
negotiations by the authorities had in fact rendered null and void the calculated 
equivalence between the lives of the death fasters and the demands of the prison 
movement, and it had done so by revoking the exchange-value of death on the principle 
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that the fundamental right to life was irrevocable and inalienable.140 The affirmation of 
the right to life by the legal discourse of the political and administrative authorities, in a 
violent reversal of terms, had converted this right into a duty, imposing upon its bearers 
in both senses of the term (carrier and sufferer) the obligation to live, and what is more to 
live for the conservation and improvement of their lives. For the right to life was also a 
right of the state, society and the family over the person whose life was a parcel of social 
value and capital which was entrusted to its bearer on the sole condition that he or she did 
not misuse it, let alone use it up, by putting his or her life and bodily integrity at risk.  
Which, in fact, meant that the bearers only had a right of usufruct, and this is why the 
constitutional law indeed protected (human) life as a value in and of itself for and, if 
necessary, against the person who was reduced to a mere beneficiary of the right to life, a 
beneficiary who was strictly banned from relinquishing or alienating this entrusted life.141 
The corollary of this legal argumentation for the prohibition of suicide and equally 
importantly, of self-sacrifice was that the death fasters could not give a life that was 
always already given to them. They were already indebted to the state and society for 
their life, and accordingly they could not obligate the state with their deaths.  
This is why, as the counter-propaganda of the authorities came to a head with the 
prison operation code-named “Return to Life” which was allegedly undertaken to save 
the lives of the death fasters who were represented as hostages in the hands of the 
organizational command, DHKP-C turned the prison struggle into a struggle whose 
                                                
140 In a series of books on the Death Fast in the prisons of Turkey and hunger strikes in general, the 
investigative judge Ahmet Taşkın (2005a; 2005b; 2005c) presents the legal argumentations of the Turkish 
state and I am here paraphrasing them.    
 
141 In Basında Cezaevi ve Gerçekler, Taşkın (2005a: 54-55) writes: “The fundamental rights and freedoms 
are bound fast to the person. These rights which protect the person as a value in and of itself above the 
person consist of right to life, right to bodily integrity, right to self-improvement, and right to freedom. The 
person can neither relinquish these rights nor transfer them to another person.”   
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primary goal was to defend the Death Fast itself by re-establishing the exchange of death 
which no longer took account of the law of equivalence but, as Baudrillard (1993) would 
say, only the challenge and reversibility of exchanges—death against death.  Unlike 
TIKB and the organizations under its leadership which had taken the decision to wait 
upon the reaction of the political and administrative authorities before launching their 
teams of death fasters, DHKP-C launched its third team four days before the prison 
operation, and raising the stakes even higher, the death fasters of its first team in every 
prison made a declaration of their decision to burn themselves in the likely event of an 
operation.  
The operation, as G. has indicated in his retrospective account, had forced them to 
choose between life and death, and both choices had seemingly ended in the same losing 
position to the extent that neither life nor death belonged to them any longer: “‘Surrender 
and live!’ ‘Life’ is always presented as a reward for self-surrender, but this is a ‘life’ 
which is granted to you only in exchange for your freedom. When you enter through the 
door of this granted life, it is no longer your proper life, you are no longer the same you. 
You know that you do not possess your life anymore for that life is granted to you as a 
reward in return for your surrender.” But this life of “slavery” was not inevitable, and G. 
reminded those who might indeed like to forget that in the last instance one always had 
the right to refuse. And to refuse this hollow parody of life which was severely limited by 
loss of self-propriety including one’s values and ideals, inasmuch as freedom, as G. has 
affirmed it, was the absolute, irreducible condition of life, did not thereby dispense them 
from the challenge of meeting the threat of death on its own terms; and it indeed 
stimulated them to refuse, more radically still, this death by responding to murderous 
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power with an equal or even superior death insofar as death could not be threatened with 
death: “Under such conditions, to ward off the threats of death by running the risk of 
dying and walking upon the enemies of the people would be a breach in the wall of 
enslavement. It brings about the defeat of the tyrants who trust their threats of death 
because death is, simply speaking, defeated.” 142 The irreversible transitivity of death (or 
life, to the extent that death necessarily implies the possibility of life) has given way in 
his account to a radical reversibility, albeit a reversibility marked by a supreme paradox: 
they have defeated “death” only by dying. But it is perhaps in his final summing up, in 
his “simply speaking,” that the ambiguity of death insists in a series of questions, even if 
obliquely: Which death is it that is defeated? And if it is, as he appears to intimate, the 
murderous power of negation that is defeated, is it defeated by them, by their power of 
death? Or is it rather defeated by their inalienable and yet unpossessable relation to 
death? Asked otherwise, is it defeated by the irreducible incommensurability of the 
relation—the relation without relation—that binds them to their own death?  
For it was not the act of killing which had become reversible insofar as the object 
of the act of killing had not turned into an agent. They did not kill the other which was 
not to say that they failed to act upon the other as they had claimed to do so, and in an 
“explosive” manner, in their declarative speech-acts. Nor, the agent and the object of the 
act, despite appearances to the contrary, had collapsed into each other in a reflexive 
transitivity. It is in fact arguable that such reflexive transitivity was even possible since 
the subject of the act was not external to the act itself as he or she would have necessarily 
                                                
142 In fact, the threat of death on the part of the political authorities was often ridiculed (at least in words) 
by DHKP-C’s death fasters who saw it as a sign of the impotence and helplessness of the authorities in the 
face of their commitment to die. How could someone who had already lied down to death, they asked, be 
threatened with death? 
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been in the act of killing, and they could have remained external to the act of dying only 
at the risk of complete objectification of their bodies. But their bodies resisted being 
instrumentalized by their will, and this was a sign that they were patients of a verbal act 
which had not originated in them and yet somehow still abided in them to the point of 
separating them from themselves. And though the source of the act may be said to lie 
outside of them inasmuch as it was unknown, they were not—as marked grammatically 
in the sheer impossibility of passivating the intransitive verb “to die”—mere objects of 
the violence of the Other even if one were to ascribe an agent to the event of death and 
one almost always succumbs to do so, as Lévinas (1977: 233) has suggested, by 
identifying the approach of death with the approach of the Other. For the Other would 
still not have appeared as another subject—someone who can be known as a human 
presence—but as the coming of the absolutely unforeseeable.  
In this sense, DHKP-C’s death fasters did not desire to simply be the agent of 
“death,” they desired more, they in fact wanted to be identified with the verbal act itself, 
the event of death or better as death insofar as death is the ultimate example—the 
example that cannot by definition be an example—of the absolute alterity of the event. 
This temptation to merge with the immediate, the “immediate” which, as Blanchot (2003: 
38) argues, “excludes everything immediate” because it can only be grasped by way of a 
detour or turning, was more than an isolated case of intensified hostilities, and recalling 
much of our earlier analysis, its effects extended to DHKP-C’s organization of the Death 
Fast as a whole. Already, DHKP-C’s death fasters had envisaged the scene of their death 
as a sudden void, notwithstanding the impasse of time which separated their own death 
from death as an anonymous event, as a sudden absence in the place of their addressee as 
 170 
if death was the presence of the absence of the Other. They had in fact, in seeming 
contrariety with their bodily deeds, figured themselves as deathly weapons in their 
declarative speech-acts at their pledge ceremonies before the operation. In the case of 
performative speech-acts, where the division between the subject of enunciation and the 
subject of statement is less clearly demarcated, it is often the similarities between the 
utterances that are indeed more striking than the differences between them; and thus this 
pervasive self-figuration that first occurred in the context of the pledge of Ali Rıza 
Demir, a death faster on the first DHKP-C team in Ümraniye Prison, returned in barely 
modified form in the recitations of the death fasters on subsequent teams conferring to his 
words the status of a quasi-formula:  
 
To the calls of surrender by the enemy in the prisons, we are crying out with a 
stronger voice, ‘we are going to die, but we’re not going to surrender.’ We are 
bullets loaded into the gun barrel. Each one of us is going to explode in the hands 
of the enemy in this attack against the people, and in particular, against us the 
prisoners. We are going to be martyred.143 
 
Read not simply in terms of what he appears to mean or say but in terms of what it 
literally says, the figure of weapon here demands to be read less as an instrument and 
more as an event. For he does not quite mean to say that they weaponize death or life 
insofar as life is only another name for the capacity for dying, but rather he declares 
themselves to be, beyond metaphor, weapons which are ready to strike as the event of 
death, and veering towards an absolute aporia, he even declares themselves to be death 
insofar as death bursts into the present only to occasion a breach of difference between 
the apriori perfect and infinitive of death, separating and drawing together my death and 
death as an impersonal event by an inescapable interval of time which keeps the 
                                                
143 Ahmet Ibili, Canım Feda, Istanbul: Boran Yayıevi, 2006, p. 144. 
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coincidence of the two deaths in perpetual reserve. And this is arguably why DHKP-C 
did not ultimately discern a difference in the efficacity of the various forms of dying 
(death-fasting, self-burning, and suicidal attack) which were subsumed under the 
category of the sacrificial act, feda eylemi, with the emphasis falling on the offensive 
nature of the act. For they thought that each form of dying displayed a force with an equal 
magnitude notwithstanding the direction of the force which merely had the function of 
effecting its transmission, and thus this was a force which always reached its target 
inasmuch as it blasted the law, ushering, through the fissures of the law, the claims of the 
Other that, manifesting itself as death, sought for itself—and perhaps gave itself—a 
language that would reveal the truth, a truth hitherto unsayable and unregarded, by 
closing the very gap or disjunction between truth and power that their declaration to die 
for their demands had itself placed at the center of political discourse.    
DHKP-C had defined death from the outset as the goal of the Death Fast, and by 
doing so it had determined death as an object, state, or end that must be reached and 
attained, at least by the death fasters on the inaugural teams which were glorified as 
“vanguard battalions” in view of the certainty of the death of their members. The death 
fasters of these teams had in fact made their pledges knowing fully well that they would 
have to die and yet they were more than ready to accept their approaching deaths for, as 
Ahmet Ibili had explained in a conversation before he burnt himself in Ümraniye Prison, 
they would bring the victory: “Neither I nor you, nor the others will see the day of victory 
because we will bring the victory. We will bring the victory with our deaths. We will fall 
as martyrs.” Far from being a secondary effect or a by-product of their act of resistance, 
in this perspective, death had become an end in itself. 
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In this sense, death had already taken place, and they found themselves suspended 
between death and death, between a death that had occurred when they made their 
pledges—the pledge ceremonies were in many ways preparations for funerals—and a 
death which had yet to occur because they had to accomplish the task of dying still, 
against life which was no longer their own life proper but a life that was in some sense 
anonymous if only because it reasserted itself with a plaintive perseverance, speaking in 
the first person while making its host refer to herself in the second person: 
You are putrefying. You smell the odor of acetone coming from your mouth. 
Your head aches so much that you hit it on the walls. You want to live 
instinctually. All of your cells want to live physically. Even the pain is a sign of 
life. It is saying: Make me live, look I’m dying. Despite the pain, you don’t stop. 
Your will and spirit fight with your body. Can’t I live? 
 
As they hung indeterminately between the necessity of death and the endlessness 
of dying, they were dead and alive because, as G. reveled while reading the memorial 
poems which were written down to be recited in her own final absence, their form of 
dying had given them the chance to hear their funeral speeches in advance of the end, and 
they were alive and dead because they prepared their own funerals, deciding upon the 
grave sites and detailing their burials in their statements of last wishes which echoed back 
and forth from one to the other like reciprocal quotations the hope of a communion 
punctuated by an extravagant supplication to be buried together with the martyrs of the 
past, next to or even on top of each other. The future had turned into a ghostly 
premonition of the past and, in this sense, it was no longer the future at all, but already 
belonged to the past which had become the site of a tantalizing responsiveness, offering 
them beyond life and beyond death a timeless presence on the condition that they 
continued to be its guardians.  
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The presence of the past which was always already less than present just as it was 
always already more than present had set them apart, making them indifferent to the 
everyday demands of the living because they had made a pact not with the living, but 
with the dead still living, and their war was not with life but rather with death, with the 
death they could never seize, not even when they quested after their own death in heroic 
impatience, for they could not be done with dying, not without experiencing to the limit 
the anguish of the wait.  
Ali Rıza, in a letter written to one of his comrades from the prison, expressed his 
displeasure with his abiding health despite their recent decision to refrain from taking 
vitamin B 1 which had served only to defer their death:  
My health is good, god damn it! I’m dreaming of the days when I can write to you 
that I am feeling bad. I long for the coming of those days with my whole heart. I 
cannot wait to explode in the hands of these murderers.144 
 
He was restless to die, and yet he was still living, a life only afflicted with waiting 
in an empty present save the fervid anticipation of his future death because the truth of 
their demands, were he not to die, would never come to any proof. The political 
authorities, seemingly deaf and indifferent to their demands, had exploited the absence of 
death to cast aspersions on the truthfulness of their act. They had spread the false rumor 
that their survival was a sign of their secret eating. He longed for his death because death 
and only death could give expression to his truthfulness and testifying as it did to the 
truth of their demands. Were he to defer his death, on the other hand, by taking vitamin 
B1 for instance, he would only prolong the Death Fast and by consequence, occasion 
albeit inadvertently the death of others for only the precipitation of deaths could prevent 
                                                
144 Ibid., p. 400. 
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the introduction of new teams.  Survival was always already, then, the sign of a broken 
promise. 
  The fortuitous survival of H. (and in a sense, it was always fortuitous to survive 
the Death Fast to the extent that all decisions about the suspension or termination of the 
fast were left to the discretion of the organizational command after the prior consent of 
the individual death faster) had the oddly contrary effect of arousing his anger. It was not 
that he was feeling guilty of surviving in the place of his comrades, quite the reverse. The 
violence of his anger at having survived the death fast had its source in his falling short—
as announced in the performative naming of the act— of the task of dying, and thus he 
berated himself for not measuring up to the demands of the organizational command 
which had little in common with the repressive authority of the state because they had 
incited him to action by the seductive nakedness of a question: Can you die? That is to 
say, do you have the power to die? He did not quite remember the number of days he was 
on the fast—and why should he show care or concern about the number of days when 
death is the aim of his striving?—but he believed it to be 180 days referring to his father 
for the exact number, 186. He began with the surprise of the unexpected delay of his 
death only to fulminate against the absence of the event which had left him suspended in 
an inescapable lapse of time, and lest his impossible survival was understood to be a lack 
of desire on his part, he subjected his body to a frivolous interrogation, harassing himself 
with insatiability and persistence.  
It’s been 150 days, 200 days… You’re not eating anything, just sugar, salt and 
water… nothing else. I was getting surprised at myself. I was on my hundredths 
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happening? Why didn’t I die? I was really getting angry with myself. What the 
fuck! Is there a problem with our body?145  
 
The withdrawal of death from the realm of possibility threatened their virility and 
heroism, transforming impatience into the most excruciatingly patient wait. Days were 
marked by the tedious repetitiveness of dying, which did not allow itself to be mastered 
by the sovereign power of negation still: 
Days resemble each other. On the one hand, we wait for death and feel its 
approach and on the other hand, for victory… But death, the death that will put 
that point, the last point, is withholding itself from us. 146  
  
But this doleful insight into the impassibility of the distance between the present 
and the future of death, and it was impassible to the extent that it was already there (she 
felt its approach), had reinforced her desire to die. Sevgi Erdoğan concluded her diary 
entry on January 26, 2001(six months before her death) by apostrophizing death with the 
urgency and beseeching tone of a certain eschatological “come” which addressed the 
future, the future that death gives, as power, (“victory” she writes), and the imminent 
presence of the community to itself: “Come death, come death!”147 
This movement of advance and retreat had taken a spiraling turn with forced 
feeding which had prolonged the ordeal of dying, submitting them forcibly to an endless 
series of deaths and resurrections. “The tape,” A. said to me, “rewinds itself.” The ability 
to live was only another name for the ability to die, and the endless circle began again: 
“You then need another 50 or 100 days to die.” But after a few rounds of these undesired 
                                                
145 Though I asked my questions in the second person singular, H. always answered them in the first person 
plural. His use of possessive adjective in the first person plural gives an indication of the complete 
identification of his desire with the desire of the group; his body does not belong to him, it has already 
merged with the collective. 
 
146 Yasemin Berrin, Büyük Direnişin Uşak Cephesi Başeğmeyen Kadınlar, p. 150. 
 
147 Ibid., p. 154. 
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resurrections, death fasters became exasperated with resuming an act interrupted by 
forced-feeding, which had turned the struggle into a struggle to defend the Death Fast 
itself. The exigency of death underlying the act of death fasting, as DHKP-C saw it, 
underwent a further inflection whereby the necessity of a detour through partial deferral 
that alone had inhibited the Death Fast from achieving its aim of death was itself side-
stepped by overreaching it in the immediacy of self-burning. The death of the individual, 
though it now took the form of a calculating act accomplished in order to recover a more 
proper death by abolishing the necessity of waiting, had to be repeated itself in a series of 
potentially endless re-enactments which indicated both finality and incompletion, time 
and timelessness.  
That the Death Fast had not faded away owing to the exceptional perseverance of 
the DHKP-C whose teams of death fasters had succeeded each other uninterruptedly over 
seven years was averred by DHKP-C as a proof of its exteriority to law. Yet, far from 
being beyond the law, DHKP-C had in fact fallen hostage to law since the repeated 
negation of the law by the return of death necessarily confirmed the supremacy of law as 
a limit. The result was the relation to the limit of law, like the relation to death, began to 
resemble the limitlessness of time, a limitlessness that gave rise not to another law, but 
the endless succession of teams and thereby deaths that still resisted designation as 
events. They were in fact more like absent events, events without events if only because 
they were bound to (and by) the future as the coming of victory. As Ç. recapitulated their 
slogan “To the End, To Eternity, To the Last,” during the seventh year of the struggle, 
each death faster was never the last but the penultimate one in an infinite but closed 
series, a series of absolutely singular yet substitutable placeholders: “Every volunteer, 
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every death faster is a last man, but they are not the last point. In 1996, Yemliha [Kaya 
who was the last person to die before the state agreed to negotiate] was the last man. 
There is no last man until victory.”  
The organizational command invoked the endlessness of the Death Fast only to 
abstract a revolutionary Subject (and thus capitalized after the fact) from the 
uninterrupted continuity of its teams, and it did so by subsuming the singular acts of 
dying within a dialectical unity and closure. The temporal succession of the teams 
expressed the defining value of a revolutionary “culture” for which self-sacrifice, feda, 
was only ever an occasion for the demonstration of the impotence of power to take hold 
of this deathless Subject.148 But the singular acts of dying, though they now appeared, by 
a fetishistic inversion, to be the embodiments of this self-same sacrificial Subject, had in 
fact given rise to this ideal and unchanging self-identity by their possibility of repetition. 
In fact, DHKP-C had recuperated the possibility of repetition itself as a new possibility 
on the second year anniversary of the Death Fast by exploiting to radical effect the 
structure of repetition and difference that is the calendar. Henceforth, the ninth and 
subsequent teams (4 more) were named after exceptional martyr-death fasters, and these 
rememorative teams were introduced on the anniversaries of their deaths and other events 
of note. In this manner the inaugural series re-duplicated itself to constitute a new series 
                                                
148 For a description of this “culture” after the end of the Death Fast, see Yürüyüş, “Büyük Direniş 2000-
2007 Ölüm Orucu,” (The Great Resistance 2000-2007 Death Fast) October 12, 2008, no. 2, p. 10: “The 
Great Resistance, both from its ideological and political starting point and the values it has produced within 
the resistance itself, became an important barricade against imperialism’s politics of degeneration. In the 
midst of this depravation, it has added new values to the values of the people. This culture and its values 
are the most important inheritance that will shed light on the struggle of people. That it has demonstrated 
that there are still people who are willing to die for their beliefs, for their comrades, and people, this and 
only this, is a real strike against the bourgeois culture and its individualism. This is one of the victories of 
our resistance.” 
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of death fasters who repeated the past events as if they were looking forward to their own 
ghostly repetition for completion.149 
By turning towards the past events to re-call them, in spite of the irrevocability of 
the past, and not because of it, one may equally conclude that they had also turned away 
from the pursuit of power to inscribe the event itself as a timeless instant within time 
whereby the singular acts of dying severed their relationship with law to respond to the 
law beyond the law—the law of the Other. That the organizational command sought to 
capitalize upon, or at least to recuperate this repeated return of death by harnessing it to a 
rival code of values could not efface its unanswerability. As far as the outside gaze was 
concerned, the unanswerability of this insistent repetition was perhaps the one that 
disturbed the most, for at the very moment that the Death Fast lost its political force and 
justification, its own repetition of itself divided the presence of the present and denied the 
seeming closure of the event. Though this repetition could only appear as mechanical 
repetition from the outside, which was why in turn it appeared as empty ritualism, as the 




                                                
149 The ninth team was named after Zehra Kulaksız, a member of TAYAD who had died on the death fast 
outside the prison in Küçükarmutlu in June 2001. The tenth was named after Gültekin Koç who died in a 
suicide attack against a police headquarters in January 2001. The eleventh team was named after Sevgi 
Erdoğan who had continued to fast in Küçükarmutlu after her release and died in July 2001. The twelfth 
team was named after Fidan Kalşen, a female prisoner who had set herself on fire in Çanakkale Prison 
during the prison operation. The last team was named after Cengiz Soydaş, the first death faster to fall 
martyr in Sincan F-type Prison in March 2000. 
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Chapter V 
Feda: The Sacrificial Knot 
What is this force that drives the drive to reproduction, even if mere reproduction 
would mean death?  
--Rosalind Morris, “Legacies of Derrida: Anthropology”     
                    
Revolution is sacrifice and audacity. 
DHKP-C (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front) 
 
There is no last man until victory. 
--Ç., A death faster who decided not to go through the end 
 
Let me be the last one. 
--Fatma Koyupınar, The last death faster to die 
 
 
“We’ve already won,” she said in a matter-of-fact tone of voice, announcing their 
“victory” dispassionately. Having kept her composure all day without any easily 
discernible venom in her eyes, Z. spoke as if the government had not persistently refused 
to meet their demands, as if one hundred twenty two people had not died on the fast, as if 
her sister, Fatma, the one hundred twenty second one, had not died three months ago.  
   A woman of firm appearance with a look of surprised inquiry and yet of haughty 
pride in her eyes, Z. had served ten years in prison for taking part in the bombing of a 
police station as a commanding member of the outlawed Marxist-Leninist organization 
DHKP-C (Revolutionary People’s Liberation Party-Front). Her sister, a long-time 
comrade, had died on April 27, 2006 after fasting for three hundred and fifty four days. 
And three hundred and ten of those days were spent together in a cell with no one else but 
Z., as the prison administration had given her the impossible task of attending to her 
dying sister all alone.  
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In one way or another, both of us were prey to blindness. My blindness lay in 
seeing no truth other than loss. Hers was in clinging to a strange faith in the future that 
disallowed her from confronting the undeniable presence of deaths in the present. Yet, I 
did not dare to question her certitude openly for fear that I would reopen her wounds with 
my incredulity and thereby wound one more time. Instead I waited for some words from 
her that would allow me to understand the sense of her claim. Her conclusive evidence 
for their victory was their losses. Such, then, was the power of wounds in her 
imagination--dehiscent wounds that would burst open like flowers and let what was 
already coming into presence, the people, arrive. Together, we were suspended over a 
precipice dangerously oscillating between bestowing either too much or too little sense to 
the seriality of deaths.      
I had chanced upon Z. when I visited Behiç Aşçı in the summer of 2006.  Behiç 
Aşçı was the advocate of political prisoners affiliated with the outlawed Marxist-Leninist 
organization DHKP-C. In solidarity with the political prisoners in solitary confinement, 
he had begun fasting on April 4, 2006 together with Gülcan Görüroğlu, a mother of two, 
and Sevgi Saymaz from Uşak Prison as the only remaining member of the thirteenth 
death fast team.  The rest of the outlawed Marxist organizations had called the death fast 
off on May 28, 2002, declaring that the death fast had consummated its role in the 
struggle against the new prison project. Isolated in its struggle, DHKP-C had carried on 
with the death fast for four more years despite public inattention and lack of support.  
When I met him, Behiç Aşçı had been fasting for the past hundred and thirty-one 
days in a house located on a parallel street from the courthouse, itself located on the main 
avenue running through the middle of Şişli. A central area of İstanbul serving as a hub for 
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public transportation, this wide avenue was lined with general goods shops, coffee-shops, 
and restaurants under tall buildings of offices, banks and apartments. The back streets 
were still residential, housing many working class families and students who attended 
either the well-known high schools in the area or a great number of evening and weekend 
schools where they prepared for the annual high-school and university exams or learned 
English.   
I ventured to see him at the time scheduled for me.  A couple of young men with 
yellow vests indicating that they were on the picket line opened the door and showed me 
into the living room. The hallway was dark and the doors of the three rooms at the 
opposite end were closed. It was a spacious and well-resourced apartment. I was seated 
on a sofa across the large screen TV on the right and was told to wait. There were several 
people in the room. Between the greetings with two young women in picket line vests 
who wrote down my name and occupation in a notebook and an elderly couple, I turned 
and shifted carelessly about, surveying the living room. Behind the seats on the left was a 
long dinner table with a potted geranium placed in the middle. A series of chairs for 
visitors spotted the wall joining the two separate parts of the room from the right hand 
side to the left.  On the left hand side of the wall hung a news board where someone had 
pinned various news items about Behiç Aşçı’s death fast cut from national dailies and the 
organization’s own paralegal publications. And suddenly I noticed this startling object on 
the left hand side of the wall. It was a small wooden device placed on a metal file cabinet 
with a pot of daisies on both sides. As I peered at it persistently and curiously, I realized 
that it was a time meter of some sort registering the passage of days. It read 131. It 
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seemed as though the number of days was made to signify here both patience and 
impatience, beckoning to a victory to come before death.   
On the right hand side of the wall at the opposite end of the room was an 
approximately eighty by forty inches poster which read “Where there’s no justice, 
resistance is a right.” This red poster with yellow block letters was distinctly colored with 
the insignia colors of the Party. It was flanked on both sides with posters half its size. 
These smaller twin posters in black and white gave a slightly different message: “In a 
country where law and justice are destroyed, I am on the death fast for the fundamental 
right to live.”  
It might appear absurd for the “I” of the phrase to declare that it is dying in order 
not to die. According to its logic, the “I” of the phrase can escape the miserable fate of 
dying under an unjust and lawless political order by dying on the fast precisely because 
the senses of the two deaths are different. The first death does not refer to the cessation of 
life, but to the lack of possibilities of existence under such a political order.  By playing 
on this double sense of death—ontic and ontological death—the phrase reveals the death 
fast to be yet another possibility: death as a possibility which will inaugurate another 
ability-to-be. Here, death as horizon is not only the end but also the beginning, opening to 
and making possible all that can come from the future. Yet, at the same time, the 
evocation of death as a possibility here secretly harbors within itself a reference to a 
future that might never become the present of the “I” itself. Notwithstanding the great 
dissolution, in dying, of relationships with everyone else, as stated by Heidegger in 
Section 50 of Being and Time, the “I”, in dying for a right to come, is first and foremost 
dying for the other.  
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No sooner did he make his tardy entrance with a deferential group of young men 
behind him, then Behiç Aşçı rested his gaze upon me. For a couple of minutes he stood 
by the sofa in the same position, apparently deep in thought; but soon a cold, listless 
smile forced itself to his lips. He shook my hand and slowly sat down on the sofa. His 
face was pale and stern, as if quite frozen, motionless. He decidedly resembled an 
inanimate wax figure. His daily routine, he said, was clearly articulated, carefully 
organized. He had newly arisen from some two hours’ repose after the visitations in the 
morning. As soon as he told me this, one of the young men in picket line vests started to 
serve sour cherry juice. I looked at his emaciated hand as he sipped the beverage which 
was not allowed to the earlier death fast teams. I remembered at that moment having been 
told by the survivors of these earlier death fast teams how the death fast had passed 
imperceptibly into an indefinite hunger strike in the later stages of the prison resistance 
during which the standard diet was modified in accordance with the size and political 
consciousness of the forces of the participating political organizations inside the prisons. 
He must have sensed my inquiring expression because he immediately felt the need to 
give an explanation for his diet. “There is not a fixed formula for death fasting in the 
world that specifies the acceptable kinds of liquids,” he said. “For us, unmixed vitamin 
B-1 is fundamental. It does not have a nutritive value, yet it ensures the proper 
functioning of the nervous system and the brain. In the course of the 1996 Death Fast, 
most of the deaths occurred due to the collapse of the nervous system rather than due to 
hunger.  Secondly, we are drinking different types of liquids: water, tea, instant coffee, 
and various kinds of herbal teas as well as sugar and salt. There might be variations in 
this diet, but what distinguishes the death fast from an indefinite hunger strike is the 
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resolution to die. One takes the same liquids on the hunger strike, but there is not a 
declaration of the determination to die.” Though his definition of the death fast was 
consistent with the ideological and tactical differentiation between the death fast and 
indefinite hunger strike officially recognized by the radical Marxist groups in Turkey, the 
modifications of the standard diet have had a great impact on the time of individual 
deaths. For this reason, his altered diet was rather a sign that the Party was giving time 
both to the government and to Behiç Aşçı for the resolution of the conflict which had 
extended well into its seventh year.  
Their current campaign identified the generalized censorship as the last one in a 
series of governmental counter-tactics (such as forced feeding and mass discharges from 
the prison) which sought to introduce a new level of isolation by interrupting the 
communication between the prisons and outside. The State Security Court in Istanbul had 
imposed censorship on the national media for covering news related to the continuing 
prison struggle as early as December 14, 2000.150  The ensuing operation in the prisons 
on December 19 coupled with the successive waves of mass arrests in public protests had 
intimidated the crowds of protestors and gradually stifled the civil movement against the 
new prison regime. In order to break through this censorship which had taken the form of 
a compliant silence, the Central Committee of the organization had called for the fasting 
of a member with status such as a legal advocate or a medical doctor outside the prison.     
“The resistance demands lives be forfeited (can bedeli),” he said in a low voice to 
me, bending forward as he added: “The Ministry of Justice took the decision for the death 
                                                
150 Radikal, “Umut Var, Çözüm Yok,” (There is Hope, but No Solution), December 15, 2000. 
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fast in the name of those people.151 Committing a crime against humanity, the Ministry of 
Justice made 122 people, Gülcan, Sevgi and I take the decision for the death fast.”    
From these first two phrases alone, a suspicion is already born about the identity 
between the one who spoke the law and the one to whom the law applied. As the French 
philosopher Jean-François Lyotard (1988: 97-104) has shown, the pronoun of the first-
person plural is in effect the linchpin for the discourse of authorization in a republic. 
Substitutable for a proper name, We, the Turkish people, is supposedly able to link 
prescriptions such as articles in codes, court rulings, laws, decrees, ordinances, circulars 
and commands onto their legitimation. The republican principle of legitimacy is that the 
addressor of the norm and the addressee of the obligation are the same. The legislator 
ought not to be exempt from the obligation he or she asserts as norm. And the obligated 
one should be able to promulgate the law that obligates him or her. The first-person plural 
that reputedly unites the addressor and the addressee is constantly threatened with being 
split and this threat appears at its height when the obligation made to the addressee is that 
he or she die. That which orders death is excepted from the obligation, and that which 
undergoes the obligation is excepted from the legitimation. The authority comes out of a 
we from which the addressee is excepted once and for all.  Thus, there is an invocation of 
a greater “we” called humanity (which is not a collective proper name), that acts as a 
witness to that lesser “we” which has vanished with the complete splitting of the 
addressor and addressee of the law. As we will see, there is no “we” in Turkish society 
except in the extinction of the “I” in the name of the nation. 
                                                
151 Though it reads awkwardly in English, the literal translation of his words in Turkish would be the 
following: “The resistance demands life payments.” In Turkish, the emphasis is on the substitutive value of 
lives in an economy of violence with the state.  
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A few days ago the Minister of Justice had publicly asked Behiç Aşçı to bring to 
an end his unlawful act and to continue to pursue the rights of his defendants in court. He 
had said in a press conference, “In our country, a state of law, the paths of pursuing legal 
rights are by all means open. Therefore, it is impossible to accept this act of death fasting 
which was begun on the abstract assumption that there is isolation in the prisons.”152 The 
Minister of Justice’s public invitation to legal action performs a double function. While it 
operates to push political action outside the law and thereby criminalize it, it 
simultaneously becomes the means to absolve the state of its responsibility for the deaths 
and purifies it of its own violence.  
There is little faith in the applicability of law in Turkey and it is commonly 
believed that the legal “I” is a pure appearance as a fictional bearer of rights. This status 
of the legal “I” is an unintended consequence of the modernist-nationalist program of 
institutional reforms undertaken in various spheres from law to language at the inception 
of the Turkish Republic in 1923. This radical project of state-led social engineering 
sought to replace all Ottoman-Islamic social, political, and cultural institutions with 
institutions modeled on those of the West. Within two years of the birth of the republic, 
the caliphate had been abolished, religious schools and courts had been shut, wearing of 
the fez had been banned, and Ottoman Arabo-Persian lettering was replaced with Latin 
phonetic orthography.  
Kemalism, the official ideology of the Turkish Republic founded by Mustafa 
Kemal Atatürk, fabricated a strange relation to the West that denied its foreignness by 
recognizing the West as its proper self. The foreign could not in effect be something that 
                                                
152 BirGün, “Adalet Bakanlığı Aynı Yerde,” (The Ministry of Justice is in the Same Place), August 10, 
2006. 
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posed itself outside the self; it was always already a part of the national self. This was a 
national self that willed itself to be an absolute subject by subordinating alterity to the 
unity and totality of the national One. It pretended to do so by positing itself as the self-
present origin to all possible origins of difference. In its first congress held in Ankara in 
1932, the Society for the Study of Turkish History propounded the “Turkish Historical 
Thesis”. This theory, which Mustafa Kemal emphatically supported, held that the Turks 
were descendants of Aryan inhabitants of Central Asia, who had been forced by drought 
and hunger to other areas such as China, Europe and the Near East (Berktay 1983; Ersanlı 
1996). In doing so, they had created the world’s greatest civilizations. Similarly, Sun-
Language Theory launched in 1935 as part of the language reform held that all languages 
derived originally from one primeval language, spoken in Central Asia, that Turkish was 
the closest of all languages to this origin and that all languages had developed from the 
primeval language through Turkish (Lewis 1999; Ertürk 2011). 
The famous saying of the national founder—“We look like ourselves” (Biz bize 
benzeriz)—was a tautological articulation of the nationalist phantasm of pure immanence 
in which the foreign other would be no other than the Turkish self itself. Such a fully self-
constituted national self that allowed no being apart from itself would have threatened to 
become the extreme moment of the impossibility of sociality and yet this deadly closure 
still depended upon an originary supplementarity. It was the founder himself who divided 
this totality to constitute the nation’s exemplary Other.  
Mustafa Kemal in Western clothing, at the blackboard, teaching the nation his 
new alphabet, figured as an absolute translator endowed with the power to transform 
every illegible sign into transparency of meaning. The national founder neutralized the 
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force of the foreign by translating its irreducible difference and multiplicity into a 
universal language and thereby, one might say, essentially killed it. He was the 
embodiment of the abstract logic of rationality, and as such, was as clear as daylight. 
Here, then, is a seeming affinity, even identity between the founder and death embodied 
in the pure concept. But the pure idea cannot be devoid of materiality altogether and this 
proved to be an irresolvable paradox.  
According to Michael Meeker (1997: 171), the relationship between the founder 
and citizens was figured in a language of familiarity and intimacy: “the citizen could be 
seen and heard by the founder, just as the founder could be heard and seen by the 
citizen.” But what does it take to be in an intimate relationship with a pure concept, that 
is to say, with a void or nothingness of some kind? It would be no exaggeration to say 
that the citizens of the new republic were asked to identify with their own death. To be a 
citizen was to lose the materiality of one’s distinct being. The national “I” was not only 
self-effacing, in the sense of being humble and inconspicuous, it was also self-effacing in 
the much more radical sense that the position of the “I” implied its eradication as the 
undoing, the erasure of any relationship that could be conceived between what the “I” 
was and what it ought to have been as a national subject. One must have had nothing 
characteristic of itself to become a part of the national society, or, in other words, one had 
to be “nothing” in and of itself.  
Such an impossible demand for identification with one’s own “death” ended in 
the splitting of the national “we” prefigured as a total(izing) Subject. The Turkish 
sociologist Meltem Ahıska (1998) critically describes this condition as the bifurcation of 
the Republican everyday into the two deathly horizons of national identity: the vacuity of 
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official identity and its substantive inside rejected by the Kemalist ideology that solicited 
and consigned it to obscurity. While the popular “I” with its particular determinations 
(such as ethnicity, language, religion, political ideology) was expelled from the public 
gaze to survive in the darkness of a ghostly realm, the official “I” remained visible but 
oddly existed only on paper. This condition was exacerbated by the incapacity of the 
newly founded Turkish state to produce a national “we” lacking the necessary resources, 
technologies, and institutionalization.  
Turkish society was split apart by these two competing “I”s, so to speak, that 
recurred in one form or another throughout the entirety of its history, but whose 
differences could not ever be equalized, reconciled, or mediated, but only ever registered 
in their fundamental incompatibility, dissymmetry, and discord. Every time the “I” of 
speech tried to take charge of the openness of the abstract “I,” it was immediately 
negated. It was unable to extend beyond itself towards others to make common cause and 
was therefore bound to exist as a mere “I.” The official “I”, on the other hand, simply did 
not exist. It was so abstract that it fell completely into nothingness and had no bearing on 
anything specific, no substantive content at all. This disjuncture of the “I” could only be 
sutured in the complete identification with the national being which would have required 
the total negation of the “I”.153 Said otherwise, neither of the two “I”s could become a 
political subject. In this society, one acceded to political subjectivity only in self-(ab)-
negation, but then one was no longer a subject. Correlatively, there was no common 
                                                
153 Every child is molded in this sacrificial subjecthood as they learn to repeat the founder’s words at the 
beginning and end of the school week: “Let my being be a gift to the Turkish being!” (Varlığım Türk 
Varlığına Armağan Olsun!) 
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language in which the sub-communities that made up the national society could speak to 
each other except the official language.  
In this respect, the gargantuan drive for self-identity did not only founder on the 
sheer impossibility of suturing the rift between the two “I”s, which were of its own 
making in the first place, but also, more importantly, it continued to produce an 
uncontrollable excess. To the ghostly remainders of the national “we” was added the 
spectrality of the official “we”. The ghostly realm which harbored the specific “I”s was 
imprisoned in the darkness of its interiority. If it did manage to break into daylight, it was 
effaced away as mere “exception” redoubling the originary effacement. Hence, it ceased 
to exist as truth hidden behind the appearances waiting to be rationalized and normalized 
with the extension of law. Instead it became mere hearsay and thus essentially 
unverifiable. At the same time, the abstract “I” which did not exist became the only truth 
of the national identity, a “truth” which was indifferent to truth in its emptiness. In truth, 
both realms came to partake of fiction which, in Blanchot’s terms (1999: 396-7), is “truth 
and also indifference to truth.” 154  
It was the state which thrived on this rift between the two “I”s. It kept this ghostly 
realm as a space of lawlessness and administered and exploited the illegalities therein to 
establish and increase its power. At the same time, it left the law intact so as to better 
mark its difference from the extra-legal forces with which it was intimately entangled. 
This ability to move back and forth across the rift between law and lawlessness bestowed 
the Turkish state with an incredible spectral power. As Yael Navaro-Yashin (2002: 175) 
                                                
154 Ahıska (1998: 25) cites the modernist Ottoman thinker Abdullah Cevdet to give an example of the 
pragmatism of both Ottoman and Republican modernities that have invested in the power of lies:  “…What 
the Oriental mind says is not untrue. But we are not in need of the true, but the useful. In my view, every 
lie, every fake, every non-sense which arms the human being with resolution and will in the arena of life 
struggle is the truth itself. For the supreme truth in life is the life struggle.” 
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critically observes, the Turkish state appeared in multiple faces and guises: the mafia 
dealer, the police officer, the parliamentarian, the military official, the spy, the figure of 
Atatürk, and so on. Paradoxically, it was by withdrawing identity from itself that the 
Turkish state was able to operate as an endlessly excessive possibility of erasure, 
displacement, alteration, and proliferation. “The state,” she writes, “emerged as an 
apparition—now you see it, now you don’t—an intangible nonentity that appeared 
constantly to change hands.” It is this movement of self-differentiation that rendered the 
political order in Turkey illegible.155  
The sovereignty of the Turkish state, then, does not reside in legitimation, which 
is almost always called into question. The sovereignty of the Turkish state resides in its 
power of metamorphosis, in its ability to appear in multiple faces and guises. It “is”, in 
essence and in effect, unverifiable. Hence, the Turkish state is not threatened by powers 
of unmasking which would capitalize on the moment of verification but rather by powers 
of fiction, which thrive on unverifiability.  
It is my argument that a politics of truth is bound to fail under these conditions. 
However much evidence one produces for its illegitimate acts, the Turkish state does not 
lose its power. It is this illegibility, unidentifiability, or unverifiability that revolutionary 
insurgency needs to take into consideration. The question to be posed, then, is: What is 
the force of death fasting under these conditions? What are its modes of strategic 
functioning and vulnerabilities? How are they marked by this very nature of the Turkish 
state which is itself an effect of the divided national self?  
                                                
155 Or, Walter Benjamin would say, mythical. Benjamin (1986: 295) describes the powers of a mythical 
world with two keys words: as “demonic” and as “ambiguous.” The ambiguity of such a world is demonic 
because it is tied to the polytheism of the mythical world, in which no clear hierarchy permits an 
unambiguous identification of authority. 
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Behiç Aşçı talked of his futile labors as an advocate of political prisoners and of 
the illegible law in Turkey—what he said traced the passage from his failed attempts to 
obtain justice to his decision to death fast. The terms of the Anti-Terror Law gathered in 
their extensive sweep a range of activities that could stamp “anyone,” he said ominously, 
with the criminal agency of membership in an outlawed organization. The root of the 
word for organization in Turkish, örgüt, is the verb denoting the act of weaving, örmek. 
In contradistinction to the English word which indicates a system of rules governing 
behavior, the Turkish word refers to a web of social relations. It however has the sinister 
connotation of conspiratorial scheming as if any other collective identification and action 
would threaten the well-being of the Turkish state and nation.156 In this respect, the verbal 
root of örgüt brings into view the disjuncture between the legal name and the web of 
social relations that it purports to name.157 As Christopher Bracken (1997: 120) has aptly 
demonstrated, the legal text “grants the world an object to be observed, regulated, handed 
over to the police—and arraigned.” The legal name produces a dubious specter that 
divides its referent from itself proliferating it to its detriment. We were too caught in the 
abysmal workings of what was in fact the law itself. Örgüt ceased to mean what it meant 
                                                
156 It can be argued that the word adopted this connotation after the military coup in 1980 which forcefully 
installed a neo-liberal economic regime in Turkey. The post-1980 military and civilian governments did not 
grant to any social class other than the bourgeoisie the right of organizing and forming themselves as an 
autonomous political force. Galip Yalman aptly describes this form of socio-political structure as 
“authoritarian individualism.” In line with the New Right thinking in England and elsewhere, it was 
understood that a strong state would be necessary as the political guarantor of economic individualism. See 
his “The Turkish State and Bourgeoisie in Historical Perspective,” in The Politics of Permanent Crisis: 
Class, Ideology and State in Turkey, eds. Neşecan Balkan and Sungur Savran, (New York: Nova Science 
Publishers, Inc., 2002), p. 46. 
 
157 For this reason, the outlawed leftist organizations identify this word as a term employed in the idiolect 
of the police and prefer to use instead the words siyaset (politics) and/or yapı (structure) to refer to 
themselves. While the first word posits the political nature of their acts against the state’s criminalization of 
Marxist militancy which puts their acts on a par with organized crime, the second one lays emphasis on the 
founding character of such political action. 
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legally but began to oscillate uncontrollably between what it still did mean legally and the 
always other possibility that it meant something different, something that inhabited the 
legal name as its own fundamental alterity. Behiç Aşçı switched back and forth between 
disclaiming his connections with DHKP-C and fully embracing them. It was never clear 
whether he was speaking as a singular “I” dying in the name of humanity or a communal 
“I” sacrificing himself for the protection of the “we”.  
The public prosecutor had filed a lawsuit against him alleging that he was a 
member of the outlawed organization DHKP-C on account of his act. There is presently 
no law banning the practice of death fasting outside the prison. The syllogistic reasoning 
of the prosecutor, he explained, went more or less like this: Death fasting is the act of the 
outlawed organization; He is performing this act; Then he must belong to the outlawed 
organization. He was not punished for his infraction of the law, but rather for his 
association with a social group that was considered to constitute a risk to the order of the 
state.158  
Behiç Aşçı’s account of the criminalization of Marxist militancy and its extra-
legal elimination testifies to the ontologization of criminality that Michel Foucault (2000: 
198-199) exposes in the emergence of the figure of the “dangerous individual” at the turn 
of the twentieth century. Dangerous individuals are not punished for what they have done 
but for who they are and, being the persons they are, for what they will have done in the 
future. It would be no exaggeration to say that any “I” of speech, because it is ultimately 
                                                
158 The fear of being taken for someone else that James Siegel (1997: 185) describes as the precarious 
condition of sociality in revolutionary times was an affect that overwhelmed me on a daily basis in the 
course of my field research. I was reminded by the insinuating remarks of my interlocutors that I could be 
taken into custody simply for talking to them. To be in relation with them—even at such a preliminary 
level—was a risk to be heeded; and yet, at the same time, such risk taking constituted the basis of any 
possible intimacy between us. 
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an uncontrollable source of speech, can devolve into a dangerous individual in Turkey 
where, as I have argued, the national “we” is impossibly (de)constituted in the voiding of 
the existence of “I.” The split nature of political ontology in Turkey necessitates the 
constant policing of the gap between the official “I” and the “I” of speech. The publicly 
declared dangerous individuals, then, with the generalized policing that they authorize, 
constitute, as Foucault has argued (1977: 281), a means of perpetual surveillance of the 
entire population. Such generalized policing of the population does need to be written 
into law and thus redoubles the illegibility of the political order.  
Behiç Aşçı told of the policemen who had been repeatedly acquitted of all charges 
in the killing of his defendants in every single State Security Court despite their 
admission of guilt and evidence.159 He counted his numerous filings of complaints, 
criminal charges, and lawsuits against abuses in prisons which were almost always 
dismissed by prosecutors. He continued to speak indignantly, trying to take control of 
such illegibility by attaching it to a single source of decision-making. “It is said that tecrit 
(isolation) is a state policy. And you cannot fight state policy in Turkey. It has been 
always said that there was a master plan behind the prisons and that the implementation 
in the prisons abided by this master plan. But neither the Istanbul Bar nor we can get a 
hold of this master plan despite the fact they have asked for it in official writing. In other 
words, there exists a law which we neither know nor see and our filings of criminal 
charges are dismissed according to this law.” Almost powerlessly he lowered himself 
deeper into the sofa. I offered him the glass of water on the coffee-table; but despite his 
                                                
159 Heirs to the infamous martial law courts, the State Security Courts had a three-member judiciary panel 
comprised of a military officer and two civilian judges. Having started to operate in May 1984, they came 
to handle cases dealing with terrorism, gang-related crimes, drug smuggling, and membership in illegal 
organizations with the passing of the Anti-Terror Law in 1991. 
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paleness and even the trembling of his hands, he declined it and continued to speak. “In 
appearance, there is a law; but there is also another law in effect which cannot be seen by 
anyone. The written laws deceive the people. It writes of our freedoms and rights. The 
unwritten law abolishes all of our rights one by one.”160  
Rights, he was saying, cannot be taken for granted in a political context wherein 
the applicability of legal entitlements and protections are nullified by the force of such 
“unwritten laws.” The objective of the death fast was therefore to expand the terrain of 
struggle for rights by creating a “ground” for the coming into visibility and 
simultaneously into speech of the prison conflict and thereby for its eventual resolution: 
“The death fast cannot achieve anything by itself alone. The aim of the death fast is to 
create a ground. It is to bring out a problem into the open and to create a ground for its 
resolution.” In his account, the death fast disclosed the commonly unrecognized violence 
of cellular incarceration which redoubled its violence in the denial of violence by an 
other violence which inscribed itself into the space of law. From this perspective, the 
death fast was a violent act of inscription (Derrida 1974: 112) bringing the ghostly realm 
in the dark into the daylight of speech in a political order where the law of law was 
forever to keep the two realms intact and yet separate from each other.    
We sat for a few minutes in complete silence as the nonchalance of this moribund 
man’s intellection lingered with me. It suddenly compelled me to remind him of the event 
that he had come to witness at the state’s forensics center. In an earlier interview with 
                                                
160 In Discipline and Punish (1977: 222-223), Foucault entertains the suggestion that “the disciplines 
constitute nothing more than an infra-law,” only to reject the notion and argue that they should be regarded 
as a “counter-law,” in that they do not simply extend the forms defined by laws into the micro-level but 
actually undermine the formal and juridical liberties. However, the mechanism of power does not operate 
here to produce normalization and goes awry in the attempt of doing so, but rather thrives on its lack 
thereof.   
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him published in DHKP-C’s paralegal weekly, I had read that he had resolved to go on 
the death fast after witnessing this event. In the wake of the prison operation, he had 
accompanied the families of two dead prisoners to the morgue of the state’s forensics 
center to claim the bodies of their dead children. Both of the bodies were severely burnt 
to such a degree that the families were unable to identify their own children. Finally, each 
family decided to claim any one of the bodies. In the interview he had reported their 
exchange in these words: “You take one and we take the other. In any case, aren’t both of 
them our children?”161 The violence of the state was such that it destroyed difference. It 
even dissolved the radical heterogeneity of the dead. This process of dematerialization 
which resulted in their absolute substitutability nonetheless generated something else and 
something more. For the families opened up the possibility of another sociality in the 
name of which their children had given their lives, a sociality that invested in an 
anonymous subjectivity, despite and because of its violent erasure. Yet this possibility 
itself was foreclosed when pure substitution opened onto pure identification on the basis 
of a thinking of community as communion in death. In the same interview, Behiç Aşçı 
was also reported to say that he had carried 122 coffins and that he had to pay his “debts 
of conscience” (vicdan borcu) to these fallen death fasters. I came close to being 
sacrilegious when I asked him whether it was the ethical significance of these deaths that 
had kept alive the resistance for the past seven years above and beyond the viability of its 
political calculus. He listened and answered in a weary and displeased voice: “Debt of 
conscience is intertwined with politics. It is impossible to separate these from each other. 
If you did not have political consciousness, you would not be able to experience the 
feeling of indebtedness. I can say that a person cannot go on the death fast simply for 
                                                
161 Yürüyüş, “Vahşeti Gördü Gözleri,” (“His Eyes Saw the Brutality”), December 24, 2006, no. 84. 
 197 
debt of conscience, cannot do it, cannot risk his life. To put at stake his life, he must have 
political consciousness. But as he continues the action with his political consciousness, at 
the same time he naturally settles accounts in his conscience.” What emerges here is yet 
another narrative of the hierarchy between political class consciousness and affective 
attachment. But something else also becomes evident, and that is the degree to which this 
form of politics operates entwined with and sometimes indistinguishable from ethical 
obligation.  
We had talked for a long time, more than an hour, and he was still in the same 
torpor; not a muscle in his face moved, not the slightest movement appeared in his body. 
Finally, there came the quiet, deep sound of the big wall clock striking once. With a 
certain uneasiness he turned his head to look at the face of the clock, but at almost the 
same moment the door, giving onto the living room, opened, and a group of boisterous 
people appeared with bouquets of flowers. The newcomers streamed in joyously through 
the living room door and soon they all settled themselves into the chairs in the room as 
though they had never risen. The old lady who talked in a Black Sea accent hugged me 
and only then inquired about my identity. When the lean woman diagonally opposite, Z., 
overheard our conversation, she excitedly invited me to TAYAD and gave me the address 
and the phone number to make an appointment.  
Though there was nothing out of the ordinary at first sight, one thing struck me 
particularly, and confirmed my perturbing intuition. As I looked at the young women and 
men in uniforms intermingling with persons of casual attire, the dinner table decorated 
with flowers reclining against a wall with political posters, and public visitors conversing 
with the members of an extended family coalescing around its “sick” kin, I became 
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conscious of the inconspicuous blending of the intimacy of a domestic space with the 
anonymity of a political stage in this room. The state of anomalous ordinariness 
associated with sickness that reigns in the practice of death fasting practically compelled 
home visitations. Yet these visitations were not simply understood as a sign of political 
alliance but also as a promise of social identification with them. In fact, they bespoke a 
complicity of interpellation as they were an attempted enfolding of any visitor by means 
of addressing these others as if they were already part of the group, sharing stated 
premises, goals, and social attitudes. The hosts imputed to the visitors a desire for 
intimate association. In doing so, as Michael Meeker (1997) has perceptively argued, 
they recognized the existence of a mass society of anonymous others, but they understood 
it in terms of personal, face-to-face relations.  
Another way of saying this is that the political subjectivity that had emerged in 
the socialist movement in Turkey in mid-1960s had acquired a clandestine character with 
the violent coup d’état on September 12, 1980 and had thus ceased being relational for a 
long time. Its clandestine character was no doubt a necessary dimension of political 
action and survival under the brutal military regime, but at the same time, it paradoxically 
meant the withdrawal of the socialist militants from the streets and their gradual isolation 
from society. In the words of the Turkish socialist cultural critic Sezai Sarıoğlu, the 
organization had transformed itself into a “home” for the militants.162 This domestication 
of political organizations became all the more acute with their disengagement from the 
general field of politics and concomitant devalorization of forms of action practiced 
therein. Consequently, they appeared to function as a secret counter-society with its 
                                                
162 Sezai Sarıoğlu, “Sosyalizmin ve İnsanın İçi Açılmamıştır,” (The Insides of Socialism and the Human 
Have Not Yet Been Opened,) Birikim, February 2003, no. 166.  
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unknown chiefs, rules, principles of obedience, forms of conduct and private language. 
The question to be asked, then, is: How does the experiencing of the political universal as 
a familiar particular introduce another economy, another relationality that does not enter 
into, or at least deflects part of itself outside of and away from the economy of violence? 
That is to say, how is the question of political sovereignty reconciled with ethical 
responsibility? To answer such questions requires that one listens to the narratives of self-
sacrifice (feda) within which the members of this organization negotiate political 
commitment and ethical responsibility to the familial other as each other’s shadow.  
There are two different words standing for sacrifice in Turkish, both of which are 
turkicizations from the Arabic: kurban and feda. Kurban goes back to the Hebrew korban 
which “expresses the idea of “approach” or “bringing near,” possibly to the altar” 
(Robbins 1998: 286). In Turkish, it has the connotation of lack of consent on the part of 
the sacrificial victim. Feda, on the other hand, refers to a sacrifice of the self that is 
willed and desired. It is a turkicized form of the Arabic word fida’ which means 
“redemption, repurchase, ransom.”163 Fida’i, derivative of the former, is a figure of 
devotion. It is a name used of special devotees in religious and political groups who offer 
up their lives to save the rest of the community.164 Its cognate in Persian, feda’i (plural 
feda’iyan) is closely associated with martyrs who died fighting at the Battle of Karbala 
(Abrahamian 1988:4). The DHKP-C militants are however inspired by the contemporary 
                                                
163 According to the Encyclopaedia of Islam (2008: Vol. XII, 306), fida refers particularly to the liberation 
of Muslim captives in Christian territories by ransom. 
 
164 Among the Isma’ilis it was used of those members who risked their lives to assassinate the enemies of 




Palestinian guerrilla fighters. They see themselves as fighting an analogous war of 
liberation in a country under the occupation of imperialist powers.165  
DHKP-C’s use of the word feda encompasses a range of insurgent forms of self-
sacrifice such as self-starvation, self-burning and suicide bombing. Nonetheless, the word 
is often used to refer to the latter two forms with the idiomatic expression feda eylemi 
(feda action). This idiomatic expression functions to mark DHKP-C’s difference from the 
rest of the leftist organizations which refuse to employ these latter two means of 
resistance. It also appears to found a new tradition of Marxist militancy distinguished by 
its absolute commitment since the latter two forms completely rule out the possibility of 
survival, unlike the death fast.166 In its semantics, we need to take notice of fidelity as 
much as (if not even more than) of belief. What the word feda bears witness to is the 
fateful inseparability of total devotion to one’s comrades from total commitment to one’s 
cause. 
II. 
After circumambulating twice the building located a few blocks from Behiç 
Aşçı’s apartment on a Sunday afternoon, I finally rang the bell of TAYAD in anxiety. A 
window opened on the fourth floor and an old woman with a white head covering peeked 
out. “Who are you?” she asked. I offered my name and muttered diffidently that I had 
made an appointment with M. on the phone the day before. She went inside and about a 
                                                
165 Nasser Abufarha (2009: 70) makes a distinction between ‘amaliyyat istishhadiyya (martyrdom 
operations) and ‘amaliyat fidai’ya (self-sacrifice operations), a term used earlier in Palestinian resistance 
discourse to refer to operations where the undertaker had little or no chance of returning, making the 
execution of the mission a commitment to self-sacrifice. The former term “istishhadi”, on the other hand, is 
a newly coined one by Hamas, endowing the earlier term “fida’i” with religious qualities. In line with the 
earlier term, DHKP-C’s use of the term is strictly non-Islamic. 
166 I say “appear” because the Kurdish separatist movement has been employing these means of resistance 
since the early 1990s. DHKP-C could however be considered the first leftist organization in Turkey to 
make use of these tactics notwithstanding the Marxist components of the Kurdish guerrilla struggle.  
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minute later she threw down the key for me to open the heavy iron door. It was my 
second time at the Solidarity Association for the Families of Prisoners and my eyes 
searched for the few faces that I had gotten to know a couple of days ago. TAYAD 
represents solely the families of the outlawed leftist group DHKP-C (Revolutionary 
People’s Liberation Party-Front). It works to publicize the grievances of prisoners, 
conducting various campaigns to solicit the attention and support of the general public to 
the cause of the prisoners. It organized an important part of the civil movement outside 
the prisons in order to support the struggle within the prisons by pressuring the public to 
take action.  
During my first visit, M., who appeared to be in charge of the organization, had 
informed me about tecrit (isolation) ending with the showing of a gory documentary with 
long pannings of disfigured and burnt bodies in the morgue accompanied with the sounds 
of a dissonant electronic music. She had severe burn marks on her face, arms and legs 
herself. As I gazed attentively at the burnt bodies resembling tree trunks, I straightaway 
felt Z.’s eyes upon me, turned, and looked away so quickly that she smiled, pointed at 
one of the unidentifiable figures as her comrade and, with a vaguely mocking look on her 
face, told me that they themselves had filmed the scenes in the morgue as evidence 
against the brutal operation in the prisons code-named “Return to Life.” The encounter 
was gripping at the moment and even more afterwards—for only in retrospect was I clear 
as to what had actually happened. Z. was not simply insinuating that I could have been in 
their place. Rather, she was asking me to see through their loss and take notice of another 
sacrifice, one which was unmarked.  It was a matter of the most silent, inner sacrifice.  Z. 
wanted me to be impressed by their self-control as they sacrificed themselves to the 
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severe duty of documenting their loss. Did I have the subtlety to comprehend that proving 
one’s loss meant delaying mourning and putting it off indefinitely?167 That was the secret 
relation I was compelled to see between the two kinds of self-sacrifice.  
What was more, they had to prove the violent deaths of their comrades, for which, 
they were held responsible by the judicial system. M. had looked me straight in the face 
and had declared in amazement that they were being summoned to the court for public 
cases on the deaths of their comrades on charges of “encouraging and assisting suicide.” 
One could witness the death of others and bear witness to it, but there was one thing that 
was impossible: one could not bear witness to one’s own death and to one’s own 
incapacity of bearing witness. This was a paradox, and the paradox redoubled itself, 
because it was also true that in order to be able to remember and to describe, to recount 
and to record, what happened to them, survivors needed to describe everything as though 
it were slightly external, as though they had been only witnessing—witnessing the 
sufferings and deaths of others. If they had done more than only witnessing, with the very 
thin line between witnessing and bearing witness, they would not have survived. The 
state officials not only held them accountable for bearing witness to the deaths of their 
comrades, but they also capitalized on the ineluctable shame of survivors and forced them 
into complicity with the brutality of the state’s violence.  
To my dismay, I was told that M. and Z. had just returned from the weekly 
demonstration in Sultanahmet Square and were presently in a meeting. Every Sunday, 
TAYAD reads testimonial letters from the political prisoners in maximum security 
                                                
167 For this distinction, see Marc Nichanian, “Testimony: From Document to Monument,” in Armenian 
Genocide: Cultural and Ethical Legacies, ed. Richard Hovannisian (New Brunswick: Transactions 
Publishers, 2007) pp. 41-62. See also his “Catastrophic Mourning” in Loss: The Politics of Mourning, ed. 
David E. Lang and David Kazanjian (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003), pp. 99-125.   
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prisons. They appeal to pedestrians with words involving both imprecation and reproach: 
“They died for their people. What did you do for them?”; “Tecrit continues to kill, will 
you remain silent?” Theirs is a cry for help, addressed not to anyone in particular, but to 
the passersby as anyone---anyone can help. Death should have a dispropriating effect on 
the one who must respond. Yet they are appalled when no one is overtaken and is made 
to respond. TAYAD’s branch in the capital has been meeting under the allegorical 
monument of hand in Abdi Ipekci Park for the past 1150 days. One cannot really tell 
whether the hand opened towards the other is making an offering or praying for a 
miracle. Maybe they are doing both: the first act in public, the second in secret.  
Amidst running children, I waited for M. and Z. drinking tea and watching the 
group of men in the middle of the large living room commenting favorably on the fierce 
woman on the television screen. I suddenly became aware of their desire for self 
recording. It rendered the members of this community capable of appearing to 
themselves, I thought. Yet, it was not their losses but their violent encounters with the 
authorities that enabled them to irrupt into public view. As I was captured by the contrast 
between the composed figure of the captain of the policemen and her frenzied manners 
that the intimacy of their contact at the border between the demonstrators and special 
police teams brought out, she entered the room with some young men who were coming 
to have dinner from Behiç Aşçı’s house a couple of blocks down the street. The dark, 
green-eyed, petite lady was B. Z. and M. dashed out from one of the four rooms in the 
interior of the apartment and introduced me to her. I hurriedly inquired about mothers 
that I had requested to meet in our first meeting. Z. answered curtly that B. was one. She 
was the widow of a rural guerrilla who had died six years ago in a clash with the security 
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forces. Both of her sons were serving time in prison with the charge of membership in 
DHKP-C. Her elder one, T., was suffering from psychosis under solitary confinement. 
They made me hasten to the study past the rooms in which I could only spot a row of 
bunk beds. On the table, in the middle of the study, the tea pot was boiling and there 
stood a full but untouched and forgotten glass of tea. T. was dawdling around the table 
and going into all corners of the room, not conscious of his movements. He had been 
released from the Kandıra F-type prison three weeks ago. He seized me at once by the 
hand and said ardently, “Welcome, sister (abla).”  
 I soon saw the wall covered with the pictures of the fallen death fasters. One 
hundred and twenty two passport size portrait photographs were collaged together into a 
poster. While the individual frames of the portrait photographs brought out the singularity 
of the dead, the encompassing rectangular frame of the poster appeared to bound the 
multiplicity of the dead into an individuated holistic form not unlike the cells of a prison. 
Slightly underneath this poster was stretched a canvas banner with the words of their 
latest slogan: “To the End, To Eternity, To the Last.” On the adjacent wall hung a widely 
circulated photograph of Sevgi Erdoğan, one of the iconic figures of the movement 
whose funeral had brought together thousands of people. The photograph heightened and 
accentuated her physical parts. The corporealization, so to speak, of all her being as an 
effect of hunger hollowed her living presence but at the same time enveloped her with a 
spectral power captured by the slogan underneath it: “Long Live the Death Fast 
Resistance.” Next to her photograph was a placard quoting the last words of a 1996 death 
faster, Berdan Kerimgiller, who, I was told, had stood out among others for reciting the 
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epic of Şeyh Bedrettin in his unconscious state168: "The future of mankind is incredibly 
open. We have all the possibilities.” With the gaze of the dead fixed upon us began a 
conversation in which specters and revenants intertwined inextricably with omens and 
portents to form the knot of the present.  
“We are resisting for the right to resistance,” Z. said with a faith holy and 
steadfast. Such an abstraction of their ends in the sixth year of their resistance means to 
mark the limit of power relations and bring to the fore the recalcitrance of the 
revolutionary will which constitutes a permanent limit to the exercise of power that tends 
to (impossible) fulfillment and thus, Foucault would say (2000: 347), suspend itself in 
reducing its adversary to total impotence, thereby becoming mere violence. “We will 
continue with our resistance until our very last man. I could be the only remaining one, 
but I would never surrender, even unto death,” she continued switching from the first 
person plural to the first person singular as if there was hardly any difference between the 
two.  Faced with the intransigence of the revolutionary will on which it has no purchase, 
which it has no power to win back, the state re-constitutes itself only by becoming the 
violence of the negative. The response to the state’s denial and negation of alterity takes 
the form of absolute negation of the revolutionary self, and thus redoubles the state’s 
gesture of projecting nothingness onto the other. Difference from the state is thought to 
                                                
168 Şeyh Bedrettin (1359-1420) was a charismatic preacher who led one of the greatest peasant revolts 
against the Ottoman Sultan in 1416 in the Aegean coastal region of Anatolia. Bedrettin and his 
companions, Torlak Kemal and Börklüce Mustafa, precipitated an insurrection among the poor peasantry of 
Karaburun suffering enormously from high taxes during a period of political unrest as a result of the 
fratricides after the Battle of Ankara (1412). Bedrettin induced the peasants not to pay their taxes and share 
the land equally among them. After a series of initial victories, Bedrettin had to withdraw on the Karabarun 
peninsula with his 10,000 men who were slaughtered by the sultan’s army. Börklüce Mustafa was 
immediately crucified while Şeyh Bedrettin was taken to the city of Serez where he was hung. The leftist 
culture in Turkey likens Şeyh Bedrettin to Muenzer and other revolutionary theologians. Owing to the 
Turkish communist poet, Nazım Hikmet’s epic poem on the same figure, one of his alleged sayings is 
widely quoted:  “Share all you have apart from the lips of your beloved.”   
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be reinstated in the absolute negation of the revolutionary self. The opposite of victory is 
not defeat but total submission to the state. Total self-annihilation, then, becomes a form 
of victory.  
This had been their claim and they had proved their claim that they would never 
surrender even unto death by their 122 martyrs. “We said we would refuse to surrender 
unto death and we are doing it,” she said with great emotion pointing at the photographs 
of the fallen death fasters. One speaks here as if one’s words are divided into two by a 
temporal interval like in a promise. One speaks in the present but one enacts one’s words 
at some time in the future. They become one’s proper words, so to speak, only after their 
enactment in the future. Words are essentially falsifiable, that is they threaten to become 
lies, unless they are brought into action by their speaker. The truth of one’s words is then 
decided only in and by their enactment.169  
The one who sincerely promises, Nietzsche says in the second essay of the 
Genealogy of Morals (1998: 35-36), wields the power of the sovereign to enact what he 
says, to bring into being what he wills. The promising being, one who is able to discharge 
words into deeds, produces an “I” which stands for itself across time.170 The “I” appears 
however to be sovereign in its absence here. Or rather appears to be sovereign in its half-
presence as a corpse which stands as the proof of the return of the “I” to itself as one and 
                                                
169 Since Austin (1962), we know that performatives, unlike constatives, are never true or false. Following 
Paul de Man’s argument in “Promises” (1974), an essay on Rousseau’s Social Contract, I would like to 
emphasize however the logic of sovereignty here which finds its ground in the triumph over the temporal 
disjuncture between the constatives and performatives. One authenticates one’s claim in action and 
differentiates itself from other claimants by the differences in the capacity to do so. Truth of sovereignty 
itself is based on the felicitous performance of such actions.  
 
170 Here I also want to acknowledge the influence of Jacques Derrida’s Rogues (2005) and Samuel Weber’s 
essay “Rogue Democracy and the Hidden God” (2006) in conceiving the ontological structure of 
sovereignty as “ipseity.” 
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the same, be that in death.171 But the “I,” as support of power, cannot say “I” in death 
and, as Blanchot writes (1981), dissolves into the impersonal, anonymous “one”.  
For families, close relatives, and inhabitants of Küçükarmutlu, the corpse remains 
an “I” within the hold of affective attachments. Yet, it at the same time stays behind as a 
proper name having a universal signification. The death fasters had already pronounced 
themselves (half)-dead at the moment of their decision, but had continued to speak for 
hundreds of days before death came to find them. The declarative statement “I’m (half)-
dead” did not partake of the extraordinary as death became quite banally a part of 
everyday life.  In these close circles of identification, the interlocutors of the fasters were 
not only at a loss with words, but were also unable to eat any food. In the face of a 
speaking death which literally choked them, the only way they could have continued on 
with their everyday life and, at the same time could have engaged with this half-corpse 
was to talk to this “I” as if it were immortal. The “I” would be immortal not simply 
because it would continue to live in their memory but also because it was a proper name 
that would survive its bearer in (world) history. They had to constantly make the move 
from relating to the fasters as intimate others to seeing them as the sensory appearances 
of universal ideas. Such a conflicted relation to the death fasters was necessary for the 
continuation of sociality in a community which was compelled to identify with this death 
with an intimate face. One could not otherwise watch a loved person dying, take care of 
her or him over a period of hundreds of days, and most importantly, restrain oneself from 
                                                
171 One of the heroic deeds of DHKP-C militants often told is their fighting onto death with the police 
forces. A much glorified incident is one of the leading cadres and her cell’s writing of their last words in 
their own blood on the walls of the cell house discovered by the police forces. This is a telling gesture 
which discloses their desire to mark metonymically their presence even in their absence that the writing of 
words necessarily entails. See the pamphlet “Ellerimizde Silahlarımız, Dilimizde Sloganlarımızla 
Kucaklıyoruz Ölümü,” (With Our Guns in Our Hands and Our Slogans in Our Tongues do We Welcome 
Death), n.d. 
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interrupting his or her death when it is in one’s power to do so. In a community wherein 
only death speaks, how else can one make a distinction between oneself and a murderer? 
I am presently interested in the (mis)figuration of the relation of the corpse to the 
anonymous others, but I will return to this issue of identification with a speaking death 
inside the close circles of identification later in the chapter. I invoke the latter aspect here 
to make a note of the fact that what makes the continuation of the social possible in the 
close circles of identification is precisely that which constitutes the fundamental paradox 
in the figuring of the corpse’s relation to the national society of anonymous others. How 
is it that the most particular is also expected to be recognized as the most general?172 And 
what are the consequences of doing so?  
In effect, the death fasters were already dead to themselves even before they 
undertook the death fast. When others looked at them, they did not necessarily see a 
person. They rather saw thoughts. To understand their thoughts was to have seen them. 
The death fasters were personifications of universal thoughts, pure abstractions such as 
freedom, justice, and equality, and communism as their absolute, irreducible condition. 
What Blanchot (1981: 39) writes of the French revolutionaries in the Reign of Terror is 
pertinent to the Marxist militants as well : “The Terrorists are those who desire absolute 
freedom and are fully conscious that this constitutes a desire for their own death, they are 
conscious of the freedom they affirm, as they are conscious of their death which they 
                                                
172 In Kojève’s reading of Hegel, such a synthesis of the particular and universal constitutes the end of 
history when “the strictly particular, personal, individual value of each is recognized as such, in its very 
particularity, by all, by Universality incarnated in the State as such; and in which the universal value of the 
State is recognized and realized by the Particular as such, by all the Particulars” (1980: 58). The Marxist 
militants misrecognize themselves as syntheses of the particular and the universal precisely because the 
political universal is experienced as a familial particular. In truth, the Party can impersonate the political 
universal either by borrowing from the future when it will have been recognized by all the particulars or by 




realize, and consequently they behave during their lifetimes not like people living among 
other living people, but like beings deprived of being, like universal thoughts, pure 
abstractions beyond history, judging and deciding in the name of all of history.” In other 
words, the “I” had to be devoid of any individuality or specificity. It had to be as general 
as it could be, so much so that it could be called a purely (or merely) grammatical 
subject. It was an “I” which, by definition, could not say “I.”173  
In actual fact, the Marxist militants hardly use the first person singular in their 
speech, as if they know that the “I” of speech is bound to conflict with the generality, the 
pure grammaticality, of this “I.” Instead, they prefer to use the first person plural as if the 
“I’’ were “We and the “We” were “I”. Émile Benveniste explains the displacement of the 
first person singular by the first person plural in these words: “The reason for this is that 
“We” is not a quantified or multiplied “I”; it is an “I” expanded beyond the strict limits of 
the person, enlarged and at the same time amorphous” (1997: 203). This expanded “I” 
can never be a true plural, however, because its extension always has a limit. As 
Benveniste concludes: “Only ‘the third person,’ being a non-person, admits of a true 
plural” (1997: 204).  The limited generality of the “We” is confounded here with the 
anonymity of the third person plural owing to the certitude about the abstract generality 
of an “I” that has become universal thought. Universality is of course not the same thing 
as plurality. Unlike the third person plural which stands for the infinite alterity of 
anonymity, pure concept can never be as plural as the third person plural since it 
dissolves the pre-conceptual singularity of beings in the total generality of meaning. But 
the disjuncture between the two perspectives is compounded when these thoughts 
                                                
173 For the paradoxical status of the allegorical “I,” see Paul de Man’s “Sign and Symbol in Hegel’s 
Aesthetics”, Critical Inquiry 8 (Summer 1982), p. 775. 
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themselves appear to lose their value of universality and the communal “I” is threatened 
ever more with remaining a mere “I”. Such a widening gap between the communal “I” 
and the anonymous other is thought to be bridged in addressing the latter as an always 
already known other. In other words, there is a persistent desire to transpose the 
relationship to the anonymous other into an extended face-to-face relationship. The 
uncustomary exposure of the face in the public funerals drives away the incipient 
impersonality asking the people to relate to the corpse as an intimate other and to 
recognize the “I” in the “We”. The short biographies which detail the name, date and 
place of birth, and ethnicity of the fallen death fasters (and other DHKP-C militants) in 
their obituaries has a similar function in that it compels the anonymous readers—after all 
some among them must have been born in the same local town or belonged to the same 
ethnicity—to recognize the dead person as one of their own. Here is an example: “Şefinur 
Tezgel was born in 1971 in Tokat, Armutalan village. She came from a poor family of 
Alevis. She was a nurse and worked to organize other health workers. She was arrested 
and imprisoned at the funeral of a guerrilla who had been martyred in Tunceli. She joined 
the first death fast team in Çanakkale Prison and set herself on fire on the day of the 
attack in the prisons. When her body was found, she was still making the victory sign.”  
National communities, Benedict Anderson (1998: 55-56) emphasizes, make sure 
that the “unknown soldier” remains unknown—that is unidentifiable as a particular 
person. Instead of an empty signifier—like the legal “I” which lacks any material inside 
in its formality—that may be affectively invested by everyone, each fallen militant in this 
case is a particular person who demands to be recognized by and for his/her familiarity. 
In her last speech before she set herself on fire on December 28, 2004, Sergül Albayrak 
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addresses the people in the second person plural and asks this anonymous addressee to 
identify her as one of them and thereby recognize her act as a sacrifice for them: “You, 
all the peoples of my homeland, you should know that this force is coming out of you. It 
is you who create this force. Embrace that which belongs to you; don’t give it up to the 
enemy. We are burning for you. Bury our ashes in our homeland. Look at the world 
which will be born from our ashes.” There is confusion in the limits of the “we” here. 
One cannot tell whether it designates the communal “we” or the national “we.” The 
sacrificial act marks the moment of their possible (mis)identification and the corpse 
carries forth this intimate voice into the future as a sign that continues to call the 
anonymous others to action.  
This anthropomorphic metaphor of a speaking sign endowed with a voice might 
seem misleading.174 From the perspective of my interlocutors, however, the corpse of the 
Marxist militant was both a universal sign and a familiar face. If there was a transparent 
sign, so to speak, it “was” the corpse. At the same time, the corpse was imagined to have 
the intimate voice of an absent but familiar person with whom one continued to speak as 
if it could respond beyond the border between life and death. Transported by that corpse, 
they could not understand why the others did not hear the message of the corpse which 
was supposed to be absolutely translatable. This impossible configuration of the corpse as 
both a universal sign and an intimate voice was thought to be possible by the mere 
facticity of death.  
“People are dying day by day minute by minute. The people of this country 
should be starting movements which would shake the entire world. It is a great 
                                                
174 For this figure of speech called prosopopeia, see Paul de Man’s “Autobiography as De-Facement” in 
Rhetoric of Romanticism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984), 64-81 
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contradiction that there is no response,” T. interjected almost beside himself. The mere 
facticity of the corpse—that there is a corpse—calls “the people” into being in the 
hyperbolic expectation that “the people” that the corpse made possible will eventually 
catch up with this projection. “Right now we do not have a people fighting next to us. But 
we believe that this accumulation (birikim) will make the people fight,” Z. continued 
prophetically. “The accumulation?” I interrupted. “122 deaths,” she answered my 
question, referring to a deposit, a precipitate, a heap of corpses. They were astonished 
that the society at large did not respond to this heap of corpses which called upon it.  
“What makes you think that the deaths will precipitate the coming into being of a 
collective revolutionary agency?” I inquired. “The slightest exceeding of the limit (sınır 
aşma) might be sufficient to pour the people into the streets,” T. said, restraining himself 
with difficulty. M. completed his sentence, “They are trying to destroy the force which 
can create that mobility. We are that force.”  
The imagined effectivity of the corpse relies upon a conflation of personal 
sovereignty with political sovereignty that finds its ground in the imputation of a desire to 
others for identification with a source of force that manifests itself in the audacious acts 
of the militants. T. and M. were putting Mahir Çayan’s theory of revolutionary violence 
into words.  
DHKP-C claims to be the only “true” heir to THKP-C (People’s Liberation Party-
Front of Turkey)—the legendary guerrilla organization of the early 1970s. Captivated by 
Guevarist ideas of guerrilla warfare, Mahir Çayan, the principal ideologue of the 
organization, worked out his own theory of revolutionary war called Politicized Military 
War Strategy (Politikleşmiş Askeri Savaş Stratejisi) in his famous series of pamphlets 
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“Uninterrupted Revolution I-II-III” (Kesintisiz Devrim I-II-III) published in April 1971 
as a book.175 Politicized Military War is a specific form of people’s war to be waged in 
countries of belated capitalist development under the economic domination of neo-
colonialist powers such as the United States. In colonial and semi-colonial countries such 
as China and Vietnam, overt foreign invasion coupled with a feudal system characterized 
by weak central authority had provided the objective conditions for building up a popular 
army in the rural areas which eventually had the strength to encircle and capture cities, 
and finally to seize power in the entire country. Çayan claimed that foreign occupation 
had nevertheless become covert with the enforcement of capitalist relations of production 
by the local ruling classes dependent on foreign capital and propped up by its military 
forces. The greater centralization of government, concurrent increase in transportation 
and communication networks across a national territory united by a market economy, and 
the growing importance of cities and working classes had created an “artificial balance” 
(suni denge) between the oligarchic regime and popular forces ruling out a classic 
people’s war formulated by Mao Tse-tung.176 Çayan argued that the general uprising had 
to be sparked off by organized and well prepared military operations by a revolutionary 
vanguard during the course of which the masses of the people would be drawn in and 
armed as in Cuba.177 At the same time, drawing on the lessons of Che’s failure in Bolivia, 
Çayan wrote: “The doctrine that the masses will, in some spontaneous way, respond to an 
                                                
175 Mahir Çayan, Bütün Yazılar [Complete Works] (Istanbul: Atılım, 1992), pp. 229-350. 
 
176 Mao Tse-Tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith II (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 
2000). 
 
177 As Che wrote: “… the essence of guerrilla warfare is the miracle by which a small nucleus of men—
looking beyond their immediate tactical objective—becomes the vanguard of a mass movement, achieving 
its ideals, establishing a new society, ending the ways of the old and winning social justice.” See Che 
Guevara, Guerrilla Warfare, p. 114. 
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insurrectionary center—a military foco—needs serious reexamination.”178 He 
distinguished his understanding of the vanguard war from that of THKO (People’s 
Liberation Army of Turkey), which he associated with Régis Debray’s foco theory.179 
According to Çayan, Debray tended to proceed from the proposition that the most 
important form of propaganda was military action to a conclusion that in most of Latin 
America the creation of military skilled guerrilla foci was sufficient to bring about 
favorable conditions for an eventual people’s military victory. Thus, he underrated the 
vital connection between the vanguard war (which in its early stages must of necessity be 
of a limited magnitude) and other forms of militant mass activity. In contrast to Debray, 
in other words, Çayan appeared to emphasize the need for a political leadership as much 
as for a military one and the need for the political mobilization of the masses. However, 
Çayan too could fall easily into Debrayist formulations. In order to disrupt the false 
equilibrium and to force oligarchic regimes to reveal their true character as dictatorships 
of violence, he argued, a revolutionary vanguard had to perform a series of successful 
armed actions which would display a surplus force as a counter pole of attraction for the 
people: 180  
…it is necessary to demonstrate to the masses the strength of the armed 
revolutionary front fighting against the oligarchy, and in a way, it is necessary to 
demoralize and wear out the enemy by shows of force (kuvvet gösterisi). The 
vanguard’s series of military victories is the only way to achieve this. The masses 
will feel sympathy towards the armed revolutionary front at first. But because 
they exaggerate the power of the central authority, they watch these armed actions 
                                                
178 Çayan, Kesintisiz Devrim, p. 325. 
 
179 Debray worked out this theory in his famous Revolution in the Revolution?, trans. Bobbye Ortiz (New 
York: Groove Press, 1967). After his release from his imprisonment in Bolivia, Debray published a re-
evaluation of Revolution in the Revolution which essentially disavowed his foco theory now dubbed as 
vanguard war. It might be for this reason that Çayan is making such an effort to distinguish his theory of 
vanguard war from that of Debray. 
 
180 Çayan, Kesintisiz Devrim, p. 318. 
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with great curiosity and hesitation lacking faith in the armed revolutionary front. 
Upon the success of the guerrilla operations, the masses will see that the armed 
revolutionary front is a significant force—indestructible and everlasting. At that 
time, their sympathy will turn into trust. This is the second phase. This fact does 
not mean that the support of the majority of the people is gained. It is only when 
the guerrilla war becomes continuous and consistent that their trust will turn into 
support.  
 
The impact of the guerrilla operations, he claimed, would be greater in a country 
like Turkey where the strong state tradition of the Ottoman Empire had persisted with the 
Kemalist single party regime into the 1950s. Unlike in Cuba, however, it was the urban 
areas which would become the main theater of guerrilla operations in the initial phase. 
Çayan had designated the urban areas as the desirable site for such spectacles of 
revolutionary violence because he believed that the earlier activities of university youth 
organization Dev-Genç (Revolutionary Youth) such as boycotts, university occupations 
and demonstrations against the U.S. Sixth Fleet had created favorable conditions for more 
violent forms of armed action. More notably, he anticipated that these acts of 
revolutionary violence would have been spectacularized by mass media, and in this way 
the force of that violence would have been extended in space and time through its 
dissemination.181 From this perspective, the manifestation of a surplus force in the 
stagings of violent acts in the urban areas would disclose the false invincibility of the 
state and thus transform the absolute war between the vanguards and the state into a 
totalized war with the participation of the proletariat and peasantry who, as witness-
spectators, would be awed and thus swayed by such shows of counter-force: “The armed 
                                                
181 As Çayan rightfully noted, the national public had gained knowledge about the guerrilla operations of 
Maoist TIKKO (Workers’ and Peasants’ Liberation Army of Turkey) in the southeastern provinces a year 
and a half after the fact. He also admitted that they did not have the time to prepare for a rural guerrilla war. 
For the objective and subjective conditions for urban guerrilla war, see Çayan, Kesintisiz Devrim, pp. 345-
6. 
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propaganda jolts the masses at first and gradually raises their consciousness. It shows that 
the central authority is not as powerful as it appears to be and that its power above all else 
relies on demagogy, clamor and intimidation.” The labor of transmission of revolutionary 
theory and practice is overshadowed here by a transmission by enthrallment which is 
imagined to translate itself—through repetition—into a hailing of the vanguard’s heroic 
action. Revolutionary pedagogy is displaced by pure affectivity (affection by the audacity 
(cüret) of the vanguard) which automatically creates the ability of the masses to 
spontaneously recognize the vanguard as a new source of authority. The regular 
recurrence of military victory acts fundamentally by itself and unleashes a politically 
efficacious force. Yet the political efficacy of this force derives neither from the 
legitimacy of its cause nor from the scale of its violence. It rather mobilizes by its power 
of unmasking: an unmasking which reveals the groundlessness of the state’s power in the 
violence which measures and makes the difference between different claims to 
sovereignty.182  
There is however a significant shift in the modality of revolutionary violence 
between the early 1970s and the present. The spectacles of revolutionary force presently 
happen to take the form of self-destructive negativity which is understood to be the one 
and only way of binding a power that knows no limits in its use and degree of violence. 
“The enemy is so reckless, so merciless,” Z. said. “But all types of weapons, 
sophisticated military technologies are ultimately powerless before the human will. 
                                                
182 The guerrilla operations of Çayan and his group consisted merely of bank robberies, hostage taking and 
kidnapping of foreign experts and civil servants residing in Turkey. Having taken hostage two foreign 
technicians to forestall the capital punishment of the military and political cadres of THKO (People’s 
Liberation Army of Turkey) Deniz Gezmiş, Hüseyin Inan and Yusuf Arslan who had been caught earlier on 
their way to an operation base for rural armed struggle, Çayan and his group were cornered in the Black 
Sea village of Kızıldere and were brutally killed by the security forces on March 30, 1972. Ironically, it was 
their crushing defeat, not their astounding victory that entranced the succeeding generations of militants. 
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Human will can defeat any force however powerful it is. Whatever it does, it cannot take 
away death from me. It is rendered inoperative in front of my death. The enemy is 
frightened,” she continued referring to the acts of self-immolation. “They cannot come 
face to face with us. They can only look at us from the tip of their water hoses and gun 
barrels,” M. said turning to me.183 The eye of power cannot gaze upon the revolutionary 
force without the necessary distance and armed mediation. This condition, were it to fail 
to respect, it would subsequently be exposed to its own destruction. The audacity of their 
acts is such that it has the capacity to intimidate and thus overcome sovereign power by 
going beyond the limit beyond which it is said not to reach: death.  
In as much as the corpse is the material proof of self-sovereignty, it is also the 
sign of the power of Marxist ideology. This ideological power, however, does not 
originate from the contents of thoughts. Its power rather comes from its ability to 
magnetize wills which embrace it to the point of sacrificing themselves for its sake 
without reserve. “Günay,” went on Z. who had witnessed the thirty year old woman 
burning herself to death in Uşak prison on February 29, 2004, “was showing us how to 
step out of our proper self and put the ideological source in its place.” Günay had been in 
prison for 5 years, with six months left to her release, and on the death fast for 133 days. 
Z. demurred—yet continued anyhow, the rest of us listening with a certain suspense: “It 
was the power of that source, it was that will that embraced her body with the fire of 
feda.” Thus, the corpse is thought to be a tantalizing figure as well which provokes the 
onlookers into imagining themselves as the recipients of such excessive giving. The self-
                                                
183 The opposite is not true. DHKP-C militants proclaim that they will pursue, find, and persecute every 
single one of their murderers and torturers. They ensure that they will see through even those who go 
through aesthetic operations to hide their identity. If their acts blind those in power, their vision is 
penetratingly disclosing. See the pamphlet “Devrimci Sol,” n.d., p. 29. 
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sacrificial acts bring into view a different kind of power which is prepared to give itself 
up for the life and future of the people in strict opposition to a power that demands 
sacrifice from its subjects for its own self-preservation. This is a kind of power that 
dissipates itself in love for its subjects, and in doing so, creates a collective subject to 
which it is immanent.184  
The agonistic exchange with the source of authority is, then, imagined to bind the 
people to an enduring economic relationship with the revolutionaries, shifting the 
signification of the sacrificial act (feda) from an unproductive expenditure (Bataille 1985) 
to a gift given in excess to the social that founds the new political community. It is as 
though for this second form of sacrifice to take place what has to be sacrificed is the pure 
sacrifice without reserve itself. The aneconomical understanding of sacrifice inevitably 
gets sublated by an economical understanding of sacrifice. Such an economy is based on 
the myth of pure giving without return. “Self-sacrifice is the highest dimension of 
sacrificiality.  You cannot see the result of your action. You gain nothing. You are giving 
your self up for the people. For the future. This is at the same time your faith. You 
believe that it is going to happen whether you are there or not,” Z. said reassuringly about 
the future.  
In actual fact, however, there is a strange oscillation between the aneconomical 
and the economical marking the community’s most extreme moment—of both possibility 
and impossibility. Said otherwise, sacrifice begins at the moment when sacrifice becomes 
a question. In her last speech before she set herself on fire in Gebze Prison on May 1, 
2004, Selma Kubat testifies to this aporia of sacrifice: “My people! I love you so much as 
                                                
184 The DHKP-C militants understand their leader’s relation to them in the same idiom of sacrificial love.  
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to burn for you, turn into ashes. You are worth it. Listen to us; do not listen to those who 
say you are not worth anything. Happy days are not far away but are soon to come. 
Believe in us, trust us. I trust you, my people.”185  
To believe, Émile Benveniste (1961: 1971; quoted in de Certeau 1985) says, is to 
“give something away with the certainty of getting it back.” Michel de Certeau (1985: 
195), on the other hand, underlines the temporality of this closed economy. “Believing,” 
he contends, “makes a communication practice out of the alterity of time (or of non-
immediacy).” The temporality of belief is a temporality in excess of the present. It 
preempts the present from coinciding with itself and gives a future by inscribing the other 
within the self. De Certeau writes (1985: 201): “Belief, by means of a gift (or sacrifice) 
creates the empty space that installs the other, but that other must fill the void. It produces 
this “other” presumed to insure against what it is losing. It is not surprising that belief 
should obey this dynamic circularity. Is this not the very structure of the lived present? 
This present is, in fact, what, by vanishing, constitutes the alterity of a future.” The “I” 
loses a part of itself in the present and expects to recover it in the future from the other as 
other and more than itself. As M. said: “Those who are only troubled by their lives proper 
perish, disappear one day;” and added immediately: “Those who sacrifice their lives 
[literally say life sacrifice] multiply towards new lives.” In this spirit, then, they 
contemplated and imagined their death, in the idiom of a sacrifice that multiplied rather 
than consumed; with crowds of people coming behind, as they took the final step looking 
forward, to their arriving from the future.  
 But, I am impelled to ask, again, what sort of sacrificial drive is this, which fails 
to draw any response from the other, and yet which stubbornly refuses to come to an end, 
                                                
185 TAYAD Bulletin, Special Edition, p. 24 
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and in so doing dissipates itself recklessly? This sacrificial drive derives its force of 
repetition from a twofold certitude. Sacrifice, in order to qualify as such, to make sense, 
must be recognized. So it proleptically projects its own recognition into the future as 
though time were always lagging behind itself and as though, in equal measure, it were 
always ahead of itself. The copula in the Party’s dictum—“The revolution is sacrifice and 
audacity”—calls the revolution into presence as an event which first occurs as something 
that has already occurred. The occurrence of the revolution is the extraordinary 
happening of that which has always already happened and nevertheless has yet to happen, 
and thus remains unforeseeable.186 Sacrifice points forward to the moment of recognition 
which is to come, which it anticipates as its decisive end and with respect to which it will 
have been a mere forerunner.  
But, the revolution, the end of sacrifice, so to speak, depends on its very return. 
The return of sacrifice is the condition of both the impossibility and the possibility of 
recognition. Sacrifice is indeed destined to return, as though it hoped to fulfill and 
complete itself. It promises to repeat itself and to return until it finally accomplishes what 
it has promised. But there is no guarantee that another sacrifice will assume the legacy of 
                                                
186 This temporalization of the revolution appears to be an eschatological version of Çayan’s “uninterrupted 
revolution” (kesintisiz devrim). He argued that a “revolutionary situation” was not necessary for a guerrilla 
or people's revolutionary struggle to be waged successfully. In colonial and semi-colonial conditions, the 
commencement of armed activity did not have to be necessarily related to the moment in time when the 
question of the seizure of power was on the agenda. The society could be transformed with the deliberate 
creation of organized groups that embarked upon protracted armed revolutionary struggle. The vanguard 
was a political fighter, a member of an organized revolutionary force, who used the struggle itself, the 
vanguard war, as an instrument of agitation and mobilization. He aimed to raise the level of popular 
participation to the point at which revolutionary aims became general. In Çayan’s view, people’s war under 
neo-colonial conditions necessitated the indefinite prolongation of the vanguard war, which formed the 
preliminary stage of all people’s wars, rendering the revolution continuous: “The pacifists in our country 
claim that we are still in the stage of evolution and that the objective conditions for armed struggle do not 
exist. In countries under imperialist invasion, the two stages of evolution and revolution cannot be strictly 
separated from each other. In these types of countries, revolution is not a short but a long stage. It is 
practically impossible to determine where the stage of evolution ends and that of revolution begins. Rather, 
these stages are telescoped into each other” (Çayan 1992: 300; emphasis mine).  
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the promises made in a preceding one. The agent of recognition has changed in the 
passage from the one to the other, and together with it, so has the meaning and 
temporality of sacrifice. In deferring the fulfillment of the promise into the unforeseeable 
future, one encumbers the present with demands for payment, binding it in relation to the 
legacy of the past and the promise for the future. One gives too much time, if you will, to 
the anonymous other; and alas, too little time to one’s fellow comrades to respond.  
I will return to Michel de Certeau one last time to question the source of this 
twofold certitude, a certitude with no ground which will bring into view a wholly 
different modality of sacrifice. According to de Certeau, the impossibility of grounding 
belief sets off a movement towards an (more upright) other of the other culminating in 
the figure of an absolute Other. But the very advent of this figure, fabricated as the only 
real guarantee against the fragility of the relation to the other, is itself an effect of the 
fidelity of others. Belief is in fact grounded in neither integrity nor truth but 
phantasmatically in number. “Belief of the other”, de Certeau argues, “is the postulate of 
belief in the other”: “It is because others (or many) believe that an individual can take his 
debtor to be faithful and trust him. A plurality guarantees the guarantor” (1986: 200).  
I will repeat my question. If the proclaimed debtors, “the people,” refuse to 
respond to the sacrifice on their behalf, why does sacrifice still continue? Why does it not 
come to an end? In keeping with de Certeau’s logic, then, it must be continuing on 
because there must still be believers who are continuing to give on the strength of a 
guarantor. It could be said that the Party acts as the guarantor for the continuation of 
sacrifice. It assures the endurance of the resistance by surviving the sacrifices of its 
individual members. Yet the longevity of the Party itself depends upon the prestige and 
 222 
desirability which reflects back on it from these individual sacrifices. The continuation of 
sacrifice relies then on the reciprocal relationship of trust between the Party and the 
sacrificial will. But this reciprocity of trust itself stands upon an ethics of comradeship 
(yoldaşlık) characterized by total devotion to one’s fellow comrades.187 Sacrifice, which 
guarantees the coming of the moment of recognition by continuously returning to itself, 
generates a new form of sacrificial economy. Beyond the Party and its leadership’s 
assurances, it is the fidelity of the intimate other that guarantees that one’s sacrifice will 
not have been in vain because it will have been repeated by a chain of others until the 
moment of victory.  
B. who appeared to be endowed or perhaps afflicted with a heavy gift, which she 
bore in all humility, began to speak after listening patiently for some time to what the 
others had to say. Those words had been uttered clearly and fluently; these came rather 
hesitatingly and brokenly. Yet they stood out all the more like a clear and sharp nucleus 
within a pale and misty envelope. From her half-utterances, her broken phrases, and 
bursts of scolding, I gathered that what I heard corresponded to their expectations.  She 
was there to prove to me that their sacrifices were not for nothing.  
B.’s son was placed in a three-person cell in May 2001 and his health had steadily 
deteriorated. He constantly heard voices. In the beginning, these voices uttered single 
words.  Gradually, he started to talk to the voices as if they were with him in the cell. 
They were saying, “burn yourself, burn yourself, kill…” He could not bear to hear these 
voices that began to acquire faces. He was swearing, shouting, punching the walls, and 
hitting his head on the cell door. Locking himself up in the bathroom, he beat up the 
apparitions with the broom in order to make them disappear. One day he stayed in the 
                                                
187 In Turkish, yoldaş literally means of the same path, yol. 
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bathroom crying for forty-five minutes. His eyes were blood red and his neck and chest 
were marked with his fingerprints for he had tried to choke himself. He went up the stairs 
muttering: “Dishonorable, despicable creatures, they are trying to kill us. They are telling 
me to set myself on fire. You go ahead and set yourself on fire, why should I set myself 
on fire? … Am I crazy? You are crazy.” He lost himself and attacked the glass window 
cutting himself. He was bleeding badly, but he refused to be treated in the prison 
infirmary. His cell mates calmed him down and he was discharged to Bakirkoy 
Psychiatry Hospital where he stayed for twenty days. He was brought back with a report 
stating that he had fully recovered. A few days after this return, he once again tumbled 
down into the world of the other to the point of attempting to set himself on fire twice.     
  B. ranted at the state for not releasing her son. She struggled for a year and a 
half just to have him transferred to a hospital. If he were on the death fast, she said, the 
prison administration would already have called the doctors on him for a medical 
intervention without even consulting the family. On the other hand, she added, death 
fasters who were “in good physical shape” were discharged by the state. She furiously 
remarked that those who did not continue their death fast outside the prison were 
“traitors” who were set free at the expanse of their comrades by making use of the so-
called “gift” of the state.   
B. was assured that the fasters were not dying in vain. They were dying so that 
new generations would not descend into madness in the F-type prisons. After all, she 
exclaimed, her son did recover and he recovered because of the devotion and patient care 
of his comrades. Such fidelity was on a par with motherly love. “My son says that he was 
able to stand on his feet because of his family and comrades. If I’m alive today, he says, 
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it is because of these two kinds of love.” Her son, she declared, derived his strength from 
the resistance of the fasters who were dying for the future of the people. “I tell everyone. 
Look at your loved ones before going to bed. Our children are dying for people whom 
they do not know in any way. Why does a young woman at the age of 22, in the best 
years of her life, set herself on fire? She also would have liked to live. But she chooses to 
die so that people will not fall into madness in isolation. She’s dying for you and me. For 
heaven’s sake, they will say no to injustice one day, won’t they? We’re not the only ones, 
are we?”  
But when, “they,” the anonymous other does not respond, sacrifice becomes the 
fateful repetition and commemoration of the original sacrifice of the intimate other, your 
sacrifice for me and my sacrifice for you, “you and me” bounded within the sacrificial 
knot. Then, every sacrificial act comes to entrust itself as a deposit for safe-keeping into 
the hands of another which, when it follows, restores to life the specter in waiting, 
deposited in the preceding act, and is haunted and possessed by it. Sacrifice connects the 
next moment to the one before, attaching the past to the present. It obliges the future to 
account for the deposit with which it has been entrusted and to assume it with fidelity. It 
brings the future to pass, summoning it as of now, sooner than it would have wished, to 
the point where it becomes one with the present. Here there is both chance and danger: 
chance, because the repetition of sacrificial act is a way of making the other live on in the 
self; danger, because this appears to be the only way of doing so.  
As Marcel Mauss (1964: 74) stated long ago, “sacrifice contains in itself the 
condition of its recurrence.” Here I argue that fidelity to the intimate other constitutes the 
unpresentable excess of the sacrificial machine that has in fact continued to uphold and 
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sustain it incessantly. And paradoxically, this excess comes into view when the sacrificial 
machine suddenly breaks down. But that story cannot be heard here where the sacrificial 
machine appears to function uninterruptedly. We need to go somewhere else to bear 
witness to a life which chose not to repeat the sacrificial act.  
III.  
Ç. was managing a coffee shop on the third floor of one of the historic hans, 
Rumeli Han, flanking the İstiklal Caddesi in Beyoğlu.188 It takes a few cruises and 
attentiveness of a peaceful mind to fall out of sync with the rhythm of this thoroughfare 
to take notice of the art nouveau hans and the passageways whose facades and entrances 
are usually covered up by the glitter of advertisements and palimpsest of political posters. 
Whereas temporary visitors look for enchanting experiences in one of its havens on the 
weekends, its permanent residents refer to it as an open prison.  
Along with a series of highly publicized renewal projects had appeared the specter 
of crime unsettling the euphoria of the new millennium. Pickpockets and glue-sniffers 
had begun to descend into the thoroughfare from the poor neighborhoods bordering it on 
each side as well as the far-off ones connected by the new subway line.  In response, the 
police forces, making a show of their force with their tanks at rest at the entrance to the 
thoroughfare in Taksim Square, had displaced themselves into the mobile mass and were 
roaming in groups of two or three with machine guns, forming a mirror image of the 
gangs of thieves on the street.  
As I joined the rest of the pedestrians who continuously ripped apart and sutured 
back this main route with their steps, the words of the Turkish poet Küçük İskender 
                                                
188 Han is a multi-story apartment building where wealthy non-Muslim Ottomans used to live. Each has a 
proper name which refers to different parts of the world such as Rumeli Han, Afrika Han.  
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(2000) reverberated in my ears: “In Beyoğlu, everyone believes in the revolution as much 
as they believe in suicide because in Beyoğlu everyone has returned from their death 
sentence.”  
An old album of the famous Turkish female singer Sezen Aksu was playing when 
I entered the coffee shop. As he greeted me and seated me at one of the tables, Ç. did not 
bother to turn down the volume. We spoke for a few hours while the voluminous music 
provided a secretive sheath for our conversation in the midst of which he confessed more 
than once that it was very difficult for him to talk about this “matter”: “I am tousled 
(darmadağın oluyorum). Frankly, that is why I do not talk to anyone.” To this day, I can 
only fathom the reasons behind his decision to talk to me. Was it because A., a higher 
ranking militant who had also left the organization, had brought me to his coffee shop to 
talk at a “quiet” place? Or was it because he had found a medium for the transmission of 
his words which would have flowed in a different circuit of communication? 
“I was on the third team,” he said. “How did you decide to volunteer?” I inquired. 
“You ask yourself whether you can die or not. If you say I can die, you become a 
volunteer,” he answered. But immediately, he started to recount his reactions to the 
television screening of a violent assault on the members of TAYAD: “TAYAD is making 
a press release. Old women, young women are being beaten. At that moment, you can set 
yourself on fire. If you were outside, you would kill every single one of them. They took 
away everything from the people, their properties, their lives. They hurt you and you 
want to hurt them too. (Senin canını acıtıyorlar, sen de onun canını acıtmak istiyorsun). 
For this reason, you can do anything. If you cannot do anything, you set yourself on fire.” 
“The violation of women,” as Rosalind Morris (2002: 7) argues, “solicits patriarchal 
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viewers as those kinds of viewers who can be wounded by the wounding of others, and 
who can feel this wounding as the assault on that which is proper to them.” In a similar 
vein, Ç., the emasculated male subject here, is driven to kill the other in the self in order 
to purify himself of such patriarchal complicity with the enemy.  
When I interjected that hurting the enemy and hurting oneself were two different 
things, he explained himself by recounting yet another story. During the state’s operation 
in Bayrampaşa Prison, Ç. tries to dress the wounds of his comrade under heavy fire from 
the security forces. He takes his dead mate whose body has literally disassembled out into 
the prison yard and performs a funeral rite of some sort: “I was naked. I just had a jacket. 
I took it off and put it under his head. At that moment, I went and poured some stuff over 
me. Had they allowed, I would have set myself on fire.” In Ç.’s narrative, the victim is a 
part of the self that has been partially separated. In burning the self, the surviving self re-
embraces the victim as part of the self. In another sense, it destroys that part of the self 
which has entered into complicity with the perpetrator. For survival itself is a sign of 
entering into complicity with perpetrator. That is why he wants to be scarred by power’s 
violence. The scar is a clear trace and memory of wounding and its lack thereof might be 
an indication of treachery. In such a context, it is only normal that everyone in this 
political community would prefer to die for the other to living. In fact, twenty-eight of the 
thirty prisoners who died during the operation were members of DHKP-C. They did not, 
Ç. said proudly, seek shelter from the fire, but walked right into it to barricade for each 
other. “How can I tell you of that moment?” said he. “Many people are falling down, 
bleeding, and shouting around you. You try to protect them. What do they say? You 
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become motherly. You are ready to sacrifice yourself right there. There is no such barrier 
as the fear of death,” he continued. 
He continued to talk about dying for the other, but he said nothing about his very 
decision to end his death fast. He was declared a traitor by the organization for his 
decision to end his death fast after the medical intervention. It was doubly difficult for 
him to live with this stigma because his sister, G., had died on the death fast outside the 
prison a couple of weeks before his decision, followed by her close friend. Both women 
had children and earned their living by babysitting and cleaning houses. I did not venture, 
however, myself to address him directly, who, for his part, let an hour elapse before he 
raised the subject. He said that he did not believe they were going to die. “They were not 
supposed to die. They should not have died.” “We were all surprised when they died. We 
had thought that the Party would not allow for their deaths. I had not thought in such 
political terms at the time. I knew that the war was going to extend itself and become a 
people’s war, but I was surprised because they were the first ones to die.”  When Ç. told 
about his decision, his superiors replied that political prisoners did not have the luxury of 
keeping their lives as common people, implying G. and Ş., gave theirs away. They told 
him that he could either recuperate his dignity by restarting the death fast or live as a 
despicable traitor for the rest of his life.  
He never explained to me what this meant for him. I asked him whether he felt 
any differently about the past. “While I was inside the war, I experienced very beautiful 
feelings,” he said. “I was very pure, I wasn’t soiled,” he continued in a self-mocking tone. 
The disarticulation of the “I” from the communal “we” had left it vulnerable to a certain 
errancy which is interpreted here in a phallocentric manner as rape by the capitalist order 
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of the state. In fear, Ç. sought to secure himself against such self-dissolution by holding 
onto his masculinity which he considered as his only inalienable possession. He refrained 
from commenting on the present further and returned to the past once again to recount 
how he had welcomed his injured comrades into the cell after the operation. Even though 
he was on the death fast, he was feeding his injured comrades. “Can you imagine the 
emotional condition of these people? They cannot just say they won’t eat because they 
need to get well as quickly as possible so that they can begin to take care of us who are 
on the fast.” But although Ç. talked of this period of his life with great nostalgia, it was 
impossible to discover what his true feelings were. He would return again and again to 
talk about nothing but this sacrificial bond which now kept his voice in bondage. 
“Some people do not have the right (hak) to speak. I am one of them. I do not find 
the right to speak in myself,” he said determinedly. “But you also lived through it, why 
wouldn’t you have the right to speak?” I intervened. “Yes, I’ve lived it, but there are still 
people living through it. I have been away from it for a long time.” He repeated that he 
did not have the right to speak. When I dared suggest that there was more than one 
subject position, he scoffed at such a liberal notion of “right”: “I am aware of my 
individual rights (hak). But what I tell you can only be a recollection (anı). What I have 
lived is tiny compared with what those people have lived. We’re one in a thousand, one 
in a million maybe. A. has lived perhaps more intensely than I did. She has both chosen 
and was chosen. But she doesn’t have a right either after some time. I believe that it 
remains as a recollection because nothing has come to an end. Those who have called off 
the fast should not be at ease either. I am not, they should not be either. They do not 
deserve it (hak etmiyorlar) because they are not fighting. They have surrendered. It’s 
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really difficult to explain it. You’re being beaten up and some others are telling its story. 
If today people can walk around and have the courage to establish political parties, it is 
thanks to you, you pay the price (bedel) for it. Others rely on these labors (bedel). Yes, 
they also paid a price, but there are people still paying a price, one should respect them. 
They should not speak at all because they would do harm to these people. I do not want 
to be one of those people who do harm.”  
He insists that I register his words as mere recollection. He wants me to do so not 
because the event has come to an end but precisely because it is still continuing. One 
could say that he is not in the act anymore and not being in the act he has fallen out of 
social time and perhaps even out of world-historical time. In this sense, the event has 
come to an end. It has come to an end for him who will henceforth have to exist as a mere 
“I.” Thus, he can only have an interiorized memory of the event which he will have 
locked up in his own personal past. Yet in another sense, the event has neither vanished 
into the past nor extinguished itself in the preserve of interiorized memory. Instead, a 
memory of fidelity is already at work in his desire to speak as if the past were dead. 
Memory of this sort, Derrida (1986: 58) explains, does not try to revive the past as it was, 
which is nothing but a retrospective projection from the present, but rather entrusts it to 
the future by leaving behind an inscription. What if there were a memory of fidelity that 
far from leaving behind a trace, it demanded the destruction of the trace itself? He was 
afraid of leaving a trace that would have inscribed or revealed difference in the very 
presence of the present event. Even if he might not have wanted to leave a trace, this 
could have happened just by itself, unintentionally, when words started falling from his 
lips. For it is only in the act of reading and interpreting (“remarking upon the trace” if 
 231 
you will) that the trace could be grasped retrospectively as being the trace of this or that 
by unknown others in different contexts and future scenes. Once he started speaking, he 
knew that he would not be able to control his words which could have ended up being 
injurious to those whom he still felt obligated to protect despite the fact that he had 
broken his first promise to them. He wanted his words to have no effect, neither on the 
present nor on the future. If he were not going to remain silent this one time, he wanted to 
make sure that his interlocutor listened to him as if he were a mere “I” recalling a dead 
past, which nonetheless, she might add, rendered his present still-born, haunted by the 
past, alive in death. All he had was an individual voice; he lacked the capacity to be heard 
for the political organization guaranteed the becoming audible of voice. 189 He wanted to 
remain as an individual voice; he did not want his voice to carry itself over into other 
times and spaces. He had stopped giving so he did not have a right to speak as an “I” as if 
it were a “We.” He could start to “speak” again when he would speak as death since it 
was impossible to reciprocate the gift of life except by taking upon himself a similar 
death. 
There was in fact, something surprising in the incoherence of his thoughts, 
accidentally betrayed and always vaguely expressed. Usually at the most important 
moment he would break off and relapse into silence or turn to another subject. He started 
to talk about the exhibition on martyrs that took place in Ş.’s house in Küçükarmutlu 
which hosted most of the death fasters including her outside the prisons. In order for the 
                                                
189 Death fasters distinguish their act from the isolated and sporadic insurrections of the common convicts 
in Turkish prisons or the detainees in Guantánamo Bay. From this perspective, isolated selves cannot 
supply their voices with an echo, and it is the function of the political organization to make that voice 
audible and meaningful by stamping it with its publicly recognized name. For this difference between 
individual and collective voice concerning the subjects of the crowd, see Rosalind Morris, “Giving Up 
Ghosts: Notes on Trauma and the Possibility of the Political from Southeast Asia,” positions 16:1, 2008, 
pp. 250-251. 
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house to bear witness to the state’s brutal assault in November 2001, it was left in its 
ruined condition. When I mentioned that it was a museum of an extraordinary kind, Ç. 
responded that all houses in Küçükarmutlu were museums for everyone had a keepsake 
from the militants who stayed the night over perhaps never to return. A cigarette lighter, a 
hair band, a pen, any small thing that they forgot behind, he told, became a relic. He 
added right afterwards that his other sister had visited Behiç Aşçı at his house and that 
she had made a gift of one of the handkerchiefs, handkerchiefs of victory, that her fallen 
death faster sister had embroidered five years ago.  He next asked me whether I 
understood the meaning of such an act. When I looked at him perplexedly, he winked and 
grinned as though to say that she had solicited him to die. The death fasters had made 
gifts such as handkerchiefs, cards, framed photographs with their names signed and many 
more as a token of their love and as to be remembered. That their surviving families ask 
for reparation for their other gift, “gift of death” (Derrida 1995) by relaying those tokens 
attests to what Gayatri Spivak (2002: 14) describes as “the violent production of the 
precarious subject of reparation and responsibility”.190 Dying for the other can indeed be 
hurtful and indiscreet precisely because it can arrogantly ask for gratitude towards the 
“gift of death” one cannot not accept. One can never measure up to the immensity of this 
gift. Thus, the disproportion inevitably transforms the experience of responsibility into 
one of guilt. Ç. confided in me that he would one day perform an act of feda by way of 
suicide bombing an important figure of power. Would he do that in order to absolve 
himself for wanting to live and because that meant living at the expense of the other 
under such conditions? He is certainly not the only one who recklessly crosses through 
this aporetic condition of existence over and over.  
                                                
190 Gayatri C. Spivak, “Translation as Culture,” Parallax, vol. 6, no. 1, January 2002, p. 14 
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IV. 
As our meeting was coming to end, I asked Z. about her sister. The prison 
administration had abducted her sister from their three-person cell to take her to the 
hospital where the doctors had tried to dissuade her after a decision which would have 
been read as a mark of real free choice, choice of freedom, but she rejected medical 
intervention, so they brought her back and placed her in a single-person cell. Z. and the 
others petitioned to be moved to her cell, but they allowed for a single person, and that 
was how Z. ended up becoming the sole person attending to her sister on the death fast.  
“Face to face,” she said, “separate from other friends”: “One looks at her as if she 
might die any moment. One wants her not to die. One wishes for the resolution of the 
conflict. To watch your sister, your comrade wasting away, dying is so difficult that one 
prefers to die in her place, that is, if one had a right to choose.” Z. herself was on the 
death fast in 1996 and she attended to other death fasters in the past, but sharing one’s 
sister’s death locked up in a cell with no one else was different. “In a sense”, Z. 
explained, “you become a single person.” She had to eat. She had to eat because she 
needed to take care of Fatma, but every time she ate Z. remembered her sister and choked 
on the food. She could not share every feeling with her for she was going towards her 
death. Sometimes she did not want to speak to her, but wanted to speak about her with 
other friends who were not there. It is as if she wanted to drive away death by killing her 
sister in speech. She wanted to kill the death that gagged her by referring to her sister in 
the third person who, according to Benveniste (1998: 229), is a non-person. She wanted 
do so in order to be able to speak again.  
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When Fatma was released from the prison, she continued her death fast outside at 
Behiç Aşçı’s house. Her family did not want her to continue outside the prison. Z. was 
relieved that her sister was finally able to talk to their family in person and convince 
them. For their relatives and neighbors had started to lay the blame on Z. for not 
dissuading her sister. She disclosed that they would ask her reproachful questions:  “How 
can you stand it? She’s dying everyday. Do you want her to die?” The non-compromising 
attitude of the state turned the Fatma’s closest kin and loved ones into murderers who 
were forced to make the decision to watch her slowly wasting away. And perhaps 
revealed too the deadly power that the fasters fatefully embodied and reflected back on 
their close circles saturating them with the mirror images of the principal author of 
destruction.  
When Fatma finally died, Z. found herself surrounded by a void: “You look for 
her. I took care of her close to a year. I attended to her daily. There was something that I 
did for her every single day. Now she is no longer there.” She was infuriated with those 
who forced them into making such difficult decisions. She called attention to the fact that 
it was them above everyone else that wished for these deaths to come to an end and 
added in a helpless tone: “Let no one die and if someone has to die, let that person be me 
one says. That choice is such a choice.” 
In the next chapter, I turn to those who did not even have the “choice” to die for 
they were thrown into an emptiness where they did not stop dying if only because they 




The death faster takes a stand, and in taking and maintaining his or her stand, 
secures a territory whose borders are marked out by his or her face, pose, and speech that 
are the essential traits of a speaking subject, an “I” who imposes him or herself. He or she 
strikes a willful pose by refusing to eat, and in doing so, by suspending his or her 
relations with the other since food, like language, is originally vested in the other—one 
always eats from the other, for the other, and with the other—and for this reason, the 
death faster fills the space, though he or she is the most vulnerable, at the expense of the 
other.191  
Not that the death faster does not seek to engage with the others who are 
welcomed or for that matter unwelcomed in his or her territory. With a proselytizer’s 
belief in the power of communication even it will be to little purpose, he or she does not 
tire of speaking his or her own concern with family, visitors, doctors, and even soldiers, 
and yet he or she still stands out with the solitary but sovereign presence of an “I” 
because it is death that opens the death faster from within him or herself to the future—
his or her territory is coextensive with his or her own time. The death faster’s essential 
territory is not his or her body which is always already in time and is thus de-limited by 
other bodies, but it is rather his or her life-death whose limit is within itself, that is to say, 
                                                
191 Strictly speaking, the Death Fast is not a “total” fast since the death fasters still continue to “eat” in a 
certain manner though their diet is restricted to water, sugar, salt, and vitamin B1. That the constituent 
elements of their diet were purchased from the prison commissary with the exception of B1 which was 
provided by the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey bespeaks the inextricable relation with the other, and 
even with the hostile other. Though the authorities exploited this fundamental dependency to cast 
aspersions on the act by accounting for the longevity of the death fast with secret eating on the part of the 
death fasters, they neither discontinued the selling of these items to the death fasters nor interdicted the 
delivery of B1 to the prisons. To the contrary, they expanded the prison commissary list to include different 
kinds of sugar and candy unlike the military regime of the early 1980s which had stopped giving sugar and 
salt to the prisoners months before the 1983 and 1984 Death Fasts to preempt its hoarding for later use.  
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the death faster’s territory is his or her own time which is given in his or her irrevocable 
and inalienable relation to death. It is this time proper—how can time be proper to a 
mortal being and yet doesn’t the “I” itself presuppose this originary temporalization?—he 
or she safeguards against the hostile other insofar as the political efficacy of the death fast 
depends on the very protection of its ontological structure which I have earlier identified 
as différance or the movement of deferral or difference between life and death which 
gives rise to a seemingly pure possibility (see Chapter 1). For the death faster keeps in 
reserve one and at the same time both his or her ability-to-live and ability-to-die and in 
doing so, gives time, though a limited period of time, to the political agencies to decide. 
He or she does not leave to these agencies the decision concerning his or her life and 
death, that decision belongs to the death faster and to him or her alone, he or she forces 
them to make a political decision by exposing them to his or her posthumous power of 
judgment, the becoming murderer of the agencies of decision, as it were, with the death 
faster nearing his or her death. The death faster’s power of judgment (which is distorted 
by the very same rule as a self-threat or the threat of the organizational command to its 
own members) maintains its force however only on the condition that the death faster 
remains to be in sovereign possession of his or her time. Accordingly, political agencies 
of decision, instead of responding to their political demands, overtake the time of the 
death faster, by arrogating the decision concerning life and death, and they do so by 
deploying against the death fasters the invasive medical technique of forced feeding (not 
by tube, but by intravenous feeding) which does not realize one of the possibilities, life, 
at the expense of the other, death; to the contrary, it negates both possibilities with the 
result that the death faster, though he or she may resume the act upon reawakening and 
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many decide not to after a series of resuscitations which are long and torturous, has 
already lost the integrity of his or her act whereby neither his life nor his death belongs to 
him or her any longer. This vitiation of the integrity of the act begins gravely to 
compromise the possibilities of the Death Fast too inasmuch as forced feeding thwarts the 
Death Fast in its ends, which is neither the necessary survival nor death of the death 
fasters but the inscription of their demands into the political space, by reducing its 
eventness to the eventuality of life or death.   
This political neutralization derives its possibility however from prior 
impossibility to the extent that it ultimately relies upon the ruination of the ontological 
structure of the death fast which is always already, before any intervention of the other 
who still waits for the death faster to lose consciousness, a self-ruination that is in fact 
inherent in its structure itself inasmuch as it is brought about by nothing other than the to 
and fro movement between life and death, the pendulum of “auto”-affection, which 
thrusts the death faster outside him or herself only to restitute him or her as other but as 
the other of the same until he or she no longer has time. This is arguably why, though 
they follow the events happening in the world outside them with great attentiveness, 
nothing happens on the death fast, there is nothing to intuit as an event except the passage 
of time and time is only a name, as Derrida writes (1973: 85; 1982: 55), for the 
“possibility of the impossibility” of self-sameness, a becoming-the-other-of-the-same. 
This endless movement of temporalization, though it sustains the “I” and thus his or her 
act while transecting it through and through, comes to an end for the death faster with the 
ineludible loss of consciousness whereby he or she will no longer be “the other-as-the-
same,” no longer a “self,” but an opening in and of itself where the inside opens upon the 
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outside to lose itself in the interval of difference between them. He or she will have 
become a mouth without a face, a mouth which belongs to no one.192  
This indeterminate descent, a descent from self-presence into self-absence, marks 
the closure of the event for the death faster whose impassive body is hauled away in 
chains from prison infirmaries to state hospitals where it becomes a space of decision, 
and it is the detour through a calculated decision to refrain from precipitate action within 
this medical domain that alone allows the state to alter the opening of the event into the 
opening of the death faster to the acts of others insofar the secession of the state gives rise 
to a proliferating division of the agency of decision and has as its paradoxical outcome an 
ungovernable series of encounters between doctors, families, and political organizations 
over the mute body of the death faster where the political bleeds into the ethical. Who 
decides? And how does one decide? How does one relate to this mouth without a face 
and how does one do so especially when “it” still speaks from this non-place? Is it heard 
or not? And if it is heard, how is it heard by different ears? 
Unheard Mouth that Speaks 
   02.03: Blood Pressure: 120/105; Pulse: 90. Temperature: 37.5. Sleeping. 
02.05: Stronger heart beat. 
02.16: Faster but weak pulse 
02.20: Pulse 94, weak heart beat. 
02.26: “Did you sleep well?” 
02.27: “Every word, every word and letter has a great, a great meaning today.” 
02.27: “Do you have anything to say to me?” 
02.28: “Hold on now. Where are we, what are we going to say, is not clear yet. 
What is there to say?” 
                                                
192 With the phrase “mouth without a face,” I invoke Jean-Luc Nancy’s figuring of the opening or openness 
of Dasein with the non-figure of “buccality,” “mouth” as an originary opening before becoming the mouth 
of a speaking subject. For thoughtful readings of Nancy’s buccality, see Peggy Kamuf’s “Bèance” in The 
New Centennial Review, vol. 2, number 3, 2002, pp. 37-56 and Sara Guyer’s “Buccal Reading” in The New 
Centennial Review, vol. 7, number 2, 2007, pp. 71-87. In an interview with Jean-Luc Nancy (1991: 114), 
“Eating Well: The Calculations of the Subject,” Jacques Derrida also questions the valorization of the face 
in sacrificial humanisms including that of Heidegger and Levinas and offers instead “orificiality” as a 
metonymy for the relation to the other. 
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02.30: He drank some water. “Do you want some more water?” He was able to 
drink the water from the medicine dropper only in two or three swallows.  
02.31: “I could pull together neither here nor there. Since I don’t know this area 
well, I haven’t pulled it together yet.” 
02.35: Moaning, unintelligible murmurings… “Isn’t it the last meeting?” 
02.45: Aggravation of moaning. He swings his arms right and left… “In front of 
the mirror…where the Ceyhan river is.” 
02.50: He began to hiccup constantly and as he hiccups, water comes out of his 
mouth. 
02.55: Blood Pressure: 127/92; Pulse: 108; Temperature: 37.2 
03.10: There is no answer to any question. There is no reaction to the question 
“Do you hear me?” 
03.15: He’s sleeping, his eye lids are moving, he takes deep breathes which are 
interrupted by short ones intermittently. 
 
Though it adopts the form of a testimony, (it was published as a part of a 
collective memoir of the 1996 Death Fast)193, the narrative of T.’s dying nevertheless, 
and at the same time, is a clinical chronicle through and through, one that observes and 
inscribes T.’s encounter with death in its different chronological phases without any 
pathos as if it were a laboratory experiment, but the anonymous chronicler (we only 
know that he is an attendant and the attendants of death fasters are detached and stalwart 
figures who are responsible for protecting the death faster) desists to meditate on his own 
gaze that manifests its object (which may equally well be, as Foucault (1973) has shown 
in the Birth of the Clinic, a subject), as a mouth that still opens beyond language, 
occupying a space that is one and at the same full of words and empty of them, strangely 
loquacious and silent.  
The subject of this quasi-clinical gaze listens to inscribe, inscribing the event with 
a strange automaticity as though it may only be experienced in the past by reading this 
record, and he begins to “see” rather than hear T.’s words as if he were already a dead 
                                                
193 Ulaş Osman Yılmaz, Ölümü Yenenleri Kimse Yenemez, pp. 56-57. 
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voice with the result that he absolves himself of the burden of responding to the 
unanswerability of T.’s speech.  
What was T.’s relation to words? He was speaking “spontaneously,” they wrote. 
Were they his words or were he quoting, so to speak, without the quotation marks? That 
they still understood his words did not mean that he heard them. Did T. intend any 
meaning? Or did they make his words say what he has never said? Should his remarks be 
taken literally, symbolically, or merely as a symptom of something else, of his comatose 
state for instance? Such questions, though there was an insuperable distance between T. 
and his deathbed attendants, simply do not appear in the memoir, and instead T.’s 
attendant (or attendants) asserts, in a passage inserted between these quasi-clinical 
observations that rehearses much that is familiar to readers of these memoirs, T.’s 
delirious speech was itself a testimony to the very truth of his commitment despite and, 
one might add, because of his non-self-presence:   
As he lost his capacity to speak, increasingly unintelligible sentences and words 
began to come out of his mouth accompanied by arm and hand gestures. And yet 
despite his unconscious state, one saw from his speech the strength of his 
attachment to the revolution and his complete integration with the organizational 
duties in the depths of his consciousness. In the final stages of the death fast when 
childhood events often re-surface in consciousness, T.’s murmurings were 
intimately occupied with the revolution and the organization until the very last 
moment. (emphasis added).  
 
That there were allusions to specific places, dates, and people in T.’s delirious 
speech which, explicitly or implicitly, beckoned to personal events and endeavors that 
pertained to the broader history of the organization proved persuasive enough to suspend 
the unanswerability of T.’s speech—an unanswerability which one would think would be 
exacerbated to the extent that T. is on the point of disappearing and cannot be questioned 
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on the meaning of his parting words—and yet the words spoken by T. are accorded 
privileged and even revelatory status insofar as truth speaks through them. Truth 
animates the words with a volitional consciousness “who” testifies to his own 
truthfulness and does so in absentia because, we are told, a perfectly converted 
consciousness is unconscious, the subject who allows the truth to speak is always already 
spoken through.   
For all its apparent exceptionality, the narrative of T.’s dying is however far from 
an isolated one, for one thing it opens a citational frame by drawing, in an understated yet 
knowing way, on the eye-witness narratives of their leader’s death in the 1984 Death Fast 
who had, as death approached, found himself fighting in the Battle of Stalingrad (he had 
in fact asked for his gun) and in fact by the end of the 1996 Death Fast this “warring to 
death”  had become a far more commonplace experience. For this reason, the succeeding 
generations of death fasters found themselves impelled to have a similar experience, and 
as R. readily conceded on behalf of the death fasters, they even prepared themselves for 
such a dramatic encounter with death, perhaps searching, even unbeknownst to 
themselves, for their own historical setting and character. Perhaps, this should not be 
surprising, because all relation to death partakes of the false, the fictitious, the fictional: 
“Death,” as Blanchot writes (1982: 155), “is its own imposter.” One always dies as 
someone else because there is no true death as such.  
There were, of course, many death fasters whose dying words have disappointed 
such heroism. Their deathbed attendants recount privately for instance that, as death 
fasters lapse into speaking in a voice not their own, they may make whimsical requests 
with a puerile persistence, or instead of resolutely refusing any food, as their duty and 
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responsibilities demanded, they may begin, entirely out of character, speaking of food, 
with the result that, on these occasions, one strives to assuage the death faster as if he or 
she were an intemperate child or simply turns a deaf ear. No sooner the frivolity and 
unrealiability of this speech—its outbursts are always told as a diverting anecdote, 
embarrassing and laughable at the same time—confirms the disappearance of the death 
faster and announces the arrival of someone else than he shows himself, instead of the 
faithful devotee of the cause, to be in the grip of his own phantasms which are at best 
impertinent to the historical event lest they cause it harm by consenting to a medical 
intervention for instance. At that limit, it is no longer the death faster who is in control of 
his destiny, and his attendant refuses to acknowledge any of the demands expressed in 
this speech as his and begins, henceforth, to guard the death faster himself against the 
other(s) living in him, and he does so by having recourse to memory, by summoning the 
last words of the death faster before unconsciousness into the present to deaden this other 
speech. Had the attendant not remembered, that is, had he not kept his promise to the 
death faster, he would have heard this speech like the medical doctors do—the 
nonsensical utterances which endow the doctor with the power of intervention. The death 
faster who does not respond to the interrogative questions of the doctor, though he may 
still speak, is already no one because speech without intentional consciousness is not 
deemed to be language by the medical ear; it is words become mere sounds ringing 
hollowly the knell of the living subject who needs to be restored to consciousness by 
immediate action if only to hear the death faster express his or her refusal to receive 
medical treatment in his or her own words. 
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In 1996, of course, neither the prison guards nor the gendarmes (military force 
charged with outer security measures) could enter the wards to remove the death fasters 
to the prison hospital; and it was that very failing on the part of the authorities that had 
enabled the organizations to govern the space between the possibility of living and the 
possibility of dying. The organizational command of the wards put the death fasters in the 
double and concomitant position of placing themselves at one and the same time under 
the jurisdiction of the organization, the law of identification, while also relying upon the 
communal care, bond of comradeship. In this earlier prison setting, the death fasters 
belonged to the community and were given, by that belonging, both the duty to persevere 
to the end and the constancy of care to do so in the all-enclosing presence of the 
community. Accordingly, the fate of the death fasters were entirely bound to the 
momentous decisions of the organization as regards the vicissitudes of the Death Fast, 
and it is no exaggeration to say that the inaugural teams of death fasters were destined to 
die inasmuch as political agencies of decision almost always sought to defeat the Death 
Fast by consuming the energies of the organizations by a categorical refusal of their 
demands at the outset. Under such circumstances, the individual death fasters who 
changed their minds were condemned, for falling short of their task, to a solitary 
existence whereby the exuberant attention of their comrades were withdrawn at once and 
unhesitatingly for they had kept to their lives at the price of the lives of others. Such a 
betrayal, of themselves and their comrades, was deemed to be carnivorous, “the one who 
drinks (one “drinks” soup in Turkish) soup is in fact drinking our blood,” because it 
called forth, hollowing out as it did the sacrificial death at the center of the Death Fast, 
more deaths in order for their devotedness and resolution, concealed and unregarded, to 
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come to any proof, which in turn explains why the attendants, in spite of themselves, let 
the death fasters die in those instances where they could have been saved to live longer.   
The attendants were indeed extremely faithful to the death fasters, so much so, that they 
tended to the death fasters a considerable time, accompanying them through the twists 
and turns of dying in order then, when it too came, to relinquish them to death with the 
result that the they had to undergo a certain experience of the im-possible, the necessity 
and the injustice of the decision to let the death faster die, which comes into view in a 
brief encounter recorded in the same memoir, a peculiarly truncated—limited—entrance 
of a third person who, though he interrupts this death scene, is bound to remain an 
observer still.  
Accosted by a physician as part of the group of physicians affiliated with the 
Association of Turkish Physicians (TTB) which provided medical supervision and advice 
at the request of the organizations, T.’s attendant is faced with the aporia of a proposal 
that calls upon him to consider the prolongation of T.’s respiration. Such an aporia, he 
insists without taking the time and thinking through his refusal, is the price as well as the 
condition of political action as such.     
When they came, I was sitting at the bedside of Comrade T.. He had lost his 
consciousness days ago, and the cooling in his hands and feet had moved up to his 
elbows and knees. They examined him with great care. A little later, one of them 
returned to say that he wanted to talk to me. One day before, T.’s epiglottis had 
slipped into his throat and the prison doctor who happened to be there had turned 
him over and pulled it back to allow him to breathe again. The doctor who wanted 
to talk to me had heard about the incident. “We could make an external 
intervention which would allow him to breathe from his throat,” he said. Medical 
interventions which do not involve medication like heart massages are generally 
acceptable. T. was living with the power of his heart and only his heart at that 
moment. The interests of the action, and T. had devoted himself to it, he had even 
proposed to cut the water and sugar, necessitated the refusal of the doctor’s 
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proposal. Such an intervention will not have brought him back to life. I knew this. 
Nonetheless…one of the most difficult “No”s in my life came out of my mouth.194  
 
T.’s attendant’s apparently easy resolution of the aporia rests on the double 
allusion, first, that the only proper goal of medical intervention is the delaying of death 
but T.’s death is already here; and second, that were he alive T. himself would have made 
the same decision—hadn’t he wanted to cut the water and sugar?—T. had already made 
an offering of his life. Thus, fidelity to T. and the political act are purchased only by 
infidelity to the still living; and the purity of death is at the price of turning aside from the 
impurity of dying. T.’s attendant affirms T.’s sacrifice, he must sacrifice him one more 
time to make his act legible as sacrifice for the first time, by maintaining intact the 
subject at the expense of the living, but by doing so silently justifies too his own decision 
which runs the risk of resembling an act constituting murder lest T.’s sacrifice be 
recognized as sacrifice. The two exigencies, that of T.’s sacrifice and that of sacrifice of 
T., do not exist in isolation from each other; to the contrary, they belong together as the 
very condition of each other’s possibility. The sovereign act of offering on the part of T. 
and its repeated affirmation by his attendant cannot of course be performed except on 
condition that death itself be a possibility and it is this possibility which may be said both 
to follow and precede the sacrificial act that forcible feeding rendered inoperative in 
2000.  
The Executioner in Absentia 
Throughout the late 1980s and 1990s the hunger strikes of the political prisoners 
had confronted each and every new government as a refractory administrative and 
                                                
194 Ibid., p. 74. The government conceded to the demands of the organizations the morning after T.’s death. 
I was told in 2006 that his sister was still furious with the organization because of the terribly short interval 
of time between his death and the agreement. 
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political problem. But only rarely during that period had the political and administrative 
authorities explicitly referred to forced feeding and it was not until January 6, 2000, when 
the tripartite protocol between the Ministries of Justice, Interior, and Health signaled an 
important new departure in the penal regime, that they began to address forced feeding at 
all directly and in detail.195 The highly contentious protocol enabled the wardens to 
petition the High Public Prosecutor for an order authorizing the removal of prisoners 
from the wards for forced feeding in the prison infirmaries or hospitals. That the 
authorities were drawn to intervene in the hunger strikes increasingly in this way was an 
indication not only of the urgency of new penal measures, but it was also a harbinger of 
the prison operation, an operation which was a brutal and integral part of the penal 
transformation and which had succeeded in separating the hunger strikers from the 
protection of the political collectives, eventually leading to their isolation in the hospitals.  
The use of forced feeding, though it was already adopted as a legal measure 
against hunger striking, placed itself at the center of public debate during the negotiations 
with the death fasters, and the political authorities mobilized the language of law in the 
service of nullifying the force of the Death Fast by forced feeding. For this reason, it is 
worth examining here the legal argumentations which constituted the grounds for the 
forced feeding of the death fasters.  
Judges and criminal law jurists (Feyzioğlu 1993; Soyarslan 1990; Taşkın 2005) 
did not contest the legitimacy of hunger striking by drawing an analogy from the outset, 
one already evoked in the public debate, between suicide and hunger strike. Instead, they 
conceded that the hunger strike was an act of protest that expressed, much like speech 
and writing, a set of demands with the aim of drawing attention to them and having them 
                                                
195 For the full text of the protocol, see http://www.cte.adalet.gov.tr/mevzuat/protokol/saglik.pdf.  
 247 
accepted, and as a result they indeed recognized it as the lawful exercise of the right to 
free expression and communication of thoughts and opinions, a fundamental 
constitutional right secured under Article 26. They rather called into question the 
legitimacy of the hunger strike as a means by subordinating its legal ends to the temporal 
end of the act, that is, the possibility of death whereby it became indistinguishable from 
suicide: “Can an act which gives rise to death considered to be a legitimate means of the 
exercise of the constitutional right to expression of thoughts? To answer this question in 
the positive or the negative, a preliminary question needs to be resolved. Does the 
individual person have the right to death? Does the fundamental right to life include its 
opposite, that is, the right to death, the right to put an end to one’s life?”(Feyzioğlu 1993: 
16). The right to life was inalienable and it was for this reason that the individual person 
did not have a constitutional right to death, and yet this decisive statement threatened to 
become circuitous unless the prefix in- of inalienability was to be understood here, 
however implicitly, not as a mark of affirmation but one of privation: the right to life was 
inalienable in the sense that it could not be freely alienated by the individual person him 
or herself. Thus, the unconditional denial of the right to death which these jurists have 
developed in their arguments relied upon the repudiation of the proprietary concept of the 
right to life, and in fact the proprietary concept of right itself, and brought into view a 
legal subject who was not a subject of property, and who could not freely alienate or 
withhold his or her life or body as if they were legal possessions, and as a consequence, 
this legal subject lacked personal sovereignty, if by this we mean the power over life and 
death. For this legal subject was a subject of duty and responsibility whose autonomy and 
self-determination was limited by his or her responsibilities and duties to society: “Article 
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12/2 of the Constitution mandates that the fundamental rights and freedoms of individuals 
include duties and responsibilities to society, family, and other persons. The individual 
person has responsibilities to society as much as to him or herself and for this reason does 
not have absolute power of disposition over his or her life.” (Soyarslan 1990: 279).  
Since there was no relationship of ownership between this legal subject of duty and 
responsibility and his or her life and body, the hunger strike devolved into an unlawful, if 
not criminal, “abuse” of the right to life and security and well-being of person upon 
posing a threat to the life and body of the individual hunger striker. Under such 
circumstances, the hunger strike corresponded to an act of “self”-violation, a violation of 
his or her life and body on the part of the hunger striker, and it imposed upon the state the 
defense of the life and body of the hunger striker against him or herself. Understood in 
this way, the intrusive act of forced feeding was not considered an unjustified 
infringement of the freedom of the person but a “legitimate defense” to the extent it was 
the forcible repulsion of an unlawful and violent attack of the hunger striker against his or 
her person (Taşkın 2005: 57).  
Though the law appeared to preserve the life and body of the individual person 
against his or her own act, it may well be argued that it in fact preserved the “right to life” 
itself and in doing so it preserved the law and the political sovereignty which was 
responsible for preserving the rights themselves. In this way, the excess of right over law, 
the irreducibility of the assertion of right to the rule of law, was subdued by overwriting 
the fundamental and inalienable right to life itself as an obligation: “Though there is no 
legal rule which turns the hunger strike into a criminal act, be that as it may, since a 
hunger strike which has gone beyond the limit of endurance would result in death, and 
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this would mean the relinquishing of the right to life, it should thus be concluded that this 
act is against the law” (Feyzioğlu 1993: 19).    
Thus, the jurists concurred that the law was bound to take into consideration the 
consent of the hunger striker until there was a risk of serious and permanent physical 
debilitation or imminent death in which case artificial feeding and medical treatment 
would be administered by the doctors regardless of the consent of the hunger striker. In 
fact, the jurists put permanent physical debilitation on a par with death on the grounds 
that the constitution did not recognize the right to harm one’s physical being and 
authorized the doctors to intervene even without waiting for the comatose state, arguing 
that the risk of death and permanent damage might exist prior to the comatose state. As 
far as the prison doctors and personnel and doctors at state hospitals were concerned, the 
jurists imposed upon them forced feeding as a public duty. Were the doctors to refuse 
administer forced feeding, the government had the legal right to take action against them 
for breach of duty since they were bound to administer forced feeding not only by virtue 
of their public office but also by the general duty to rescue an injured person.  
Despite the threat of taking criminal action against doctors and prison personnel 
for “neglect of duty,” the government did not order its appointed doctors in prisons and 
state hospitals to forcibly feed a conscious and competent death faster but it did force 
them to make a decision about the life and death of the death faster, and it did so by 
endowing the doctors with the discretionary power to resuscitate a comatose death 
faster.196 In making the decision not to concede to the demands of the death fasters, the 
government had in fact already executed the death faster—a comatose death faster, as the 
death fasters well knew, is an already executed death faster—but by imposing upon the 
                                                
196 Cumhuriyet, “Müdahale Etmeyene Soruşturma,” December 23, 2000. 
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doctors the decision to let die or make live a comatose death faster, the government 
delegated to them its own role of the executioner. Confronted with this decision, an 
individual doctor could only have escaped this role of the executioner by delegating it 
further to others, another doctor or a family member who would undersign the final 
decision—and it was almost always a decision for intervention. 
Though the death fasters themselves did not recognize a difference between 
“medical intervention” and “forced feeding” and they used them interchangeably to mark 
the homologous violence of medical intervention insofar as nonconsensual artificial 
feeding also violated the integrity of their act of refusal and exploiting as it did their 
unconsciousness to contravene their advance instructions refusing treatment, the 
government officials and jurists put all their efforts into differentiating nonconsensual 
artificial feeding from forced feeding proper.  
Forced feeding was not deemed to be a medical procedure but merely a method of 
nourishment which could be administered by any prison personnel without necessary 
medical training. It involved the use of physical restraints, coercion and force, and as the 
government officials and jurists conceded, it was denounced by the World Medical 
Association’s Declaration of Tokyo on Torture (1975) and Declaration of Malta on 
Hunger Strikers (1991) as “a form of inhuman and degrading treatment.” But despite the 
negative terms by which they characterized forced feeding, there is every reason to 
suppose that the government abstained from deploying such a forcible method because of 
its impracticability. The government would be hard put to find doctors who would be 
willing to participate in forced feeding, a procedure itself fraught with medical 
complications and death. And considering the high number of death fasters, how likely 
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was it that the government would find as many doctors? And in view of the active 
resistance of both the death fasters and their attendants—even the removal of a death 
faster from the prison cell to the prison hospital was a demanding undertaking—would 
the government be able to contain the much certain disorder in prisons and hospitals?  
Medical intervention, on the other hand, as defined by the officials, was the 
resuscitation of a death faster, who had lapsed into a comatose state, by intravenous 
feeding to prevent his or her imminent death and permanent debilitation, and in this 
sense, the official definition indeed adhered to the definition of artificial feeding in the 
practical guidelines of the Declaration of Malta on Hunger Strikers (1991).197 Though the 
Declaration, while referring to this emergency situation, had acknowledged that the 
urgency of the decision may imply breaching the duty to respect the autonomy of the 
hunger striker, it had not released the doctors from responsibility by deciding in their 
name; it had in fact left the ultimate decision for intervention to each individual doctor.  
But what is it, one may ask, about the violence being done to the integrity of death 
fasters by medical intervention that distinguishes it from the violence of forced feeding 
itself? For what justifies the recourse to medical intervention is not so much the absence 
of violence, which is seemingly suspended by the unconscious state of the death faster 
(there is still use of physical restraints to preempt the death faster from pulling out the 
catheter that delivers the nutrients to the blood stream upon awakening to consciousness), 
but rather the emergency status of the intervention itself which, as Taşkın (2005: 106) 
wrote (somewhat reiterating Feyzioğlu’s arguments),  is only administered to protect the 
death faster from imminent death and permanent debilitation. However, with regard to 
                                                




the life it was supposed to save, the medical intervention was far less effective than the 
justification of its violence required. For as the death fasters expressed in their bitterly 
scathing words, to the contrary, the medical intervention at this stage resulted in nothing 
else but permanent debilitation lest death, and to that extent the act of preservation turned 
retrospectively into an act of execution and the act of saving became an act of 
punishment. The implications of this reversal are serious ones for doctors for they show 
with what ease medical intervention may be inverted and take on the mantle of a different 
type of violence, a greater violence committed on behalf of the death faster but against 
him or herself, and for this reason alone the organizations accused the government-
appointed doctors of intentionally disabling and even killing the death fasters. There was 
no evidence whatsoever that the doctors in prisons and state hospitals had administered 
artificial feeding without the proper dose of vitamin B 1, and the doctors affiliated with 
both the Association of Turkish Physicians and the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey, 
the only doctors that the death fasters trusted and entrusted themselves to their care, did 
not in fact corroborate these accusations, confirming instead that the doctors who were 
not even remotely sympathetic to the death fasters had sought their aid in administering 
the proper form of treatment at the onset of unconsciousness. Yet as far as the 
organizations were concerned, the doctors were always already guilty insofar as they did 
not take responsibility for the consequences of their act because, and this is the decisive 
and yet implicit ground of their accusations, the act of intervention itself a priori absolves 
the doctors of responsibility—they could always claim that it was too late.   
It was to acknowledge the violence of medical intervention and to call upon the 
doctors to take their own share of responsibility that the Association of Turkish 
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Physicians (TTB) had sought to put an end to the debate on medical intervention and had 
done so in a summary fashion by contending that the doctors had the “duty” to comply 
with the World Medical Association’s ethical principles and practical guidelines 
adumbrated in the Declaration of Malta on Hunger Strikers (1991) at the risk of being 
reprimanded by the Association for professional misconduct. And though the Declaration 
had a much more equivocal language concerning the application of the Ethics Code, 
TTB’s spokespersons insisted that the Declaration had left the doctors with no other 
course of action other than abiding by the decision of the hunger striker, and on the 
occasion that the doctors found themselves incapable of performing their “duty” for 
“reasons of conscience”, TTB maintained matter-of-factly, they were given the right to 
refer the hunger striker to another doctor as stipulated in Article 4 of the Preamble of the 
Declaration. TTB’s reading of the Declaration did not allow the individual doctor to 
decide except to decide not to decide, so to speak, and compelled the Association’s 
opponents to contest its univocal reading. If one reads the Declaration with an eye 
towards ambiguity, as TTB’s opponents did, there are signs that the Declaration does not, 
as TTB represented it, unambiguously decide in favor of duty in the name of the doctor.   
The Declaration, as we have broached in passing above, describes the 
unresolvable contradiction dividing the doctor’s encounter with a comatose hunger striker 
as a contradiction between two competing obligations, two principles, between “moral 
obligation” and “duty”, between “the principle of beneficence,” the respect for the 
sanctity of life, and “the principle of autonomy,” the respect for the autonomy and dignity 
of the patient, and far from reconciling this differend by a just decision, the Declaration 
only affirms it in the “free decision” of the doctor, a decision which is free to the extent it 
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is laden with responsibility. In fact, the Declaration allows the doctor to decide not once 
but twice, and the two decisions are separated by an interval of time, the first one before 
the hunger striker who is still a speaking subject, the second and the final one before the 
comatose and yet still living being. The first trial of the doctor, as TTB reminded those 
who found themselves in a moral impasse, is to decide whether he or she is “capable” of 
abiding by the hunger striker’s decision or not (and in this sense, the doctor is always 
already in a passive position); the second one renews the same decision at the risk of a 
double infidelity to both the hunger striker and the doctor him or herself for the doctor 
remained to be the doctor of the hunger striker only by promising him or her to abide by 
his or her decision. To decide anew, as the Declaration announced to its addresses, also 
meant remembering the first decision; and in both cases, to remember that one had made 
the decision not to withdraw:  
When the hunger striker has become confused and is therefore unable to make an 
unimpaired decision or has lapsed into a coma, the doctor shall be free to make 
the decision for his patient as to further treatment which he considers to be in the 
best interest of that patient, always taking into account the decision he has arrived 
at during his preceding care of the patient during his hunger strike, and 
reaffirming article 4 of the Preamble of this Declaration.198  
Instead of appealing to an obligation or duty on the part of the doctors, then, the 
Declaration places them before an essential and solitary responsibility, which is the 
responsibility to decide both for the hunger striker and in relation to themselves.  
That TTB justified its categorical refusal of intervention by a parsimonious 
reading of the Declaration is evident and yet it may be argued that if the Association 
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sought to impose upon the doctors the duty to act in conformity with a professional code 
of ethics, it was solely in order to refuse all complicity with the violence of the state, a 
violence which, crucially, the government had even declined to acknowledge as such by 
claiming it to be purely an ethical judgment on the part of the doctor. There is reason to 
suppose that the categorical refusal of intervention on the part of the Association was a 
reaction to the public debate about the Death Fast which had devolved into a single but 
divisive question about the best interests of an unconscious death faster, whether the 
advance instructions of the death faster could be overridden by the decision of a doctor 
for medical intervention on the grounds of the principle of beneficence. But as TTB’s 
President, Dr. Füsun Sayek, forewarned the doctors of the consequences of medical 
intervention, it was already too late to save the hunger striker in a comatose state, and the 
individual doctor who decided to overrule the decision of the death faster would only be 
responsible for the bodily and mental impairment of the death faster, and in most 
instances for his or her death.199 More importantly, in an interview, at a time when—TTB 
argued—the deadlock in negotiations had imposed a tacit resignation and the real 
political debate had become stifled beneath a hollow and oppressive consensus on the 
necessity of medical intervention, Metin Bakkalcı, the Vice President of TTB, contended 
that the political agencies of decision were drawing the doctors into the quagmire only to 
deflect political decision and called upon them to perform their own duties instead of 
obliging the doctors to make an ethical decision.200 
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At the very point TTB was evidently seeking to break out of the violent politics of 
both the state and the organizations, its categorical refusal of medical intervention was 
misread—and there was of course always that risk—as endorsing a mode of violence, 
that far from interrupting a violent politics, appeared merely to propose a mirror image of 
that politics. Its name got associated with murder and the Association was pronounced 
guilty of deciding for death against life, and in doing so sacrificing life for a political end, 
and thus TTB ended up appearing in the eyes of the public as simply an exponent of the 
political violence of the death fasters.201 
But if TTB’s endeavors to interrupt this violent politics failed, it was not because 
the Association, in its impatience to justify non-intervention, had become liable to be 
contaminated by the very violence it claimed to challenge, but because it had forced the 
doctors to respond to the contestation that came from the other. For their categorical 
refusal had bound the decision of the doctor by duty but “duty” did not operate in TTB’s 
discourse as a term which simply designated a course of action required by office or law, 
but a binding relation to the other—in this sense, TTB’s emphasis on “duty” attested to 
the impossibility of a free decision because the decision of the doctor was always already 
bound by the decision of the death faster.  
TTB’s grounding of the ethical decision of the doctor in the political decision of 
the death faster ultimately relied on an untenable conception of the complete autonomy of 
the death faster. TTB argued for the autonomy of the death faster by ascribing to a liberal 
understanding of the doctor-patient relationship that put the principle of patient autonomy 
over that of beneficence, and for this reason alone its categorical refusal of intervention 
                                                
201 See Hıncal Uluç, “Ölümün Etiği mi Olur Doktor!..” Sabah, December 22, 2000; Doğan Heper, “TTB 
Yönetimi Istifa Etmeli”, Milliyet, December 22, 2000. 
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was bound to founder for the liberal notion of the proprietary subject underlying the very 
same principle would provide the grounds for the decision in favor of intervention. The 
collective form of the Death Fast—and doesn’t the proprietary subject inevitably 
undermine the grounds for collective action and political action in particular by opposing 
the self to the other?—made many doctors question the autonomy of the death fasters.202 
They had serious doubts that the death fasters had made their decision freely and without 
influence (and they psychologized this subject of desire by accounting for its insistence 
by “peer pressure”) and some among them went so far as to conclude that the death 
fasters were deprived of their right to decide their own fate under the coercion of the 
organizational command with the result that they felt justified in resuscitating a comatose 
death faster against his or her advance refusals because in resuscitating they were 
restoring to death fasters their right to life and self-determination. TTB’s own affiliate 
doctors themselves, though the organizations had solicited for their medical supervision 
and advice, addressed the difficulties of ascertaining the “true intention” of the death 
fasters owing to the lack of privacy and indirect communication with the death fasters. 
They were not able to have one-to-one conversations with the death fasters since their 
attendants accompanied them at all time during the consultations. Dr. Hulki Forta, the 
board member of the Association who was responsible for the direction and management 
of the activities of the Association pertaining to the Death Fast, alluded to the same worry 
in our conversation. He admitted that he had talked more with the attendants than the 
death fasters themselves during the prison visitations, and added that he did not always 
know whether the attendants were reporting to him the communications of the death 
                                                
202 In fact, the Declaration also stipulates that the hunger strikers should be protected from coercive 
participation and if need be removed from the company of other strikers. 
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faster or those of “a third party” with the implication that the interference of the 
organizational command was making it impossible to have a doctor-patient relationship 
with the death fasters. This is to say that even those doctors, who were least susceptible to 
the propagandist representation of the death fasters as hostages in the hands of the 
organizational command, still had reservations about the autonomy of the death fasters.  
A great number of the doctors for intervention, though they drew attention to the 
necessity of private communication, daily clinical observation, and recording of the 
advance instructions of the death fasters in opinion pieces and television interviews, did 
not in fact have a doctor-patient relationship with the death fasters. They could have 
encountered with a comatose death faster only in an emergency room and even the 
possibility of that encounter depended on their working at a state hospital where the death 
fasters were transferred upon losing consciousness in prison.  
It may be said that the most difficult task devolved upon the prison doctors who 
had to oversee the wasting away of the death fasters in their care until the beginning of 
the comatose state. Prison doctors, though merely agents and functionaries of the state, 
had influence upon government officials, and the management of the prison, and as the 
forensic doctor, Önder Özkalıpçı, described them to me, they were somewhat like 
provincial doctors who had the confidence of the townspeople, but a confidence which 
came with a concomitant responsibility that would make any misdeed on the part of the 
doctor a cause for disrepute. In this sense, the non-anonymous if not confidential 
relationship of the prison doctors with the death fasters could hardly allow them to make 
a medical intervention against the will of the death fasters, and indeed the prison doctors 
in Bayrampaşa Prison Hospital had made known clearly and officially that they would 
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not administer forced feeding under any condition by sending a petition to the Ministry of 
Health. For this reason, the Ministry of Health, far from facilitating a doctor-patient 
relationship, ruined the possibility of any relationship at all by circulating doctors and 
medical staff from one prison to another every month. As a consequence, the death 
fasters strictly refused to be examined by these newly-appointed doctors in prisons, and 
in fact they considered them their enemies who watched out for the signs of 
unconsciousness to administer forced feeding. In such circumstances, the duty of the new 
prison doctors did not go beyond passive monitoring and dissuasive speech and after one 
or two deaths that occurred before they could intervene they were soon faced with the 
realization that on these terms they could not do anything at all and petitioned the 
Ministry to replace their daily visits with a weekly one for they no longer wanted to 
watch the death fasters dying in their care.    
Doctors affiliated with TTB, as their decision for non-intervention became the 
object of attack and accusation by other doctors, underwent a similar passivity with the 
difference that they were unable to withdraw from the circular, empty obligation of 
attending to the death fasters for they were solicited by the death fasters themselves, and 
for this reason TTB’s affiliate doctors perhaps had the most traumatic experience among 
doctors. The Ministry of Health had allowed them to enter the prisons in early December 
(December 3-14) during the negotiations with the organizations, and they had used this 
occasion to collect the medical records and advance instructions of the death fasters.203 
They would subsequently make public the records and instructions of the death fasters to 
                                                
203 That the government had wanted to share out responsibility for the imminent deaths was plain in the 
easy and hasty access given to doctors affiliated with TTB—was related to me by Dr. Hakan Gürvit, the 
neurologist whose collaborative work with Emel Gökmen on the Wernicke-Korsakoff Syndrome had 
prepared well in advance both the death fasters and the Association against medical complications during 
the Death Fast in 2000.   
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give evidence to the truth of their fasting against the falsifications of the Ministry of 
Health. Some two months after the prison operation, as they prepared to attend to death 
fasters in various prison infirmaries and hospitals with the permission of the government 
that had quarrelsomely reproached them for their decision of non-intervention, they found 
themselves embarking on what was to be a new phase. They would make a greater effort 
than everyone else to make the death fasters live by employing, instead of the stern and 
yet artless procedure of forced feeding, their skills and knowledge, and find that the 
proximity to the death fasters would make it not more, but less possible.  
A death faster suffered from muscle spasms and tremors, Dr. Önder Özkalıpçı 
related to me, and he discovered that his troubles were caused by potassium deprivation. 
A truly critical state, he could have died from a cardiac arrest. And because he believed 
that the varied diets of the death fasters were a sign of their clinging to life—and indeed 
the death fasters had adjusted the declared diet according to their personal needs—he did 
not desist to persuade the death faster to take potassium salt since salt was already a part 
of their diet. But it transpired that even to tirelessly endeavor to find possibilities of 
prolonging the life of the death faster without doing violence was still to be caught in the 
act of executing the living as well as being judged for it by both the authorities that had 
given them permission to enter the prisons and the organizations that had sought their 
medical supervision. In a second conversation, he related another incident emphasizing 
the equivocal attitude of the prisoners whose confidence could easily turn into suspicion 
towards TTB’s doctors and regard into accusation. A death faster had died as a result of 
the natural course of self-starvation, and he had gone into the cell to deliver the dreaded 
news. The prisoners in the cell, notwithstanding all Dr. Özkalıpçı’s care, attacked him, 
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throwing whatever they could find at hand, and storming at him with vengeance, “you’ve 
killed her.” Death was the death faster’s posthumous power of judgment over the other 
which was as scrupulous as it was unforgiving and it did not make a distinction among its 
witnesses. 
As he talked disquietedly of his own experience in the hospitals from which the 
anticipated arrest and thus the futility of the care had eventually withdrawn him, Dr. 
Hakan Gürvit evinced lament in his allusions to the paralysis of this non-violent other 
who was equally subjected to the judgment of death.  He had been in charge of the death 
fasters in Kartal Prison and had made constant extended visitations until the June of 
2001. That he could neither make them live nor let them die had given him the greatest 
distress and even made it, at times, impossible for him to continue but he had born the 
burden with patience and resilience until his patients, the death fasters on the first and 
second teams, had begun to die one by one, and he then had to abandon, in spite of 
himself, his commitments to take care instead of the survivors suffering from the 
Wernicke-Korsakoff Syndrome. The proximity to the death fasters had enclosed the 
TTB’s doctors in an impossible resignation and it had forced them to acquiesce to the 
deaths not because of but in spite of their commitment to non-violence, leaving them with 
no exit.   
For the prison doctors there was one option remaining. The prison doctors eluded 
the responsibility to decide by exercising their right of withdrawal and they did so, 
according to Dr. Hulki Forta, to the point of abusing it insofar as they did not defer the 
decision for medical intervention to another doctor but rather they made their decision for 
medical intervention through the other doctor. This is how they did it: They transferred 
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the semi-comatose death faster from the prison infirmary or prison hospital to the 
emergency rooms of state hospitals where the receiving doctor, by virtue of the medical 
emergency which demanded urgent and decisive action, administered artificial feeding. 
Though the Death Fast was in the papers, and though the medical records and the 
advance instructions of the death fasters including the TTB booklets giving detailed 
information about the proper administration of artificial feeding were supposed to be 
transferred with the death faster and signed by the transferring prison doctor, the prison 
doctor transferred the death faster in his care without ensuring that the doctor taking over 
the care of the death faster receive the medical records and the advance instructions to 
enable him to make his own decision. Accordingly, the seeming withdrawal of the 
transferring prison doctor licensed the receiving doctor to administer artificial feeding as 
if the death faster in his care were only an anonymous, comatose patient in an emergency 
room, and in this manner relieved both the transferring prison doctor and the receiving 
doctor from the responsibility of making an intervention against the will of the death 
faster. Were the receiving doctor confronted after the medical intervention, he could 
always have justified his decision by claiming that he did not maintain a doctor-patient 
relationship with the death faster; and that the advance instructions of the death faster 
were not handed over to him at the time of the transfer; and that he could not have been 
sure that the death faster still refused medical treatment on account of the impossibility of 
communication in the comatose state. 
In most instances, though not all, the death fasters pulled off the catheter after 
regaining consciousness. These death fasters who still persisted in fasting were taken 
back to the prison cells—at least during the first months after the operation, roughly until 
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the spring of 2001. Though the long and burdensome transfers operated to weaken and 
dissolve their resolution, these death fasters counted themselves fortunate because they 
left the unfavorable conditions of the hospital to be attended by their comrades in the 
cells. The death fasters, since Bayrampaşa Prison Hospital was the only prison hospital in 
the country and this hospital could not itself provide the necessary treatment in the final 
phases of the death fast, had to stay in makeshift wards of the state hospitals which, if not 
precisely unwholesome, were nevertheless inadequate for the medical care of patients 
prone to pneumonia and other infections. Though these patients had to stay in intensive 
care units, as Dr. Özkalıpçı communicated, the makeshift wards were usually in the 
dilapidated basements or abandoned wards of the hospitals, and though they needed 
private nurses who would move them periodically to prevent pulmonary aspiration and 
bedsores and help them cleanse themselves, the medical treatment and care did not go 
beyond mere artificial feeding. The death fasters were left all by themselves and the 
medical staff of the hospital (nurses and rarely doctors) came only three times a day to 
change the artificial feeding tube. 
After the first series of deaths in the spring of 2001, the prison doctors began to 
transfer the death fasters to state hospitals before the comatose state (and Istanbul, they 
might first be transferred to Bayrampaşa Prison Hospital from the various prison 
infirmaries and then from there to a state hospital depending on the condition of the death 
faster), and these death fasters continued their fasting under medical monitoring and 
under complete isolation inasmuch as the hospital infrastructure and space allowed for 
such a practice. For this reason, though a stern regime of individual isolation was in 
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practice in some hospitals such as Kartal Training and Research Hospital in Istanbul, 
group isolation was much more common.204  
While isolating the death fasters—leaving them with their own violence—the 
authorities took steps to admit first-order kin, only and only them, into the very same 
space of isolation—leaving them alone together with the familial other. In this way, they 
not only assigned the families the task of taking care of the death fasters, but one and at 
the same time deployed the affective attachment of the families against both the death 
fasters and the families themselves by exposing them to each other. The authorities had 
already allowed for one-hour daily visits in Bayrampaşa Prison Hospital beginning in 
early April, and they had done so to add to the sources of dissuasive power over the death 
fasters for the families had begun to send letters to the government giving permission for 
involuntary medical treatment of their children. Semiha, both a mother and comrade who 
worked in TUYAB (The Union for the Relatives of the Arrested), accounted for such a 
conduct on the part of families by arguing that most families had withdrawn from the 
struggle after the prison operation because they had lost faith that the Death Fast would 
succeed in doing away with the new prison regime.205 She communicated their reasoning 
to me speaking in their voice: “We knocked on every door, we got beaten up by the 
police, and yet look what happened? Our children were still put into the F-type prisons.” 
Convinced though they were of the futility of their children’s struggle, families were also 
                                                
204 In fact, group isolation had already begun to operate in the Bayrampaşa Prison Hospital where the death 
fasters and the injured from the Istanbul prisons were brought after the prison operation. The group 
isolation functioned here on the basis of a distinction between those death fasters who were still on the fast, 
those who were no longer on the fast, and those who had resumed fasting after admitting to having made a 
mistake by accepting medical treatment.   
 
205 TUYAB (The Union for the Relatives of the Arrested) is an umbrella family organization that brings 
together the relatives of prisoners affiliated with outlawed leftist organizations except those of DHKP-C 
and TKEP/L.  
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aware of their limited powers of persuasion and for this reason, they had strived to gain 
time for their children by giving permission to the authorities against the will of their 
children. Medical intervention would at least make their children live longer and perhaps 
give them time too to reconsider their decision. 
The subsequent and long-term admission of the familial attendants into state 
hospitals, though it also sought to harness the mistrust and despondence of families by 
inserting them into this space of decision, it had a purpose beyond that of disencumbering 
the doctors of full responsibility. According to Semiha, it had only added to the 
malevolence of the authorities for they had turned her own child into their instrument of 
torture and had done so by withdrawing from this scene.  
Our admission into the hospital was pure coercion. They let us attend to our 
children to make us watch them dying. Our hands were tied and we were 
watching our children dying. It is a veritable torture, is there anything more 
painful than this? 
 
The authorities deflected the accusatory violence of the death faster off 
themselves by interposing the familial attendant, and the isolation was the condition for 
the concentrated form of this violence which exposed the mother to the accusatory 
violence of her own child. 
Semiha stayed in Kartal Training and Research Hospital for two months until the 
discharge of her daughter as a consequence of the new governmental practice of 
suspending the sentences of the death fasters on the grounds of their deteriorating health. 
During the first month, Semiha and her elder daughter were taking turns to take care of 
the younger daughter. After the first month, the elder daughter announced that she did not 
feel equal to the task and could not stay there any longer lest “she commits suicide,” and 
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Semiha had to take over the full care of her daughter all by herself. She had to stay in her 
daughter’s room at all times which meant that she had to eat and drink in front of her 
fasting child. The windows of the room were covered with thick and dark curtains and 
she was not allowed to look outside the windows. The doors of the room had to be kept 
open and fluorescent lights were on for twenty-four hours for the surveillance of the 
soldiers who were keeping guard outside the door and in the hallway. She could not even 
go to the bathroom for cleansing or washing dishes without the company of soldiers since 
they did not want any of the attendants to see each other. 
The regime of isolation in the hospital made it impossible for the familial 
attendants to retain a reserve and a distance from the violence which submitted them to 
the violence of the death fasters. They had to suffer through the death fasters—they could 
not look away—and they could neither suffer for them by fasting in their place—they had 
to take care of the death fasters—nor suffer together with others—there was no outside of 
the mise-en-abyme of accusatory violence, which demanded of its victims that they admit 
their guilt and undersign the decision for the medical intervention.  
A Different Kind of Punishment 
As far as the death fasters were concerned, forced feeding functioned only as a 
punishment, a punishment that was thereby infinitely at odds with its ostensible aim of 
preserving their lives against them. For forced feeding did not grant them an extra lease 
of “life” by making them live; to the contrary, it gave them death in increments and was 
thus deemed equivalent to torture. This is why the death fasters made strenuous efforts to 
keep the purity of the act itself, on the hand by precipitating and on the other by deferring 
death and yet only a very few managed to survive or die without being subjected, not 
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once but repeated times, to artificial feeding. In these instances, though there are very few 
exceptions, repeated resuscitations became utterly a matter of indifference, and the death 
fasters ended up abandoning the act with an acquiescence as though they had long ceased 
to notice and feel rage at such occurrences which however bore within them the ruins of a 
subject: 
I was never afraid of death. I wanted to die too in this act, but the mental suffering 
and torture of medical intervention broke me in. They were forcibly hooking up 
the IV line, and I was pulling it off when I came to my senses, and then they were 
forcing me to keep the IV line, and I was putting up a fight against it…to live 
through the same process over and over again has consumed me. 
 
But more than this torturous delay of death, the death fasters in 2000 were beset with a 
genuine fear of bodily and mental impairment since they lived in close quarters with the 
survivors of the 1996 Death Fast who could only get by in the prison with the aid of their 
comrades.  
Once-valiant fighters to death, the survivors now suffered from Wernicke-
Korsakoff Syndrome, an irreversible damage of the brain brought about by the depletion 
of thiamin, vitamin B 1. An unavoidable phase in the fatal course of self-starvation, when 
the death faster does not incorporate the vitamin supplement into the diet, the depletion is 
disproportionately aggravated by artificial feeding administered without the proper dose 
of additional B1 for the remaining storage of thiamin in the body is used up in the 
processing of the sugar in the intravenous infusion—the gift become poison.206  
                                                
206 For a clinical description of the disease, see Maurice Victor, Raymond Adams, and George Collin, 
Wernicke-Korsakoff Syndrome: A Clinical and Pathological Study of 252 patients and 82 with post-mortem 
examinations, Philadelphia: F. A. Davis, 1971. For a study in Turkish which gives an overview of the 
literature with new findings based on the case studies of the death fasters in 1996, see Emel Gökmen, 
Wernicke-Korsakoff Hastalığı ve Açlığın Diğer Nörolojik, Sistemik Komplikasyonları. Unpublished 
medical dissertation. Istanbul University, School of Medicine, Department of Neurology. Istanbul, 1999.    
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The protective effects of the vitamin B 1 supplement (both against precipitate 
death and improper artificial feeding) were not known in 1996, and by a fateful turn of 
events, the survivors had fallen into unknown depths of degradation and abjection by the 
hands of their own comrades who had rushed to administer the initial intravenous feeding 
in the wards upon the news of the agreement with the government before the death fasters 
were taken to the hospital emergency rooms, and in this sorry process, they had even 
prevented, albeit inadvertently, a number of healthier death fasters from surviving the act 
unimpaired.  
In 2000, a group of neurologists from Istanbul University Çapa Hospital headed 
by Emel Gökmen and Hakan Gürvit, who had already been part of the group of doctors 
affiliated with the Association of Turkish Physicians visiting the prisons in 1996, and 
who had followed up the survivors of the death fast in 1996 after their treatment at the 
Istanbul University Çapa Hospital over a year-long medical monitoring in Bayrampaşa 
Prison, initiated a public information campaign with the collaboration of the Association 
of Turkish Physicians and the Human Rights Foundation of Turkey (TIHV) to raise 
awareness of the essential function of B1 in preempting the Wernicke-Korsakoff 
Syndrome with the purpose of saving a new group of death fasters from becoming invalid 
like their counterparts in 1996.207 Emel Gökmen and Hakan Gürvit together with Erdoğan 
                                                
207 The Association of Turkish Physicians educated the prison doctors about proper artificial feeding and 
established a pilot center in Bayrampaşa Prison. It had also prepared two booklets and sent them to all the 
hospitals and affiliate doctors of the association. Basing itself on the study of Gökmen and Gürvit, the first 
booklet provided the doctors with the necessary information on the monitoring of the death fasters and their 
proper medical treatment. The second booklet which proved to be controversial informed the doctors about 
the principles of professional ethics concerning hunger striking and practical guidelines for action. This 
booklet was based on the World Medical Association’s Declaration of Malta on Hunger Strikers. The 
Human Rights Foundation of Turkey organized the delivery of pure B 1 (in tablet and ampoule form) to 
prisons, state hospitals and families. There was no unmixed form of B 1 in Turkey and the death fasters 
needed very high doses of the vitamin, the pure form of the vitamin was brought in suitcases from Europe 
by volunteers. 
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Özkalıpçı, a forensic doctor affiliated with the Human Rights Foundation who had 
performed the first autopsies of the death fasters in the country after the Death Fast in 
1984, made representations to persuade the organizations to use B 1. They enjoined the 
organizations to recognize that the protection of the resistance depended upon their self-
protection. According to these doctors, the organizations, and especially DHKP-C among 
them, were still deeply critical of B 1 because they thought that B-1 functioned merely to 
compromise the only binding force of the Death Fast, as was already in evidence in the 
falsifications by the government and seemed prepared to disregard the use of B 1 to 
defend the resistance itself. The doctors contended that the refusal to use B 1 in the belief 
that aspersions of the government might thereby be proven wrong was absolutely 
disastrous, and would serve in fact only to precipitate deaths. For their part, they 
promised the prisoners that they would take on the responsibility of informing the public 
about the proper functions of B 1. Though they recognized that there was always the risk 
that their endeavor to publicize the necessity and benefits of B 1 might itself be inverted 
into just another threat of violence against the death fasters, since it was always possible 
that a hostile other could also use this medical information to harm the death fasters, and 
for this reason alone, the doctors argued, it was all the more urgent for them to use B 1 
because it would protect them against improper artificial feeding.   
Though the death fasters accepted to take B 1 in 2000 for self-protection and 
though the proper termination of the death fast was public knowledge among prison 
doctors and those at state hospitals at the time, the death fasters in 2000 still concluded 
that they plainly ran the risk of becoming an invalid because of their close contact with 
the 1996 survivors who were afflicted with the Wernicke-Korsakoff Syndrome.  
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The strange affliction manifested itself in the ataxic gait of the survivors and some 
could not even walk on their own due to a vertiginous imbalance, and when it was not 
restricted to a “pure” Wernicke’s disease and it hardly ever was, it assumed the form of 
an enduring amnesia, Korsakoff’s psychosis, which did not only cover with oblivion 
indiscriminate parts of their past, but more troublingly, dispossessed them of the presence 
of the present by making it impossible to recover the alterity of the past by means of 
retention—they could not recognize people they have met, places they have been, 
conversations they have held, emotions they have felt across an indefinite lapse of time 
though they had the sensation of having seen, having been, having spoken, having felt—
the past did not return as a present or more properly speaking, the past returned but to 
immure the present in its absence. The presence of the absence of the past made of the 
present a repeated opening to time and space which did not give itself as a world but as a 
world always already at its ending whereby awakening to consciousness was experienced 
more as a perpetual recapitulation of death than a rebirth. A punishment, in I.’s words, 
much more iniquitous than a death sentence: 
They [the authorities] thought that they could end the Death Fast with medical 
intervention and especially with improper medical intervention. If you die, it 
serves my purpose, but if you don’t die and become like this, it serves my purpose 
even better. I am not killing, I will not kill, I will not let you die, but I will make it 
much worse than dying. You’re going to die everyday, every time you wake up, 
you will be born again. It is something for someone to die once, it is completely 
something else to be born again and die again every single day. The same thing 






I dis-appear: The Mad Return Writing the Diary of a Death Faster 
Unlike the fallen fasters who escaped death by the perpetuation of their proper 
names within the perenniality of the political collectivity, Ismail Hakkı Sadiç appeared to 
be an embarrassing and out-of-place figure that was neither living nor dead. Yet what he 
may be found to offer, within the confines of his journal, was another name for death.  
Lacking the sublime splendor of the dead, he was driven by a guilty solitude to 
bring to a closure his act interrupted by forces outside and beyond his will, but he was 
more than ever incapable for he had sunken into an inescapable void which covered with 
oblivion the most basic facts. For how long has the death fast been going on? What were 
their demands? When did he end his fast? Was he the only one in this condition? Did he 
ever want to resume fasting? Did they allow for it? He did not remember. His comrades’ 
answers momentarily dispersed the darkness enveloping him like a flash of lightening 
leaving behind the same trail of questions. 
Ismail Hakkı Sadiç begins the preface to his journal published under the title Hazy 
Light [Puslu Aydınlık] (2001) by quoting himself proclaiming a crime that has left him as 
a trace in effacing all traces of its violence. This crime that has irreparably rendered him 
incomplete and in search of his self, is a theft of memories: 
Who am I? My name is Ismail Hakkı Sadiç. I’m a person who has been on the 
death fast for 120 days in Edirne F-type Prison where I was transferred after 
December 19. I’m a Human Being whose memory [hafıza] has been effaced, and 
who has been robbed of his past and his memories [anı] marked by happiness, 
hope, fear, love and hatred. I’m a Human Being who is forever bound to live in 
the Moment [An] and who comes to life and dies yet again every single day as a 
result of forced medical intervention. (1) 
 
He has lost his past. He has lost something that he had already lost, but he feels 
that he has lost himself as if he were dead for he has become an empty consciousness of 
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time only marking the return where things become both what they are and other than 
what they are, and dis-appear.  
Awakening to consciousness, Sadiç bears witness to the fragility of his link to the 
world. His awakening always occurs as an awareness of the overwhelming force of an 
unknowing repetition. He does not know what he is repeating, but he knows that he is 
repeating.  
I don’t know today’s date. It is as if I have awakened for the first time today. It is 
as if I’m seeing this place, my friends for the first time, but it is also as if I’ve 
seen and known them before. (24) 
 
All that takes place takes place, so to speak, with quotation marks, both as a 
vestige and as an alteration of itself. This perpetual recurrence turns each person or event 
into a version of another. Each event, it seems, is like a memory or a premonition that is 
full of meaning only to the extent that it is simultaneously empty of all meaning.  
When he begins to feel completely undone by this strange force which plays 
havoc with states of consciousness like “first time” and “again” by making things happen 
for the first time as already past, Sadiç decides to keep a journal to establish a series of 
reference points which will allow him to ground himself in this present without present. 
Yet what begins as an unyielding exercise in memorization, ends as a memorial for 
forgetting. Unaware of the risks of writing, he is gradually led astray from his task.    
The journal opens with a litany of proper names which might as well be read as a 
death toll from a war. In his first entry which is undated, Sadiç writes about the condition 
of his comrades. Next to each proper name, he jots down whether they are living or dead. 
And if living whether they are still continuing to fast or not. He features his name among 
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the rest as an “I” fallen into the anonymity of a third person: “Ismail Sadiç =terminated 
his hunger strike” (5).  
In the following entry, from which time is still absent, Sadiç recounts his 
awakening to consciousness at a hospital where he had apparently been taken for medical 
intervention upon losing consciousness. Finding himself hooked up to an IV line, Sadiç 
takes it off without delay. A comrade sitting on a bed near the windowsill tries to stop 
him alleging that the death fast has come to an end for them as a result of the medical 
intervention. Sadiç refuses ardently and maintains that they are obliged to recommence 
fasting upon regaining consciousness. If he were to take off the IV feed, his comrade 
assures him, the authorities would enchain Sadiç to bed and transfer his comrade to 
another ward presuming that he has forced Sadiç to resume fasting.  In this way, Sadiç 
would hinder him from taking care of a third comrade who is lying unconscious in the 
next bed. Instead of betraying his cause, Sadiç betrays his comrades, and as the first 
comrade anticipated, he ends up being chained to his bed and having an IV forcefully 
reinserted. The journal entry closes with his awakening from sleep to realize that the first 
comrade has indeed disappeared leaving him alone with the third one still lying 
unconscious. In insisting on my cause, Sadiç seems to be saying, I lost my one and only 
witness who could have testified to my fidelity. In fact, no one could possibly watch the 
death fasters constantly, day and night, and so no one could produce firsthand evidence 
that their fast had really been rigorous and continuous. Only the death fasters themselves 
could know that. They are therefore bound to be the sole spectators of themselves. And 
Sadiç knows deep down that he could not have stayed true to his cause for he is living. 
That the narrative leaves unsaid the facticity of his survival unveils the scene of fidelity 
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as a scene of betrayal. More important, the veracity and the sincerity of the narrative 
remain in suspense until a certain event has taken place that makes the future into the 
point from where the past, seen in retrospect, gains the value of truth. As Sadiç questions 
himself: “If it has really happened in this way, why don’t they want me to resume death 
fasting? Why don’t they give me permission? Why don’t they trust me?” (9)  
As the desired event fails to take place, Sadiç returns to the ambivalent scene to 
write it over and over again. Though with each new repetition, it becomes not more but 
less recognizable. What has been narrated in the definite past tense comes to be narrated 
in the inferential past tense. Implying possibility, doubt and uncertainty, the inferential 
past tense is used in Turkish whenever the speaker has not been an eyewitness to the past 
events. If his re-inscription of the events at the hospital disappears Sadiç, where he was, it 
simultaneously causes him to appear where he is not, by representing him at a distance 
from himself.  
He is writing in order not to forget. Every time he writes, he also reads. Every 
time he reads his writing, he becomes conscious of himself as other. The act of writing is 
from the first divided by the complicity between writing and reading. Yet this mutual 
implication of writing and reading takes a very different modality here because of the 
irremediability of the gap between Sadiç the writer and Sadiç the reader. Sadiç the reader 
recognizes but cannot identify with Sadiç the writer. This division brings about a striking 
transformation in his relationship to himself. He now begins to feel he is quoting himself 
endlessly as if he were a copier of his own writing.  
I do not remember having written this, but I do remember having read something 
like this. Is it because I have read it that I am writing it? Is it because I do not 




His writing is in the form of a series of repetitions or recurrences in which to 
advance is always already to return. Repetition here functions as both compulsion and 
failure and writing then becomes an insistent repetition of that which by definition it 
cannot say. It becomes unreadable. Like an image which startles the eye, the very 
materiality of his repetitive writing manifests nothing except that he cannot forget that he 
is forgetting.  
Even I cannot read what I have written. Why is it then that I keep writing so 
blindly and inattentively? Or am I scribbling on this blank sheet of paper just to 
kill time, to forget. Do I really remember these things? Or do I not want to 
remember them? (42) 
 
As he realizes that there ceases to be any escape from this vacuous accumulation, 
Sadiç starts to question his own intentions. Perhaps he is writing to forget rather than to 
remember. Or even worse, he is perhaps pretending to forget in order to evade his 
responsibilities to his comrades surreptitiously. Now, though, the compulsion to repeat 
takes on a more violent, less forgiving dimension, and while on one level, Sadiç forfeits 
any control over the words he still takes to be his, he is also compelled, with this endless 
repetition, to entertain the thought that it demands of him. There is no remedy for him but 
death. Thus, he desires nothing else but to die on the death fast. 
While the journal ends without ending, writing and its temporality startlingly 
shifts with the letters in the appendix. The temporality of writing in the journal belongs, 
in fact, neither to past nor to present nor future, but rather to another time, in relation to 
which, time itself is continually beside, outside, or beyond itself. In stark contrast to the 
journal, Sadiç’s letters to his comrades bespeak of an unwavering faith in a future as a 
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moment of deferred ending. He imagines the times when cemeteries will have been 
converted from places of mourning into schools wherein people will have learned from 
the epitaphs. His hallucinatory notes will then have acquired a historical value for future 
generations. To this temporal alteration is added even greater and more astounding 
intensity as Sadiç affirms life with all the force he can muster in view of this dream about 
the future that he shares with his comrades. His desire for death then transforms into a 
desire for immortality.  
Yes, comrade. I manage to stand upright, to keep living because of this dream. 
And with this dream, I gather the force to collect myself together to go down for 
another run on the track. And I will do this. And I will do this. And I will do this. 
I will run again. I will run again. I will run again. I will once again capture time 
inside me, and take it between my hands. I will once again master time. I will 
once again capture time inside me, and take it between my hands. I will once 
again master time. (68) 
    
After 
G. still insisted on the inescapable necessity of the Death Fast in 2000 and it was 
evidently hard to imagine that any of her comrades could have thought otherwise. At any 
event, as far as G. was concerned, there seemed little reason why she should want to 
regret her decision, though they had paid an exceedingly high price as a result of the 
flawed organization of the Death Fast, anymore than in 2000 she might have wanted in 
principle to question the organizational command that had excluded in advance all other 
possibilities of political action. But though this had the effect of precipitating a massive 
number of them headlong into the Death Fast and G. asked in retrospect whether the 
Death Fast had to be organized as a collective act to such a degree, the organizational 
command had arguably proven itself to be far less equipped in providing the conditions 
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for the death fasters to maintain a uniform, unvarying regimen that the collective nature 
of the Death Fast had required of them.  
This unacceptable inconstancy had severely affected the whole of the first and 
second teams who were able to take vitamin B 1 only intermittently, for 20 days or a 
month at the most without interruption, because the delivery of the vitamin to prisons was 
cut off following the prison operation. The implications of this imprudence were serious 
ones, to the extent that these teams had the highest number of death fasters, and this was 
surely one reason why their members had succumbed to premature brain damage which 
could have been averted by taking appropriate action under the circumstances.   
This restrained yet also deeply indignant imputation of negligence to the 
organizational command was a symptom of the larger crisis affecting G.’s life in the 
present which had to do with the strained relationship—both interdependence and 
disparity that still bound the survivors to the organization. Indeed, G. conceded, the 
organization had offered the greatest assistance in returning them to everyday life by 
opening Yaşam Evi (House of Life) barely one month after the discharges from prison. 
She had been just a visitor at the House because her family, living in Istanbul, had been 
taking care of her since her release shortly after the forced termination of her hundred-
and-thirty-five-days-long death fast. G., overindulged by her family, had felt that their 
effusive but no less solitary attention had required her to take a distance from this 
“smothering atmosphere.” “My family,” she said, “was mistaken. They thought that I 
would get better if they fed me and put me to bed. The separation from home, from my 
mother and father, was the most effective cure for me.” She expatiated on the 
gratifications of visiting the House, and though she was able to make the scene once or 
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twice a week, “there was, as though, a cut between the two atmospheres,” she said, “my 
feelings and thoughts used to change the moment I arrived at the House as if I were 
making a new beginning.” There was something delightful and enjoyable about 
performing their home exercises together that had gotten easier and easier until she was 
able to walk on her own. It was the same with eating together—they were not able to 
prepare their own meals but they could help with setting the table and cleaning afterwards 
whereas her mother would not even let her put an empty glass on the tray. She had also 
developed her poor speech by partaking in the daily routine of reading newspaper articles 
to each other. There was much chance of coming into contact with others at the House 
too if only because it had become a gathering place for old and new acquaintances who 
were coming in twos and threes one after another to offer their services to them, and G. 
had personally got to know quite a few herself in all her months there. 
She had continued to share the life at the House—this well-regulated and diligent 
life—with dear old comrades, doing exactly what they did month after month. At first she 
had rather liked being in close proximity with them, but after being there for two years, 
she could not say she enjoyed it anymore because it was a proximity based solely on 
illness which closed them off to the world, as if there were no need for them even to go 
outside or speak to others. They had a great deal of resolve about them—though, granted, 
without their even being aware of it, that resolve was being increasingly satisfied by 
treatment, to the point where it had become, as it were, a substitute for the political duties 
to be fulfilled out in the world, a kind of “false” occupation. 
Immediately after recuperating her bodily autonomy—she could walk with a 
walking stick out there in the world—G. wanted to return to “active duty.” The thing was, 
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as she told me one day, they had begun to “regress” under the celebratory embrace of the 
comrades and in a year or two it was all over with such attention, and then she had 
suddenly come to see that they had fallen outside the political scene. Her constitution was 
not exactly the strongest true and she would be lying were she to claim that she was 
capable of all efforts and activities—she moved slowly, spoke in a garbled and impeded 
manner, and forgot repeatedly. Yet there was no reason she should have filled her world 
with the treatment, and nor did they have the right to send her from one interview to 
another, from one film shoot to another, without asking of her opinion as if her health 
hardly qualified her for any other role but that of a witness. And who better to perform 
this role, she implied, than an ailing survivor whose only relation to the organization was 
through her witnessing? And who, in every essential aspect, could have been just any one 
of them? 
She had found a keyboard at home and started to practice touch-typing, devotedly, 
with the ambition of type-setting for their newspaper. Gone now were the days of armed 
struggle, even those of unionizing in the textile workshops, all of which had occupied her 
early years in the organization before going into prison. Though she could no longer take 
part in active political duty, she thought that she could have daily and first-hand 
knowledge of the politics of the organization, familiarizing herself with the positions on 
current issues by taking up this task in the newspaper. Her expectations did not 
correspond to their decision nonetheless which frustrated all the hopes she had cherished 
for her return to active life, and she understood only too well the connection between the 
decision and her poor health. After all they had chosen, instead of her, another ailing 
death faster that distinguished him—to his advantage—from G. with the greater bodily 
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debilitation, making in “frigid objectivity” the matter-of-fact point that the severity of her 
malady, above and beyond personal considerations, was the reason behind her 
elimination. His health did undoubtedly far surpass her own and it was quite conceivable 
that they may have found her “defects” prejudicial to the efforts and activities of the 
organization, and yet G. still demanded an explanation for the decision and drafted a 
letter to this effect. The letter, perhaps more damagingly, was never answered, and in 
opposing only a hollow silence to all her questions, the organizational command—after 
granting her an exceptional status in the Death Fast—had totally disregarded G. as if she 
were not an equal at all, refusing to acknowledge her as an addressee even. And that was 
what enraged her, “this was the moment she had really lost it,” in the same way she had 
been enraged that day in the film shoot, when she had realized that the organizational 
command was taking utter license with their illness, the illness that embodied her being 
and that she shared with the others. She would not have been assigned to the task but for 
her crutches—the organizational command had chosen her for the interview only to 
exploit the exhibitional value of her crutches which accentuated and enhanced her 
condition as though she were a mere “mannequin.” 
Her anger was heavy-laden with disappointment, doubt, and fear which had 
spilled over into boundless uncertainty about herself. Up to that moment G. had 
preserved her individual self-respect, though the reserve and brooding silence of the 
organizational command had caused her to be visited by periodic doubt, but now she 
looked at herself with their eyes and realized clearly and distinctly, as doubtless they did 
too, that she was an invalid: 
Okay, I’m thinking of doing this, but will I be able to do this or not? Will I be 
able to take a position there? Will I be able to take up this task in this activity? 
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After a while, you start picking at yourself. From then on, you don’t say that the 
people around you are doing this to you. You start saying, “I’m like this, I 
couldn’t do this or that. Or I won’t be able to do this.  
 
They had an attendant comrade who accompanied them everywhere, taking them 
to their treatment at the Human Rights Foundation and overseeing their daily 
programmes at the House. He would help them walk in the streets and attend social 
gatherings, always introducing G. and her ailing comrades as death fasters. This was the 
title he used emphatically, though not praisingly, not in the sense in which they had 
learned to understand it during the struggle, it had little to do with the distinction and 
honor that they had attached to the word. For he would never present himself as a death 
faster, though he had been one, unless someone in the group identified him as being one 
of them. That he preferred to remain inconspicuous had made it clear that the title death 
faster, which had normally served as a title of honor and distinction, was cast in an 
entirely dark light now, which was absolutely appalling—it had turned into a stigma 
underwritten by medical dictum:  
Even if you rip at the walls with your fingernails and say you want to do 
something, even if you believe that you’re capable of doing a certain task, at least 
up to a certain level, there is a stigma (yafta) which sticks to you. You are 
damaged in one way or another, and there is a medical name for this damage. The 
most important thing about it is that it is brain damage. It sticks to you like a 
stigma in one way or another because you cannot recover from it. 
 
Further, two weeks ago, she had learned from her sister that everybody shunned 
her like the plague during the first two years of her release from the prison; for whenever 
their comrades invited her sister to an activity and she wanted to bring along G., under 
the circumstances, and in order to avoid unnecessary troubles and public attention, they 
had compelled her sister to leave her behind as G. used to shout in the streets, though at 
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separated intervals of time, and fall down too when a loud sound made her lose her 
balance. For G. the belated news from her sister was too much—she clenched her fists—
the disregard of the organizational command had already weighed on her stilling her 
desire to rise above her disease; it had made her susceptible to interludes of self-doubt 
that had slowly, remorselessly, grown worse. But this, that her own comrades did not 
want her around she had not expected to hear from her sister; it made her see the entirety 
of the world in the sign and image of her illness. Nothing could come out of her efforts to 
make progress but the futility of such a proceeding because “nobody finds you self-
sufficient, they do not make long-term plans with you.”  
Nothing, not even her survival of the operation and death fast, had been more 
exacting than her relations with her comrades, family and people in the streets, this 
distress was exacerbated by the amnesia afflicting her, but no less than by the experience 
of the outside world after five years of imprisonment, and G. remembered neither the 
outside world, nor herself, though she had to inhabit both; she had left them in the past: 
I am aware that I am not the old G.. I feel so differently but I don’t remember the 
old G.. But the ones who look from the outside tell me that I am still like the old 
G.. “Your reactions are those of old G.,” “You haven’t changed that much,” they 
tell me. But I don’t have it. I don’t remember how I used to react to things in the 
past. Based on what they tell me, I say, ‘Huh. Hmmm. That’s how old G. used to 
respond, that’s how I used to think under these circumstances.’  
 
People around her attributed to G. a self-sameness and imagined that the ill G. 
was, as it were, the old G. who had to bear the agonies of an ill one, but nothing was 
further from the truth. As far as G. was concerned, the old G. had already died and she 
related to it as if it were a mere name which survived its bearer—and wasn’t it a fact that 
the old G. could not die completely because people were ever ready to lend her a hand in 
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remembering it with a wealth of anecdotes and narratives that elicited more of an 
acquiescence than inquisitiveness, an indifference than exhilaration on the part of G.? But 
they were not in the faintest degree interested in the future of G., or rather a common 
future with her, “nobody ever makes long-term plans with you,” she repeated again and 
again. In her hopeless and circumscribed state that went nowhere beyond itself—she 
showed her crutches—how could she give form to the new person that had come into 
being? A new G. who was always already dispossessed of the future, she was suspended 
in a present between the past and the future which, as she figured it, was a passageway 
which did not give way to a passing. She was waiting there for some decisive event to 
happen:  
It is as if we are on a subway platform or in a waiting room, neither our before, 
nor our after is clear. We’re waiting in that corridor. One day when we fully 
remember our past or ourselves, our before, when we become capable of making 
a decision about our future, about what we will be doing, how we will be situating 
ourselves in the future, it seems like we will step out of that corridor. But I don’t 
know myself when and how we will come out of this corridor. 
 284 
Conclusion 
Who or What Survives? 
Like any conclusion, this one also has a prospective as well as a retrospective 
dimension. The Death Fast was addressed here both as political violence and as 
something more than political violence which could still be named as political violence 
but also exceeded that name and stood, as it were, beyond the violence of the political.  
Infidelity, it seems, is an unavoidable condition of all critique, and yet to respond 
faithfully to the death fasters, I suggested, one must pursue their own language to the 
limit, in order to draw forth this something or someone that carries the Death Fast outside 
and beyond itself and confounds political conviction, and affirm thus the difference of the 
Death Fast from itself. A critique that opens the Death Fast to its own difference is a form 
of fidelity which is necessarily couched in infidelity. 
Derrida (2002: 289) has observed that Kritik of violence for Benjamin means 
primarily having the “diacritical” power to choose, discriminate, decide between different 
forms of violence. But what is it, one may ask, about the destructive violence of the kind 
affirmed by Benjamin, that distinguishes it from the violence of law? To this question 
Benjamin provides in fact only an opaque answer; for what justifies the revolutionary 
recourse to violence in Benjamin’s text is neither the ends of this violence, which 
necessarily turn it into an act of foundation, nor its effects, but the relation of this 
violence to the present. Benjamin makes it evident that his critique is concerned precisely 
with the relation of violence to the subject and to the social, the relation of violence to the 
subject as a relation to the social, not in the mode of founding, but rather in that of an 
opening which destroys nothing but the permanence of identity. Benjamin’s resolve to 
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overcome an instrumental and a productive concept of violence represents an effort to 
think violence as an event whose very eventfulness consists in the opening of the social 
that both determines and is determined by the opening of a petrified subject onto the 
social: a new, unprecedented, and one may add unrecognizable, subject born in and by 
the transformation in the order of social relations. 
Accordingly, a critique does not deserve the name for Benjamin unless it enables 
one to judge violence differently and otherwise than the courts of law, including those 
who invoke the codes and rhetoric of law in other guises. That is to say, the critique itself 
has to ignore, suspend, erase, displace, and alter the instituted protocols of readability of 
violence; and it may be argued that this is what gives the demonstrative power, 
exemplary force to the pedagogical violence by which Benjamin communicates the 
violence of this (self)-transformation. The task of the critic of violence, in Benjamin’s 
terms, is to disrupt the languages and signifying orders of violence, languages which have 
frozen (and thus decayed) into a mere code of the community, by turning the critique 
itself into an inseparable part of the event that the critique does not represent but puts into 
play insofar as the possibility of language—response to that which lies beyond the 
code—is itself on this condition. 
The work of the critic of the Death Fast begins in a political space overdetermined 
by the sacredness of life, and despite the uncontrollable political equivocation inherent in 
the word “life,” contending ideologies are agreed in their avowed intention to protect the 
inviolability of life. Rather than a decision between rivalrous forms of life, such as 
“individual” or “communal”, the question of politics may perhaps best be described as 
the question of the decision between a life enclosed within itself, isolated not only from 
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what can injure it but from what can come to its rescue and allow it to endure in time and 
a life open to the Other which takes the risk to leave itself behind and in the process gives 
rise to other than itself. In other words, between a sacrifice which measures life against 
life and a sacrifice which gives life to life, or between a community of sacrificial 
reproduction and a community exposed to its own difference.208 And it is clear, as 
witnessed by the notion of sovereignty underlying the Death Fast from the outset, that the 
thinking of community is here decisively coded by the concept of sacrifice that embalms 
life in the ideal image of death.  
This is why it is all the more bewildering that those who speak, if not in the place 
of death fasters, on their behalf, impose the burden of responsibility on an exterior 
collective subject whose political judgment, as it were, is dangerously bound by moral 
judgment concerning the life of the death fasters. A responsible critic, if a non-violent 
critique is impossible, refuses to arrogate the power of moral judgment since this 
subjective act of judgment recoils upon itself and provokes its own judgment, a sentence 
which only pronounces the identity of the subject of judgment: murderer or brother. Such 
at any rate is the implication behind the insistence of the organizations on the necessity of 
declared positions, and though the organizations emphasize the primacy of their political 
values over life, they cannot not adopt as their own the vocabulary of the state for they 
also accuse their adversaries in the name of the inviolability of life, and it is this double 
strategy of affirmation and negation of life that governs their moral legislation of the 
Death Fast. For the sacrificial execution of life, if it is not recognized as sacrifice, reverts 
to murder; and the addressees who do not suspend the undecidably illicit action by 
recognizing the Death Fast as a sacrifice in their own name become de jure murderers. 
                                                
208 “To sacrifice,” Blanchot (1988:15) writes, quoting Bataille, “is not to kill, but to abandon and give.” 
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That one has to decide and to decide quickly between the injustice of law and the 
legitimacy of their demands, between the secret violence of the carceral regime and the 
truthfulness of the death fasters lest the addressees themselves be adjudged as guilty by 
the mourners of the silent, dead body of the death faster, however, leaves little space of 
intervention for the critic who is struck by the rift between the space of dying and 
political space borne by the death faster. 
The awareness of the rift between the space of dying and political space, between 
the endurance of the death faster and the duration of the political act—the distinction that 
one might thematize as the difference between ethics and politics—requires of the critic 
that she attends with vigilance to the anonymity of life which links—without linking—
the two spaces. For any act of linking between the two spaces is dependent on what one 
might call a condition of originary de-linking. On the one hand, such a condition implies 
the possibility, indeed, the necessity of linking in general, without which there would be 
no meaning or sense available to political discourse at all. On the other hand, if what 
presides over the linking of the two spaces is a principle of originary de-linking, it 
follows that the link between the space of dying and political space can only ever be a 
secondary or derived one; with the result that every linking necessarily remains 
precarious and arbitrary, subject to endless multiplication and revision, or writing. The 
death faster, in his or her resistance to naming, bears witness to this rift whose very 
purpose is to challenge the adequacy of linkages rather than confirm their authority. 
This is why, I responded, within my own writing of the Death Fast, to the 
inculpating question, insistent demand, and pressing urgency at heart of the Death Fast, 
by displacing the critical gaze from the political space to the space of dying, from the 
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dialectic of politico-juridical sovereignty to the event, from the symbolics of martyrdom 
to the remnants of the Death Fast who clung to life outside time and sociability. This anti-
anamorphic gaze—to the extent that it deformed the image of beautiful death—
necessarily broke with the demand for the disclosure of truth, since death never yields 
itself to a single truth, but to a truth that is always other, and attended instead to the 
question of testimony. The testimony of the death fasters, insofar as testimony is 
precisely that which is “untrue” in the radical sense of not being subject to values of truth 
and falsity, allowed the opening of a relation to the Other beyond the barriers of 
languages encrusted with formulas, mannerisms, and stereotypes, including both the 
language of the organizations which functioned like a password, more a mere marker of 
identity than a language, and the languages of the Right and the Left which echoed, albeit 
differently, the official language of the state in its tick-like reaction. 209 For the Left also 
lacked that “momentary suspension of disbelief” which is necessary to hear the Other.  
On one level, such an approach may be criticized as naïve, but as Derrida (2002) says 
there is no social bond without this elementary faith, “without an ‘I believe you,’ without 
an ‘I believe’,” naivety here is better read as an uncertain name for the act of commitment 
to the Other that originates in the very rupture of community, an act of commitment to 
the death faster who strikes as a disruptive force, as difference, that makes language 
possible, before he or she becomes a sign—and it does not matter whether he or she 
functions as a sign of the violence of the state or the power of the organization—in 
which, as Benjamin insisted, the violence of language and language of violence bleeds 
into each other. 
                                                
209 Indeed, Roland Barthes (1989: 68) defines the mythic as the “density of idiolect”.  
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To respond to the death faster as Other—and does not all language come from the 
Other?—the dissertation overemphasized the scandalous disproportion between human 
loss and political gain, which was more symbolic than real. And yet to overstate the 
political defeat was not to give credit to the instrumental logic of politics, but, beyond 
such instrumentality, to think the improductivity of the Death Fast in relation not to the 
political and juridical order, but to the event which was indifferent to a future judged as 
success or failure. In this respect, my own political conclusions take their distance from 
the assessments of both the organizations and their leftist critics that, despite their 
seeming opposition, are indeed reverse images of each other in that they both measure the 
success or the failure of the event by its end results as though the event could only 
become recognizable as a work of death.  
On the Left’s reading, the prison movement had suffered a heavy tactical defeat, 
one which was greatly exacerbated by the investment of the entirety of its forces into the 
Death Fast.210 This massive investment in the Death Fast at the expense of other forms of 
prison struggle had premised itself upon the impossibility of protecting self-dignity and 
honor in the F-type prisons, and by that very token had identified the physical fact of 
confinement itself, notwithstanding the noncompliance of the prisoners, with political 
submission which had in turn necessitated fending off the attack with a single and 
definitive counter-attack at the price of a high number of deaths. The insistence of the 
organizations on the Death Fast, from the perspective of the Left, had resulted in the 
disastrous expenditure of their forces. Aside from the deaths of one hundred twenty two 
                                                
210 For a critical overview of the position of the Left on the Death Fast, see Garbis Altınoğlu, “2000-2001 
Ölüm Orucu Üzerine Bir Değerlendirme” (An Evaluation on the 2000-2001 Death Fast), 27-31 July, 2001. 
This evaluation can be found in the online archive of documents concerning the first three years of the 
movement compiled by the same author. “2000-2003 Ölüm Orucu Direnişi Belgeleri” (The Documents of 
the 2000-2003 Death Fast Resistance), http://www.xs4all.nl/~afa/tm/turkce/belge.html.  
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militants, they argued, the socialist movement would be preoccupied with attending to the 
survivors with physical and mental impairment which meant ultimately that the 
movement would be diverted from its pending political tasks unless the organizations 
relegated a great measure of the burden to the families, and such a course of action would 
in turn damage irreparably the ties with the families.  
The expansion of the Death Fast after the prison operation, instead of a temporary 
retreat that would have obligated the political authorities to account for the deaths of 
thirty-two prisoners, the argument of the Left continued, had lent credibility to the public 
image of the state as a protective power that made all the effort to keep the death fasters 
alive, and this had led inexorably to the incrimination of the organizations, families, and 
other supporting groups for the ensuing deaths by the political authorities who had simply 
looked to the withering of the Death Fast with a deadly intransigence. Accordingly, the 
insistence of the organizations had served not to raise the hopes of the masses, but merely 
to exacerbate their despair by showing the state to be unwilling and inflexible in the face 
of such heroic perseverance and what this implied for the politics of the future was that 
the Death Fast had consumed the efficacy and the significance of the hunger strike as a 
political means rendering it inoperative for the foreseeable future. 
But the Left called into question, in the strongest possible terms, not only the 
political logic and effectiveness of the full commitment of the organizations to the Death 
Fast, but also explained it in a much more far-reaching way as both the cause and the 
effect of the severance of the prison struggle from other political and social struggles. 
The prison organizations had missed the political moment—the risk and chance of the 
contingent event occasioned by the concomitance of the economic crisis with the penal 
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transformation—to augment the rising protests by strengthening their weak ties to the 
working people. Throughout the winter of 2001 and into the spring, the public protests 
against the economic crisis had expanded from the industrial workers to the public 
employees on the one hand and on the other to the small shop-keepers and craftsmen, and 
though the prison movement had sought to extend itself towards other struggles by 
including the abrogation of the Anti-Terror Law and the State Security Courts within its 
list of demands, they had subordinated the material interests of the working classes to the 
immediate demands of the prisoners. True, the prison struggle had attempted to win over 
the working classes and the Kurdish people to its cause by proclaiming that the F-type 
offensive was an offensive equally against them, and yet this claim had not gone beyond 
mere agitation-propaganda insofar as it was based on the rebuttable presumption that the 
military and the political authorities had attacked the prisoners to coerce the working 
people into submission by destroying their vanguards who safeguarded their hopes with 
exemplary defiance and perseverance in the prisons. From the Left’s perspective, the 
vanguardism of the prisoners was not a true and actual vanguardism, but a fictive and at 
best a potential one and it was the endemic inability of the organizations to confront this 
issue that had given rise to the Left’s critique of the Death Fast, which they saw as a 
movement motivated more by wishful thinking than by proper understanding of political 
realities, and blinded to the unpalatable truths by their obstinate belief in their role as 
vanguards. Indeed, the F-type attack against the prisoners was itself a structural effect of 
precariousness of the ties with the working classes and their representative political 
organizations, and this was why the victories in the past struggles for rights in prisons had 
shown themselves to be partial and temporary which had only resulted in the physical 
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debilitation of the prisoners, and the political and administrative authorities had employed 
this war of attrition to pernicious effect by delaying the medical treatment of the prisoners 
after long-term hunger strikes. Thus, according to the Left, the brutal implementation of 
the penal regime of isolation was itself rendered possible by the confinement of the 
prison movement within itself, and it was largely the withdrawal of the organizations 
from politics, and the illusive nature of the vanguard war adopted by them in prisons, that 
lay behind the scandalous negligence of the Death Fast. In their regard, the Death Fast, if 
not exemplary, was arguably no exception to the “narcissistic” manner of politics adopted 
by the organizations and the Left also castigated the organizations for their voluntarism in 
having firmly established self-sacrifice as a “norm”—a norm which had erased the 
distinction between sacrificiality and mere killability—with the result that the 
organizations, being enclosed within themselves, like brotherhoods (tarikat) and sects 
(mezhep), had become enthralled with death.211  
Violently polemical and full of rhetorical reversal, this is a critique in which the 
representation of the Death Fast seems to be finally indistinguishable from the rhetoric of 
the state officials. It is true that this hostility to the organizations on the part of socialist 
workers parties (Labor Party (EMEP), Socialist Power Party (SIP), and Freedom and 
Solidarity Party (ÖDP)) was hardly unexpected, for it was entirely consistent with their 
divergent, dissymmetrical political discourses throughout the whole of the preceding 
                                                
211 See Ayhan Özgür, “Ölümün Kutsanması ve Bir Ideolojik Hattın Çöküşü,” (Sacralization of Death and 
the Fall of an Ideological Line) in Özgürlük Dünyası, February 20, 2001 and Aydın Çubukçu, “Açmazdan 
Çıkmak” (Stepping out of the Impasse), in Evrensel, May 30, 2001. 
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decade; no one was surprised, therefore, least of all DHKP-C, which could only think of 
accusing the workers parties of being fearful of the violence of the state. 212 
Admittedly, this view of the Death Fast was not shared by all sections of the 
Turkish Left. Ömer Laçiner, in Birikim, for instance, though still deeply critical of the 
solipsistic closure of the illegal organizations as such, sought to give a sociological 
explanation.213 On his reading, 1980 was a watershed for the socialist struggle in Turkey; 
for in September that year the military coup had crushed the socialist movement and by 
the early 1990s, to all intents and purposes, the majority of the leftist groups had 
abandoned the armed struggle they had been pursuing, at different intervals, since the 
beginning of the 1970s, in favor of legal party and union activities. The post-1980 divide 
between legal parties and illegal organizations, though they pretended differently to their 
addressees, argued Laçiner, corresponded to a social divide which had partitioned the 
society into two irreconcilable camps. The illegal organizations recruited their members 
largely from disaffected youth in poor neighborhoods, who, sick and tired of the 
dejection and contempt of society, had turned to armed struggle in the desire to overcome 
what they saw as their entrapment in a state of “non-being” (hiçlik); indeed alongside 
their deep-seated anger, disgust with polite society, and hatred of police, what mainly 
                                                
212 DHKP-C’s polemical articles against the Left published throughout the Death Fast in their weekly 
Yaşadığımız Vatan are compiled in the book Büyük Direniş ve Sol (The Great Resistance and the Left). Ed. 
Ercan Kartal. Istanbul: Boran Yayınevi, 2011. For their responses to Ayhan Özgür and Aydın Çubukçu, see 
“Tüm Reformistlerin Avukatı EMEP I-II” (The Advocate of All Reformists EMEP I-II), “Direniş ve Akıllı 
Sol” (Resistance and the Clever Left), “Solun En ‘Akıllı Komünisti’ Aydın Çubukçu Konuşuyor” (The 
Most ‘Clever Communist’ Aydın Çubukçu is Speaking), and “Nasıl Akıllı Komünist Olunur? Evrensel 
Okuyun” (How to Become a Clever Communist? Read Evrensel), pp. 160-177; 184-201; 262-267; 293-
295; 302-306. 
 
213 See Ömer Laçiner, “Hayata Dönüş!” (Return to Life!), Birikim, no. 142-143, February-March, 2001, pp. 
10-16. It is also instructive to look at his article on the 1996 Death Fast to trace the development of his 
position. “Ölüm Oruçları’nın Ardından Derin Sessizlik,” (Deep Silence After the Death Fasts) Birikim, no. 
88, August 1996, pp. 3-8. 
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distinguished these youth was their readiness to undertake violent acts that demanded of 
them their own self-destruction.  
Though understandable, Laçiner argued, in the context of a capillary and yet 
invisible social confinement, this mode of violence had nonetheless severely hollowed 
out the role of armed struggle within liberation and socialist movements. Armed struggle 
here no longer targeted critical centers of infrastructure and key figures of authority in 
order to effect a political hiatus; it instead concerned itself only with the mere auxiliaries 
of power in murderous revenge with policemen, and in this respect, the organizations had 
constrained armed struggle within a certain political, ideological and existential closure, a 
closure in relation to which violence had begun to operate as a simple posture of 
negation, a negation which only negated their state of exclusion.214 So, however much 
this mode of violence was legitimized as a defense of the future of the people against the 
repressive violence of the state, it did not go beyond a mere revolt and, what is more, it 
was a revolt against the entire society as though the cause of their ignominy and misery 
could be attributed to everyone and no one. And though Laçiner went on to argue that 
this posture of revolt reached its apotheosis in self-destruction insofar as the purity of the 
act decidedly depended on the willed embrace of death, he was still obliquely critical, by 
his very sociological emphasis, of at least some of the analysis put forward by the 
                                                
214 In her reading of the Death Fast, Banu Bargu (2008) radicalizes this posture of negation to the point of 
affirming it as an act of absolute refusal. However, the purity of this refusal is arguably far less radical than 
her analytic requires. To the extent that the violence of refusal, by interrupting politics, offers itself up as 
the foundation and beginning for a new politics, it inevitably always already forms part of that new politics; 
the act of revolt turns retrospectively into an act of foundation and the act of refusal becomes an act of 
assertion. What at one stage may be construed as a pure interruption of politics, then, necessarily runs the 
risk of turning out to have been only an impure episode in politics.  
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socialist workers parties. 215 For he suggested that the failure to think of the question of 
social transformation except in terms of the act of refusal and to conceive of violence not 
in relation to the transformation of social relations, as a Marxist politics would do, but by 
recourse to that, despite the strenuous efforts of the organizations to make it appear 
otherwise, it was difficult to understand in any other way than a mere “reactivity”, was 
itself the symptom of a social and political predicament. On the one hand, Laçiner rightly 
pointed out that the violent, visceral act of refusal was the consequence and the sign of 
the incapacity of the organizations to command the economic and techno-scientific 
machinery that had pushed a large section of the population into the margins of society 
only to stifle them beneath a rigid and oppressive surveillance; and on the other, what 
was clearly at stake here, in Laçiner’s view, was the future of a socialist politics which 
had lost its “creative and critical impetus.” Thus, the question that came to dominate the 
whole of the thinking with regard to the Death Fast, beyond the legitimacy or illegitimacy 
of its violence, on the part of the Left, was the more radical question of the survival of a 
decaying or even a dead politics. Indeed, it was clearly to reinforce this point, though it 
had to be voiced more discreetly than ever before, that the Leftist critics of the Death Fast 
misrepresented idealization as a fetishization of death and it may be argued that they were 
in a certain respect right to confound ideality with death insofar as death is another name 
for the mere reproduction of the code of community. 
                                                
215 It is also important to note here that there are serious allegations against the leading organization of the 
Death Fast that it was subcontracted by the intelligence services in the war against the PKK (Workers’ 
Party of Kurdistan). Such collusion with centers of power of course seriously casts into question the 
discourse of the organization that attributes a great value to the absolute, categorical refusal of the political 
order. This is not to say that the purity of political action is not a much more complex question at the level 
of the individual. 
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This dissertation, though responding still to the same question, took a very 
different approach. What I defended in the dissertation was not a dialectic of negation 
and affirmation, death and freedom, but a persistently double logic which found in the 
very movement of the Death Fast the simultaneous constitution and dissolution of the 
community. Accordingly, I dramatized how the death faster, in exposing him or herself to 
his or her “own” inappropriable death, far from recollecting him or herself in an 
imaginary wholeness, remained imprisoned within his or her act of opening with the 
result that the sovereignty of the subject gave way in my representation to the radical 
dissolution of the subject.  In this, of course, I was doing nothing extraordinary, save 
perhaps to demonstrate the paradox of a sovereign posture which gave rise to an 
existence without a past and a future endlessly repeating a vanishing present. And this 
accentuation of the rupture in inheritance was admittedly a form of hyperbole, but an 
affirmative one, which exaggerated the destructive force of the Death Fast to make a 
discreet gesture towards an emergent subject: “Someone”, in the words of E., who “can 
imagine another way of struggling against the system, imagine another way of being, 
imagine being somewhere else.” Unrecognizable to him or herself, belonging to no 
language and nowhere, he or she is still in search of a community, and it is in response to 
this infinitely distant and infinitely close “someone”, that Writing of Death, after all, was 
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